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THE

CALCUTTA REVIEW

An Illustrated Monthly

Established 1844



THIRD SERIES

Volume XXXII

JULY—SEPTEMBER

1929



PUBLISHED BY

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

CRCU 643(1)

First Series	...	...	*1844*
New Series	...	...	*1913*
Third Series (Monthly)		...	*1921*

GS 2154



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THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

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THE SYSTEM OF EDUCATION IN GERMANY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE STUDIES OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES

II

The highest form of educational institutions are the so-called "Hochschulen" that is universities, polytechnica and so on.

The oldest German universities were founded during the Middle Ages: they are Prague (1348), Vienna (1365), Heidelberg (1386), Leipzig (1409), Rostock (1419); besides these which still exist—Prague and Vienna at present of course outside the political frontiers of Germany—some others had been founded, which have ceased to exist for various reasons. The universities were originally institutes under the influence of the clergy and of an international character, which can be seen from the fact they used the Latin language. The outward forms of the constitution as the division into faculties, etc., have remained until this day. Renaissance and reformation brought about many changes. In some German states it was found necessary to found universities whose chief aim it was to train young men for the civil service, as for instance in Marburg (1527), Königsberg (1544), Jena (1558), to mention the most important ones which still remain. The inner difficulties of Germany, the 30 years' war, the general

impoverishment consequent thereon brought about a very hard time for the universities. This explains that many of the greatest German scholars of the time, *e.g.*, Leibniz, were no university-professors, and that science was cultivated chiefly outside the universities in academies and scientific societies, where these men found more genial work.

Under the sway of the rationalistic ideas of the 18th century the universities shaped their life in many ways differently. We can name as landmarks the foundation of the universities at Halle (1694) and Göttingen (1737). Here the liberty of teaching and study broke through the old custom and German became the language of teaching. Halle had the great professors Thomasius (law), Francke (theology), Wolff (philosophy); Göttingen became the mother of New-Humanism, which placed the knowledge of antiquity on a new basis. A new epoch was marked by the foundation of the university in Berlin (1809) under the auspices of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Fichte, and Schleiermacher. The characteristic feature of this period is the abolishment of antiquated forms retained from mediæval times and the active help of the state especially as regards finances. After the model of Berlin the universities of Bonn (1818) and Munich (1826) were founded, the other ones reorganised in the same fashion to remain on a par with the others. One of the chief causes of the outward development was that they were free from more elementary teaching, which the schools took over from the task of the philosophical faculty. In modern times some new universities were added, shortly before the war (Frankfurt) and after the war (Cologne and Hamburg); the university of Strassburg has become French by the peace of Versailles. To-day there are 23 universities in Germany ; none of them is under the control of the "Reich," but every one belongs to one of the various states composing it. Prussia has 12 universities : Berlin, Bonn, Breslau, Frankfurt, Göttingen, Greifswald, Halle, Kiel, Köln, Königsberg, Marburg and Münster; Bavaria has 3 : Erlangen, München and Würzburg;

Baden 2 : Freiburg and Heidelberg. The other greater states each have one : Saxony : Leipzig; Thuringia : Jena; Hesse : Giessen; Württemberg : Tübingen; Mecklenburg : Rostock, and Hamburg : Hamburg. The management of all these universities belongs to the ministries of the states to which they belong. The circumstance that the different universities belong to various countries has done much good in so far, that they thus became independent of certain doctrinal opinions which were supported by one or the other state.

The freedom of science is kept intact also by the fact that the universities are possessed of a far-reaching self-government. The chief of a university is the "rector." He is generally elected for one year from the number of ordinary professors by the professors themselves, and is confirmed by the government. The rector, who on festive occasions wears mediaeval robes, has great authority. He is aided in his official work by a body of professors, the so-called "senate."

The whole body of teachers of a university is divided into faculties. In most universities there are four of these : the theological faculty, the legal, the medical and the philosophical. As the philosophical faculty includes also philology, history, political economy and natural sciences, this is by far the largest of all. In some universities it has been therefore divided into several faculties : the philosophical faculty, the faculty of natural sciences, and the faculty of political economy. Except the new universities of Francfort, Hamburg and Cologne all universities embrace a faculty of theology. Most of them are Protestant, as the population in Germany is chiefly Protestant. Only Catholic theological faculties are in Freiburg, Munich and Würzburg. Bonn, Breslau, Münster and Tübingen each have a Catholic as well as a Protestant theological faculty.

Among the subjects taught in the Philosophical Faculties of German Universities, Oriental Philology is one of the most important. I say, most important, not because there are so many students of them—you will not expect that they are studied

by so many as law or medicine—but because the study of Oriental Languages is of vital importance for the future culture of the world. It was Friedrich Schlegel, the great German romantic poet, who in his book "On the Language and the Wisdom of the Indians," published in 1808, gave first expression to the opinion, that European and Asiatic literature, culture and history form an interconnected whole and have therefore to be studied equally. He said, "As in the world's history the Asiatics as well as the Europeans constitute one great family, Asia and Europe form one inseparable whole, thus one should always endeavour to comprise also the literature of all cultured nations in one continuous development and as an intimately connected edifice, as a great whole. Then many a one-sided and narrow view would disappear of itself, and everything would appear in a new light."

Oriental Languages were already taught at an early date in German Universities, because the study of the Bible required some knowledge of the Hebrew language. Though also other Oriental languages besides Hebrew were occasionly studied in Germany, it was only since the beginning of the 19th century that the interest in, and the study of, the languages and the cultures of the East became more and more prominent. To-day in every one of the 22 German universities lectures on several Oriental languages are delivered in every sementer. Generally Oriental languages are classified in 3 groups. The first comprise the Semitic and Islamic languages, *viz.*, Hebrew, Assyrian, Syrian, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, etc.; the second group comprises the Aryan languages of Persia and India; the third group comprises the languages of the Far East, as Chinese, Japanese, also Tibetan, etc. In the greater Universities there is almost at least one Professor of every of these three groups, sometimes there are also several Professors and "Privatdozenten" who deal with the same subject. In the smaller Universities almost everywhere Islamic and Aryan Philology are represented.

The Indo-Aryan languages met with an interest already at the beginning of the 19th century, as the words of Friedrich Schlegel have shown. The first Sanskrit-chair in Germany was founded in 1818 ; the first Sanskrit Professor was August Wilhelm Schlegel. Formerly the Professors of Indian Philology were at the same time also Professors of Comparative Philology ; now the two branches of science have become so extended that scarcely one man may be able to master both of them; therefore there are now special Chairs of Comparative Philology.

As the former union of Aryan and Comparative Philology shows, German scholars formerly were chiefly occupied with investigations of the primordial so-called Indo-Teutonic language as with the study of Vedic and Classical Sanskrit. Later on also the study of Pali and Prakrits was taken up, but almost all scholars had made only ancient India, that is to say Hindu and Buddhist India up to the Mohammedan Conquest, the subject of their studies.

To-day, in my opinion, it is to be the task of German-Indian Philology to extend the aims. We should not only deal with Veda and Epics, with the scriptures of the Jains and Buddhists, with Sanskrit poetry and philosophy, but also with the literature and culture of modern India. Tulsîdâs and Sûrdâs, Ghalib and Iqbâl, Premânand and Dayârâm, Nândev and Tukârâm, Kîrttivâs and Dwijendralal Roy are not less worth to be studied than the poets who wrote in Sanskrit or Prakrit ; Kabîr and Nânak, Râmmohan Roy and Dayânand Saraswati deserve to be studied as exponents of the religious thought of India as well as the Âchâryas of the past; the history of the Rajputs and the Marâthas is as important as that of the kings of by-gone days. To-day India is re-awakening as a nation, she is gaining greater influence in the world day by day. It must be therefore the aim of German Indology to devote its labours as well to the India of to-day as to that of the past. I hope that the study of modern Indian languages and of the fine literature they have produced will find in future more followers than

before. Doubtless, it is the duty of science to unearth the past, but the *raison d'etre* of the study of antiquity must always be to make us understand the present. In the same way as modern European Philosophy and literature are expounded to Indians by prominent Indian Professors in Indian Universities, also the religious life and the poetry of present India should be dealt with by competent scholars. This would help greatly to eradicate many prejudices and misconceptions on India still powerful in the West, and this would lead to a greater understanding between East and West.

Having dealt with the position of the study of Oriental Languages in German Universities, I turn now to an account of the way in which in German Universities the Professors renew their number.

If any one has the intention to take up the academical career, he must first pass his doctor's degree. For this purpose he must write a scientific dissertation which is criticised by the Professor of the branch in question and who is sometimes helped by a "co-referrent." If the dissertation has been accepted, *viva voce* examination has to be passed. The demands requested by the various faculties and Universities vary. I myself for instance was examined in Bonn in my chief branch, Sanskrit philology for one hour, in the two minor branches, Philosophy and Comparative History of Religions for three quarters of an hour each. The actual promotion for the degree follows later on after the dissertation has been printed. The promotion is attended by great solemnity in some Universities; formerly disputations took place at which the candidates had to defend some theses against opponents. To-day the formalities are much simpler and during the War the obligatory printing of the dissertations has been abandoned in many cases. When the young scholar has passed his degree, he has to pursue his scientific studies for two or three years, until he can begin his career as a University teacher. The permission to give lectures (venia legendi)

at a university he obtains when his faculty allows him to "habilitate himself" as it is called. For the habilitation it is necessary to write a scientific dissertation again. If this has been accepted the candidate has to hold a trial lecture and has to pass a colloquium before the faculty. This is in many cases a matter of form, but can also assume the shape of a severe examination, which the candidate may not pass. After the first trial lecture and the colloquium before the faculty a new lecture has to be held before the students. When all this has taken place, the habilitation is considered as finished. The scholar is now "Privatdozent." As the name implies he has the permission to hold lectures but he remains a private gentleman and has no claims on the state. For his lectures he receives the fees paid by the students, but these are very moderate, because the "Privatdozenten" have generally very few hearers. A Privatdozent receives no salary from the Government. This has its good and its bad sides. For the university and the state it is of course a great advantage, because they get in this way a new teacher for nothing. The Privatdozent also gains some advantage, in so far that he keeps his own independence. Regarded from an economical side the want of a salary is a great disadvantage for the "Privatdozent." If he does not belong to the few who have a private fortune, or can get assistance by well-off relations, he is forced to look after a position which will bring him enough to live on. Only a small part of the "Privatdozenten" can be employed in scientific institutes or as librarians; most of them must endeavour to get a position in an industrial firm, as a lawyer, as a medical man, as a writer, and so on. This of course is for many a great hardship. Under the pressure brought on by the war and the time of inflation, the call has been raised louder and louder for a salary to be given by the Government to the "Privatdozenten." The Government has not listened to this demand, and as I think for good reasons and quite justly. If they really received a salary, naturally the number of privatdozenten would be limited and

the number of appointments would be arranged according to necessity. At the same time the independence of scientific research would suffer, because in that case the Government would simply refuse to appoint men who do not suit them. The quality of science is no doubt better taken care of under the present conditions. These difficulties may be solved differently by bestowing scholarships on them, or by giving them a sort of commission to hold lectures on a certain subject. By this his living is assured, without his becoming a civil servant. This system has been further advanced lately inspite of the financial difficulties of the state ; it is to be hoped that it will be furthered on a still larger scale, as otherwise it will be difficult to find men in the rising generation who will enter a scientific career.

The geting of the "venia legendi" in no way means the right to acquire a professorship ; in all universities there are some men who have not succeeded in attaining a higher position. The appointment for a new professorial chair is done in the following way. The faculty makes up a list on which it names three persons which it regards as possible candidates for the position of the professor who by death or by taking up a new position has produced the vacancy. The minister of education selects whom he thinks fit ; in some case it has occurred that the minister appoints some one who is not named by the faculty ; this may have been right in some cases but it has also caused trouble between the minister and the faculty. All the professors are appointed for life. When they have reached a certain age (68 or 70 years) they relinquish their office, that is to say, they retain their salary, but are no longer obliged to deliver lectures or to perform administrative duties. There are several grades of professors in Germany, "ordentliche," "ausserordentliche," "Honorar-Professor," *i.e.*, ordinary, extraordinary and honorary professors. Whilst formerly the ordinary professors alone had seat and place in the senate, now the extraordinary professors and the "Privatdozenten" also have representatives in the faculty.

As there is perfect freedom to teach in the German universities, so there is every freedom to choose what sort of lectures one wishes to attend. Everyone who has obtained the right to study at the university by passing the final examination of a higher school or by acquiring the right of a hearer as a sort of guest, may attend every lecture he likes. The students enjoy liberty in every way. They can choose which university they like, they don't live in colleges but where they like ; their attendance at the lectures is under no control ; there are only very few intermediary examinations, there is no point-system. The scheme of studies is only sketched in broad lines and the time required for the study is unlimited. On an average we may assume that a time of 8-10 semesters will be sufficient to pass the examination. The two semesters by which the academical year is divided, are from the 15th of April to the end of July and from November to February. The winter-semester is broken by 14 days' Christmas-holidays, the summer-semester by one week Pentecost-holidays. In this way half the year is occupied by lectures, the rest is taken up by vacations. During the first year after the war, between the two semesters there were inserted " intermediate semesters" to enable former participators in the war to study more quickly. As a permanent arrangement this raising of the number of semesters during the academical year has not been retained, luckily, as a further increase of lectures and courses would be of no good either to the professor nor to the students, and would hinder the thorough working-through of the lectures in question.

The great freedom which German students enjoy has developed itself during the course of the centuries. It finds its expression in the right of the students to form corporations among themselves. In the middle-ages professors and students, hailing from the same home, formed societies, called "nations," which had special rights reserved to them. Later on these societies were limited to the non-graduated, so that they became only

student-corporations, the so-called "Landsmannschaften." Since 1815 besides the "Landsmannschaften" there appeared a new kind of corporation, the "Burschenschaften," which stood up for the ideal of a united Germany during the time of the internal dissensions and played a great political part. About 1820 a third kind of corporation was formed, the "Corps." All these kinds of corporations still exist but they are now only societies which do not insist on the members being of one territory. They are all similar in this respect that they uphold certain customs at the "Kneipen" and "Mensuren." Besides these corporations, whose members bear coloured caps and bands across their chest, there are others who accept no challenge to a duel, at the Catholic societies, founded in 1848, or the "Wingolf," since 1844. Besides these, there are also singing societies, gymnastic societies, societies with scientific purposes, and so on. The students who wear colours play a great part in the smaller Universities ; in the greater towns they are less noticed, where other interests overshadow them. These students' corporations are a speciality of Germany ; though many drawbacks may be ascribed to them, their power to educate has been amply proved.

The students of the German Universities own according to the new reforms a far-reaching self-administration. All regularly matriculated students of a German University, German subjects as well as those of German extraction, in Austria, Czechoslovacia, and so on, form the "Studentenschaft," *i.e.*, "studentry" of this University. Their interests are looked after by elected representatives. The studentry has established committees for sports, for recommendation of lodgings, for work, and so on. These committees are of great importance to-day, as many students are obliged to earn their livelihood in all kinds of ways. This is a great problem. During the time of inflation it has been shown that many of these students could not bear the double strain and devote their time with equal energy to their studies and to

a practical profession. In trying to combine the two, both suffer. Many kinds of ways have been tried to alter this. Before the war things were simpler. At that time there were so many exhibitions, that almost every fifth student got support in that way. Of the students of theology almost the half (47 %) were provided in this manner. The greatest number of these exhibitions which partly were very old, have lost all value through the inflation.

The studentries of the different Universities of Germany, Austria, and German Czechoslovacia are united in the organisation of the so-called " Deutsche Studentenschaft " which meets annually in summer.

The " Technische Hochschulen," *i.e.*, the technical institutions occupy the same standing as the Universities now. These are establishments which prepare young men who desire a leading part in industry, manufactures, and so on. As technical studies have gained only lately the same position as the sciences, the technical institutions in Germany are of more recent date. They have almost all been developed from lower technical establishments. The impulse given by the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris was decisive to show the way. The oldest technical high-school in Germany is that in Braunschweig (Bruńswick) which has risen out of the Collegium Carolinum founded in 1745 by the Duke Charles I. To-day there are 10 technical high-schools in Germany which were almost all founded during the last 50 years. They are: in Prussia: Aachen, Berlin, Breslau, Hannover ; in Bavaria: Munich ; in Württemberg ; Stuttgart ; in Saxony: Dresden ; in Hesse: Darmstadt ; in Baden: Karlsruhe ; in Braunschweig : Braunschweig. Their organisation is similar to that of the Universities. In 1922 the different branches have been remodelled according to their relationship as faculties. In this way the following faculties were formed: general sciences, architecture, machines (including electrotechnics and shipbuilding) and raw products (including chemistry, mining, etc.).

For academical instruction in the branches of veterinary, surgery, agriculture, forestry, and commerce, there are special institutions as the " Tierärztliche Hochschule," " Landwirtschaftliche Hochschule " and so on. The privileges and rights of these institutions are not yet fixed ; for instance the Commercial Schools have obtained the right to confer doctor's degrees only lately.

The Universities, technical institutions, and so on, have formed a union called " Verband der deutschen Hochschulen " which is to look after their interests ; a great meeting is held annually.

Besides these institutions there are others which teach only special branches. For instance in Düsseldorf there is an Academy for practical medicine in which students of medicine and dental surgery who have passed their first examination are trained for the final examination. For the instruction in art and music there exist a number of institutions, which in our time have in many ways been assimilated to the Universities.

A new foundation is the "Akademie der Arbeit " (Academy for labour) established in 1921 in Francfort. It receives as pupils workmen, employees of all kinds, and lower clerks, who are sent there by the trade unions, that they may be instructed on the important questions in politics, economy, sociology, and labour law. The course lasts 9 months. The teachers are mostly taken from the University of Francfort.

The so-called " Volkshochschulen " (popular Universities) are to look after for the spread of knowledge on a large scale among the people. Ideas of this kind have been endeavoured to be realised since the middle of the last century in various ways. The Protestant and the Catholic Churches have founded in the " evangelische Arbeiter-vereine " (Evengelical Workmen's Unions") and " katholische Gesellen-vereine " (Catholic Journeymen's Societies) organisations of confessionally-tinted instruction. The liberal and social-democratic educational societies, which appeared during the last quarter of the 19th

century, followed similar aims as the confessional unions, only they propagated different ideals. Besides these there were others that proclaimed absolute neutrality in religious and political matters, and tried to transmit a wide range of learning by way of single lectures. Since the war the interest for such institutions has grown largely and "Volkshochschulen" have come up everywhere. These owe their existence all to private initiative ; but the state has shown its interest in these institutions, which are not meant only for workmen but for all classes of society, by arranging courses for the teachers of "Volkshochschulen." In these courses, which last about 8 or 14 days the theoretical and practical problems of the "Volkshochschulen" are discussed. So the danger of superficiality, which may easily creep in such establishments, may be avoided and the education of good teachers may be safeguarded. During the last years a number of them have disappeared again, the cause of which is that after the war too many of them had been founded, which did not command the necessary financial funds. Another reason is the enormous development of broad-casting that transmits instruction cheaply and easily.

I have endeavoured to give you an idea of German education and to show you how it seeks to give instruction to every one, to assist them in the hard struggle of life. We have seen what the new reform has undertaken, to found a uniform base, above which superstructures are erected to give room for all kinds of instruction. The whole, which may be compared to a sky-scraper, reaching so to say from the earth to the sky, contains galleries everywhere which free every stage from its isolation and bring it in lively contact with all the others. The building is not yet finished and furnished in all parts ; nor can we tell at present whether all that the reforms of the last years have brought, will fulfil the promises expected of them. But the aim towards which education strives is clear and in conformity with the social ideas of our time ;

every individual person shall be furthered in his education so far, that he may fill his place in his profession and also as a useful member of society. The variety of abilities and intelligence makes an extraordinary number of ways of education necessary. The divergences in the mode of education is much larger by far than what I have mentioned here, because here I could only enumerate the most important institutions, which are under the control of the state, but I have not spoken of the many tentative experiments which were undertaken privately with a view to obtain the same or better results.

Two things are necessary to reach the goal: Firstly, everyone must get the education suited to his abilities, so as to make the most of them. The highly-gifted is hampered if he has no chance to unfold his talents, whilst the less-gifted receives no real advantage by having a lot of matter drummed into his brain which goes far beyond his capacity. Therefore a careful selection of the gifted and the ungifted must be made somehow with all the help that modern psychology can give us.

Secondly, education must take care that what is taught does not remain a dead matter. Education must remain close to the sources and problems of our life, it must always keep an outlook for the whole. Therefore useless smattering of many things and superficial half-knowledge must be avoided as well as the breeding of specialists who do not see beyond the limits of their narrow little speciality. Life and knowledge, special and universal education, must be intermixed so that they give mutual help to each other and give new life to each other. This harmony cannot be realised by the best schemes or theories but it is chiefly dependent on the quality of the teachers. We Germans have had the good fortune in the long course of our history to have among us a great number of great educationalists who led the people to higher aims; let us hope that they may have successors who will bring enthusiasm and ability to fulfil their work.

All true education has its roots in nationality. The remembrance of it is the great source of power from which a people drinks health and youth. A full conception of its mission in the world a nation can only acquire if it also studies the characteristic features of other nations and strives continually to adopt what it sees good in others. Not hermetic seclusion of one nation against the others but only working together of all can produce the raising of the universal culture of mankind. I am thankful therefore that my stay in this country enables me to become acquainted with Indian institutions which may be useful to serve as model for my country and to open connections that may prove very valuable for the work of our German science. India and its achievements in the world of thought has since the days of Goethe and Schopenhauer found especial interest in the best of our greatest mind. Let me close these remarks by giving utterance to the hope that the cultural relations between India and Germany may become more and more intimate in the future and that an exchange of the experiences made in education may prove a great boon for our two nations.

HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP

THE CEYLON UNIVERSITY COMMISSION REPORT

A Critical Survey

Genesis of the Riddel Commission.

It has been for a long time admitted that higher education in Ceylon is far from being quite satisfactory. Though elementary and secondary education is carried on the most efficient lines, students who have real interest in higher education are severely handicapped owing to a combination of reasons. In the first place, the University College in Colombo which trains over three hundred under-graduates for the external examinations of the University of London, is not adequate for the needs of Ceylon, and it may even be said that not only in the meagre number of under-graduates trained but also in the variety of Faculies in force, it is far from satisfying the just aspirations of the forward youth of Ceylon. In the second place, such of the courageous souls who, taking advantage of the University of London which, as Professor Coueslant writes in the Calcutta Review of August 1928, " allows external students to obtain its degrees by merely passing examinations, mostly on paper " without any recognised course of University training, appear for those external examinations which require no Laboratory training, do often have to pursue blind alleys and their attempts are honoured more by failure than by success. In the third place, even the students who are descended from plutocratic families who will not grudge spending much in English Universities, have of late found it difficult and increasingly difficult to get admission into them and are thereby deprived of a chance to forge a brilliant career in the island or elsewhere. And lastly, the intelligentsia of Ceylon have found that there is really an inconsistency in boys having to depend for anything and everything upon the University curriculum and examinations whether of Cambridge or of London. These,

however perfect they may be at the places where they originate, when once transplanted without due regard to local conditions and applicability, are bound to lose their colour and assume a grotesque if not a meaningless form. For all these reasons educationists here began seriously to consider the inauguration of a University at the earliest possible date.

With this very laudable objective the Legislative Council voted a substantial sum to be used for the future University of Ceylon and thanks to the machinery of interest that sum has now accumulated to over five million rupees. Last year the next step in the matter was taken by the Legislative Council when it proceeded to a discussion of the site question which has ever since been pursued with vehemence and at times with a vituperative display only to be equalled by the similar controversy about the headquarters of the Andhra University. The two sites which had the privilege to be in the limelight of discussion are the Buller's Road site and the Dhumbara Valley site near Kandy. It is impossible for one who has no intimate knowledge of the country and one who does not make the least pretence to any thorough study of the subject to have the courage of his conviction to say who is wrong and who is right. So then, after all these months of intent watching of the many and varied turns this controversy has taken in the press and on the platform, one is led to that stale and yet most true of all platitudes—much may be said on both sides of the question. It will therefore suffice, if it be said, that after prolonged and what seemed at that time to be never-ending discussions a resolution at last emerged from out of the net of amazing amendments and long-drawn-out deliberations: plainly put the Ceylon University Commission which has recently issued its report was a child of that resolution. The question of site was not to be reopened and the express terms of reference of that Commission were that it should submit a "complete and detailed scheme" for establishing a University at Kandy in accordance with the resolution passed in the Legislative Council,

The Personnel of the Commission.

When the announcement of the University Commission was made it was greeted on all sides as being sufficiently comprehensive to be representative in character and efficient in substance. The Government was especially fortunate in securing the valuable services of Sir Walter Buchanan-Riddel, Principal of Hertford College, Oxford, as Chairman of the Commission. As " The Ceylon Daily News " remarked in its editorial of 29th January, 1929 : " The presence of one of his ability at the head of the Commission has led to the issue of a wonderfully concise report in which the multifarious problems connected with the establishment of the future University are discussed with sympathy, understanding and expert knowledge. Among the twenty or more others who constituted the Commission were the Director of Education, Mr. M. T. Akbar, the then acting Attorney General, Prof. Marrs of the University College, Sir Marcus Fernado, and Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan, the veteran Knight and educationist of Jaffna.

The Report.

The report of the University Commission was published as a sessional paper on 28th January, 1929, and was instantly recognised to be a masterly document, whatever may be the defects of specific portions of the report. Even " The Ceylon Independent " the acknowledged champion of the Colombo site called it " a scholarly report embodying many valuable recommendations." One certainly cannot say that it is absolutely an unanimous report : but it must be conceded to the merit of the Commission that a fair and workable amount of unanimity has been achieved in the report. Out of the twenty-four signatories to the report as many as eleven, including the Chairman, have appended their dissents or notes or riders as the case may be, some of a trivial nature but others of a

more far-reaching character. Whatever may be the financial soundness of the proposals, there is no doubt that if the recommendations are carried to the letter the Kandy University will justify the sacrifices made by the country on its behalf " by gaining recognition among the universities of the world as a ' corporation of learning ' effective in advancing knowledge and promoting truth." That is a consummation indeed devoutly to be wished and that is exactly the reason why the Commission unequivocally point out that the inauguration of the University should not be deferred to a distant date but that a start can and ought to be made within five years. They realise indeed that it will take a prolonged period extending to nearly ten years before all the University buildings are constructed but " as it is clear that it would be uneconomical if the buildings first finished at Kandy were to stand empty and unoccupied...until the whole scheme was completed," they urge that the start should be made within five years. It is too early yet to say whether the Government will carry out these recommendations, especially since from the publication of the report educationists and politicians have ranged themselves again into those dreary camps ready for another wordy battle on the question of sites. Be that as it may, we shall take one after another the main recommendations of the report and offer our own remarks about the same.

Salient Features.

The Site Question : What has the Report to say about it.

Sir Walter Riddel when interviewed by a representative of " the Ceylon Daily News " prior to his departure from the island remarked : " The terms of reference state quite clearly that the Commission were to work out a scheme for the establishment of a University according to the resolution of the Council. We have had no option about that and no discussion.....All we had the power to do, if we thought it

necessary, was to recommend minor modifications of the site and that we have done." The Commission have recommended the extension of the present site by the acquisition of two adjoining areas so as to give scope for the utmost expansion of the proposed University.

About the suitability or not of Kandy as the University headquarters, the Commission's report is silent. It remains still for us to examine seriously the contention of "The Ceylon Independent" voiced forth in its leader of January 30th: "The Report of the Commission is the greatest condemnation we have yet read of the Kandy scheme." As against this almost fantastic contention "The Ceylon Daily News" declared in its leader of the same date: "Not one line, not one sentence could be found to support the view that the Commission found the Kandy site undesirable or unsuitable." Between these two extreme views it seems to be a safe conclusion that had the Commission really been averse to the Kandy site, though it might have nonetheless recommended a more or less equivalent University scheme, it would never have been so very sanguine in its expectations of the future of a University which they know full well is constructed on a false basis. Therefore one may suppose that the Commission as a body were not against the Kandy site, though individual members might very well have been. Nay, one may even go further and suppose that the Commission were neither against it nor for it: they thought that the merits of the two sites were well poised and as already the Council had decided one way, looked upon it as the best solution of the problem.

The Type: Unitary and Residential. Halls of Residence.

One of the most fascinating chapters in the report is that dealing with the restrictions to be imposed on undergraduates in accordance with the requirements of "a residential university." The Commission point out that two distinct interpreta-

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tions have been foisted upon the term " residential university" and have arrived at a halfway house between these two in their recommendations on this all-important matter. The phrase as understood in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge will require that each undergraduate shall reside in the hostels maintained by the University for a certain or the whole period of their University education with a view to affording maximum opportunities of corporate life and intellectual co-operation between individuals varying over a wide range in race, abilities and prejudices. Some of the Indian Universities notably the Benares Hindu University, have tried as far as possible to reproduce something of the kind of life above pictured. But as the Commission remark, the term in its broader use merely implies "a system under which undergraduate members are required to reside for a specified period within a prescribed radius of the University." The Kandy University is to conform to the latter interpretation of the term although in order to include the best of the former mode of life the report recommends, " that every undergraduate should normally be required to reside in a Hall of Residence (or Hostel) throughout his University career." The word ' normally ' and indeed the remarks that follow in the Report suggest sufficient elasticity in the application of the rule to include undergraduates who could conform to the restriction dictated by the broader interpretation of the term. One is very happy to see the very safe and sane compromise arrived at.

A not less important question and one the proper solution of which will tend to the progress of the University is the institution or otherwise of denominational Hostels. But here the Commission are placed on the horns of a dilemma. They realise that " one of the most valuable functions of a University should be to mitigate such divisions whether of race, of religion or caste." To allow denominational hostels to be introduced will be to leave the door open for the accentuation of religious differences and the march of separatist and communal

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tendencies. Strongly as are the Commission impressed by the force of the above arguments, they have yet to face the cold facts with reference to education in Ceylon. As they pertinently remark: "It is incontrovertible that the Government of Ceylon by long established policy recognises and pays grants to denominational schools and colleges of all grades." So much so there are purely Hindu schools and colleges, Buddhist schools and colleges, and Christian schools and colleges of all sects and of all missions. In some cases in big Hindu colleges not even one Christian student may be learning. Communal differences are sharp even in education which ought to be the least communal in character.

Difficult though the problem was, this has been solved in the nature of a sound compromise in a statesmanlike manner. Under the scheme there are to be denominational hostels (or "Halls of Residence" as the Commission choose to call them) for the four major communities, *viz.*, one each for the Hindu, Buddhist, Roman Catholic, and Non-Roman Catholic Christian communities. But the Commission have recourse to the second best in ensuring that the four denominational hostels shall be under the complete control of the University itself and not under the Superintendence of individual communal organisations. The University authorities shall pick up four of the Wardens of the Halls of Residence from the four communities while the other wardens shall be appointed without denominational considerations. Under this system those who want to lead separatist lives may do so; while those belonging to the four major communities as also the members of the Muslim and other minority communities may have their residences presided over by wardens appointed without regard to communal considerations provided they have a cosmopolitan outlook. It might indeed be objected, as the Commission are fully aware of, that even this formal recognition of communal differences would be "a partial surrender of the University ideal." Yet this is the best the Commis-

sion could be expected to do under the existing circumstances.

The Constitution.

The Constitution proposed by the Commission is modelled on the constitutions of the various Universities of the world. The provision that the governor of the island should be the Chancellor *ex-officio* and should function as the one main link between the Government and the University will hardly sound strange to Indian ears. The Pro-Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor are prototypes of similar officers in most Indian Universities. The Vice-Chancellor is to receive a salary of Rs. 36,000 per annum. The supreme governing body of the University is to be the Court which should represent the University, the Government and the Public. The Council will be the executive body of the University and will perform the functions of the Syndicate of some Indian Universities, *e.g.*, the Madras University. The Senate is to be the principal academic body and shall be responsible "for education, instruction, and examinations." It seems to be more or less another edition of the Academic Council of the Madras University. About the Faculties, General Board of Studies and Research, and the offices of Registrar and Treasurer, it is enough to remark that there is nothing novel in the recommendations. It should however be taken note that in emphasising the value of the library in a University they justly remark: "It (the library) is, in the common phrase, the laboratory of the Arts student in particular and it would be important for the university to secure the services of a man possessed of wide literary interests and trained in the special technique of library administration." Let us hope that the government will pay due attention to the suggestion contained in the above statement.

Buildings of the University: Kandyan Style.

The imperative need for imposing buildings that would inspire and evolve an atmosphere conducive to the fostering of high ideals of University life is the keynote of the Commission's recommendations on the buildings to be constructed for the University. They have done just the right thing in recommending that the Library block which should provide for 60,000 volumes with reading accommodation for fifty readers should occupy the most central position in the site. One other recommendation too is interesting. In the matter of the construction of the Convocation Hall, the Commission seem to suggest the advisability of making it conform to the "general characteristics of the architecture indigenous to Kandy." And about the six Halls of Residence they favour architectural individuality for each of these rather than six several editions of the same building indistinguishable anyway. They also recommend the choice of an architect, preferably from the Royal Institute of British architects to be in charge of the building operations and rule out choice of architects on a basis of competition as thoroughly unsatisfactory and derogatory to the best interests of the University.

The Faculties.

The choice of faculties to be established at the outset in the University being the first of the questions arising out of the terms of reference, the Commission have bestowed much thought on this and have finally recommended the inclusion of the five faculties of Arts, Science, Law, Medicine, and Engineering. The Faculty of Arts should include the departments of English, Oriental languages, both classical and modern, European languages both classical and modern, Philosophy and Psychology, Education and Archaeology. It is significant that the department of Philosophy should embrace Hindu Philosophy

as connected with the study of Sanskrit and Tamil Literatures, Buddhist Philosophy as understood from the study of Pali, Sanskrit and Sinhalese literatures and Islamic philosophy as connected with the study of Arabic language and literature. The inclusion of the department of Archaeology is of considerable importance in as much as this will enable the University to make researches about the archaeological aspects of the famous remains at Anuradhapura and Pollanaruwa.

The Faculty of Science is to consist of the departments of Chemistry, Physics, Botany, Zoology, Physiology, Anatomy, Mathematics, Agriculture and, for women candidates only, Domestic Science. This is fairly comprehensive and when it is further stated in the report that there should be Honours courses in all the above subjects, one is fully justified if he expects good results from the University. There are to be Masters' degree in Science in which the candidates may offer any one of the above subjects with the exception of Agriculture. The really valuable additions to this Faculty are Agriculture and Domestic Science. There are people indeed in Ceylon who think that Agriculture should have constituted a Faculty in itself instead of being thus, as they consider, ignominiously shelved within another Faculty. But this surely is no argument. There is no reason *a priori* why sufficiently good work should not be done even under the present scheme. It is just those who love names for names' sake, who, like Langevin even in the very act of talking prose want to know what prose is, that would propose such ridiculous objections to such a valuable Report. The view is also held in very respectable quarters that provision for the teaching of Agriculture can far better be provided in Kandy owing to its proximity to the world-famed botanical gardens at Peredeniya than in Colombo.

As for the Faculty of Law, nothing definite is said in the Report. The only thing of importance is that the Council of Legal Education has been quite amenable to instituting Law as one of the Faculties and has also expressed its willingness to

accept the University Examinations as equivalent to their Law examinations except the final one.

The really serious divergence of opinion ranges round the Faculties of Engineering and Medicine. Not that any one thinks that the inclusion of the two faculties is unnecessary but many fear, and justly so, that better provision can be made for Engineering in Colombo. As regards the Faculty of Medicine, the Commission recommend a bifurcation of the course, one a preliminary course in Physiology, Organic Chemistry and Anatomy in Kandy and a three-year course in Medicine proper in Colombo. This became a virtue of necessity for the Commission who clearly understood that Colombo alone, with its Medical and Sanitary head-quarters will be the proper place to impart instruction in Medicine. A layman cannot and should not pass any dogmatic judgment on these things. However, it may be added that if only the University can honourably acquit itself in the discharge of these functions, in the teaching of these Sciences, there need not be any more wrigglings on this question. For after all nothing is more decisive than success.

The Vernacular Entrance Test.

One of the recommendations of the Report is :—" Both at the Entrance Examination and at subsequent stages of the degree course every candidate should be specially tested in English and every candidate of the Tamil race or Sinhalese race should be similarly tested in Tamil or Sinhalese language and literature." No one with a spark of national honour in him will deny that as an ideal suggestion it is very laudable but to make indiscriminate and rigorous application of this rule, even at the very earliest stages of the University, is fraught with consequences of a serious nature. And the force of this argument is brought home with added emphasis when it is realised how inefficient the teaching of vernaculars is in Ceylon schools. Ceylonese must certainly study their mother

tongues ; but it is advisable to grant some sort of a concession for a fixed period in the initial stages of the University, just sounding a note of warning to pupils who care not for their mother tongue. There is really point and pregnant sense in the contention of " The Daily News" which writes : " If the Ceylon University is not blindly to follow the path traced for it by the External Examinations of the London University and if it is to help to develop a culture native to the soil, it must insist on giving its proper place to the mother-tongue of the people."

Number of Under-graduates to be trained : the Staff.

Provision is to be made for 500 under-graduates to begin with. This number is not after all very much more than the number at present learning in the University College, Colombo. But then in the University there will be potentialities for considerable improvement and the variety and the scope of the courses in the Kandy University will be undoubtedly greater. In comparison with the 8,784 under-graduates of the London University this 500 is nowhere. But after all a beginning can only be a beginning. The teaching staff recommended includes 17 Professors with salary from Rs. 12,000 to 15,000 per annum, 6 Readers on Rs. 9,000 to 11,400, 26 Lecturers on Rs. 6,000 to 8,400, and 19 Assistant Lecturers on 3,600 to 5,400, bringing it all to a total of 68. There is every reason to hope that it will be a very efficient staff.

The Cost of the University.

The Commission fix the initial cost at over ten million rupees. They also calculate that the annual recurrent expenditure of the University would come to Rs. 1,230,000. They write : " The net additional cost over and above the present annual net expenditure on the University College would be approximately 5½ lakhs of rupees." Questioned by a press

correspondent Sir Walter Riddel remarked: "I cannot say what the country can afford at the present time but I have no doubt that it is better to have no University than to have a shoddy one." Universities are always expensive but there is no use in minimising expenditure by underpaying the staff or by ill-equipping the Laboratories and Library. In view of this the fantastic claim of "The Ceylon Independent"—"with four millions a start can be made in Colombo"—seems ridiculous to a degree. One wonders what sort of a start that start with four millions can be. There thus seems to be no weight in the argument of those persons who say that the establishment of a University at Kandy can at best be only a 'Luxury University' serving the interests of a few plutocratic families. Indeed University education is only for fortune's favoured few. But the few that receive University education at the expense of the country will surely repay with compound interest the good they have received. And moreover a University is a vital necessity to vindicate national honour and should never be looked upon as a money-yielding industry from the State's standpoint.

Conclusion.

The wages for the working of a University should not in Heaven's name be sought in terms of cut-and-dried maxims of profit and loss. The remuneration is rather in the shape of an unconscious fostering of national culture on the very humblest of the sons of the land, in the utter annihilation of the false avenues and by-lanes of outlook that have willy-nilly took possession of the youth of the land, in the dilation of the soul, in the enlargement of the vision and in its being made to sing in unison with the Music of grand Creation. That the Ceylon University will do all this let us hope: and with the robust philosophy of the Count of Monte Cristo let us "Wait and Hope."

K. R. SRINIVAS IYENGAR

THE FASCIST MOVEMENT IN ITALY[1]

I

In this paper we propose to trace the history of the Fascist Movement in Italy and to examine some of its salient aspects.

When the last Great War broke out in July, 1914, Italy was labouring under very difficult conditions. The State finances, upset by the Lybian war, had not yet been wholly restored ; the army was ill-equipped and the public spirit was restless. At the outbreak of the War the Italian Government declared the neutrality of Italy to the profound relief of the majority of the people. The Government justified their conduct as not being in violation of the Triple Alliance (with Germany and Austria), because the war was not a war of defence. But at the same time it began to carry on negotiations now with her allies and now with the entente powers. It wavered between neutrality and intervention in accordance with the course of events, while it gave no lead to public opinion nor did it make adequate preparations for the eventuality of war. The ambiguous attitude of the Government fostered and accentuated differences of opinion in the country. The only organised and properly-constituted party, the Italian Socialist Party, pledged itself to neutrality. The Catholics, too, were more or less against intervention. During the first days of the crisis the small Nationalist group advocated intervention on the side of the allies. What is a matter of surprise is that the Mussolini group of revolutionary socialists were ardently in favour of intervention from the moment the War broke out.

As we shall see later on it was not merely from the nationalistic point of view that he pleaded for intervention. He

[1] A Paper read before the Dacca University Economic Association on the 19th February, 1929.



resigned the editorship of the *Avanti,* the official Socialist organ, and in November, 1914, began to edit a paper "*Popolo* d'Italia" to preach his gospel of intervention. Thus the War gave rise to violent and acrimonious wrangling between the supporters and opponents of neutrality, while the Government did not cease negotiating with the rival belligerents. As days passed, the failure of her allies to consult Italy before embarking on the war, the story of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and the skilful and vigorous advertisement of the imperialism of Germany and Austria, and many wild rumours, alienated slowly but steadily the sympathies of the Italians for their allies. Finally, the failure of the Government to wrest favourable terms from Austria, and the signing of the infamous Treaty of London (26th April, 1915) resulted in the declaration of war against Austria and her allies. But all through the strenuous period of war there was a sharp conflict between the Nationalist and the so-called anti-Nationalist, the name given to those who were in favour of neutrality.

The close of the war did not bring peace and prosperity to the belligerents. The after-war period was in all these countries a period of civil commotion, unrest, despair, hardship and disillusionment. Particularly was this the case in Italy. With the close of the war Socialism in Italy received a new and unexpected lease of life. Founded in 1895 with undiluted Marxism as its watch-word, the Italian Socialist Party grew steadily in number and strength. But it was not free from internal squabbles. For instance, there was in 1912 the expulsion from the Party of the Reformist Socialists who believed in parliamentary action and attached greater importance to the method of reform and permeation than to that of violent revolution. In the elections of 1913 the Socialists increased their strength in the Chamber of Deputies, the Official Socialists numbering 53 and the Reformists 26. During the war-period Socialism fell into marked disfavour among considerable portions of the population mainly because of its anti-war and

anti-nationalistic bias. But when the war-cloud had disappeared, the devastations caused by the war in men and money, and the unjust and unsatisfactory terms of the so-called "Peace" Treaty, were used as arguments by the Socialists in favour of the view that the war was a war of exploitation of the masses by the classes, of the weaker by the Stronger Powers. Anti-Socialism lost ground rapidly, and Socialism now enlisted in its ranks discontented and disillusioned soldiers and all those who had suffered unjustly during the war. Moreover, the 'Social myth of the Russian Revolution and its promise of a workers' paradise,' attracted an ever-increasing crowd of followers to Socialism.

Of the Interventionists some went over to Socialism and some accepted the Peace Treaty. 'But there were other Interventionists who rebelled against the diplomacy that "cheated us of our victory" and it was they who, led by Mussolini, organised early in 1919, the "*Fasci di Combattiments*" in order to uphold the claim of Italy to the material and spiritual fruits of victory." They agitated against all Neutralists, but above all against the Socialists, who gave no support to the campaign for the recovery of national rights. But still there was no sign of any ebbing of the tide of Socialism. Out of the 8,000 Communes of Italy, 2,000 were in the hands of the Socialists who proceeded to enrich the workers at the expense of the middle-class officials and to the ruin of the municipal finances. Something like a quarter of the country was under the Red Flag. Strikes were of daily occurrence and production was at a very low ebb..." A veritable terror was established, and a state of mind became general which inclined people to accept the outbreak of the social revolution and its triumph as the lesser evil and an escape from the existing situation." [1]

The Socialist Congress of October, 1919, pledged the Party to the establishment by violence of a 'dictatorship of the whole

[1] John Buchan : Italy (Nations of To-day series), pp. 249-50.

proletariat as a step towards a complete Communist regime.' The elections of November, 1919, sent 154 Socialists to the Chamber, and they then formed the strongest and best-organised group; but they were by no means prepared to shoulder the responsibility of Government.

Another party, organised early in 1919 under the name of the Popular Party, captured as many as 99 seats in the Chamber. It at once took its stand as a Centre Party and since the Socialist Deputies reached the imposing number of 154, and the Constitutional Opposition of the Nationalist and Conservative Right numbered about 60, the Popular Catholic Party was an indispensable element in the Government majority. It actually helped to form the various Cabinets of the four groups of the Liberal Democrats, but owing to fundamental difference in outlook, none of the coalitions was stable or powerful.

While the Socialists refused to shoulder political responsibility, troubles were brewing in the country which seemed for the time being to indicate the triumph of revolutionary Socialism and of Bolshevism but in reality sealed the fate of both for ever. In the summer of 1920 there was a dispute between the employers and the labourers engaged in the Mechanical and Metallurgical industries. Attempts at settlement proving futile, the Federation of Mechanical Industries proclaimed a general lock-out throughout Italy. The workers promptly retaliated by seizing a number of metallurgical factories, to the accompaniment of revolutionary songs, waving of red flags, and threats of murder. The contagion spread like wild fire to a number of other industries. The Socialist Revolution seemed actually to have arrived; the factory-owners were struck with panic, while the impotent government of Giolitti looked passively on.[1]

The occupation of the factories soon ended in utter failure. However much they might have bragged of Bolshevism and 'dictatorship of the proletariat' the so-called Socialist and

[1] *Cf.* Odon Por: Fascism, pp. 66-67.

Trade Union leaders were least prepared for such an eventuality. Moreover, the economic conditions were also very unfavourable to the workers. A severe wave of depression was now passing over Italian industries, and running their business as they did at a loss, many an employer was not unwilling to hand over the factories temporarily to the clamorous workmen. Further, Italian industries are to a very large extent dependent on foreign countries for their raw materials, the supply of which was practically stopped owing to the fact that foreign exporters lost their faith in the future of these industries. It is no wonder, therefore, that production was brought to a standstill and the workshops had to be handed back to their owners.

The failure of the occupation dealt the death-blow to the power and prestige of Socialism. The once-powerful Socialist Party hastened its own downfall. From almost the beginning of its career it wavered between revolution and no revolution, and this dilemma became glaringly evident in the post-war days when its ranks began to be filled by all sorts of malcontents such as the disillusioned ex-soldiers who joined the Socialist and Trade Union Movements in large numbers, being determined to help forward the much-advertised Socialist revolution. The Socialists, however, failed to make use of the military capacity and revolutionary inclinations of their new recruits, for, strange to say, 'the movement which preached revolution and violence was by no means prepared to put it into practice.' Thus the Socialists put themselves outside the pale of reality, as far as the proletariat were concerned, by declining mass-revolution, just as they put themselves outside the pale of parliamentary reality by refusing to accept office in the ministry.

At this point there entered into the political arena another party—the Fascist Party which was of recent origin and had so long a localised and restricted existence. It has been held by many people that Fascism arose as an indignant protest against the Bolshevik mania in Italy which had utterly paralysed the life of the nation, and that Fascism must be regarded as the

saviour of Italy inasmuch as it brought about the collapse of the occupation of factories. Yet nothing is farther from the truth. It has been shown above that the failure of the occupation came about of itself, out of the inherent difficulties of the situation and certainly not through the intervention of either the Government or of the Fascist Party. Let us now look into the origin of Fascism. The National Fascist Party of the present day was formed in 1921 by a transformation of the "*Fasci di Combattiments*" (bands of ex-combatants) which were themselves created in the spring of 1919 out of the "*Fasci Interventisti*" (groups for intervention) constituted soon after the outbreak of the Great War.

We have seen that from the very beginning of the War, Mussolini, at that time an extreme revolutionary Socialist, was ardently in favour of intervention, but why? "It has been Mussolini's proud boast," observes Mr. Murphy, "that he was one of the first Socialists in Italy to see that the War offered a golden opportunity for putting the Socialist revolution into effect. He founded the *Popolo d'Italia* as a Socialist paper, calling on the Italian proletariat to take part in the War, because once the armed masses of the populace had learned solidarity and comradeship at the front they could return with the rifles in their hands and enforce the postulates of the Marxist revolution!"[1] The revolutionaries were moved by the conviction that the war had brought with it a situation of world revolution, a period of transition to a society which might be called "Socialist," and they organised themselves into "fasci" for intervention, and to these, therefore, may be traced the true genesis of Fascism. Thus the beginnings of Fascism date from the outbreak of the Great War, when Italy was still neutral and when Bolshevism was still unborn. Indeed in its early days Fascism had a programme which could easily vie with that of Bolshevism. The main heads of Mussolini's programme of

[1] Fortnightly Review, December, 1925; "The Parabola of Fascism" by James Murphy.

1919-20 are :[1] ' The national constituent assembly to be understood as an Italian section of the international constituent assembly of the people; the proclamation of the Italian Republic; the decentralisation of the executive power; an elective magistrature independent of the Executive; abolition of all caste titles such as Prince, Duke, etc.; abolition of conscription; general disarmament ; freedom of thought, of conscience and of religion, of association, of the Press, of propaganda, of agitation, individual and collective; suppression of banks and stock exchanges; the expropriation of all Church property; confiscation of land in the interests of the workers; a heavy capital levy.'[2]

But ever since Fascism has come into power, its policy has been in direct antithesis to the original programme; and this anomaly can easily be explained when we consider that " Fascism was the result less of ideas than of feelings; and, as time went on, it made use of the state of mind of its followers and adherents." There was a time when Mussolini was eager to win back the Socialist masses. His whole campaign of 1919 and 1920 was in competition with the Socialists. During the occupation of the factories he not only showed himself favourable to the step taken by the workers but greeted it as the signal of a new economic order and went even to the length of sending emissaries to the Labour Confederation to offer it the help of his Black Shirts.

[1] For the entire programme, See Nitti : Bolshevism, Fascism and Democracy (1927), pp 214-15.

[2] *Cf.* " We are not against the Socialists. So little tenderness have I and we Fascisti for the bourgeois that one of the postulates of our programme is the decimation of wealth, the confiscation of excessive war profits, and a heavy tax on capital." Mussolini in '*Popolo d'Italia*' of Nov. 10, 1919. Or, again, " Either the Haves will agree to Expropriation or we shall turn our combatants against them and lay them low."

Even when disowned by the Socialists, Mussolini took pride in being a Socialist of the Extreme Left. Thus on the eve of his expulsion from the Socialist Party on Nov. 25, 1914, Mussolini addressed the Milan Socialists as follows : " Twelve years of my party life are a sufficient guarantee of my faith in Socialism ..Do not think that in taking away my membership card you will be taking away my faith in the cause, or that you will prevent my still working for socialism and revolution."

See " Mussolini as revealed in his Political Speeches " by Baron Severeno, pp. 5-6.

But with all his tempting propaganda Mussolini failed to capture the imagination of the workers and all the Fascist Candidates for election to the Chamber in 1919, including Mussolini himself, were left in the cold by the electorate. Spurned by the working masses Mussolini looked around and found almost unexpected help and patronage from two other quarters—the rich and the Government. With a view to balancing the Budget Signor Giolitti passed legislation providing for the inscription of securities, the inquiry into war-expenditure, the confiscation of war-profits, the probate duties, etc. This legislation was perfectly sound; but it was most inexpedient to threaten the rich, especially when the party most benefited by such legislation, namely the Socialists, were continuing their wild opposition and threatening trouble. "In actual fact it was after this legislation was passed that the '*Fasci di Combattimento*' which had dragged on a wretched existence in obscurity and impotence, began to be regarded with a friendly eye by the war-plutocracy." [1] At the same time Giolitti thought it wise to play off the Socialists and the Fascists against one another and thereby keep both under check and subjection to himself, a device in which he was already a past master.

In the Spring of 1921, Giolitti dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and very foolishly concluded an alliance with the revolutionary Fascists not only against the Socialists, which is understandable, but also against the Catholic Popular Party which was one of the pillars of the Social order. Moreover, the Government armed the Fascists with pistols, rifles, bombs, etc., which were freely used by them on their opponents.

Sig. Giolitti, the Prince of intriguing politicians, was sadly disappointed in his expectations: the Fascisti, thirty of whom had come into the Chamber with the help of Giolitti, at once stood against him on the question of the Treaty of Rapallo; the Popolari, already embittered by the questionable electioneering methods of the Old Man, increased their strength from 99

[1] Ferrero: Four Years of Fascism, p. 51.

to 107 ; and finally, the Socialists,[1] though they had lost 20 seats, came firmly resolved not to co-operate. Giolitti fell[2] and was succeeded by Bonomi, a Reformist-Socialist, ' a man experienced in administration but uncertain and vacillating in politics.' He, however, made some attempts to check the illegal activities of the Fascist Irregulars ; but his actions were infructuous chiefly because he was not backed by the middle-classes and the higher ranks of the bureaucracy.

Bonomi was obliged to resign as the Giolittians decided to withdraw their support from the ministry. As the Popular Party would not accept Giolitti, Facta was installed in February, 1922. But Facta was a weak man, unequal to his task. He was Giolitti's lieutenant and a tool in the hands of the Conservatives, the Nationalists and the Fascists.

The Fascisti continued their violent and nefarious activities with redoubled energy.[3] The Fascist Irregulars assaulted Socialists, raided Socialist and Popular Clubs and occupied towns and villages. On July 31st, 1922, a general strike in the public services was declared by the Trade Unions, the sole aim of this " legalist strike " being to affirm the authority of the State against the Fascisti, who were trying to subvert it. The Fascisti ordered the State to stop the strike, in an ultimatum which runs as follows : ' we give the State forty-eight hours to prove that it possesses authority over all its employees.....when this Time has elapsed Fascism will resume full freedom of action and supplant the State.' The Fascists were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate action, and masses of

[1] So many Socialists were returned not because their hold on the people was as great as it was before but because the majority of the people were horrified at the violence of the Fascists during the election campaign. This shows that the heart of the people was still sound.

[2] Giolitti found, as Salvemini puts it, " that he had burned down the house in order to roast a pig."

[3] *Cf.* Buchan : Italy, p. 251, " The Black Shirts outdid the Red Flag in brutality and violence."

Black Shirts, perfectly disciplined and armed, appeared in every town and village of Italy.[1]

The ' protest ' strike was officially called off. The Government did not, however, act with the energy required by the Fascists who now continued their smashing counter-offensive.[2] But " just as Government had allowed the forces of revolution a free hand in the autumn of 1920, when it believed them to be the strongest, so now it refused to interfere with the repressive actions of the Fascisti, illegal though they were."[3] Even at this critical moment of their fortunes, the Socialists declined to avail themselves of the last opportunity offered them for co-operating with the other democratic parties.

At this stage, it may be said, the Facta Government worked entirely at the bidding of the Fascisti and it was looked down upon by the public, the country was now in high tension and all kinds of wild rumours were afloat. The Press, inspired by the Industrial and Agrarian interests, sang the slogan of Bolshevism all over the land, although Bolshevism, if there had been any, was overcome two years before, after the occupation of the factories.[4]

The effect of the recent general strike and of the parliamentary crisis was that the Fascisti ' became in an increased degree the objects of Liberal approval and Government tolerance.' Meanwhile, the Fascists were openly parading and concentrating their forces, but the Government resolutely

[1] Luigi Villari : The Awakening of Italy, p. 154.

[2] *Cf.* Buchan : Italy, p. 251. The successful violence of the Fascists, who were very much less in number than the Socialists and were often armed with no better weapons than bludgeons and castor-oil bottles, proved the cowardice of the Labour-leaders and the marked inferiority of the proletarian organisations. " Violence with method was the secret of Fascist Success," as Odon Por says, *vide* also, Prezzolini, Fascism, pp. 51-52.

[3] Villari : The Awakening of Italy, p. 123.

[4] *Cf.* Sturzo : Italy and Fascism, p. 111. Mussolini himself wrote in his paper on July 2, 1921 : " To say that there still exists a Bolshevist peril in Italy is to substitute unnecessary fears for the reality. Bolshevism is vanquished. Nay, more ; it has been disowned by the leaders and by the masses," quoted by Wickham Steed in the Contemporary Review, May, 1928, p. 551.

refused to interfere. At last some Fascists challenged Facta to hand over his resignation, and on the evening of the 27th October poor Facta tendered to the King the resignation of his Cabinet. That very night began the mobilisation of the Fascist armed Irregulars and the organisation of the March on Rome. Faced with this imminent crisis the Cabinet resolved upon the proclamation of martial law throughout the kingdom. The decision was communicated to the King and wired to the Prefects with orders to put it into force at noon (Oct. 28th). At the same time various persons, including certain Army Chiefs, intimated to the King the terrible consequences of a fight between the Army and the Fascists, and gave him to understand that there could be a Salandra Cabinet with Fascist representation. The King vetoed the proclamation of Martial Law and invited Salandra to form a Ministry.

The success of his Coûp was beyond the wildest dreams of Mussolini, and feeling that his hour had struck and realising the weakness of the other side, he made it known through his friends in Rome that he could join no Ministry; "that power must be given to himself, that, unless it were conferred on him then and there, at Milan, and unless his armed followers were allowed to make a peaceful entry into the capital as symbol of victory, he would not stay his march on Rome. All was granted by the King and by the Facta Government which looked on passively." In the meantime, Mussolini had quite dramatically swallowed up his declared hostility to the Church and had abjured his Republican leanings, and he declared his intention to support the Monarchy if he found no hindrance from that quarter. "The 31st October saw the triumphal entry into Rome of about 30,000 Black Shirts, amid the applaud of their friends and the pensive dismay of the greater number of citizens."[1] *Thus Mussolini's success was not due to any miraculous power that he possessed but to the quickness and determination with which he acted at that psychological moment and*

[1] Sturzo: Italy and Fascismo, p. 119.

to what is equally important, the failure of the pseudo-Democratic and pseudo-Liberal Political Class and the folly and incapacity of the Socialist leaders.

Though in a hopeless minority in Parliament Mussolini, backed as he was by an armed militia outside, forced the Chamber into abject submission and made it grant him plenary powers. It was the fond belief of many of its supporters that once in office Fascism would divest itself of all illegality and violence. But in this they were sadly disappointed. The series of brutal and inhuman murders, bludgeoning, administering of castor oil, etc., that have been perpetrated on a large number of the citizens including some of the most highly honoured and capable leaders and scholars, by the Fascist volunteers and even by some of the trusted lieutenants of Mussolini, presumably with his knowledge and approval, will ever remain the darkest blots in the annals of Fascist Italy.

(*To be continued*)

ABANIBHUSHAN RUDRA

TRANSFERABILITY OF OCCUPANCY HOLDINGS IN BENGAL

II

The papers to which the Government of Bengal refers contain innumerable opinions and statements made by those interested in the question—the result of enquiries set on foot by the Government of Bengal. The Government in its circular letter No. 3 T.-R., dated May 24, 1884, asked the Commissioners of all divisions to hold conferences of the district officers in regard to the Tenancy Bill. The various conferences differed in their opinions as to the lines on which legislation should proceed; but it is remarkable that all the commissioners of the five divisions of Bengal agreed in their reports, that the custom of free transfer had taken deep root in Bengal, and that the practice was resorted to without any interference on the part of the Zamindars. The inquiries showed that in case of transfers of occupancy-holdings the landlord's assent was never obtained. Moreover, as the Government of Bengal in its letter of January 15, 1884 says: "Manifestly, if assent was essential to the validity of the transfer, the fact that it had been given would form part of the record or deed of sale. No such assent was, however, recorded." The letter concludes: "The practice of free-sale exists in every district of Bengal, unfettered by any veto or fine."

It is clear that the custom of free transfer had already taken deep root in, and was fast spreading all over, the rural economy of Bengal.

Pre-emption.

But from the very beginning the powerful landholding interests declared themselves against making occupancy-holdings transferable by law. The Zamindars were rich and powerful and they made their voice heard. It came to be supposed in a vague indefinite way, that if the custom of transferability was recognised by law, the

interests of the Zamindars needed protection. One of the ways of doing this was supposed to be by giving them a right of pre-emption in case of transfer of occupancy-holdings. The Government of India in their despatch of March 21, 1882, to the Secretary of State, declared their opinion that the rights of the settled raiyats being maintained, the landlord was fully entitled to choose his tenants in all cases of transfer. It says: "We would therefore declare, that in all cases of the transfer of occupancy-holdings in raiyati lands, whether by private sale or by sale in execution of decree, or by foreclosure, the landlord shall have a right of pre-emption; that in cases of private sale or foreclosure he may, if necessary, apply to the Civil Court to fix a fair price, or the amount of the mortgage debt; and that his purchase or redemption shall result in the land being placed at his disposal as unoccupied raiyati holding." (Para. 92.)

The Secretary of State in his Revenue No. 54 of August 17, 1882, approved of the grant of a right of pre-emption to the landlord.

The Bill as introduced in Council in 1883 also retained the pre-emption clause in favour of the landlord.

It is clear that both by the Government of India and the Zamindars, the right to pre-emption was regarded as a necessary corollary to the grant of the right to free transfer. It is curious on what inadequate grounds this important privilege was demanded. One of the reasons given was that the landlords should have a right to choose their tenants. The validity of this contention really depended on an underlying presumption that the landlords were the absolute proprietors of the soil. Indeed, that was one of the grounds on which the landlords objected to tenancy legislation *in toto*. Neither the Government of Bengal nor the Government of India admitted the correctness of this proposition; and it had been denied by the Secretary of State for India. It had been held that the raiyats had substantive rights in the soil which derived neither their origin nor their sanction from the Zamindars. It had been

most authoritatively pronounced that the rights of the Zamindars amounted to nothing more than an estate or an interest in land which was not exclusive of other interests in it. Under the circumstances the Zamindars and the tenants could only be rightly regarded as joint proprietors in land, and the whole theory of the landlords having a right to choose their tenants falls to the ground.

Connected with this argument, and based on it was the claim that the Zamindars should have the means of saving themselves from undesirable tenants. An ordinary student of rural conditions in Bengal would find it difficult to believe that it was seriously proposed to give legal protection to Zamindars against prospective harassment by undesirable tenants. One should be inclined to think that the good landlord would not have much of that problem and the bad ones would not need much of Government help in the matter. On grounds of abstract theory, there is no more reason why a landlord should have the right to object to whomsoever he may please to think of as an undesirable tenant than that a tenant should be allowed to object to an undesirable landlord.

In 1879 Mr. Field regarded it as a mere sentimental objection which was not worth the consideration of the legislature.

But the question has other and serious implications. If the landlords were given an instrument by which they could keep out anybody as an undesirable tenant, it was more than likely that a system would grow up by which their consent should acquire a money value. They would waive their right to pre-emption only when it was made worth their while to do so. Thus it would, at once, be a source of power and income to the Zamindars, and a cause of depreciation of the occupancy-title to the raiyat, who should ultimately have to bear the burden of the consideration-money given to the Zamindar for waiving his right to pre-emption.

Another argument advanced was that it was necessary to give the Zamindars a right to pre-emption, in order to enable

them to guard against the danger of rival and enemy Zamindars buying up occupancy-holdings in the midst of their property, and being a source of danger and harassment to them. It is not difficult even at the present day to realise what must have been the use and influence of the *Lathi* and *Pagri* in those days. But they must have been more significant in the relation of the landlord and tenant, than in that of rival landlords. One can understand reasonable precautions in the ordinary criminal law in the interest of law and order. But to give one class in the body politic a valuable privilege seriously affecting the rights and interests of another class on the ground of existing animosity and rivalry within the class that gets the privilege is neither reasonable nor conducive to the best interests of the community.

There is another reason why this power was proposed to be given to the Zamindars. By the proposed legal recognition of transferability of occupancy-holdings, the raiyats were supposed to be getting an important advantage as against the Zamindars. The right of pre-emption was sought to be given to the Zamindars as being in the nature of a compensation. This will appear from the speech of the Governor-General on March 13, 1883, when, speaking on the Tenancy Bill, he sought to conciliate the Zamindars by saying that the Bill was conferring a benefit to the landlords by giving them the power of pre-emption, which they could not claim in places where the custom of transferability already existed.

On March 14, 1884, the Select Committee presented its Preliminary Report. It proposed to make occupancy-holdings transferable subject to the option of the landlord to pre-emption at an agreed or fixed price, and option to the raiyat, in case the right of pre-emption was applied, to keep or sell the land.

It may be observed that the Government of Bengal was opposed from the very beginning to the grant of this right of pre-emption to the landlord. It gave its view on the matter in its letter No. 1906 T.-R. of September 15, 1884. It says: "This limitation is in the nature of a concession to the

Zemindars, which they do not enjoy at present, and which is *pro tanto* calculated to diminish the value of existing occupancy-rights." It continues: "The pre-emption clauses of the Bill meet, as the Government of India will observe, with no approval and it is in the Lieutenant-Governor's opinion essential that they should be abandoned. The evidence submitted is conclusive on the point that as a general rule, occupancy-rights are now freely saleable in Bengal without any interference on the Zamindar's part. To introduce the novel right of pre-emption therefore would very seriously depreciate the value of well-established occupancy-interests."

We have seen that the claims of the Zamindars to the right of pre-emption could not stand close scrutiny.

The Mahajan Menace.

Another problem which commanded the consideration of the legislature in connection with the question of making occupancy-holdings transferable was the supposed menace of the Mahajans. If was said that if the raiyats were allowed to sell their holdings freely, all the land should go into the hands of the money-lenders, who would have them cultivated by employing the same men as their under-tenants. Thus on the one hand occupancy-rights should be enjoyed by a class detached from land and on the other, the real cultivators should remain in their own lands, in a degraded condition of serfage.

In one way or other, this problem baffled the commissions and public men who were concerned in tenancy legislation, and attempts were made to solve it in various ways.

The rent law commission sought to meet the question by prohibiting the raiyat from mortgaging. In order to render the prohibition effectual they recommended that any such mortgage should be void to all intents and purposes and that no court of justice should take cognizance thereof or give effect thereto in any judicial proceeding whatever.[1] They further

[1] Sec. 20, Clause (*d*) of the Draft Bill,
Sec. 20, Clause (*a*) ,, ,,

enacted, that a right of occupancy, though saleable in execution of a decree for its own rent, should not be saleable in execution of any other decree.

The Government of Bengal wanted to avoid the danger by refusing to recognise the existence of the occupancy-right in the case of any person who would not come under the definition of *ryats* as given in their Draft Bill. This was a devise to bar non-agriculturists from the acquisition of occupancy-rights and in effect amounted to a prohibition of transfer of occupancy-holdings to them.

The Government of India, like the Government of Bengal, wanted to meet the difficulty by enacting that the raiyat should be allowed to transfer his holding freely, but no person who is not an agriculturist should acquire a right of occupancy in raiyati lands either by purchase or gift or devise or foreclosure or in any other way.

Another means suggested for meeting this dreaded menace, was that every transfer should have to be registered in the landlord's *Sherista*, and the latter should have a power of veto in cases where the transferee did not belong to the cultivating classes.

We have seen that the custom of transferring occupancy-holdings had already developed very far in Bengal. It would be interesting to know what proportion of these went into the hands of the money-lender. Mr. Field in his note on the transferability of raiyati holdings says that experience (for instance in Bakarganj, where holdings were commonly transferable by custom) shows that Mahajans do not always buy up the lands themselves.

The Government of India in its despatch of March 21, 1882, to the Secretary of State says about it: "There is testimony from the Eastern Districts to suggest that in that part of Bengal, the risk of the raiyat sinking to a state of serfdom is inappreciable." During the debate in the Governor-General's Council on March 12, 1883, the Honourable Mr.

Reynolds said: "It has been said that the result of a general power of transfer will be, that the land will pass out of the hands of the cultivators into the possession of middlemen and Mahajans. But experience does not justify this apprehension. The transfers which already occur every year may be counted by thousands; but the purchasers of the holdings are men of the same class as the sellers."

This testimony of contemporary opinion is supported by the following figures for the number of transfers of occupancy-holdings and those purchased by the money-lending classes for the years 1881-84.[1]

Year.	No. of Transaction.	Purchased by Mahajans or Traders.	Percentage of those purchased by the Mahajans to total No. of Transfers.
1881-82 ...	25,448	3,805	16
1882-83 ...	34,148	4,640	13
1883-84 ...	38,006	4,955	13

Thus we see that the experience of facts up to the time of legislation did not justify such a dread of the probable consequences of grant of the right of transferability as was felt in some quarters.

Yet, the Rent Law Commission wanted to prohibit the raiyat from mortgaging his holding. It is obvious that the necessities of the raiyat were not sufficiently considered in the anxiety to protect him from himself. Agricultural operations are of a seasonal character. The nature of his occupation compels the raiyat to be a borrower. Land is his only property which he can use as an instrument of credit. To take away that resource from him is to strike a severe blow at agriculture.

The Government of India perceived this and pointed out the defects of this policy in its despatch of March 21, 1882.

[1] Appendix II, Government of Bengal No, 1906 T. R., dated September 15, 1884.

After mentioning the evidence showing that the risk of the raiyat falling into the hands of money-lenders was not appreciable, it continues: "The general sense of the other opinions seems to be that if the prohibition of mortgage proposed by the Rent Commission were effectual, there would be some hardship to the raiyat, who, in bad seasons would be forced to sell his holding outright; while, if it were not effectual, it would at least operate to make the raiyat's credit worse, and the terms on which he would obtain loans more onerous." (Para. 97.)

But the policy which the Government of India advocated was equally open to criticism. They proposed to allow mortgage, but wanted to prevent non-agriculturists from acquiring occupancy-rights. The inevitable effect of legislation on these lines would have been to restrict the market to which occupancy-rights could be transferred and thus depreciate the value of occupancy-holdings as security for loans, and raise the rate of interest for the poor cultivators whose sufferings in this respect are notorious. Indeed, the Government felt this difficulty; and its advocacy of this policy is halting and apologetic. In its letter of March 21, 1882, already alluded to, it says: "We advocate them with regret, as restrictions needed in an immature state of society...As education and consequent power of self-protection spread, such exceptional legislation would grow obsolete. We therefore think that the Lieutenant-Governor should be empowered to withdraw the abovementioned provisions, in any district, where it might be established to his satisfaction that absolute freedom of transfer would be unattended by any risks." (Para. 97.)

Yet another consideration which vitiates this policy is that the differentiation of the money-lenders from the cultivators is an artificial one. Many well-to-do cultivators carry on money-lending business at times; and many Mahajans are *bona-fide* cultivators. It would be difficult to apply the policy in such cases and would discourage thrift on the one hand and put an obstacle in the way of investment of capital to land on the other.

The other suggestion that the landlord should not be bound to register anyone as his raiyat, who is not a *bona-fide* cultivator, has been effectively dealt with in the Government of Bengal No. 972 T.-R., dated September 27, 1883, to the Government of India. It says: "It may be fairly presumed that most landlords would waive their power of veto if it were made worth their while to do so. Hence a system of prices on transfers would grow up, which would have the twofold effect of reconciling landlords to dealings with all sorts of Mahajans who could best pay them; and of depreciating the value of the occupancy-title to the raiyat, on whose shoulders the purchasing Mahajan would in time transfer the full weight of the fine. For these reasons, then, the Lieutenant-Governor must dissent from the view that a veto on Sales should be allowed to proprietors, finding no justification for it in actual practice..."

We find that in all cases, the remedies proposed for this malady was fraught with grave dangers. New restrictions were suggested which might be a blow to the raiyats and agriculture by raising the rate of interest, by discouraging the investment of money in land and forcing the cultivators to sell their lands in times of distress. New powers were proposed to be put into the hands of the landlords which might be put to most improper uses with disastrous consequences. Indeed, the legislators were largely fighting an imaginary evil. The legal recognition of the right to transfer their holdings could not make the raiyats, as a class, heavy borrowers for the simple reason that the Mahajans would not have been able to accommodate them all at once. The cultivators of Bengal are well-known for their tenacity in sticking to their land; and they are not wanting in intelligence to guard their interests in the best possible way under the peculiar circumstances of their position. Nobody can deny that rural indebtedness was a serious problem then, as it is much more so now. But it had its growth in the necessities of the situation.

The problem could not be dealt with by trying to oust the

Mahajan by a legislative enactment of this sort without removing the causes which give rise to usurious money-lending. Both Rai Kristodas Pal, and the Maharajah of Darbhanga opposed the making of occupancy-holdings transferable on the ground that it would leave the raiyats to the tender mercy of the Mahajans.[1] It is curious that the representatives of the Zamindars always advocated freedom of contract in their relations with the raiyats, but they stoutly denied the same rights to the latter in their dealings with the Mahajans.

Salami.

But these were not the only dangers which the proposal of legalising transferability had to face. It was said that by doing so the Government would deprive the Zamindars of a valuable source of income. The argument was advanced that the landlords were used to settle the land with the right of transferability at a consideration. The argument was not supported by statistics of actual practice. In his Note on transferability Mr. Field wrote about this: "It would have been more satisfactory if the argument had been supported by some figures, for these alone can show how much it is worth. It is to be borne in mind, that the measure can affect those holdings only in which the raiyats have acquired a right of occupancy. Now, these holdings are not at the Zamindar's disposal to grant to new tenants upon a transferable tenure for a consideration. It is not suggested that any raiyat, who already has a right of occupancy, will pay a Salami to his landlord for the mere purpose of obtaining transferability, and I am aware of no instance, in which this has been done." Mr. Field had as accurate and extensive information on the subject as anybody else at that period, and the fact that he did not come across one single instance in which Salami was paid for the purpose is a remarkable comment on the claims of the Zamindars. Then, there are other considerations. By Sec. 78 of Act X of 1859 and Sec. 52 of Act VIII of 1869, the landlords

[1] Minutes of Dissent to Preliminary Report of Select Committee.

could sue the raiyats for ejectment for non-payment of rent. In that case they could put it on to a new man with transferable rights and demand a Salami. That this was not done in many cases shows that the practice had not taken root. Mr. Field writes about this : "If Zamindars could obtain large premiums for the grant of transferable holdings, why should they of their own accord bring these holdings to sale in execution of their decrees for rent, as beyond controversy, they have done in very many cases. The result of their doing this, instead of ejecting the raiyat, is that whatever the holding is worth over and above the amount of the decree with costs goes into the pocket of the raiyat instead of the Zamindar."

Apart from these objections of the landholding interests, if we treat the question on its merits, we find that there are the strongest reasons why occupancy-holdings should have been made transferable. The occupancy-raiyats were the most important class of raiyats both in status and numbers.

Everything is desirable which is conducive to their welfare.

The Case for legalising Transferability.

Transferability is a most important attribute of property. In England and Ireland it has become famous as one of the three F's as an essential element of tenure-right. This right to convert his interest in land into its money value would have given a feeling of proprietorship in the raiyat which would have gone a long way to the making of his prosperity. Time and again, during the controversy, men who had an intimate knowledge of the state of things in Bengal had testified that where holdings were transferable by custom, the raiyats were more prosperous and better able to withstand the pressure of scarcity and famine.

In an agricultural community, specially in the peculiar conditions of Bengal, transferability was an economic necessity. Agricultural operations are seasonal and the raiyats are poor ; they have to borrow at one season, and repay at another. By the nature of their occupation they have got to be in a normal state of indebtedness. Land is their only property

which they could use as an instrument of credit. We have seen, how, in the absence of definite legislation, land came to be transferable by custom. There were other ways how the necessities of the people found expression. While land could not be freely transferred by law, the transfer could be effected in the guise of subletting or mortgage. Mr. Field's remarks on this point are illuminating. He says: "There can be little doubt that, when interests in land cannot be transferred, they are sublet. A lease is only a form of conveyance; and when there are difficulties in the way of an absolute transfer, mortgage and lease are substituted therefor. The enormous amount of subletting that prevails in these provinces, and the very common lease, by way of mortgage, may, in some respects, be attributable to a common unwillingness, to give up the position of ostensible owner, but are mainly due to the fact, that an absolute transfer requires the landlord's consent, and that in order to obtain the consent, a sum of money must be paid. There being thus a considerable difficulty in the way of an absolute transfer, while there was none in the way of a sub-lease, subletting has become the form in which alienability, not to be suppressed, has asserted itself... There can be no doubt that transferability will tend to diminish subletting; and if the introduction of transferability be accompanied by the putting of positive checks on subletting (and this cannot be safely done, while transferability is not established; for alienability will not be dammed up *in toto*) there is every reason to believe that much good would result."[1]

The evils of subletting are many and were well recognised by Government as well as the public. The baneful influence of the middleman and the rapacity of the petty landlord who does not spare any pressure in his attempt to widen the margin of his profit grinds down the actual cultivator, penalises his industry and takes away from him every motive for thrift. Attempts

[1] Note on Transferability, Appendix I to Digest.

had been made to remedy these growing evils by law, but no adequate means of doing so had been found. It cannot be doubted that legalisation of transferability would have gone a long way to discourage subletting. Nor was the Government unaware of this. In his speech in the Governor-General's Council on March 13, 1883, Sir Stuart Baily said: "It is also clear that transferability is the only alternative to unlimited subletting, a practice which we cannot, in face of universal custom, forbid, but which we should be very glad to discourage."

Mr. Field, in his able note on transferability also introduced another very relevant consideration, which shows in how many ways economic necessities would assert themselves when barred by law from taking their natural course. He says that land can be alienated by one of these two ways: (*a*) in execution of a decree for arrear rent; (*b*) by private sale. But as a matter of experience the former method introduces the latter. If *A* wants to sell his land and *B* wants to buy it, *A* has only to refrain from paying his rent, the holding is brought to sale in consequence and *B* can bid for and purchase it. This is an interesting commentary on the advice of those who sought to avoid the Mahajan difficulty by enacting that raiyati holdings should be saleable for arrears of rent, and not transferable by private contract. Thus we see that the raiyats could not be made to stick to their land, when they found it to their interest to transfer it. Restrictions only brought about tortuous methods of avoiding the law, thus depreciating the value of the land and bringing in manifold other evils.

As we have said before, his interest in land is about the only security on which the raiyat can find the money necessary for carrying on his work. In so far as this is not a saleable interest, its value, as a security for loans and as an instrument of credit, is depreciated. This tends to raise the rate of interest at which he can be accommodated. The right of transferability would on the other hand lower the rate of interest, and thus raise the value of the property. This would not only confer a

great boon to the raiyat, but would be the best security for and the best means of recovering the landlord's rent. For the raised value of the occupancy-rights should be always available for enforcing payment to the landlord. Moreover, the legalisation of transferability would have been a tremendous incentive to thrift. If land would have been sold in some cases for extravagance, it would be no matter for regret in so far as it would have gone into the hands of thrifty cultivators who had managed to save for the purpose. It would have given free play to the instinct of investment in land, and would have brought forward much-needed capital in its use. Moreover, the existing law could be put to most improper uses to the serious detriment of the tenant. Where custom could not be proved, the raiyat could not transfer his holding without the consent of the landlord. Already, the landlords had begun to demand a Salami or a share of the purchase-money for such transfers. The dissensions on the question had brought the matter in the lime-light. The raiyats were poor, the Zamindars powerful and sometimes oppressive; where landlords were not so, their agents were. Where monetary interest could be served by twisting the law, it is clear that under the circumstances, it would be resorted to and grow into an irresistible custom. In so far as the landlord's consent would develop a money-value, it would diminish the value of the raiyat's interest by a double process. The intending purchaser would pass on to the shoulders of the raiyat that part of the consideration money which is to be paid to the landlord for obtaining his consent. And then, in fixing up the amount of the consideration money, he would make allowance for his prospective loss in not being able to realise the full capitalised value of his interest in the holding, in case and when he wants to pass it on to another. Thus if the legislature did not meet the growing custom and make it legal, there was great danger that occupancy-rights should be greatly reduced in value and the raiyat would suffer a double loss.

These considerations presented a strong case for making occupancy-rights transferable by law. Yet, when the Select Committee presented its final Report on February 12, 1885, it omitted all provisions relating to the voluntary transfer of occupancy-rights and proposed to leave the matter to be regulated by custom as under the then existing rules. The reason for this surprising decision was given by Sir Stuart Baily, when he moved, on February 27 following that the Report of the Select Committee be taken into consideration. He gave his own personal opinion on the matter, as also the reasons why the clause had been omitted. He said: "I am at liberty to state that I personally adhere to the opinion I expressed in the first debate, to the effect that both in Bengal and Bihar, the custom has taken such deep root, that it is desirable to legalise and regulate it, and that in both provinces this course would, in the long run, if not in the immediate future, be attended by beneficial results, both to the cultivators, and to the productiveness of the country, and so far I sincerely regret the decision arrived at. But, I am bound to admit, apart from the arguments directed against the principle of trasferability,—arguments founded on the injury to the landlord, expropriation of the raiyat, and rack-renting of the actual cultivator,—I am bound to admit, that the Committee found immense difficulty in devising any practical scheme of pre-emption, any satisfactory safeguard against the dreaded money-lender, any equitable method of securing to the landlord the fee which he now gets in some parts of the country, without injuring the raiyats of the other parts where they habitually transfer without payment of a fee, and that in view of these difficulties, there is something to be said, for leaving the custom to strengthen itself, and crystallise into a shape, which may hereafter render its regulation less difficult than at present."

Legislation in 1885.

Defending and explaining the position of the Select Committee, Mr. Quinton said during the debate which followed :

"We were fully conscious of the stimulus to enterprise and improvement of the land, which the power of raising money on the mortgage of his holding, might give to a frugal and industrious tenant, but when we came to apply the principle generally, we found the risks attendant on suddenly enlarging in this way the credit of a weak and impoverished tenantry like that of Bihar so great, and the difficulties in other localities of conceding to the landlords a veto upon the practice without strangling a healthy and rapidly-growing custom which is, we believe, of great public benefit, to be so insuperable, that we determined to follow the cautious advice of the Famine Commissioners, and allow the right to be governed, as at present, by local custom."

Mr. Ilbert, speaking on the motion, gave the reasons as follows: "we found, however, that the existing customs were so multiform that it would be impossible to devise any one general form of legal checks on the right of alienation which might not reasonably be charged with causing hardship to the Zamindar in one part of the country, and hardship to the raiyat in another;.....and it had to be determined, with reference, not only to the consideration whether the right of transfer was in itself a good thing or a bad thing, but with reference also to such consideration as to whether the advantages of having a positive and definite but inelastic rule outweighed the disadvantages, incidental to an elastic but uncertain custom, whether the Mahajan purchaser of whom so much has been heard was a reality or a bugbear, and last, but not least, whether any discouragement, which might be imposed on the practice of sale would not operate as an encouragement on the practice of subletting. It was under the influence of all these different considerations, that we came to the conclusion, that with regard to this particular matter the natural check imposed by custom and usage would probably operate better than any artificial checks which could, under existing circumstances, be imposed by law, and that the safer

and more prudent course would be to abstain, at all events, for the present, from positive legislation."

Another member of the Select Committee, Dr. Hunter, speaking on the motion gave the reasons as follows: "The sale of occupancy-tenure, which had at one time the approval of the Select Committee, no longer finds a place in the Bill. It appeared expedient to legalise such sales, not on theoretical grounds, much less from an abstract love of any three letters of the alphabet, but simply because such sales had grown into an established custom in Bengal, and because it would save litigation and prevent extortion, if we gave to such transactions the express recognition of the law. But when the incidents to which the custom was subject came to be discussed, there was no evidence to guide the committee. Some members maintained that the custom of sale was subject to a fee to the landlord, for registering the transfer. Others contested this position; one member thought the fee should be as high as 25 per cent.; another thought there should be no fee at all. In the end the right of sale was dropped out of the Bill, chiefly because no agreement could be come to in respect of the conditions to which the sale should be subject."

From these statements and others made during the course of the debate it would appear clear that the Committee was not against the legalisation of transferability as such. They were convinced that the custom of transferring occupancy-rights had grown considerably in Bengal; they realised that the legal recognition of the right would result in immense benefit of the raiyat and community in general. But they could not come to any definite decision as to what shape legislation should take as regards the conditions to which the right of transfer might be made subject. It is curious that under the circumstances, they gave up the principle because they could not agree about the details. How surprising and unexpected this decision of the Committee was may be realised when we remember that even the Zamindars, who afterwards

took up such a determined attitude of hostility into the question had deliberately made the admission in the British Indian Association's letter of November 20,1878 to the Government of Bengal, that with proper safeguards they had, "no objection to the proposal that the transferability of occupancy-tenure, restricted to cultivating classes, should be recognised by law."

The reasons for the action of the Select Committee.

From the beginning they suffered from certain handicaps. They had to legislate for both Bengal and Behar where conditions differed widely. In Behar the custom had not developed so strongly as it had in Bengal. In Behar the tenantry was weak and impoverished; in Bengal it was comparatively stronger and more prosperous, and better able to protect itself from the grip of the money-lender. The necessity of legislating on the same lines for localities where so different conditions prevailed prevented the Committee from effective legislation for either province.

And then the Committee was presented with any number of opinions and reports and memoranda; but it had no body of cross-examined evidence to guide its deliberations. The fault perhaps lies with the Rent Commission. It did not employ that method; it was not open to the Select Committee to do so. As Sir Stuart Baily said: "When the legislature had once decided the general lines on which we are to proceed, it was no longer open to the Select Committee to adopt this method Such a course is neither usual nor desirable."[1] None the less the effect of this defect was disastrous. The Tenancy Bill was admittedly one of the most important Bills with which the Council had to deal. The rights and interests of vast and influential classes were affected. Out of the vast body of representations of divers character, and expression of conflicting opinions, the Committee had no means of bringing out the facts except that of putting its own value on the

[1] Speech in Governor-General's Council on February 27, 1885.

opinions expressed. What made this specially regrettable was that the Government of Bengal, was at that time notoriously lacking in collected reliable data which the Committee could utilise in testing opinions and reconciling discrepancies. Dr. Hunter, who had to deal with statistics all over India, said about this in his minute of dissent: "Absence of such data is the more to be regretted in a measure affecting land-rights in Bengal; for in Bengal almost alone among the Provinces in India, there is no central department of statistics, and until quite recently there was no agricultural bureau, which might in some measure have compensated for the evidence of witnesses heard in the districts." The remarks of Mr. Quinton, another member of the Committee, are very illuminating. He says: "If there is one point more than another, with which we have been impressed in the course of our deliberations, it is that the Government of Bengal is far behind other governments and administrations in the possession of accurate information respecting the condition and relations of the agricultural community. The existence of the Permanent Settlement relieved the Government from the necessity in its own pecuniary interest of making a record of rights in land;...and the mode of collecting the revenue by the single process of selling the defaulting estate at headquarters deprived it of an agency in the interior of the districts, charged with the duty of making itself and its principles thoroughly acquainted with the landed classes and all facts bearing on their condition. This being so, we felt that we were travelling along a somewhat dark road....."[1]

It is no wonder that the Committee felt like travelling on a somewhat dark road. It is no wonder that they, at the last moment, abandoned the transferability question in which they were up against the most powerful landed interests who were loud and persistent in their opposition to the measure.

[1] Speech in the Governor-General's Council on February 27, 1885.

These interests had powerful organs in the press and powerful friends both in India and in England. The prejudices born of Western notions of property and relations of landlord and tenant were all on their side. It is indeed curious how divergent circumstances had their influence in shaping tenancy-legislation in Bengal. In a Government of India despatch to Secretary of State dated March 21, 1882, we find: "It is important not to ignore the oscillation of general opinion which occurred fifteen or sixteen years ago. Many events had tended to lower the claims of tenants in official estimation, and to help the cause of large landlords. Before the Mutiny, ideas on the subject of property and tenant-right in India took very much of their colour from the views of the able peasant-proprietary school of North-Western Provinces. But the occurrences of 1857 drew attention in some places to the leaderless condition of the people; the sympathies between the mass of agricultural population and their rulers were for some years disturbed by reminiscences of disorder and severity; the development of the country gave rise to hopes of colonisation; and thus theories of land-tenure which were unfavourable to tenant-right as being an impediment to the free disposal of property, were advocated in Lower Bengal, on behalf of Great European interests, and elsewhere, as coincident with political expediency. The relation between landlord and tenant began to be regarded as purely one of contract." (Para. 7.)

Under the circumstances, the Zamindar's case was put forth in the most favourable light, and they got the full benefit in any measure which admitted of any doubt and uncertainty. The Mahajan-dread had its share. The Committee vaguely felt that the landlord had to be given some kind of veto, and it dreaded its effect on the growing custom which they thought to be beneficial. The Committee seems to have believed complacently that if they left the custom to grow, it would crystallise in time into its proper shape in which it would be easier to give it legal recognition. It had been said that to leave

custom alone would be but to give free play to the law of survival of the fittest. In an able article Babu Asutosh Mookerjee (later Sir Asutosh) says about this: "Unquestionably the true function of legislature is to step in and anticipate the progress of salutary economical and social tendencies. But unfortunatety, we have very insufficient materials indeed, upon which to build any large conclusions respecting the character, the rate or the effects for good or evil, of the propagation of the idea of alienability of interests in land in Bengal... Wherever occupancy-holdings have become transferable by local custom, the fact is a good proof that the custom is suited to the locality. If occupancy-holdings are tending to become transferable in various parts of the country, depend upon it, that the tendency will ripen into a custom wherever it is really suited to the locality, and the introduction of the rule of transferability in other places cannot but prove mischievous. The development of customs is in all countries regulated by the law of the survival of the most suitable."[1] It is surprising how he wants to restrain the legislature from what he himself calls its true function; *i.e.*, stepping in, in anticipation of beneficial social tendencies and to give them the proper shape and direction. He does not seem to have realised, as the Select Committee did not realise, that at the stage at which the question had arrived at that time, if the legislature did not intervene, the Zamindars would; and from their relative weakness, the raiyats would have very little chance of restraining them from strangling the custom and moulding it in their own way.

This view of the question had been most ably put forward by Mr. Amir Ali in his minute of dissent to the Select Committee's Report. He says: "The free transfer of occupancy-holdings was, if I may so call it, the keystone of the measure. The custom had grown up in various parts in Bengal and was

[1] Calcutta Review, October, 1880.

gradually extending itself to the entire province. Excepting those places where the presence of a foreign element predominated, and caused some degree of friction between landlords and raiyats, the tenants who enjoyed the right of free transfer were admittedly more prosperous and better able to withstand the periodical shocks of scarcities and famines. It was admitted that, during the years immediately preceding the introduction of the measure in Council, the evidence in favour of the extension of the right of transferability had accumulated considerably. It was accordingly proposed to give a statutory sanction to that right.....It was resolved to give the right to all occupancy-raiyats throughout Bengal and Behar. During the present session, the provision has been dropped entirely from the Bill. While agreeing to the advisability of leaving to custom the right of free transfer in Behar, I consider that as regards Bengal, it would have a mischievous tendency. In every place, even where the right has been freely exercised, such as Presidency, Rajshahi, Dacca and Chittagong divisions, the customs will be disputed, with the result that a large portion of the consideration money will pass into the hands of the landlords or their servants. It would have been far better to recognise transferability throughout Bengal proper, subject, if necessary, to the payment, by the raiyats, of a graduated scale of fees upon the consideration money than to have left it to custom, which, I fear, will henceforth be disputed at every instance, to the serious prejudice of the tenant in the exercise of his right. With the safeguards which the Bengal Government proposed to attach to the recognition of the right in Bengal proper, no injury to the landholding interests need have been feared. I think the mode in which the question has been discussed, and decided, is likely to produce mischief. Had the question not been raised this mischief might have been avoided." He reiterated this warning when he spoke on the motion of Sir Stuart Baily for taking the Report of the Select Committee into consideration. He said: "In the face of this evidence, to forego all the advantages

gained after so much discussion, to leave the right of transferability to custom in the pressnt tension of feeling between landlords and tenants, is to invite the Zamindars to contest the right every time the opportunity occurs. The result of all this will be, firstly, to place a large proportion of the purchase-money in the pockets of the Zamindars, and, in the second place, materially to retard the extension and growth of the custom of transferability even where it has taken root." We shall see later on that the words proved prophetic. It will be seen that he thought the danger to be so great and real, that he was even ready to conciliate the opposition of the Zamindars by giving them a graduated fee on the purchase money. He brought in an amendment for this purpose and moved it on March 5, 1885. The resolution ran as follows :—

Mr. Amir Ali's Amendment.

That after Section 24 of the Bill, the following Section should be added :—

An occupancy-raiyat shall be entitled in Bengal proper to transfer his holding in the same manner and to the same extent as other immovable property :

(*a*) Provided, however, that, where the right of transfer by custom does not exist, in the case of a sale, the landlord shall be entitled to a fee of 10 per cent. on the purchase money.

(*b*) Provided also that a gift of an occupancy-right in land shall not be valid against a landlord, unless it is made by a registered instrument.

(*c*) The registering officer shall not register any such instrument except on payment of the prescribed fee for service on the landlord of notice of the registration.

(*d*) When any such notice (Instrument ?) has been registered, the registering officer shall forthwith serve notice of the registration on the landlord.

He moved that the acceptance of the motion on the grounds, that

(*a*) The custom of transferability had already taken deep root in Bengal.

(*b*) The raiyats who possess the right of transferability were known to be more prosperous and better able to withstand the shocks of famine.

(*c*) The information collected by the Government of Bengal proved that the Mahajan-danger was imaginary and that in the great majority of instances the transfers were made to bona-fide cultivators ; and that even where the right existed, and was exercised, the raiyats held tenaciously to their holdings.

(*d*) The legal recognition of the right would enhance the value of the holding.

(*e*) The law as it existed could be avoided by subletting ; and if matters were left to drift, it would encourage subletting.

(*f*) The question having been raised and brought to the state in which it was then, if it were left to custom, the Zamindar would demand a share of the purchase money even where the custom was recognised.

This was the last attempt to revive the question. But the amendment, as it was, was unfortunately worded. Mr. Amir Ali agreed to give ten per cent. of the purchase money to the Zamindar in places where the custom had not developed, but the amendment did not guard against the avoidance of this provision by making transfers in the guise of gifts.

There was a general opposition to the amendment even among the supporters of the principle of transferability, on the ground that it did not guard the supposed interests of the Zamindars and it did not deal with the Mahajan question. Faced with this atmosphere, Mr. Amir Ali, by leave, withdrew the Amendment.

This is how this important question was finatly dealt with by the legislature in 1885.

(*To be continued*)

J. C. GHOSH

THE BLUEBIRD

There's a bluebird ev'ry morning,
Singing 'mid the Moghra flow'rs;
And its daybreak song adorning
Greatly charms the early hours!
At each dawn the bluebird sings
Songs of love and happy things,
For I listen at each daybreak
When the bluebird bids me awake!
Ah! Is it love's prelude that the bluebird brings?

There's a bluebird singing sweetly,
In the blooming Moghra tree;
And I smile perhaps discreetly
As I hear it's melody!
For the bird has found a mate
And can sing and laugh at fate,
Can you wonder that I sigh
'Neath the Punjab summer sky?
Ah! I ask you, what is life when love comes late?

Hark! The bluebird sings of gladness,
As the Moghra gently sways;
But my mind is fill'd with sadness
For I think of other days!
Days when love and laughter went
Hand in hand with sentiment!
Striking life-chords for love's valse
From a heart that play'd me false!
Ah! without love, life's a dull entail to rent!

Winter came and drove the bluebird,
From the flow'r-shed Moghra tree;
Gone! Its songs are no longer heard
Bringing thoughts of love to me!
So it is in life's great strain
Love may come to lose or gain,
And the Moghra flow'r is left
Either kiss'd or else bereft!
Ah! Love passes by, and the Moghra flow'rs remain!

K. LENNARD ARKLOW

'TWIXT YOU AND I

'Twixt you and I the barriers break in twain,
And opposition flies, the way lies clear;
Love calls for love, unsullied love to reign,
For soon the marriage month draws near, my dear!

'Twixt you and I no secrets will be kept,
A love of rectitude and truth is ours;
A love where other passions die unwept
Unheard, they pass and mix with lesser pow'rs!

'Twixt you and I, the sun shall ever shine,
To sanctify our love of purity;
And hallow from above a love divine
That in itself brings honour's surety!

But if you play me false, frail flow'r of earth,
My vengeance shall you reap with ghastly eyes;
The wild seed sown shall grow and curse thy birth
'Twixt you and I, the barriers rise!

K. LENNARD-ARKLOW

NEED OF A SCHOOL OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES IN CONNECTION WITH CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

In the issue of *Forward* (Calcutta) of October 28, 1928, Mr. Arabindo Bose wrote an interesting and instructive article on "The Importance of the Study of German Language." I quote the passage containing practical suggestions made by him which may be of interest to the authorities of Calcutta University.

"The best way of encouraging the study of German is to establish German literary societies in different parts of India. The Germany-returned Indians must take the initiative in this case. Chairs of German should be created at the Indian Universities. German books must be imported into India in a far greater number. Our publishers and book-sellers should open direct connections with those of Germany. Important Indian works should be sent over to them to review in the leading German papers and journals. We are sure that this suggestion will not prove to be a cry in the wilderness but serve to accelerate co-operation between India and Germany. May I in conclusion request the Indian students to make a move on the point and request the University authorities to open regular German classes ?"

The suggestions quoted above are practical and should be carried out through the initiative and leadership of Germany-returned Indian scholars and businessmen. In this connection it seems to me that it is quite easy, practical and desirable to form a central organization to promote cultural relations between Germany and India. This central organization may be named "Indo-German Association" and its membership will be open to Indians and Germans who are interested in promoting cultural and commercial relations between these two nations. If Indian scholars in various Indian Universities,

Indian businessmen, who are now trading with Germany directly and indirectly, take the initiative of forming the central organization of an Indo-German Association at Calcutta, then they may expect that many German businessmen and others in India will support them in every possible way. In fact an Indo-German Association formed under the leadership of Indian scholars trained in Germany may be a factor in bringing about regular exchange of professors and scholars between German and Indian Universities.

While I heartily endorse the idea of promoting cultural relations between India and Germany, I wish to emphasise the point that every Indian University, if it is really to be a University, should have a School of Foreign Languages where all the living and important languages should be taught. From the standpoint of cultural value, the German language is no doubt very important; but from cultural as well as economic points of view India cannot ignore French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese and Japanese languages. In many respects, study of Spanish and Portuguese languages is very necessary for cultural and economic expansion of India. Indians cannot immigrate freely into the territories of the United States of America and the British Empire. Over and above the existence of Immigration Laws which discriminate against Indians, there is the terrible race prejudice against the Asiatics. But in all South America there is virtually no race prejudice whatsoever and ther is no special discriminatory Immigration Laws against Indians. In the past, Indian labourers migrated to distant shores for the sake of livelihood; it is becoming apparent now that the unemployment problem is menacing the so-called educated classes of India. It is imperative that educated Indians should migrate to all parts of the world as the men and women from British Isles did and are doing now. If an Indian youth while studying in the High School or University, studies Spanish, French, German, Russian, Japanese, Chinese or Persian, then he has the possibility of choosing some foreign field as a sphere

of his activities in business, cultural and political life. Indian Universities should have Schools of Foreign Languages and the Calcutta University should take the leadership in this matter.

Before I conclude this letter, I want to say that in Germany a University student seeking for a Doctor's degree must know at least two of the important living foreign languages. In Germany to-day, in all important cities, there are language schools such as Berlitz Schools where any one can take lessons on any of the important languages of the world. In the city of Munich and other German cities there are special night classes, arranged by the city and University authorities to teach important foreign languages, in connection with night schools supported by the city. It is needless to add that in every German University or a so-called Higher Technical School (which is really a first rate University) there are facilities for teaching foreign languages.

In the field of culture, commerce and industry and politics, the future of India is most intimately connected with the rest of the world and specially those nations which are moving forward in world affairs. This being the case, if the people of India—specially the future leaders of India—do not know foreign languages, how would they be able to establish intimate contact with the rest of the world. I have noted that some of the young political leaders of India such as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and others have recently advocated the need of studying foreign languages. This is a very good sign ; but the movement for spreading the knowledge of important languages should be directed by far-sighted Indian educators, connected with the Indian Universities and so I appeal to the authorities of the Calcutta University to take the necessary initiative in the matter.

In conclusion, I may say, that if the authorities of the Calcutta University say that owing to the lack of funds they cannot take any effective step to carry out the idea of establishing a School of Foreign Languages, to me this will be a very

ineffective excuse. "The will to do" and a "man with a far-sighted programme of action" are more important than all the money. This has been proved by the life of Sir Asutosh in creating the Post-Graduate Department of the Calcutta University and making all kinds of improvements in connection with the teaching of science. If the University authorities really want to take progressive steps, they can make a small beginning and they will find that their good work will always be supported by the general public, and ultimately even by a reluctant Government.

TARAKNATH DAS



CONSPECTUS

XI

This is an endeavour (probably not very successful) to group the subject of vocational education in a proper perspective with education generally. It should be read with scepticism, and due regard to the fact that the point of view is not as central as it ought to be. There is need for a score of articles on the same subject, each by a different writer.

Education as it is in Europe originated in the monasteries, and in an age of simple faith. Every religion is in its inception a reaction against the ideal of personal worldly success as a chief aim in life. All old educational foundations, therefore, are dominated by an ideal, in its essence unselfish, and regarding any line of study leading to a material gain with suspicion, if not with undisguised hostility. "The function of education is to enlarge the intellectual and spiritual dominion of mankind. In as much as it does anything else it is neglecting its proper work." The ideal is a noble one, though incomplete and still continues to attract as it deserves to do, nearly every one of good character, whose mind is not distorted by worldly circumstances: that is to say nearly every professional educationalist, and all well-to-do families of two or three generations standing.

The rest of the world is now at, or about at, the extreme of a counter-reaction towards materialism: Europe perhaps past the extreme, and the East still swinging in that direction. This outside opinion would probably regard the monastic ideal with contempt, as of no practical importance were it not that there has appeared in the world as a bye-product of pure learning, very great power over material things and therefore an ability to produce wealth far beyond the dreams of our ancestors. This being so, unregenerate lay opinion is quite

definite that education may be made a powerful agent of individual success, and that it ought to be. In as much as it does anything else it is neglecting its proper work.

It is quite surprising how few of those who interest themselves in education do not belong whole-heartedly to one or the other of these two camps. Nearly all American schools and colleges for instance being quite modern foundations, belong very definitely to the utilitarian side. Foundations are often, if not usually, philanthropic in intention, but it is more or less openly assumed that the best thing that can be done for a student is to make him a more successful man. The watchword is efficiency. Internal administration is usually under an energetic organizing publicist principal who keeps a keen eye on the market for educated men. Research is valued principally as an advertisement. Many short and superficial courses of instruction are offered, of which students select those that will get them a degree with the least labour in the shortest time. There are practically no devotees of learning with no ulterior objective. Of the high and holy monastic spirit there is no trace.

It would probably be impossible, now, to find anywhere in the world a school or University of the primitive monastic type, totally unaffected by the utilitarian heresy. Or to put it in another way there is nothing quite so damnable as the American University at the other extreme. But we will if we consider each institution from this point of view become aware of quite a number in Europe, that, while admitting modernism, do it with extreme reluctance. Oxford, the Home of Lost Causes, is the type. A famous manufacturer of motor cars who has set up his works in the neighbourhood has just been telling the public that a University education is worse than useless ; a tribute probably very gratifying to the University authorities.

It is for all practical purposes exactly true that, Indian educational ideas, before the advent of the English were wholly

monastic. The cultured Indian of those days was fully in sympathy with the academic founders of the Indian Universities : but there were two other factors that tended to partial utilitarianism. The most important was no doubt the poverty of the people, seeking an Eldorado in Government employment ; which provided the urge, the directing force being the need of the Government for qualified assistance. Indian thought did not envisage a utilitarian aim at all. English thought was either monastic inasmuch as it came from the educational wing, or looking for assistance where it was most needed in as much as it came from the administration. We ought to remember, moreover, if we are fully to understand, that the administration was, as it still is, to a large extent, educated in Eton, Oxford and Cambridge. It was anti-modern.

No blame is being imputed to any one in this analysis. The roots of the present lie deep in the past, and no generation can escape the results of its antecedents except partially by a very extraordinary effort of constructive imagination. That is what is wanted now if this generation is not to make as many mistakes as its predecessors did. But this is intercalary.

English in Indian Universities is English language without modern English thought. It is a very effective vehicle for the thought of Shakespeare and the Spectator ; but quite a lot of things have happened since those days that have given rise to thoughts undreamt of then. The argument, undoubtedly well founded, that the English of Shakespeare has never been surpassed or even approached, is not really a good argument for making him the backbone of an Indian education in English. Only a slight mispronunciation will destroy Shakespeare's music. And if the music is taken away what is left ? Not much except a little cheap and shallow pessimism. How little even of the thought of his own time there is, may easily be seen by comparing him with his originals. Antony and Cleopatra, for instance, is merely Plutarch done into blank verse. According to Shakespeare Antony and Cleopatra were

fine romantic characters. Actually, he was a sensual hog; she was a harlot; both were merely disgusting and in due course and as an inevitable result both reaped the wage of sin which is death. The details have no real interest apart from Shakespeare's tintinnabulations. There are in India, at the present day, large numbers of the kind of Englishmen that have made their mother-land and the empire the mighty power that it is. Very few of them know nearly as much of Shakespeare as the average Calcutta B.A. does. He leaves them cold, for the simple reason that he has nothing of any practical interest to tell them. The great days of England are these days, not those of Elizabeth and her successors in the 17th and 18th centuries. Not that Shakespeare took any interest in the England of his own time. Beyond a casual and fulsome flattery of Elizabeth there is no reference to it throughout his works. There is much of value in English thought and English literature for the Indian students. But up to the 19th century there is hardly anything that is not more nobly expressed in his own literature. He should make his acquaintance with English by means of the writers of the 19th and 20th centuries, and not continue to make the Bard turn in his grave with parodies of his rhetoric any longer. A distinguished person said a few months ago that University Education might well be suspended for a decade. He was at least quite right as regards Shakespeare, and the same applies to most of the other text books in English commonly used in Indian Universities.

Engineering Education in India is an utilitarian outcast from the monastic University—or at least was, up to a very few years ago. There had to be Engineering schools because a road or a canal cannot be imported as machines and engines can, there was no need to make them more than Civil Engineering Colleges. There is now a feeling that Indians capable of manipulating modern machines also would be very convenient. The idea that they might also design and make them has hardly yet dawned on anyone. This concludes the historical retrospect.

Education in India has now come under Indian control, and will remain there. How many Indians realize that this gift was a gift of complete freedom, provided they use it and that everything they aspire to must follow as surely as the day follows the night ? Loyola, the founder of the Jesuits said, "Give me the first seven years, you can have the rest." Not the first seven only, but all the educational period has been given. How should it be used ?

If a search of opinion were made to discover points of agreement between the Indian and the Englishman instead of differences the most exact coincidence would be found in that both are apparently quite convinced that Democracy is a better form of Government than autocracy. It is perhaps not so fully demonstrated as its advocates assume, but if we are to trust published opinion, nearly all the world is satisfied that the people must rule and ought to rule.

It is recorded of (I think) the late Marquis of Salisbury, that when an extension downward of the franchise had taken place he said : "*Now* our first step is to educate our masters." That was practical politics. It would have been still more practical if it had been said a generation earlier.

What is the sane procedure for any person who contemplates doing what has often been done before ? Is it not to make first of all an intensive study of previous failures and successes? The intent of the Indian people at the present time is unmistakeable. It is to make India a self-governing nation. We need not at all consider the wisdom or unwisdom of the intent. We can say without hesitation, as a mere matter of obvious commonsense : "Then the most important subject for your young men is history." So it is. But it should be a complete history, and it should be dispasssionately studied. The histories of England and India are both most unsuitable. It is almost impossible to study them without passion, and both are incomplete. England is at the very crest of her power and glory. The factors of her decay (if they exist) have not yet begun to work

themselves out. The history of that India which is in the minds of most Indians to-day does not exist. There is no doubt inspiration in the history of Past India, but more than inspiration is needed to build a nation. Moreover, introspective study is never effective. No doctor ever attempts to diagnose his own illness if it is at all serious. He always calls in another doctor, well knowing that his discomfort or pain will completely distort his judgment of his own case. There is (as it fortunately happens) one almost complete national history in existence. It is the history of Rome. An able German historian (Mommsen) has traced its rise from a small agricultural community to the great days of the Caesars, and Gibbon has traced the decline and fall. Both of these books are summaries of the historical research of many centuries, and both (especially the former) are real histories ; that is to say they are conscious of the people, and are not obsessed with personalities and patriotism.

The history of Rome should constitute the back-bone of any general education in history of any people regardless of race because it is the most complete available. It is the most nearly complete, but it is not in itself quite complete for several reasons, and requires supplementing. The serious defect is the ignoring of pre-human history. Those who compiled it did not know what we have now discovered ; that life is an ever victorious and progressive force, with a guarantee of, not thousands but, millions of years behind it. This knowledge is the inspiration of the Modern World and should never be omitted from any scheme of education, whatever else may be left out.

Less important at this moment than history, but likely to become more and more important, is Economics. We have for many months been stressing the wealth-producing value of applied science ; but it is not sufficient to produce wealth ; and a nation is not necessarily well-to-do and healthy because it does. That is one of the lessons of Rome. It is hardly too much to say, that Rome perished under the enormous tributes of her conquests. This is one of the problems Rome failed to

solve, and which we must now solve or perish as she did—namely how to arrest the rotting effect of riches ; not only how to produce wealth ; but also how to give to each individual as much as will benefit him, and not so much as will ruin him. Not only how much, but in what form. The Romans thought that nothing could go wrong if they gave free food and free amusements to everybody that asked for them, which seems not unreasonable. But it was in its disastrous results worse than starvation and slavery. It seems so obvious, that it is always tried ; and is being tried at the present day. It has always failed, and always must till the lesson is learned that " Men cannot live by bread alone."

Rome was a self-contained state. There was very little trade in anything except trumpery with the world beyond. No doubt the World State will come again, but it is a long way below the horizon.

International trade in its economic aspects is therefore another thing that must be studied apart from history. There is *no* history of international economics on our present scale, and the history of internal economics is a history of failure only. The conclusion is that economics is pre-eminently a research subject. Classical economics is better than none, but not much. It has no successes to its credit corresponding to the successes of applied science ; and embodies many fallacies.

These are the neglected or rather ill-taught subjects in Indian (not only Indian) Universities in the order of their importance ; namely History, Economics and Applied Science. The third we have dealt with very fully. The first two are here given their right place lest it be supposed that vocational education is offered as a panacea. It is not.

A study of the calendar of any University or College, will exhibit a common feature, on which all responsible opinion is now quite unanimous, namely, an increasing intensity of specialisation in the senior years. There is hardly any item of knowledge that might not conceivably be useful, but life is too

short to learn thoroughly all that might be learned. We have already emphasized the enormous increase of accumulated knowledge that must now be absorbed, if a young man is to reach a professional standard, while he still is a young man, nor is it only more time that is needed. There are many signs that the necessary ability is not so easy to find as it was when there was so much less to learn. It is not only because most men are less able than he was that we have no cases like Leonardo da Vinci's now. It is no longer possible for any man, however brilliant, to earn fame in half a dozen different professions. This is one of the things that tends to disguise our real progress. Ability that would have made a man famous a century ago, is to-day barely sufficient to distinguish him from the crowd. Life being as competitive as, or even more competitive than, ever it was, we are driven to attack on a narrow front, and to support it on a base no wider than is necessary. It is regrettable in as much as it tends to separate man from man, but it is inevitable. The best that can be done is to postpone it as long as possible. Specialisation is an economic necessity, but educationally it is a danger.

There are two childish characteristics that must have strongly impressed any one who has watched a child throughout a whole day. One is his tireless energy, and the other is his fickleness. From the moment that he awakes till he drops asleep in the midst of his play, he is going for all he is worth, and never for more than half an hour at the same thing. *He* needs no conversion to antispecialism. He knows it to be a loathsome thing, to be postponed as long as ever he can.

The organizers of elementary education, however, disagree with both the child and the university. God alone knows what amount of childish suffering their invincible ignorance and brutal stupidity have caused. The degree of specialisation in the typical elementary school is by far more intense than it is in the very highest classes of a University. Reading

and Writing is intellectually one subject and Arithmetic is another. That's all the child gets for the first three or four years. He is trained as a clerk and accountant. Nine-tenths of his energy is suppressed, and the universal appetite for new knowledge that might be so gloriously exploited is all wasted. It is hardly too much to say that the first two years in the College are spent in inculcating elementary concepts, that the child would have devoured with avidity before bitter experience had convinced him that *all* learning is labour. The child is born with perfectly healthy instincts. He knows what he wants to know, and is anxious to learn it. What parent is there that has not groaned under his endless questioning ? Why should we assume that it is his duty to become a clerk-accountant before he does anything else ?

The elementary school exists to train citizens. For most of them it will provide the only education they will get. It ought to cast so wide a net that ability of every possible kind will be caught (interested) and directed to its proper career.

If it is now objected that this is all theory which can have no useful application unless some sort of a syllabus of elementary education is laid down, we must reply that he who alone is qualified to lay down a syllabus is unable to write, and anyhow could not be bothered to do such a tedious, stupid thing. But if his teacher is sympathetic and kindly, and not a mere slave-driver the child will tell it to him as fast as he needs to know it. Obviously the teacher must be not only kindly but of very wide culture. It need not be very profound. He should also be more interested in children than in anything else, and able to suffer gladly their endless naughtiness from morning to night. In other words he should be a woman.

No 'mere' man is qualified to teach small children. They invariably irritate him to madness and he protests himself in the only possible way by means of a harsh and rigid discipline,

very bad for the child. A woman's endless patience with her children is not weakness, as the father nearly always thinks it is. Her method is the method of love, and is the correct method. The root of the father's disapproval is his own incapacity to imitate her. He is unwise if he interferes before the child wants him. His time will come.

Generally speaking a woman is as unsuitable for teaching children over ten years of age as a man is for teaching children under eight. This applies specially to male children, but is also true to a certain extent of girls. We will not venture to say particularly what it is that a man can teach, and a woman cannot, as we did in the reverse case. It suffices to say that it is important and should not be omitted from the education of either sex.

We add these notes on elementary education because no system of advanced education can rest securely, except on universal compulsory education. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the best thing that could be done for University and Higher Education generally, in this country, would be to suspend University Extension altogether until this is achieved. There would be an incalculable raising of the standard, if the higher institutions were forced to select the same number of students from among *all* the people instead of from a tiny minority as at present.

Explicit.

L. D. COUESLANT

"SEMPER FIDELIS!"

Bright are my thoughts, now Love's Springtime is here,
My hopes are like buds of sweet flowers;
'Tis then all my thoughts are of thee, my dear,
For the love and the home to be ours!
"Semper Fidelis" my motto shall be
Dearest, my true love is only for thee!

Tender in Summer, like roses in June,
My buds blossom out into flow'rs;
It seems my path with red roses is strewn
I'm as gay as the birds in the bowers!
"Semper Fidelis" my motto shall be
Dearest, my true love is only for thee!

Then came the Autumn and harvest of Love,
For I asked you to marry me then;
Your answer was "yes," my hopes soared above
You made me the happiest of men!
"Semper Fidelis" my motto shall be
Dearest, my true love is only for thee!

Now has Love's Winter time come with its strife,
The frost of old age, bleak and drear;
The birds and the flow'rs have faded from life
There's none but ourselves left to cheer!
"Semper Fidelis" my motto has been
Dearest, my true love is still for my queen!

K. LENNARD-ARKLOW

AN APPRECIATION OF THE EARLY LIFE OF BUDDHA[1]

India, they say, is plentiful in natural resources. But India is plentiful also in intellectual, moral and spiritual materials. There is hardly any field of activity—intellectual, political, industrial or commercial—in which India, modern as well as ancient, has not held its own against any nation. But in the sphere of spiritual knowledge and development, India stands not only unsurpassed but unequalled. If any proof of this statement is required, it is furnished by an occasion like that of to-day. To-day is the day when Lord Buddha was born, to-day is the day when he obtained Enlightenment, and to-day is also the day when he passed away to that bourne from which nobody has returned. Whenever a function like that of to-day is celebrated in India, what do we find? It is natural that many Indians should be present. But be it noted that they are not all Bengalees, but represent all parts of the country. This is not all. We find here people amongst us who have come from the borderlands of India. We have here Sinhalese, Burmese, Nepalese and Tibetans. And not unfrequently do we notice the Japanese and also the Chinese in such assemblies. Again, the Europeans who claim to be rationalists are also found. We thus see that people of various nationalities, in fact the whole world, joins hand in paying homage to the hallowed memory of the personage who was born, became Buddha, and also passed away on this day of the year. And when we know that he was an Indian and that he lived and preached his doctrines in India, we feel proud that he was born in India and raised this country so high in the estimation of the world. And we must all agree in saying that he was the greatest son of India.

[1] Speech delivered on the 23rd May, 1929, in the Hall of the Mahā-Bodhi Society Calcutta.

Nearly twenty-four centuries have elapsed since the demise of the founder of Buddhism, to show reverence to whose memory we have assembled here to-night. His name was Siddhārtha Gautama. He traced his descent from the Ikshvāku family. He was son of Śuddhodana, chief of a Kshatriya clan called Śākya. The Śākyas occupied a territory at the foot of the Nepal hills bordering upon the Basti and Gorakhpur Districts of the U. P. They were an artistocratic republic, owing fealty to the king of Kosala when Buddha was born. The biographies of Buddha were compiled many years after him. There is thus a sort of mythological air about them. Nevertheless, if we take what is common to the accounts of his life such as the *Buddhacharita* and *Lalitavistara* preserved by Northern Buddhism in Nepal and Tibet and the *Jātaka-aṭṭhakathā* of Southern Buddhism in Ceylon, that ought to pass for his reliable biography so long as it is not contradicted by the earliest Pali canon and is stripped of its miraculous portions. It is true that much has been said and written about Buddha, about his life and work, but " a well-written life," says Carlyle, " is almost as rare as a well-spent one." Fortunately for us, a well-spent life is before us, namely, that of Buddha, though such a thing is a rarity of rarities. Unfortunately there is no well-written life of that greatest son of India. Indeed, Buddha was a genius, a mighty colossal genius. The characteristics of a genius are : (1) the eye to see, which is a divine gift, (2) ' the transcendent capacity of taking trouble,' as Carlyle would say, and (3) fecundity of thought. No account of his work, which does not do justice to these qualities as developed in him, can be called life of Buddha.

Let us first consider the first characteristic of genius and see how it was evolved in that Śākya prince : I mean, ' the eye to see.' It is not the physical eye, but surely the spiritual eye, which sees through all the senses and is susceptible to all external impressions. A musician can hear and appreciate many fine notes which are imperceptible to an ordinary

untrained ear. A painter can perceive and be transported with joy on noticing colours which an ordinary man can never detect. A poet quickly apprehends and drinks in beauties in nature or in man which are hidden to the prosaic eye of an average person. In fact, to a genius this world is no commonplace, and, being of a fine, delicate and sensitive nature like a highly strung musical instrument, he is exceedingly susceptible to all external touches or contacts of even the lightest character. It is true that Buddha was not the son of a king. Nevertheless, he was a scion of a noble aristocratic family. He himself tells us that his father Śuddhodana had built for him three palaces, one for the hot, one for the cold, and one for the rainy season, replete with all comforts and sensual enjoyments, so that there could be no cause for any repulsion or disgust at any unsightly sight. Nevertheless, the sight of an old man, a diseased man and a dead man affects him in a way in which probably none of us has ever been so affected. While going out of his palace one day, we are told, he meets a man with white hair, his hand resting on a staff, *sans* eyes, *sans* teeth, *sans* everything. Similarly, another day he sees a diseased man with a swollen belly, his frame shaking as he pants, and uttering piteously 'mother, mother.' On a third occasion he comes upon a scene where a dead body is being borne by four men and followed by companions beating their breasts and mourning unceasingly. If we meet a man in a street suffering, say, from leprosy, we fly away for our life, cursing our City Fathers. If we see an old decrepit man, crying 'food, food,' we wonder how this beggar nuisance is allowed to remain in this second city of the empire. If again the sight of a dead body being carried is obtruded upon us, we forthwith close our eyes and ears, and run away from that horrid spectacle. We ourselves know that we are subject to disease, that we shall also be grown double with age, and that we shall have to quit this mortal coil. Nevertheless, no sight is more hedious, disgusting and terrifying to us all than any one of these. Such

was not however the case with Buddha, though he was rolling in luxury. These sights, commonplace though they were, offered a rich pabulum to his mind which kept on reflecting upon these phenomena.

This incident in Buddha's life reminds us of a story of Kabir. Kabir, we are told, once came to a place where a woman was plying a hand-mill. He stopped, watched, and all of a sudden burst out crying. People gathered round him and could not understand why such an ordinary thing as a hand-mill should move him to tears. So they asked what the matter was with him. He pointed to the hand-mill, and said that whatever grains were put into it from the apertures above were pounded to atoms. Similarly, this world, he proceeded further, was such a machine which pulverised everybody that got into it. Many people laughed and called him a lunatic. But there were some who admired him, but could give him no comfort. Kabir, however, continued crying till a saint of the name of Nipat Niranjan came. On learning why the former was weeping, the latter smiled a little and remarked that what Kabir saw was half the truth. It is true that whatever grains were put into the hand-mill were mostly reduced to powder. But there was that pivot pin which was driven tight into the lower stone and round which the upper stone revolved, and the grains which stood close to this central pivot remained whole and intact. Similarly even in this machine-like world, those human beings were saved who stuck fast to the immovable pivot, namely, the Supreme Soul. Kabir understood the exposition, rose up with a smiling face, and went home.

Now, of all the commonplace sights of an Indian household the most commonplace is the sight of a hand-mill. If we at all go to a place where a hand-mill is being plied, we go there not so much to inspect that execrable thing as the person who is turning it round and round, just to make sure that she is a 'maiden withering on the stalk.' But to find tongues in a hand-mill and hear sermons from that stone is considered worthy of

a moon-struck individual. To a genius, however, nothing is commonplace. Kabir was a genius, and so even the commonest sight of a hand-mill gave his mind much food for serious thought, so serious, indeed, that it made him cry. But Kabir was a fortunate man, for he had not to weep for many days, certainly not many months or years. Nipat Niranjan came to his help even before it was long, and the mystery which hung over him was unriddled. Such was not, however, the case with Buddha. On seeing the sights of a diseased, an aged and a dead man, he knew he was subject to disease, old age and death. And he thought to himself as follows: "Myself subject to birth, growth and decay, sickness and death, pain and impurity, sought after what also is subject to these, namely, wife and children, slaves male and female, goats and sheep, ... elephants, horses....." and so forth. And when he reflected thus, all the joy of life died within him. But his reflection did not stop here. And he further thought to himself: "How if I seek the birthless, ageless, diseaseless, deathless and the stainless, incomparable surety, the extinction of illusion!" To realise this object, however, it was necessary that he should renounce the world, or to use the Buddhist phrase "go forth from home to lead the homeless life." But this was by no means an easy thing. Because his was a loving soul, and affection for his parents and for his wife had laid deep roots in his heart. And as he was revolving the problem of existence in his mind and had very nearly resolved upon forsaking the world, a son was born to him, and he felt that this was but another link which nature had forged and added to the chain which had bound him to the world. Just before renouncing the world, a longing seized his mind to see the new-born babe. He went to the lying-in chamber. Yaśodharā, his wife, was fast asleep with one hand upon the babe which was lying with its face turned the other way. If he wanted to see the infant, it was absolutely necessary to remove the mother's hand. But if he did so, it would surely wake her up, and she would

prevent him from leading 'the homeless life.' A struggle was thus raging fiercely in his mind. Prosaic critics may say that Buddha has made no reference to this struggle in any one of his speeches recorded in the Pali Canon. But the Pali Canon does not contain any—not even the most oblique—reference by Buddha to his wife. Nevertheless, it speaks of his son Rāhula, and Rāhula would not have been born if Buddha surely had no wife. Again, the biographies preserved by both the Northern and Southern Buddhism give a graphic description of the hard struggle that was raging in his mind just before forsaking the world. And this is just what might be expected of Buddha. Buddha was a genius, an extraordinary personage, a *lokottara* as Bhavabhūti would say. "Who can comprehend," says this Sanskrit poet in the *Uttara-Rāmacharita* "the minds of *lokottara* or extraordinary persons, which are more tender than a flower and (at the same time) harder than an adamant." Nobody was more devoted to his wife than Rāma to Sītā. And yet when as king it was necessary to forsake her in the interest of public peace and confidenee, he did it, making his heart as hard as adamant. Nobody loved his wife and child more than Buddha did his Yaśodharā and Rāhula, and yet when he was resolved upon finding 'the diseaseless, ageless and deathless' or in other words, when he was bent upon finding Truth of Existence which was higher than divinity itself, his soft, impressionable, melting heart became hard, impervious and ruthless, and without giving any thought to what his parents and wife might feel, he left his home, sweet home, on the full moon-light night of Āshāḍha, mounted on his favourite steed Kaṇṭhaka and accompanied by his charioteer Chhanna. He did not stop till he crossed the Anomā beyond the Koliyan country. There he alighted and sent back the courser with the charioteer. Then he cut off his hair and beard, and, putting on the yellow garb, dedicated himself to 'the homeless life.'

There are critics who tell us that there was nothing singular or superhuman in Buddha's renunciation of the world.

Examples of such renunciation, they say, were very usual and numerous in Ancient India. We regret we cannot understand these critics. There are persons who have forsaken the world, being afflicted by misfortunes and bereavements in the family. There are persons who have retired to a forest gladly buffeting the winter wind because it is 'not so unkind as man's ingratitude.' There are many such both in modern and ancient India. But there are persons who in the midst of prosperity and comfort have felt "a yearning and a want which nothing could satisfy and which have robbed of their charm all earthly gains and hopes." Such are the persons described by Yājñavalkya in the *Brihadāraṇyakopanishad*. Such persons have always been very few and far between. But they, be it noted, on renouncing the world, join one religious school or another. Such was not the case with Buddha. On seeing disease, old age and death he hankered after 'the diseaseless, ageless and deathless.' He was in the world, but found the life of sensual pleasures wanting. He had therefore to take up 'the homeless life,' but not with a view to join any mendicant sect and spend his whole life uninterruptedly in the company of that fraternity, but rather to ascertain what religious thought and discipline would enable him to reach the goal he had set before his mind's eye. His was thus a 'homeless life' in quest of Truth, that is, a life of most strenuous endeavour and most trying hardship. That it began with positive discomfort may be seen from what he has said about his experiences when he ate his first meal gathered by begging. "His stomach turned," says he, "and he felt as if his inwards were on the point of coming out by his mouth." It was by a stern exercise of his will power that he overcame this feeling of distress at that repulsive food." And we know that his whole work as a researcher when he turned a mendicant, was overspread with restlessness, pain, despair and struggle. This is just as it should be. "No pain, no palm; no thorns, no throne; no gall, no glory; no cross, no crown."

Taking a week's respite in a mango-grove at Anupiya, he went to Rājagriha, capital of Bimbisāra, King of Magadha, who, we are told, tried his best to induce Buddha to revert to his life as a householder. But the latter was firm in his resolution. From there he repaired to the place where Āḷāra Kālāma was staying with his colony of pupils. There he not only learned the theory, but also mastered the practice of a *samādhi* or trance called *ākiṁchanyāyatana* and within such a short time that Āḷāra Kālāma offered to treat Buddha as his equal and co-leader of the colony. But that did not satisfy him, and so he proceeded to the site occupied by Uddaka Rāmaputra and his disciples. There he mastered the highest type of *samādhi* or trance called *naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṁjñ-āyatana*, but without much fruit. He was now convinced that the Yoga system of thought and discipline was not the proper end of the religious life, because that did not take him to 'the diseaseless, ageless and deathless.' He was now determined to give a trial to the system and practice of asceticism which had then been brought to a perfection. He therefore retired to the forest of Uruvelā, not far from modern Bodh-Gaya. This new life began well. He "spied a beautiful, secluded spot among the trees, with a pleasant, shallow, clear-flowing river close by, easily accessible, with fields and pastures all around." He was also waited upon by five Brahman ascetics, who "swept his cell, and did all manner of service for him, and kept constantly at his beck and call, all the time saying, 'Now he will become a Buddha, now he will become a Buddha.'" In such favourable circumstances he commenced a series of austerities, each more terrible than its predecessor. At times both his mind and body recoiled from these courses, but with a strong, indomitable will he set himself fast to these practices. The result was, as he tells us, that when he touched his belly, he felt his back-bone through it, and when he rubbed his limbs to refresh them, his hair fell off. So emaciated and worn almost a skeleton he had become through rigorous fasting and terrible austerities. Self-mortification

had reached its utmost limit, and yet there was no enlightenment, no insight into the riddle of the world. There must be another way, he thought, to this enlightenment. He was convinced of the hollowness and futility of ascetic practices. "It were not easy," said Buddha to himself, "to attain to this blessedness with body so exceedingly lean and wasted; how if I eat of substantial food and rice porridge?" He therefore wisely began to take food and also to indulge in some of the trances of contemplation. This brought a speedy recuperation to both his soul and body. But the five Brahman ascetics, who stayed with him and did menial service, lost faith in him and went away. On the full-moon-day of Vaiśākha he went to the foot of a tree near the Nirañjarā river. Just at that time Sujātā, daughter of the Chieftain, came to the spot for worship. Thinking him to be the presiding deity of the tree, she offered him milk-rice and departed. He partook of the dish, spread the grass given him by a grass-cutter, and sat cross-legged beneath the tree, exclaiming: "Let my skin, nerves and bones waste away; let all flesh and blood in me dry up, but never from this seat will I stir until I have attained the supreme and absolute wisdom." And lo! on the very first day of contemplation, he attained to Enlightenment and unriddled the mystery of the world.

Let us now pause here for a moment and see whether we cannot appreciate this part of Buddha's life also. Gautama Siddhārtha, we know, left his home when he was twenty-nine years old, and he became Buddha or Enlightened when he was thirty-five. We have thus a period of six years, which may be described as period of quest after truth. It was, in fact, a period of research student or professor. Unfortunately we are not in possession of a full account of this important period. We only glean from Buddhist scriptures that during these six years he served as a disciple, first, of Āḷara Kālāma, and next of Uddaka Rāmaputra, and afterwards gave himself up to the rigorous performance of religious austerities. These were no

doubt the principal events of his career as a researcher and as such have been recorded, but we cannot suppose that they form the whole account of this part of his life. In the Piṭakas many incidents are narrated which show that Buddha was thoroughly conversant with the doctrines and principles of the various religious schools and sects that were in existence in his time. When and where could he have acquired this intimate knowledge of these ? He could not have done so when he was living a life of self-indulgence in his father's mansion. And after Enlightenment, he appears before the world as a full-fledged preacher, tackling effectively every doctrine or principle of his time. The obvious reply is that he secured this first-hand knowledge during his career as a researcher. It will thus be seen that this career was occupied with a close and systematic study of the religious and philosophic activity of his age with a view to find out 'the diseaseless, ageless and deathless' after which he had hankered.' And how do we find him during this period? Exactly like a genuine researcher. It is a common-spread but wrong belief that truth flashes upon the mind of a researcher, merely by thinking about it. It is forgotten that he has to frame many hypotheses and conduct many experiments which very often end in nothing, or at best produce only negative results. It is by wasting time and energy by, for some tim, pursuing the wrong tracks that truth flashes upon the mind of the researcher, almost by the method of residue. Of course, when the truth has once revealed itself in this manner, the researcher is eulogised as a man of genius. Such was the case with Newton, Lord Kelvin and all scientific workers. The excellence and utility of the truths they have discovered overpower us so much that we forget what an amount of toiling and suffering it has cost them in the pursuit of their enquiry. Carlyle is therefore perfectly right in saying that genius is 'the transcendent capacity of taking trouble.' There was no genius in the field of science or religion who has not taken infinite pains in getting at the truth. Buddha, a genius

that he was, had to show this 'transcendent capacity of taking trouble,' and he did show it wonderfully. Enlightenment did not come to him spontaneously. It came after a fairly long period of six years' toiling and moiling. He began by following the wrong roads and frittering away both his time and labour. He had fallen into 'Himalayan blunders.' For we know that he carried his ascetic practices to such an excess that he had very nearly succumbed. In fact, messengers were sent to Śuddhodana to inform him that his son was dead. But by no means disconcerted, he stuck on till the secret of life and death unfolded itself to him.

We thus see that wisdom dawned upon his mind, first because he had 'the eye to see' and he saw with it clearly and fearlessly; and secondly because he had 'the transcendent capacity of taking trouble' and showed it with a fervour and lustre still unsurpassed by any human worker. Because this life of Buddha has a humanising effect upon us, it appeals to us with such force. If he had been represented to us as a perfect man, always thinking and doing things correctly, we should not have thought much of him. We should have admired him from a distance, as we ought to in the case of superhuman beings. But we feel that he is one of us. Being a genius or *lokottara* he no doubt exacts our admiration, but we feel that the life he has led, that is, the thoughts he had thought, the feelings he has felt and the acts he has willed are all human, though decidedly of the better and higher type. Even some of the incidents of his life, though they may smack of the supernatural, are typically and intensely human, and as such arrest our attention. Take the case of Māra, who corresponds to the Satan of Christianity. He visits and tempts Buddha many a time. Here let us take that occasion when he was resting after Enlightenment under the Shepherd's Banyan Tree, as it was called, on the bank of the river Nirañjarā. Then Māra came and addressed Buddha as follows: "Pass away now, Lord, from existence! Let the Blessed One now die!" And what

reply does Buddha give? "I will not die," says Buddha, "until this pure religion of mine shall have become successful, prosperous and wide-spread and popular in all its full extent, until, in a word, it shall have been well proclaimed among men." We are apt to treat this incident as a preternatural event and to think that Māra could never have manifested himself to Buddha. Scepticism is so rampant still in this world that even if a ghost were really to rise from a grave, we would refuse to believe our eyes. In days gone by, however, people believed that superhuman beings could mix with men. There is no reason therefore why we should not believe that this incident did occur in Buddha's life in the sense that Buddha thought that he really faced Māra, the Evil One. In fact, such a thing did happen to a religious reformer in Europe in mediæval times, I mean, Luther. "In the room of the Wartburg, where he sat translating the Bible, they still show you a black spot on the wall; the strange memorial of one of these conflicts. Luther sat translating one of the Psalms; he was worn-down with long labour, with sickness, abstinence from food: there arose before him some hideous indefinable Image which he took for the Evil One to forbid his work. Luther started up, with fiend-defiance; flung his inkstand at the spectre and it disappeared." If we now ask a scientist or any sceptic of his ilk what we are to think of these apparitions, he is sure to explain them as hallucinations. They may be hallucinations of the senses or the brain or of both, but they are not caused by any physical or mental ailment but are consistent with perfect sanity of mind. They are caused rather by an over-sensitive mind steeped deep in the belief that we can have intercourse with the spirit denizens of worlds other than our own. "But the man's heart that dare rise defiant, face to face, against Hell itself, can give no higher proof of fearlessness." It is in this light we have to interpret Buddha's fight with Māra. A more valiant soul than Buddha it is impossible to find.

Time does not permit our considering Buddha's solution of the life problem, the ripe fruit of his research work, which ensured the attaintment of 'the diseaseless, ageless and deathless,' for the sake of which he renounced the world and led a life of extreme privation and hardship for a period of no less than six years. No human being, whatever his mental and spiritual calibre is, can completely transcend the environments of his period in which he finds himself placed. Of course, he has to go one or two steps farther than what the people of his age have done, otherwise he cannot be looked upon as a genius. Above all, he has to take note of every important element of the spiritual thought of his time. And the originality of his message consists in taking an exhaustive cognisance of these elements and so connecting them as to show his own individuality of thought and spiritual development. Such was the case with Buddha's message which took a careful note of all that was important in the mental and spiritual thought of the period. And, with a cement supplied by his mind, he synthesised all these elements into a systematic theory of his own, showing how disease, age and death sprang up and how they could be counteracted so as to lead to the Path of Deliverance. Similarly, it is not possible here and now to describe his life as a preacher, the unique personality he evinced, and the fecundity of thought, the third trait of genius, which he displayed when circumstances compelled him to consider and criticise the views and doctrines of the rival schools and show lucidly how his *dhaṃma* alone was a reply to every query and silenced all doubts and misgivings.

D. R. BHANDARKAR

THE ORGANIC LAW OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

A further step in the direction of establishing the authority of the Central Government was taken on October 3 when the organic law governing the reorganization of the Nationalist Government was promulgated, following its adoption by the Central Political Council and the standing committee of the Kuomintang Party. According to the official report issued by the *Kuo Min* news agency on October 4, the new law "sets all doubts at rest as to the supremacy of the Party—the Kuomintang—which not only creates the Nationalist Government, but also directs and supervises its administration."

This declaration was significant because the Chinese newspapers for a considerable period have contained reports regarding controversies which had developed over this point, in other words the source of authority, some arguing that the organic law of the land should derive its authority from the people, while the party members argued that it should derive its powers from the Party, the Kuomintang. The report by the official news agency explained that the action now taken amounts to the beginning of the "period of tutelage" which was outlined by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his *San Min Chu-I*, meaning by this that the Kuomintang Party has now definitely taken over the control of affairs pending the final stage when the powers of government will be handed over to the people.

The Preamble to the Law.

The preamble to the new constitutional law reads as follows:

"The Kuomintang of China, in pursuance of the Three People's Principles and the Five Power Constitution of the Revolution, hereby establishes the Republic of China,

"The Party, having swept away and removed all obstacles by military force and having passed from the Period of Military Conquest to that of Political Tutelage, now must establish a model government based upon the Five-Power Constitution to train the people so that they may be able to exercise their political powers, and to facilitate the Party in hastening the handing over of such powers to the people.

"Accordingly, the Kuomintang, in fulfilling the duty of direction and supervision of the Nationalist Government devolving upon it by virtue of its history, hereby formulates and promulgates the Law governing the Organization of the Nationalist Government."

THE "FIVE-POWER" CONSTITUTION.

The new law has been popularly called the "Five-Power Constitution" since it covers the new governmental organization which includes five departments or fundamental divisions of authority. In other words, the Chinese have taken the three divisions of authority as known under the American constitution, Legislative, Executive and Judicial, and have added two others from the ancient Chinese theory of government, the Examination Department and the Censorship Department. The new system of government which is now to be given a trial by the Nationalists, was explained from a legal standpoint in an article by Mr. Liang Yueng-li, which appeared in *The Review* on September 29. Mr. Liang, who is a member of the Department of Justice, explained that the new "Five-Power Constitution" follows closely Dr. Sun Yat-sen's conception of the most efficient and workable system of government for China, a type of government combining the best of the West with the best from the ancient Chinese political system. The two elements which have been retained from the Chinese system are the Examination Department and the Censorship Department, the first being a modern adaptation of the old system of official literary examinations which was abolished when the Republic was established

and its recreation into a modernized form of Civil Service. The Board of Censors also was a unique feature of the ancient empire and consisted of an independent board or commission appointed by the Emperor; but independent; which had power of supervising and *censoring* the activities of officials, including the emperor himself. The five departments or councils, which will be known in China as *Yuans*, are to have the power of drafting the details of their forms of organization, according to the official report.

The Organic Law of the Government.

The new organic law delineating the powers of the Government and the five councils or *Yuans*, was also announced through the *Kuo Min* news agency as follows:—

Promulgated at Nanking on October 4, 1928.

The Kuomintang of China, in order to establish the Republic of China on the basis of the Three Principles of the people and the Constitution of Five Powers, which form the underlying principle of the Resolution, having conquered all opposition by military force and having now brought the Revolution from the miltary stage to the educative stage, deem it necessary to construct a framework for the constitution of Five Powers with a view to developing the ability of the people to exercise political power, so that constitutional government may soon come into existence and political power be restored to the people; and, further, in virtue of the responsibilities hitherto entrusted to the Party for the guidance and supervision of the Government, do hereby ordain and promulgate the following Organic Law of the National Government.

Chapter I.

The National Government.

Article 1. The National Government exercise all the governing powers of the Republic of China.

Article 2. The National Government shall have the supreme command of the land, naval, and air forces.

Article 3. The National Government shall have the power to declare war, to negotiate peace, and to conclude treaties.

Article 4. The National Government shall exercise the power of granting amnesties, pardons, reprieves, and restitution of civic rights.

Article 5. The National Government shall be composed of the following five *Yuan*; the Executive *Yuan*, the Legislative *Yuan*, the Judicial *Yuan*, the Examination *Yuan*, and the Control *Yuan*.

Article 6. There shall be a President and from twelve to sixteen State Councillors of the National Government.

Article 7. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the Five *Yuan* shall be appointed from among the State Councillors of National Government.

Article 8. The President of the National Government shall represent the National Government in receiving foreign diplomatic representatives and in officiating or participating in State functions.

Article 9. The President of the National Government shall concurrently be the Commander-in-Chief of the land, naval, and air forces of the Republic of China.

Article 10. In case the President of the National Government is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the President of the Executive *Yuan* shall act in his place.

Article 11. The National Government shall conduct national affairs through the State Council. The State Council shall be composed of the State Councillors of the National Government, and the President of the National Government shall be the Chairman of the State Council.

Article 12. All matters which cannot be settled between two or more of the *Yuan* shall be referred to the State Council for decision.

Article 13. All laws promulgated and all mandates issued

by virtue of a decision of the State Council shall be signed by the President of the National Government and countersigned by the Presidents of the Five *Yuan*.

Article 14. Each of the Five *Yuan* may, according to law, issue orders.

CHAPTER II.

The Executive Yuan.

Article 15. The Executive *Yuan* shall be the highest executive organ of the National Government.

Article 16. The Executive *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 17. The Executive *Yuan* shall establish Ministries to which shall be entrusted the various executive duties.

The Executive *Yuan* may appoint Commissions to take charge of specified executive matters.

Article 18. The Ministries of the Executive *Yuan* shall each have a Minister, a Political Vice-Minister, and an Administrative Vice-Minister, and the various Commissions shall each have a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, all of whom shall be appointed or removed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 19. The Ministers, and the Chairmen of the various Commissions, of the Executive *Yuan* may, when necessary, attend the meetings of the State Council and of the Legislative *Yuan*.

Article 20. The Executive *Yuan* may introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 21. Meetings of the Executive *Yuan* shall be attended by the President, the Vice-President, the Ministers of the various Ministries, and the Chairman of the various Commissions, and presided over by the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 22. The following matters shall be decided at a meeting of the Executive *Yuan* :

(1) Bills on legislative matters to be introduced in the Legislative *Yuan*.

(2) Budgets to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(3) Amnesties to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(4) Declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international matters to be submitted to the Legislative *Yuan*.

(5) The appointment or dismissal of administrative officials of or above the rank of Chien-Jen (Third Class).

(6) All matters which cannot be settled between the various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive *Yuan*.

(7) All matters which, according to law or in the opinion of the President of the *Yuan*, should be decided at a meeting of the said *Yuan*.

Article 23. The various Ministries and Commissions of the Executive *Yuan* may, according to law, issue orders.

Article 24. The organization of the Executive *Yuan* and of the various Ministries and Commissions shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER III.

The Legislative Yuan.

Article 25. The Legislative *Yuan* shall be the highest legislative organ of the National Government.

The Legislative *Yuan* shall have the power to decide upon the following :—legislation, budgets, amnesties, declaration of war, negotiation for peace, conclusion of treaties, and other important international affairs.

Article 26. The Legislative *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 27. The Legislative *Yuan* shall be composed of from forty-nine to ninety-nine members, who shall be appointed by the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 28. The term of office of the members of the Legislative *Yuan*.

Article 29. The members of the Legislative *Yuan* shall not concurrently be non-political administrative officials of the various organs of the central or local governments.

Article 30. The President of the Legislative *Yuan* shall preside at all meetings of the Legislative *Yuan*.

Article 31. All resolutions passed by the Legislative *Yuan* shall be decided upon and promulgated by the State Council.

Article 32. The organization of the Legislative *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER IV.

The Judicial Yuan.

Article 33. The Judicial *Yuan* shall be the highest judicial organ of the National Government and shall take charge of judicial trial, judicial administration, disciplinary punishment of officials, and trial of administrative cases.

The granting of pardons and reprieves and the restitution of civic rights shall be submitted by the President of the Judicial *Yuan* to the National Government for approval and action.

Article 34. The Judicial *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 35. The Judicial *Yuan* may introduce in Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 36. The organization of the Judicial *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER V.

The Examination Yuan.

Article 37. The Examination *Yuan* shall be the highest examination organ of the National Government and shall take charge of examinations and determine the qualifications for public service. All public functionaries shall be appointed only after having, according to law, passed an examination and their qualifications for public service having been determined by the Examination *Yuan*.

Article 38. The Examination *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 39. The Examination *Yuan* may introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 40. The organization of the Examination *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VI.

The Control Yuan.

Article 41. The Control *Yuan* shall be the highest supervisory organ of the National Government and shall, according to law, exercise the following powers :

(1) Impeachment.

(2) Auditing.

Article 42. The Control *Yuan* shall have a President and a Vice-President.

In case the President is unable to discharge his duties from any cause whatsoever, the Vice-President shall act in his place.

Article 43. The Control *Yuan* shall be composed of from nineteen to twenty-nine members, who shall be appointed by

the National Government at the instance of the President of the said *Yuan*.

The security of tenure of office of the members of the Control *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

Article 44. All meetings of the Control *Yuan* shall be attended by members of the Control *Yuan* and presided over by the President of the said *Yuan*.

Article 45. The members of the Control *Yuan* shall not concurrently hold any office in any of the organs of the central or local governments.

Article 46. The Control *Yuan* shall have the power to introduce in the Legislative *Yuan* bills on matters within its own competence.

Article 47. The organization of the Control *Yuan* shall be determined by law.

CHAPTER VII.

Additional Article.

Article 48. The present Law shall come into force on the day of its promulgation.

DEFINITION OF TERMS.

The following explanation of terms used in the Constitution was issued by the *Kuo Min* news agency: The official title of the new law as expressed in the English language will be, "The Organic Law of the National Government of the Republic of China." The five Councils will be known as the Executive *Yuan*, Legislative *Yuan*, Judicial *Yuan*, Examination *Yuan* and Control (Censorship) *Yuan*. In future the word "National" is to be used in preference to the word "nationalist" when referring to the Government of the Republic. It was also explained that the word "Yuan" had a meaning in the Chinese language similar to the English words, "Chamber," "House," or "Council."

Cabinet Officers under Executive Yuan.

According to the law of the Executive *Yuan*, the ten Government Ministries and four standing committees will be under the Executive *Yuan*. These Ministries are, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Industry, Commerce and Labor, Agriculture and Mining, Military Administration, Communication, Railways and Health. The Standing Committees are Reconstruction, Overseas Affairs, Labor, Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. There will also be two general departments consisting of the Secretariat and Administration Affairs Departments. The present Ministry of Justice will be incorporated into the Judicial *Yuan* while the Legislative *Yuan* will consist of four committees, namely, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Military Affairs, Law Codification. It will also have a secretariat and translation department. The Judicial *Yuan* will have five departments, one committee and one ministry.

Gen. Chiang Kai-shek becomes President.

At the 173rd meeting of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee held in Nanking on October 9, the day preceding the celebration of the Chinese National Holiday, making the anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911, the following officials of the newly reorganized government, were elected :

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government.
Tan Yen-kai, President of the Executive *Yuan*.
Hu Han-ming, President of the Legislative *Yuan*.
Wang Chung-hui, President of the Judicial *Yuan*.
Tai Chi-tao, President of the Examination *Yuan*.
Tsai Yuan-pei, President of the Control *Yuan*.

In addition to the foregoing, the following were elected members of the first Government State Council :

Chiang Kai-shek, Tan Yen-kai, Hu Han-ming, Wang Chung-hui, Tai Chi-tao, Tsai Yuan-pei, Feng Yu-hsiang, Sun Fo, Chen Kuo-fu, Ho Ying-ching, Li Chung-jen, Yang Shu-wang, Yen Hsi-slian, Li Chi-sen, Lin Sen and Chang Hsueh-liang.

The election of Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang, the son of the late Marshal Chang Tso-ling, as a member of the Government State Council caused a considerable sensation in Chinese circles, the purpose apparently being to clinch the unification of the Three Eastern Provinces with the Nationalist Government.

The officials of the new Government were sworn into office with appropriate ceremonies on October 10, the National Holiday.[1]

[1] *The China Weekly Review*, October, 13, 1928.

THE RELIGION OF HARMONY

A criticism that is generally levelled against the New Dispensation—the religion of Keshub Chandra Sen—is that it is an incoherent combination of certain truths culled from different religions of the world, the result of which is something ludicrous, unnatural—destined to vanish in no time from the surface of the earth. The head and limbs have been severed from other bodies and put together to assume a new shape, which is awkward and forms no living system. Flowers have been collected from different plants and placed upon certain sticks artificially joined together,—an arrangement that cannot have any natural appearance and is bound to fall off in a short time.

But an humble believer in the New Dispensation wonders what there is in his religion that has led the critics to strike up a comparison of this sort. He is entirely at a loss to make out the grounds of the criticism and can only come to the conclusion that the critics have not taken the trouble to study the truth of the New Dispensation and have most irresponsibly expressed their opinion about it. The question may very well be asked,—in what features of the new religion have they found the incoherent combination? For the sake of discussion I may just put forward one or two aspects of it and point out to others that there is no such element of combination in it. Among the doctrines of the New Church are the units of Godhead and the brotherhood of man. Have one of them been gathered from one religion and the other from another, and then incoherently put together in the New Religion? This has certainly not been the case. A little study of the earlier religions of the world will clearly show that in all of them these two doctrines were taught with almost equal force. Similarly, with regard to worship as laid down in the New System, the elements of

invocation, adoration, sermon, prayer and hymn, have all been resorted to by the devotees of different religious communities of all parts of the world. No *Sadhana* or *Tapasya* or Spiritual Culture has been denied in the Brahmo Samaj. Congregational worship to suit the needs of modern times has of course been introduced in it. But that is because heart joined to heart in the worship of God is liberalised to recognise kinship in all human beings, absolutely necessary for its establishment of peace in the world. Where, then, is the incongruity, the unnaturalness, in the system put forward by Keshub Chandra? If the critics come forward with details to substantiate the view taken by them, the position may be cleared up.

The New Dispensation is no mere toleration; its idea of compromise is not in it; it is not even simple collectivism; it is something more than that; it speaks of an organic growth in the world of religion. The world has all along been one; the Lord of the world has also been one. Its needs were always known to Him. He has always been fulfilling His purpose. No corner and no people of the world have ever been forgotten by Him. For their good, individually and collectively, separately and jointly, He has been dispensing religions and putting up His agents, from the beginning up till now. It can never be the truth that one part of the world was favoured and other parts ignored, one people chosen and other peoples set aside, by Him. In the progress of humanity special dispensations were of course held out to particular peoples. The local needs and circumstances of the people and the time were certainly taken into consideration. One Dispensation, however, was not meant so to be cooped up in a particular apartment of the world, but was so shaped by Him that it might easily fit in with another held out in another part of the world. For long of course, when the progress of the world was not much advanced, the inhabitants of different quarters of the globe knew not of one another and might have been satisfied with the Dispensation particularly dealt out to them. But in course of time barriers have broken

down and the children of the world have been brought in close contact with one another. It can never be the will of God, the common factor of them all, that they should be quarrelling with and destroying one another ever, over these very Dispensations that have been held out for the peace of mankind. His work has always had a universal aspect ; all the earlier religious systems have certainly this universal feature and can therefore be easily put together. When properly advanced, this will be found to closely resemble each other and can but lead mankind towards one great goal of life. In the New Light vouchsafed to the world this universal aspect of religion has been made particularly clear. It is this truth that Keshub Chandra Sen was commissioned to hold up and lay before the world. The natural, therefore universally true, oneness of the world was seized and expounded by this great agent of God in the Nineteenth Century. It was his mission particularly to lay emphasis on the harmony of religions. Hence he employed all his powers with which he was gifted to do the work of his Father and to preach the Religion of Harmony. The New Dispensation, as the latest development of the Brahmo Faith was called by Keshub, "recognises in all the prophets and saints a harmony, in all the scriptures a unity, and through all dispensations a continuity." God has been working up the world as one whole, dispensing various gifts of this mercy through all eternity, looking to the requirements both of special ages and climes and of the vast globe as an organic unity. To this organic growth attention of mankind has been drawn and every one is now being exhorted to witness the wonderful manifestation of the will of the Lord of the Universe.

This is truth, eternal and universal. But, they say it has not been accepted. Is it a strange thing, an unprecedented event, in the history of the world, that truth has not been accepted? From the earliest times, how many have been found to be seekers of truth? Very few indeed ; so, if the truth of the New Dispensation has not yet found a wide acceptance, that does not go to

prove that it is untrue. It has been followed in the lives of many whose character and activities have shone luminously in the world. And certainly through a false culture no spiritual development can be attained. Further, is it true to say that the world has been abjuring the teachings of the New Faith as something unnatural and unreal? Or, is it trying to understand the new view of life, the new outlook of the world, held up in the 19th century? In every religious community there have been movements whose object is to present a liberal interpretation of its position with a view to fit in and march along with other communities. They are indeed trying to understand each other and find means to live on peaceful lines in a world where there is room for all.

Finally, for the good name of the great saint Ramkrishna Paramhansa it must be said that he was no adverse critic of the New Dispensation. He was known to have not only spoken of the religion of *Samanvaya* or Harmony, but also tried to practise it in his life. Further, he never referred to Keshub or his religion in any disparaging way. Keshub's mission was recognised and appreciated by the great saint of Dakshineswar. He would compare himself to Keshub and say that he himself had grown up tall like a palm tree, but Keshub was a big peepul tree which not only grew up high but gave shelter to many, and that he himself was sailing fast like a sloop, but Keshub was a big steamer that not only went fast but carried many on board it.

DEBENDRA NATH SEN

A VOTIVE OFFERING

I

O when I feel that Thou art I—
  What's in my heart, O Lord!
Am I the mighty lord of all?
  Or naught away from God?
Thou art I be, I'm not and yet
  Thou, Lord, art what Thou art.
The Love where with I love myself
  Is thine at end and start,
Unlov'd nor loved what I called I
  —Is cry of empty heart.
The cry's lost in Love Thou art
  —Dumb voice and mind all still;
Void, void what all call all
  Alone the void Thou fill!

II

Attempt so feeble to rehearse
Holy Vedanta in English verse—
A humble off'ring—May He bless
Whom word of none can e'er express!
"Of lords all He the One Great Lord,
Of gods all He the Supremest God,
Of masters all the Master He,
Supremest of Supremes He be,
Of faith and universe the Lord,
Grant me faith in God ador'd!" *

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJEE

* "Svetasvataropanishat."

MEDICAL EDUCATION IN GERMANY[1]

Three countries are to-day contributing to the advancement of medical research and there are only three schools of thought that are authoritative. The German school including the Austrian and the Swiss, the French and the American. Germany has all along been famous for its large contribution to the advancement of medical science. Perhaps no country can boast of such excellent organisation, training and wide-spread medical education as Germany.

Two reasons have kept the Indian student back till now from visiting the continental universities. The first was his fear of having to learn a new language and the second his desire to get a job with the British Government in India. The first reason has long been shown to be absurd, for a steadily increasing number ot Chinese, Persian, Afghan, Turkish and other foreign students are visiting the German universities and any average student can learn the language to an extent sufficient to follow the courses in six months. The second is more serious ; but the medical profession is of such a nature that it is not dependent on government jobs to give a living and there is a large and growing demand for private practitioners as well as increasing chances of research work.

The Course of Studies.

No Indian student should come to Germany to study medicine unless he fulfills the following conditions :

(1) He must have taken at the very least the Intermediate Science of any Indian University.

[1] Bulletin No. 2. Issued by the Indian Information Bureau, Berlin W. 8, Manerstr, 52. Information relating to Post-graduate and Research work will be supplied on application, since it is impossible to incorporate them in a general bulletin.

(2) He should have a thorough grounding in Physics, Chemistry, Zoology and Botany.

(3) Sufficient funds for *seven years' stay if he is to begin his medical study here.*

Students who have finished a part of their medical studies at an Indian university and have taken their examination in Physics, Chemistry, Zoology, Botany, Anatomy and Physiology, if they bring their certificates may be granted a concession of two years. But they must have sufficient funds to live at last four years in Germany.

Those who have already taken their degree in medicine at an Indian university and want to take a Post-graduate course and obtain the Doctor's degree can take an examination called the " Colloquium " at the end of two or three terms, or if they attach no importance to examinations can work at any of the hospitals. A Colloquium consists of three main subjects and a dissertation which must be submitted before applying for the examination.

The full medical course of studies extends over a period of six years, being two and a half years of pre-clinical and three and half years of clinical studies. The student may take either the state examination (for which the primary examination " Physicum " is necessary) or the university examination "Rigorosum."

Conditions of Acceptance.

The following are the conditions of acceptance :

(1) The admission to the universities is subject to the confirmation of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Public Health.

(2) All applications must be sent in at the latest by the 10th of April for the summer term or the 10th of October for winter term.

(3) Certified translation of the certificates of studies already prosecuted at foreign universities.

(4) A short description of the studies prosecuted.

(5) Evidence to show that the student is financially in a position to study.

(6) Evidence that the student possesses a sufficient knowledge of the German language.

With regard to point (5) the student has to pass a special test. It takes the average student about six months to learn sufficient German and the time taken by the student to learn the language is counted to his credit.

Terms.

There are two terms in the year. The winter term extends from 16th October to 15th March and the summer term from 16th April to 15th August. It is advisable for Indian students to come to Germany four months before the commencement of the terms to make themselves familiar with the language and the conditions here. Senior medical students are expected to do practical work at the hospitals during the holidays.

The Primary and the Final Examinations.

If the student has not already completed his primary examination in Anatomy and Physiology at some foreign university, he must show certificates of having had courses in Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology and Botany for a period of 5 terms before he can take his primary examination.

The final examination demands certificates for the following :

2	terms	in	lectures	on	medicine
2	,,	,,	,,	,,	surgery
2	,,	,,	,,	,,	Gynæcology and midwifery.
15					

A certificate to shew at least four cases of delivery conducted personally.

1	term	of	lectures	in	pathology and morbid anatomy
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	Materia medica and pharmacology
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	hygiene and public health
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	bacteriology
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	diseases of children
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	nose, ear and throat
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	diseases of the eyes
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	nerves
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	skin diseases
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	vaccination and immunity
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	medical jurisprudence
1	,,	,,	,,	,,	topographic anatomy.

The student must also, prepare a dissertation of thesis on some subject of research and submit at the time of applying for the permission to appear for the final examination.

Cost of Living and Study.

We must impress upon the student to have a little more money than too little. He need not spend more than is necessary, but it is better to have a certain amount of spare money at hand. The average university fees is about £20 a year, depending on the number of lectures that one takes. It would be wise to reckon on the average about £200 a year as the budget for a medical student for living and studying in Berlin. In the provincial universities it will be somewhat less. In England £240 is looked upon as the irreducible minimum. Apart from this the British universities suffer under severe disadvantages and as far as the Indian student is concerned have very much less to offer than the German universities. From experience and detailed questionnaire we are in a position to draw a comparison. The British universities are overcrowded, there is a growing colour prejudice which interferes seriously with the chances of

getting practical experience: in many universities Indian students are prevented from examining women, especially gynæcological cases. On the whole there is less material available at the British universities for practical training than on the Continent. It is also known that some famous British universities are forced to send their students to Paris because they themselves have not get enough cases to show. There are only two other countries that can be recommended to Indian students. The first is France and the other America. The latter is however much too expensive for the average Indian purse. The least estimate for a small university like Nebraska comes upon 1,200 dollars annually. We need not mention that really first class universities like John Hopkins, Columbia and Harvard are prohibitively expensive.

The German Universities.

The great advantage of German universities is that they are reciprocal. A student may study at any university he chooses and go next term to any other university either in Germany, Austria or German-speaking Switzerland. This is a decided advantage for the student, for he is then not bound to any particular university, but may hear any lecturer he may choose.

EDUCATION IN GERMANY[1]

(*A New and Advantageous Arrangement for Learning German.*)

The Prussian Ministry of Education (*Ministerium fuer Wissanschaft,* Kunst und Volksbildung) has authorised us to make the following announcement :

Quite a large number of Indian students wanting to come to Germany for higher education have the strange idea that the language of instruction in German universities is English. We must emphasise the point—a very important though an obvious one—that German and not English is the medium of instruction in Germany and therefore knowledge of it is absolutely essential to obtain admission into educational institutions in this country.

While the universities and other educational institutions in Germany naturally demand knowledge of German sufficient to an extent to be able to follow lectures and to profit by the instructions theoretical as well as practical, ignorance of this language alone should not prevent Indian students from coming to Germany for higher education since experience has proved that our students are able to gain the degree of proficiency in German required from foreign students without much difficulty in four months.

It is advisable that Indian students wanting to come for their education to Germany should commence the study of German in India itself. But it may be that opportunities for this are lacking, particularly for those not residing in large towns like Bombay and Calcutta. In any case students should take care to see that they are taught only by competent and

[1] Bulletin No. 3. Issued by the Indian Information Bureau, Berlin.

qualified persons. Those who, for one reason or other, are not in a position to begin learning the language in India should make up their mind to come to Germany four or five months before the commencement of the terms. The winter term begins in October and the summer term in April.

Apart from the course in German for foreign students provided by the university and the facilities for obtaining private lessons, the Ministry of Education is willing to make for Indian students, if they come in batches of fifteen or twenty, special, convenient and highly advantageous arrangements which will extend not only to the teaching of German but also to lodging and boarding and subsequently also to the obtaining of admission into the institutions which they want to join. In this case the students immediately on their arrival will be lodged as paying guests in good families in Potsdam near Berlin and taught German on an average three hours a day. Over and above the lessons in the accepted sense of the term, the students will also have excellent opportunities for conversations, so that they will be able to learn the language pleasantly, easily and quickly. Opportunities will also be provided for out-door exercises and other recreations. By this arrangement, foreigners will not only be saved from the trouble of hunting for rooms and teachers, but also from the danger of falling into the pitfalls of a large and new town, the language of which is unfamiliar to them.

Indian students pursuing their studies in England can also make use of this arrangement to study German during the vacation. For them it provides an excellent opportunity for learning a new and an exceptionally important language and seeing a new country. At the end of three or three and a half months' stay they can go back or, if they desire, and also provided they possess the other qualifications, join either immediately or at a subsequent date German universities. At all events at the end of their stay they would know German sufficient to be able to read books and converse easily. The knowledge thus acquired they can preserve and improve by independent work.

It is not demanded that only students who possess the same educational qualifications or intend to take the same or allied lines after learning German should form a batch. The main thing is that they should arrive in a group or groups of fifteen to twenty. In order that this condition is fulfilled it is necessary that the students should report themselves sufficiently in advance to a central organization (in the case of Indian students from England to an organization in London and of students from India to one in India) interested in this work and also to our office in Berlin.

As regards the question of expenses, boarding and lodging will come up to 180 marks a month and for extra expenses one ought to allow seventy marks, so that the total amount required will be 250 marks or £12-10-0 a month.

We hope that Indian students both from England and India will not fail to take advantage of this arrangement which has worked successfully and satisfactorily with Chinese and Turkish students.

CATEGORIES OF SOCIETAL SPECULATION IN EUR-AMERICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

From Herder to Sorokin (1776-1928.)

1922. **Carr-Saunders** (1886)—*Problem of Population.* Increase of population need not lead one to pessimism because although it has been continuous and rapid in historic periods it has been very slow, almost stationary during long periods. Multiplication has been controlled by customs and conscious methods throughout the ages.

1922. **Goldenweiser**: American: *Early Civilisation*: He combats the deterministic evolutionary anthropology of Morgan. The principle of "limited possibilities" in the development of culture may lead to "cultural convergences" from diversity of antecedents. A universal law of evolution is untenable and political organisation or the state is as old as social organisation (clan or gens), *i.e.*, the society. The state—no matter in what form—is an omnipresent phenomenon in primitive society. It does not arise on the ruins of, and is not posterior to, the kinship organisation. The evolutionary anthropology which considers the state to be a late arrival preceded by pre-statal (*i.e.*, purely social) stages is found to be defective.

1922. **Vinogradoff**: *Historical Jurisprudence.* He makes a comparative study of legal institutions and ideas. There are traditional unconscious elements in law, says he. Economic influences on law-making are also brought into prominence.

1924. **Bernard** (1881): American: *Instinct,—A Study in Social Psychology.* Much of all that passes for "inborn or innate" "instinct" is really "non-inherited action-pattern," "acquired from experience," formed as the result of habit. "The vague employment of the term instinct finds its logical

reductio ad absurdum in the application of the term to well-developed habit-complexes such as the "instincts" listed in the classification in McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* and the various books on educational psychology of recent years. The future control of the human race and its civilisation lies not through selective breeding of the higher social qualities but through their transmission by social contact and control. The overwhelming and generally the immediate pressures upon the character-forming process, especially in its more advanced stages, come from the accumulated psycho-social environment.

1924. **Barnes** : American : *Sociology and Political Theory.* He presents a short but comprehensive summary of the ideas of leading sociologists *re* (*i*) nature of the state, (*ii*) origins of the state, (*iii*) forms of government, (*iv*) scope of state activity, (*v*) international relations, etc.

Reference. Barnes : *History and Social Intelligence.* (1926). *The New History and Social Studies* (1925).

1924. **Meinecke** : *Die Idee der Stattsraeson* (The Idea of the Reasons of the State). This historical study of the political philosophy from **Machiavelli** to **Frederick the Great, Hegel, Fichte, Ranke** and **Freitsche** with sidelights on **Bismarck, Nietzsche** and **Bernhardi** is not merely historical. It is critical and constructive as well as may be regarded as possessing a formative value in contemporary thought. Meinecke's affiliations are to be sought in the progressive tendencies of post-war German political philosophy such as are manifest in Vierkandt. He discovers epoch by epoch an "eternal dualism" in the philosophies bearing on the "reasons of the state, those swayed by the considerations of *Macht* (power, strength, force, etc.) and those oriented to the considerations of *Sittlichkeit* (morals, virtue, etc.). *Machtpolitik,* however, has, in the main, been the dominant feature in the history of speculation and practice—culminating in the three *Gewltigen* (forces) of the modern world, namely, militarism, nationalism and capitalism. He

raises his voice against the "wrong idealization of *Machtpolitik* and the wrong deification of the state," such as have influenced German thought since Hegel in spite of Treitschke's warning. He wants the "reasons of the state" to be regulated more and more by larger doses of *Sittengesetz* (laws of morality) and ethical motives, such, for instance, as those with which Bismarck is said to have controlled the other considerations and established a "harmony" between the polarities, the two contending forces in civilization.

1924. **Bougle**: *Le Solidarisme.* According to him individualism of the classic type was, as pointed out by **Michel** in *L'Idee de l'Etat,* quite social as manifest in the "public granaries" of **Rousseau** "mutual assurance" **of Condorcet,** "public education" of **Adam Smith** and "right to maintenance" proclaimed by **Montesquieu.** Those individualists considered the state to be a servant and not a master. But in the nineteenth century a new individualism has arisen which is positively anti-statal, *e.g.*, the administrative nihilism of **Spencer,** the anarchistic individualism of **Stirner** and the anti-democratic immoralism of **Nietzsche.** It is against this type of individualism that solidarism rises to preach the cult of "mutual acid," "social life," "social dependence," etc. But the dignity of the individual is maintained intact, *e.g.*, in the "liberalist" thoughts of **Taine, Faguet, Buisson** and **Durkheim,** who although attaching value to the society, bring the world back to individualism. Solidarism could give a fresh lease to the individualism of the classic school.

Solidarism considers in equality to be both a natural and a social fact. Liberty also is not more a fact than dependence. The state is not to be regarded as an entity outside the individuals against whom or over whom it may be said to function. The only reality is the *reciprocal* relations of the individuals. Hence "public law" should virtually cease to exist and be absorbed in "private law." Or at any rate, the distinction

between the two should be reduced to the smallest proportions. From the positive fact of human interdependence emerges the problem of "quasi-contract" and "social debt." These are to be discharged in the form of "social assurances" and other method by which the inequalities may be removed and the minimum conditions of life be guaranteed to the "disinherited." The interventions of the state in economic and social life become normal phenomena. Solidarism hardly differs, if at all, from state-socialism and " reformist " or revisionist socialism. But since it neither destroys private property nor believes in or promotes class-struggle it has nothing in common with Marxian socialism.

1925. **Sorokin**—Russian : *The Sociology of Revolution.* He offers an inductive psychological analysis of the Russian Revolutions of 1905, 1917-24 and of the seventeenth century, the French Revolutions of 1789, 1848, 1870-71, the German revolution of 1848, the English revolution of the seventeenth century, some medieval and antique Revolutionary periods, the Egyptian, Persian and other great revolutions. The nationalist anti-foreign revolution such as are embodied in the Tchecho-slovak of 1918 and the American of the eighteenth century are excluded from this study.

Sorokin is anti-Bolshevik in his interpretation of the Sovietic transformation of Russia. The analysis leads him to the conclusion that excessive conservatism or proneness to stability, *i.e.*, law and order, is as vicious as excessive revolution and revolution-mongering. He is a champion of the golden man of orderly social control. The revolution is condemned in the following words :

The Russian, the French, the Engish Revolutions, and the Revolution of Huss were not stemmed. They ran their full course. Authority remained in the hands of the groups and individuals, who had been elevated by revolution, not in those of their opponents. And yet we find, says he, that this condition, of authority remaining in the same hands does not prevent

but rather accelerates result diametrically opposed to the promises and watchwords of revolution. The revolution proclaims one thing, but its hands accomplish something very different. To-day it announces something, and the same, or the next day, it tramples upon its own promises and declarations.

Sorokin finds causes of revolution in the *Freudian* repression of one form or another. Thus if the desire for food (or the alimentary reflex) of a considerable part of the population is " repressed " by famine, we have one cause of riot and revolutions. If the reflexes of individual self-preservation are " repressed " by arbitrary executions, mass murders or a bloody war, we have another cause of revolutions and troubles. If the reflexes of collective self-preservation of a group, for example a family, a religious sect, of a party are " repressed " by the desecration of the holy things of that given group, by the mockery at its members, their arrest and execution, etc., we have a third cause of revolutions. If the want of housing, clothing, necessary temperature, etc., is not satisfied even to the minimum extent—we have a further additional cause of revolutions. If the sex reflexes, together with their variations, like jealousy or the wish to possess for oneself the beloved object, of a large group of individuals are " repressed " by the impossibility to satisfy them, by rape and violations of wives and daughters, by compulsory marriages and divorces, etc.—we have a fifth cause of revolutions. If the instincts of ownership of the mass of people are " repressed " by their poverty and destitution in the face of other people's wealth—we have a sixth cause of revolutions. If the instinct of self-expression (according to **Ross**) or individuality (according to **Mikhailovsky**) of the mass of people is " repressed " by insults, under-estimation, constant and unjust ignoring of their merits and achievements, on one hand and over-estimation of the less worthy people on the other hand we have a further cause of revolutions. If with the great number of individuals their impulses of fighting and rivalry, of creative work, of variety of experience and adventure

and their habits of freedom (in the sense of freedom of speech and actions, or unchecked manifestation of innate inclinations) are repressed by too peaceful a life and too monotonous surroundings, by work which satisfied neither brain nor heart by continual restrictions upon freedom of communication, speech and action—we have further conditions contributing to the outburst of revolutions.

In Sorokin's analysis the psychological basis of revolutions is to be found in the very mechanism of human behaviour. The investigations of psychologists of the most varied tendencies have proved quite destructive to "rationalism." Already **Lange, Petrajitzky, Ribot** and others have laid sufficient stress on the part played by feelings and emotions in the psychology and conduct of men. Freud, his school and the whole series of psychologists have given predominance to the immense importance of subconscious and unconscious impulses. On the other hand **Thorndike, McDougall** and others have demonstrated the presence, variety and great determining power of man's inborn reflexes or instincts. Among these are not only social, but combative instincts; not only the parental, but that of the hunter ; not only that of subordination, but that of dominion and self-assertion. To sum up: Man is the bearer not only of peaceful, gentle, virtuous and social impulses but also of their opposites. On the other hand the Russian school of the objective method of analysing the behaviour of man and animals and the behaviourists have given still greater predominance to inborn or unconditioned reflexes, showing how completely conditioned or acquired forms of behaviour depend on them.

Revolutions are thus proved to be perfectly natural phenomena.

(To be continued.)

BENOYKUMAR SARKAR

Reviews

The Vedanta and Modern Thought.—By W. S. Urquhart, M.A., D.Litt.,—Professor of Philosophy and Principal, Scottish Churches College.—Published by the Oxford University Press.

The book is remarkable as a systematic examination of various phases mainly of Sankara's theory of Monism based on a thorough and critical study of this particular school of Vedanta. Throughout the work a number of controversial questions have been raised which show to the best advantage the writer's power of sound and mature critical judgment. It is the work of a scholar trained in the Western methods of philosophical investigation, yet thoroughly familiar with the development of Eastern thought. Much of the materials is presented here in fresh aspects. And by reason of the careful examination of Sankara's doctrine of Monism and the positive value of some of the results which are altogether new and also of the fruitful dissent which some of his opinions will provoke, the book will prove a valuable aid and furnish food for reflection. The author has shown great discrimination in his selection of topics and his penetration of the subject is admirable, no less than his great critical ability. Every page makes an appeal to reflection and the reader will find here an enrichment of his knowledge. Whatever differences there may be with some of the views of the author, whether in matters of detail or discussion, they rather enhance the value of the book.

Sankara's Absolute Reality is an undifferenced unity devoid of any quality and character. The multiplicity of the world of experience is our way of thought,—the construction of our subjective categories—and is therefore unreal and illusory, and there is, as such, a complete gulf between the two. Taking up this position about Sankara, the author proceeds in the fifth and sixth sections of the book to the following criticism:

Sankara makes a distinction between the higher and the lower knowledge, and the lower knowledge is so separated from the higher that the contradictions of the former find no explanation in the latter and the latter remains vague and indefinite like the empty, contentless *substance* standing somehow behind the qualities. This vague ultimate when completely detached from our consciousness and experience, as Sankara has done, becomes equivalent to an unconscious physical substance. But the higher is not and cannot be the negation of the lower knowledge, but its completion

which explains its contradictions. Reality is reached not by turning away from, but by fuller study of, the facts of experience which reach completion in it. By the study of not-self the boundaries of self become enlarged. There is thus an intimate relation between the higher and the lower, between the reality and the world ;—the one is not exclusive or the negation of the other.

Sankara's absolute separation of the ordinary knowledge from the higher gives us a God without qualities, God hidden beneath that fullness of divine qualities which we make the object of our worship.

So far as ordinary knowledge is concerned, the self cannot become an object of quest, without violating the principle which Sankara himself has laid down; *viz.*, the subject cannot become the object,—subjective qualities cannot be transferred to the object. How then can the self be known—made an object of knowledge,—except by negation or denial of, and abstraction from, the external objects and going beyond them ? So long as we are within the sphere of knowledge, we must perforce use the categories, but as they are adequate only for the external objects, we are forced into abstraction and negation. Without ceasing to be the subject, we cannot turn the self into an object and hence the pure self becomes unintelligible. How to know the subject then ? The author points out that it is an impossible task for Sankara, as he has rejected *activity* of the self. Activity would have supplied him with the principle of explanation and interpretation of the world and Sankara would have seen that the human mind in its activity reproduces the orderly activity of the divine mind.

Acts also, according to Sankara, have no efficacy in reaching the higher knowledge: for action is transitory and has to do with the lower order. Even the most elevated moral action cannot help to realise the real self, but it only purifies the empirical, changing self. Acts of social service, indeed, loosen our selfish bond,—but action is still earthly, still a bondage of the spirit. Identification with the ideals of a particular society cannot give us release, as it varies from age to age. Both good and evil works disappear when perfect knowledge arises.

Now, how did Sankara attempt to bridge the gulf between the abstract unity on the one hand and the confused world of experience on the other ? It was by the introduction of the conception of Mâyâ which was, as our author points out, in itself a recognition of the inexplicability of the world and a depreciation of its value. The author takes into his consideration in this connection two-fold interpretation of the theory of Mâyâ—illusory and realistic, but he seems to favour the first. Here our

learned author has shown much ingenuity in explaining the term *Avidyâ* as to how from its original psychological or epistemological sense it came to be transformed into a metaphysical principle. The unreliability of empirical knowledge is due to the inadequacy of human faculties. But our ignorance is a common ignorance and the cause of it must lie somewhere beyond ourselves ; in thus universalising our ignorance we are at the same time going far in the direction of *objectifying* it. We cannot therefore run away from criticism of it on the ground that as it is simply the hypostasis of error, it has not therefore a *positive* existence. Mâyâ or avidyá is thus not merely an intellectual attitude, but an explanatory principle also. It comes to this: if *ajnâna* is destroyable, it is not positive (*i.e.*, real) ; and if it is real, it is not destroyable,—cannot be sublated by the higher knowledge ; for 'knowledge cannot destroy a real thing.' We seem forced, the author concludes, to the conclusion that Mâyâ cannot be taken as a pure principle of illusion giving rise to an altogether fictitious world. Universal illusionism is impossible. A rigorous illusionist has no right to the word 'illusion,' he ought to confine himself to the word 'hallucination'; for all illusion involves an ultimate reference to *reality*, and what is true of particular illusion is true of cosmic illusion. The whole conception of Mâyâ is simply a symbol of humble agnosticism, though at times the author cannot help feeling that Sankara appears as the negative dogmatist.

The author then goes on to show how some scholars have adopted the realistic interpretation of the Mâyâ theory. They say, that the real intention of Sankara was to lay stress on the *connectedness* with Brahman of the things of the world and not to assert their unreality. Sankara's teaching was, according to this view, the author observes, that we are wrong if we take the plurality in separation from Brahman. The things of the world are indeed unreal in their *separate* particularity, but in their *connectedness* with Brahman they partake of reality. The ultimate unity is certainly not to be *identified* with the variety of the world, but on the other hand it is *not exclusive* of that variety.

It is thus that the author has not flinched from analysing the realistic implications of *Mâyâ* suggested by some Indian authors in defence of Sankara. But still the author thinks that Sankara "could not bridge the gulf lying between the world of experience on one side and the bare abstract unity on the other;" and that the tendency to negation is stronger in Sankara than the tendency to affirmation and that Sankara's philosophy is wanting in a fuller conception of God which would have led him to see that to overcome the world both theoretically

and practically is better than to flee from it. But he has not failed to observe, quite rightly, that Sankara was content " to see the world pass away and the glory thereof, if only it may abide in the Eternal and the world is spiritual in its origin and essence."

In conclusion of the topic, the author makes certain relevant observations with regard to the distinction which the author thinks Sankara has made between his Nirguṇa and Saguṇa Brahman. Although it seems that Dr. Urquhart is well acquainted with the opposite view that Sankara could, from his commentary, be shown that he has not made a hard-and-fast distinction between the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* Brahma,[1] that it is a mistake to regard Iswara as distinct from Brahma,—still why should Sankara, the learned Doctor asks, so often argue that differences must be negated in order that the unity may be preserved? Why again, the Doctor continues, Sankara declares that he can find satisfaction only in unity and that the passages of scripture about the negation of all differences have a meaning which leaves nothing more to be wished for? Sankara felt, our author argues, that whenever *qualities* remained, these must so affect our attitude that God will become an *object* and so will remain for ever distinct from the worshippers. Sankara was dominated by the idea that in order to know God we must be God. But surely, Dr. Urquhart concludes, this is not a necessary consequence. Neither does it imply that, on our part, there is no distinction between us and God. If we could throw ourselves with all the fulness of our being into the life of the world in its onward and upward surging, we should not be willing to deny the diversity, but should desire to see the qualities sublimated, restored, redeemed in God and the highest unification would come through the fullest appreciation of the *illimitable qualities* of the Ultimate Reality and not from a denial of any qualities at all.

Thinking that a lengthy review in the space-limit at our disposal will not serve any useful purpose, we have made an attempt to pull some of Dr. Urquhart's arguments out of his criticism of Sankara's main doctrine in his work and to place it before our readers in a nut-shell which, we hope, will show that the author is a thinker of great ability and he possesses a clear brain and his judgments are, for the most part, fair and sympathetic in certain points, if not in all.

The theory of Máyá we have described above involves the fundamental Vedantic idea of an ultimate unity and an apparent necessity for negation and in the first three sections of his book the author traces

[1] *Vide* K. Sastri's Work—" Advaita Philosophy " quoted by the author at p. 151.

the theory as it is found in the Veda and in the Upanishads and subsequently developed in the Vedanta Sutras. Section VII deals with the destiny of the Individual self and gives an idea of the place of Ethics in the Vedanta. A comparison of Vedanta as propounded by Sankara and Rámánuja with some of the Western philosophers as Spinoza, Leibnitz and Hegel finds some elaboration in Section VIII of the book. But we are compelled for want of space to refer our readers to the original book itself for these important matters. In the last chapter, the author records his dissatisfaction with the Vedantic identity relation which the author has shown has been reached by the exclusion and negation of the temporal and spatial world of experience. Without descending to details we may generally remark that we agree that it is not enough to hold the view that the transcendent is the mere negation of the mundane order. It is to be noted that as Sankara has given us two aspects—transcendent and immanent—of the Divine, if the transcendent world could be fully connected with the given world, it would cease to be transcendent; the transcendent would become immanent. Hence we conclude that there must always be an idea of a negative element in it. It cannot be construed in terms of mundane experience. "The transcendent region is so thought in relation to mundane experience that the human soul finds there complete fulfilment and realisation of his spiritual life. Spiritual value cannot be fully realised in the phenomenal world and so points beyond it and hence there is no discontinuity between the two, the higher world is never merely beyond, but what we achieve here under spatial and temporal conditions will come to fruition hereafter." Faith, though not reason, postulates that there is no discontinuity between temporal and transcendent good and here and now our soul sometimes has a foretaste of the final bliss. We can indeed say very little positive about the character of that supramundane existence, but the self will retain a continuity of meaning in spite of the disintegration of the material body and construction of a new and higher form of body, maintaining a continuity of memory of previous existence. *Cf. Sank. Com.*, Ved. Sutra,——

"अपरिमुषितस्मृतयः ··· ··· दृष्टं सञ्चरन्तः"—3.3.32.

In bringing this review of the work to a close we should like to call the attention of our readers to the consideration of certain most important points recorded by Sankara himself in his commentaries. Rámánuja and other thinkers of his type identify God with the Absolute. The being of God is all-inclusive ; nothing exists and can exist *outside* this

single real being (चिदचिद्विशिष्ट:). They have not indeed denied that the world possesses a degree of reality and they have assigned a relative independence to finite spirits. These thinkers would admit *transcendence* in the sense that God is always *more* than nature and finite selves. But we believe that all systems which take the Absolute in all-inclusive fashion must be reckoned *Pantheistic*, although a criticism of pantheism sometimes occurs in their writings.

(1) We must point out, however, that Sankara has not so conceived his Absolute; for all reality does not, in his doctrine, fall *within* the Divine being. Divine transcendence rests on the fact that God has given being to the whole world in space and time, but he himself is beyond the spatial and temporal orders and his self-consciousness does not depend on them while they intimately depend on him. The relationship is not one of *mutual* implication. Sankara has not reduced Brahman to a purely immanent process, but insists on the transcendent aspect of the ground of the world. Brahman is, however, not detached from the world, for though he is lifted above the flux of time and in this sense has a *negative* relation to it, yet he stands in *positive* relation to it as he constantly sustains (अधिष्ठान) the world which is created by and dependent on him. Brahman, because he has a transcendental character of his own and is distinguished from the elements he connects, does not reduce the individual existences to a phase of his own life[1]

(2) Sankara has shown that finite centres do not directly interact but through a common environment or medium. Their activity pre-supposes interaction with an environment which elicits the activity—"न हि अमूर्त्त: कश्चित् क्रियावान् दृश्यते, कार्य्य-कारणसंश्लेष हि कर्त्तृत्वं स्यात्" (ब्र० भा०, 4.3.15). And again "सर्व्वा भूतभौतिकभावा अस्य "'संसर्ग'-कारणभूता विद्यन्ते ··· चैतन्यरूपतया अविशिष्टेन, भूतभावासंसर्गेण लब्धविशेषविज्ञाना।" And these finite centres cannot be *absorbed* in their activity, for we cannot say that there is activity but there is not something which is active—

"क्रिया च नाम स्यात्, अकर्त्तृका चेति विप्रतिषिध्यते (वे० भा०, 2.1.18)."

Sankara has shown that the common environment in which the finite centres interact is not the Absolute and they cannot be identified with it.[2] The individuals and the medium in which they interact—both form a derived and dependent system, the ground of which *lies beyond* the

[1] Compare अथ नित्यायुतसिद्धावयवानुगतोऽवयवी परमात्मा, ... तदापि सर्व्वावयवानुगतत्वात् अवयविन एव अवयव-गतौ दोषौ गुणौ वा इति ... इयमपि अनिष्टा कल्पना।—ब्र० भा०, 2.1.20.

[2] *Vide* the story of अजातशत्रु and बालाकि in बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद् and Sankara-Bhāsya on it.

system itself. Sankara has thus insisted on the transcendent aspect of the ground of the world and it is clear then that finite individuals have not been reduced to mere appearances of the Absolute Brahman.[1] We ought not to overlook this realistic implication of Sankara's doctrine.

(3) Then again, the created world cannot be regarded as illusory and unreal, for Sankara himself has observed that in that supposition, as what is unreal cannot come into relation with what is real, Brahman would itself become an unreality—

"यदि हि असतामेव जन्म स्यात्, ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणद्वाराभावात् असत्त्वप्रसङ्गः"—मा° का° भा°, 16.

Compare also Anandagiri's gloss on this remark of Sankara.

When we carefully remember these aspects of the Sankara doctrine, much of the objections urged by our author on the ground of Ethics and religion would disappear.

KOKILESWAR SASTRI

The Bhagavadgítá with easy Sanskrit annotations and literal English translation by Sitānāth Tattvabhūshan and Srischandra Vedāntabhushan Bhāgavataratna, B.A., and edited by the former with an historical and philosophical introduction giving an expository and critical account of the contents of each chapter. Calcutta, 1929, pp.16 + lxxviii + 336, price Rs. 2-8.

Those with whom the *Gitá* is a *vade mecum* will surely welcome this neatly bound, handy volume under review. The arrangement of the different sections of the book is equally commendable, the Index to the first lines of the 660 couplets being so eminently useful in the matter of ready reference.

Readers of this volume will be persuaded to agree with the editor that 'the present edition is unique, the extant English translations being unaccompanied with Sanskrit annotations.' On a careful perusal of the

[1] In this story, बालाकि took प्राण—the common, connecting medium—to be entirely *immanent* in the individual objects, *viz.*, the Moon, the Sun, etc., etc. All these objects are mere phases of one Práṇa. King अजातशत्रु corrected this error by showing that the Práṇa—the common medium in which the individuals exist—ought not to be identified with the Absolute. We assume the ground is immanent in all centres, yet does not reduce these centres to mere phases, as it is transcendental also. यदि च ब्रह्मणश्चिदपत्ववत्, वृक्षसमुद्रादिवच्च उत्पत्त्याद्यनेकधर्मविचित्रता विजिगीषयिषिता, एकरसं ... नोपसमहरिष्यत्। तस्मात् एकत्वप्रत्ययदार्ढ्यायैव उत्पत्तिस्थितिलयादिकल्पना। न उत्पत्त्यादिभेदप्रतिपादनपरा।

introductory portions of the book, we are prepared to endorse the modest claim that "the Introduction also has something original in it, as it contains, among other things, a detailed account of the contents of each chapter, the reading of which alone, even without the study of the text, will give a clear idea of the teachings of the *Gitá*." So far as we have seen, the English translations appear to have been executed with a scrupulous care and honesty that reflects great credit on the joint authors. For the Introduction the editor is alone responsible, and he has responded to his task in a way that leaves nothing to be desired. An earnest philosophical writer with pronounced Hegelian sympathies, he brings to the execution of his task a range of scholarship, and what is probably essential to the requirements of the case, a depth of spiritual insight, which does but seldom fail to impress the reader with a persuasiveness all its own.

Within the short compass of a review it is hardly possible to bring together all the points of excellence characteristic of the work in question. We shall, therefore, content ourselves with a bare statement of the special features of the book which seem to us to have fully substantiated the claim of uniqueness initially advanced in its behalf. What appeals to us, in the first place, is a sense of balance and proportion which the Introduction evinces all through—a sense that is more honoured in the breach than in the observance thereof, particularly in the matter of writing introductions. Perhaps it is not preposterous to hazard the opinion that the editor's early training in philosophical thinking has in this respect served him in good stead. With reference to the question, for example, of the date and authorship of the *Gitá*, there is no display of extra ingenuity or technical knowledge, as is often the case in the discussion of these topics. This attitude is typical of the work as a whole which has consistently pursued a *via media* between high-browed pedantry on the one hand, and cheap popularisation on the other. Then, in the next place, what arrests our attention is its heterodoxy in the matter of departing from the time-honoured custom of embellishing a work of annotation with classical commentaries which serve to mystify the subject all the more. The effect of all these on the text of the *Gitá* is anything but edifying: far from heightening the sublimity of the theme, it borders on the ridiculous. What is true of the *Gitá* in this regard applies *mutatis mutandis* to the case of elaborate commentaries on the Bible. Our Editor, however, it is pleasing to note, has not been awed into submission by such august names in the field as Śankara and Ānandagiri, Śrídhara and Madhusúdana Sarasvatí, but has made a bold move in trying to effect an inroad

into the heart of the *Bhagavadgitá*, by breaking through the esoteric barriers of scholarly commentaries, and thus bringing the message of the *Gitá* within the easy reach of all and sundry. Finally, the rationalistic and critical vein which has been employed and sustained throughout with such conspicuous success cannot be too strongly recommended in a sphere where a dispassionate criticism, literary or historical, is rendered well nigh impossible owing to the incidence of that much too facile emotional abandon which so often prejudges the issue in its claim to have the final say in all matters regarding the ideal of the *Gitá*. Although we do not see eye to eye with our author in his disposal of 'the Krishna Legend,' yet we cannot but admire his way of envisaging the problem on which such vital issues are staked. Well might the Vishnuites contend that to divest the *Bhagavadgitá* of the 'legendary' hero is to cast away the babe along with the bath. But, then, those who stand up for the historicity of the central figure of the *Gitá*, in the interest of religious faith and worship, have yet to reckon with the fact that nothing historical can, as such, be an object of spiritual faith. Herein our author's grip on the question is as unmistakable as it is suggestive. But it is a theme too large to be dwelt upon here.

Knowing full well that even the strictest censorship cannot exorcise the proverbial 'printer's devil,' we do yet invite the alert eyes of the joint authors to certain obvious misprints which are still to be found in the body of the book. Besides those that have been incorporated in the list of *Errata*, there are some, too patent to need correction by us, in pages numbering vi, xi, xix, lv, lx, lxiv, lxviii, 11, 27, 34, 62, 64, 93, 101, 113, 135, 142, 150, 233, 242, 261, 334, 336. 'Western Indianists' in liii seems to be an obvious misprint for 'Western Indologists.' Our sole concern in thus spotting out the misprints is to assist the joint authors in eradicating the still lingering traces of the 'devil' from the second edition of this creditable work which is sure to be called for.

S. K. D.

"**India's Hope**"—by Francis Henry Skrine, I.C.S. (retired), F.R. Hist S., published by W. Thacker & Co., London (Rs. 1-8-0) ; dedicated to Sir R. N. Mookerjee is, as the author says, "a vindication of the Bengali character"—by one whose knowledge of the people of Bengal is adequate and accurate. This vindication is ably attempted in the last two chapters of the book entitled: "The Bengali Intelligentsia" and "Some Detractors, Lord Macaulay and Miss Katherine Mayo." The

author's Calcutta memories (the subject of Chapter I) are highly entertaining and his account of rural Bengal in the 70's (the subject of the next chapter) interesting. In commenting on Miss Mayo's *Mother India* the writer lays down the valuable principle that "to speak with authority on an ancient and alien civilisation demands years of sympathetic study and an intimate acquaintance with the language in which its various phases find expression." Equally sound is his observation that "human nature is fundamentally identical in all Aryan races, and the hard swearing that prevails in their Divorce Court should forbid Englishmen to sit in judgment on Indian witnesses." But he is "far from asserting that all Bengalis are paragons of virtue." He has the power to discern that though living behind the *purdah* "the Bengali women are intellectually on a level with their men-folk." "They certainly share," he asserts, "the spirit of self-devotion and self-sacrifice which animates their English sisters." Some pertinent things have been acutely pointed out in connection with the Indian Empire of to-day, Dyarchy and a Nation in the making in the chapter (Ch. III) on "the Expansion of England." The author acknowledges that the substance of the book has appeared in the Calcutta Review for June, August and October, 1928. This readable little volume should prove of immense help to foreigners in forming a just and correct opinion regarding Bengal and its people and their relation with the ruling race.

J. G. B.

Mystic Lyrics from the Indian Middle Ages (a free transcription by Paul Althaus, rendered into English by R. T. Gribble), George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 5*s*. net, is a small volume of poems in free verse remarkable for variety of individual emotional touch and perfection of sincerity, divided into 4 parts relating to Vaishnava lyrics, those from the followers of Ramananda, Sikh lyrics and those from the Hindu-Mahomedan group. Short biographical notes of the sixteen poets here represented are added. The spiritual fervour of these simple short pieces will appeal to all readers alike and the Western mind will find here a close parallel to similar emotion expressed in beautiful lyrics by European mediæval mystics.

J. G. B.

"**Lectures and Addresses**" by Rabindranath Tagore (selected from the speeches of the poet) by Anthony X. Soares, M.A., LL.B., Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London, 3*s*., is, as the Preface informs us, an attempt to present a coherent account of Dr. Tagore's life, thought, convictions and ideals, within the space of only 160 pages of printed matter and as such it is successful. The compiler claims to have confined himself to utterances of the "Poet Laureate of Asia" that give an insight into his views and individuality. Altogether nine pieces have been put together here which tell us of the poet's home life and early education, his ideas regarding progress and civilization and his criticism of modern industrialism, his conception of Art and of Indian Nationalism and his views on International Relations, his firm faith in the ultimate triumph of humanity over all disruptive forces now at work and, finally, his grand ideal of the realization of the Infinite. It will be easily seen that a wide area of thought and idea has been sought to be covered by means of a careful and judicious selection from the public speeches and addresses of one of the foremost thinkers of to-day whose manysided personality and world-embracing outlook are not unfairly reflected in these public utterances. In making such a selection the compiler always faces a very difficult task and we are not sure that his judgment may not be challenged. This labour of love, however, has been conscientiously performed in a spirit of sincere appreciation and true reverence. So vast are the materials presented in Dr. Tagore's voluminous writings that ordinary readers feel embarrassed in their effort to form a clear idea regarding the main currents of his ideas. In this respect, at any rate, the present volume will be extraordinarily helpful to a large number of Dr. Tagore's admirers.

J. G. B.

"**Orphan Island,**" by Rose Macaulay, W. Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., London, 3*s*. 6*d*., is a highly entertaining romantic story of adventure, principally concerned with the history of a prosperous community growing out of a body of ship-wrecked persons who found refuge in what is called the Orphan Island. The story carries us back to the middle of the 19th century when Miss Charlotte Smith, a young philanthropist, was escorting a number of orphans to San Francisco from East London and became ship-wrecked but its chief interest centres round the visit paid to the Island by Mr. Thinkwell, Lecturer in Sociology in the University

of Cambridge, his daughter Rosamond and his two sons Charles and William about seventy years later. Miss Macaulay displays remarkable ingenuity in conceiving how a community perfectly free from outside influence and cut off from the world of civilisation can grow and create its own tradition, government and social arrangement. Here we have the interesting picture of a new kind of Utopia flourishing on the foundations of mid-Victorian ideas so dear to Miss Smith, a veritable megalomaniac full of eccentricities. A detailed history of her life is closely presented in Chapter XIV in the shape of the diary carefully kept by this queen of the Orphan Island which fell into Mr. Thinkwell's hands. Some of the characters are drawn very firmly and skilfully and we feel much interested in the Miss Smith family forming the ruling caste. Rosamond and Flora particularly charm us. The book is also full of enchanting descriptions of land and sea in the Pacific region and dramatically ends on a number of unanswerable questions.

J. G. B.

History of the Pallavas of Kanchi—By R. Gopalan, M.A., University Research Student (1920-24) ; published by the University of Madras (1928) with Introduction and Notes by S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar, M.A., Ph.D. Demy 8vo. pp. xxxiii+245, with a map and illustrations.

This small volume of nearly 250 pages gives us a detailed account of the Pallavas of Kanchi who from the 3rd to the 9th century, A.D. held a predominant position in Southern India and wielded a momentous influence upon South Indian politics and culture. Their importance was first noticed by the late Sir Walter Elliott and the peculiarities of Pallava architecture found a place in Fergusson's immortal work on Indian and Eastern architecture. Later on, many of the Pallava records were brought to light and were edited by eminent men like Fleet and Hultzsch and by the late Mr. V. Venkayya who was one of the earliest to discuss the origin of the Pallavas. Mr. Venkayya and the late Sir Vincent Smith were the first to propound the theory of the foreign origin of the Pallavas and this theory held the ground till the researches of a brilliant Frenchman, Prof. G. Joveau-Dubreuil proved the hollowness of the arguments advanced to identify the Pallavas with the Parthians. Prof. Joveau-Dubreuil whose name must remain immortal in connection with the history of the Pallavas, succeeded also in establishing a connection between the Pallava kings of the Prakrit charters and those of the Sanskrit records.

In the introductory as well as the second chapter we have a summary of all the theories about the origin of the Pallavas together with a critical examination of each theory. In the third chapter, we have an approximate account of the Pallavas of the Prakrit charters, *i.e.*, from Bappa Deva to Viṣṇugopa (*cir.* 340 A.D.) who, it may be taken as certain, was a contemporary of Samudragupta, the Gupta king of Northern India whose conquests are narrated in the Allahabad Praśasti. The fourth chapter gives us the probable line of succession from Viṣṇugopa to Simhaviṣṇu (350 to 550 A.D.) as constructed from the data supplied by the Velurpalayam, Omgoḍu, Mangudur and other plates and in this chapter we have a discussion of the supposed Chola interregnum. The next chapter gives us a history of contemporary political powers like the Kadambas, Sālankāyanas and the Viṣṇukundins while in the next we have a detailed account of the dynasty of Simhaviṣṇu (575-900 A.D.). The seventh chapter gives us a history of the exploits of Narasinhavarman I and his successors who carried on a bitter struggle against the Chalukyas. The next three chapters describe the reign of their successors and give us the account of a dynastic revolution and the downfall of the Pallavas. The tenth and the last chapter of the book proper gives us the leading features of Pallava rule in South India, the administrative system of the Pallava empire, the system of taxation, the work of the assemblies and a short account of the literature and religion of the period.

These ten chapters are followed by three valuable appendices in which we have a list of Pallava inscriptions, an extract from the Mahāvaṃsa and the first chapter of the text of the Avanti-sundari-kathāsāra.

The valuable information supplied by the book, which is up to date in point of collection of facts and of criticism, makes it indispensable for students and scholars. The author seems to keep an open mind on many of the disputed problems and this adds to the value of his suggestions. For his careful criticism and collection of facts, he deserves the best thanks of all interested in South Indian history.

N. C. B.

Theory of Government in Ancient India (Post-Vedic Period)—By Dr. Beniprasad, M.A., Ph.D., D.Sc. (Econ.) (Lond.), Reader in Civics and Politics in the University of Allahabad, with a foreword by Dr. A. B. Keith, Prof. of Sanskrit, in the University of Edinburgh. Demy. 8vo. pp. vii+399; Indian Press, Allahabad. Price Rs. 8-8.

In this volume which has won for him the degree of Ph.D. from the London University, the author gives us practically a running

summary of the political literature of Ancient India. In the first chapter the author analyses the main features of Indian political speculation and emphasises its essentially practical character. In the last chapter of the book (Ch. XII) he harps on the same topics and lays down that ' political theory in ancient India was essetially a theory of the Governmental act. As a whole, it is a theory of the art of Government. It touches but incidentally on the deeper problems of political obligations, foundations of the state or the rights of man. It seeks above all to guide the practical course of administration '' (p. 335).

The major portion of the book from the second chapter to the eleventh comprises running summaries of the information supplied by the various types of Indian literature and which manifest the political ideals of the different periods. The summaries are very ably done and do not leave even minor details unnoticed. As such they are bound to prove useful to students. The Epics, Manu, the Dharmaśāstras and the Arthaśāstra claim the author's special attention, but he has not failed to take stock of the information available from the Purāṇas, from the works of poets and dramatists like Kālidāsa or Bāṇa and has done full justice to the political ideas of the Buddhists or the Jains. In matters of literary chronology, the author has mainly followed the views of European scholars.

While in its present shape the book is bound to be useful to students or to the western reader, it would have been better still if the author had but discussed the main topics chronologically and with special reference to the different phases of evolution. Such a handling, especially on the part of one well-versed in the methods of comparative politics, would have added to its value. As it is, the book is a welcome addition to the literature on Hindu politics already existing and the author deserves best thanks.

N. C. B.

The Dramatic History of the Christian Faith.—By J. J. Vand Der, LL.D. Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras.

The volume contains in ten chapters, a fascinating account of the early history of Christianity. The age to which Christ belonged was a brilliant epoch during which Rome became a great world power after emerging from her victories over Carthage, and tried to adjust herself to the new era of her career. It was in the midst of a complexity of civilization, that the life and teaching of Jesus Christ shone marvellous in simplicity and radiant with love. After

the climax of his life in death, a small group of his disciples resolved to conquer the world in his name. Through martyrdom and severe persecutions they carried the message of universal love and eternal life most triumphantly over the new race. Century after century thereafter, the new faith was brought in contact with various types of civilization among most of the races and nations. It was at one time glorified by saints and sages, at another time degraded by hypocrisy and even crime, and again cleansed by self-sacrificing love and purity. Through all these vicissitudes, Christian Faith has been growing, expanding, and changing in form in its abiding reality—the living Christ.

Different Christian Churches adhere to different dogmas from which have originated various sects. Many good but ignorant Christians consider their form of worship, their doctrines and ritual, as the only form of salvation given by Christ to humanity in darkness. They do not recognize their evolutionary character, nor realize that their church is the product of a process of growth or change within the Christian religion. They do not realize the fact, that it is determined by pre-Christian religions and philosophical tenets. Christianity, in fact, owes very much to the doctrines of pre-Christian religions and philosophical thought, belief and custom. Greek philosophical thought found its way to the Christian faith, and Greek Christianity derived its terminology from its doctrines. Plato was the father of Christian philosophy, as Plutonius was the father of Christian mysticism. Similarly Egyptian religious beliefs became the vehicles for the expression of Christian thought. The cult of the Great Mother was stronger in Asia Minor, especially in Phrygia, and wherever the worship of the God Mother was in pre-Christian days, a deep devotion to the Virgin Mary is found afterwards. Nevertheless the new faith which Christ introduced became the gospel of untold millions.

Even during his life-time, he authorised some of his disciples to teach and perform miracles in His name, and St. Paul who was a Universalist, carried the message with great success. He thought in continents where his colleagues thought in villages. But the new faith suffered greatly under the Roman emperors.

It is interesting to note that the teachings of Christ became very much mixed up with other tenets. Pauline Christianity was different from the Jewish Christianity with its narrow nationalism. These forms were again mixed up with the tenets of the Alexandrian Church which were a blend of Christian ideals with Greek philosophy, Egyptian wisdom and Asiatic traditions. Finally, in Asia Minor and Egypt there was a strange admixture of the doctrine of Christ with Persian and

Indian esoteric traditions to be known subsequently as gnosticism. Thus different churches arose with conflicting tenets, a strange medley of pre-Christian doctrines, to all of which there were famous exponents, like Origen, Plutonius, Athanasius and St. Augustine.

The author of this volume deserves our congratulations for the clear exposition of the various abstruse doctrines which have found their way into the teachings of Jesus Christ.

L. K. A. IYER

Wisdom of the Prophets (in the light of Tassawwuf) : by Khaja Khan, *Khan Sahib*, with a Foreward by L. Massignon ; 60, Jan-i-Jahan Khan Road, Royapettah, Madras. Price Rs. 2.

Mr. Khaja Khan needs no introduction to students of Islamic mysticism. His *Studies in Tassawwuf* and the *Secrets of An'al Haqq* have attracted considerable attention and we hope, that his present work, *The Wisdom of the Prophets*, will also be equally well received. The book under notice is an abridged translation of twenty-seven chapters of the celebrated *Fuṣūṣ-ul-Hikam* (or "Bezels of Wisdom") of the great Sūfi mystic, Shaykh Muhīyyud-Dīn Ibn'al 'Arabī "who is universally admitted to have been amongst the greatest, if not the greatest, of the many mystics produced in Muslim lands." The book opens with a *Foreword* from the pen of M. Massignon, a notable authority on Manṣūr al-Hallāj, followed by a preface and the life of the author of *Fuṣūṣ* in which, we regret to note, the author has reproduced without any comment or criticism the many extraordinary and even "supernatural" phenomena usually associated with the early life of the mystic. Ibn'ul 'Arabī was born in Spain in 1165 A.D., and completed his studies at the University of Seville. He came to the East in 1201, and lived in Egypt, Hijāz, 'Irāq-i-'Ajam and Asia Minor up to his death in 1240 A.D. He is described as a writer of "colossal facundity," Jāmī credits him with the authorship of some 500 works, while Ibn'ul 'arabī himself gives us a list of 259 works. It is surprising, however, that almost all his works have remained sealed books to the English-knowing public. Ibn'ul 'Arabī was the founder of a school of mystical theology and no history of Muslim Philosophy or mysticism can be complete without a clear understanding and exposition of the system founded by him. We are, therefore, particularly grateful to Mr. Khaja Khan for his translation of the *Fuṣūṣ*. Here the author explains the spiritual and

moral teachings of the Prophets, from Adam to Muhammad, and also discusses, *inter alia*, the many abstruse points of theology and mysticism. The book is extremely difficult and at times even quite unintelligible in spite of the learned commentary appended by the translator to each chapter.

The translation is clear and correct ; but we find that the translator has apparently followed no standard system of transliteration ; we also notice that the proof-sheets have not been read carefully. We may draw attention to only some of the mistakes that we have noticed in the Preface (pp. xiii-xxiii) : *collegues* for *colleagues* (p. xiv, 1. 29) ; *wheather* for *whether* (p. XV, 1·14) ; *Encylopaeda* for *Encyclopaedia* (p. xi, *n* a) ; *grammer* for *grammar* (p. xvii- 1·27) ; *Qasasul.Anbiya* for *Qisas-ul-Anbiya* (p. xviii, 1·23) ; "*fashi*" for "*fahsha*" (p. xz, 1. 22) ; "*Inual* for "*Innal*" (p. xxi, 1·4), etc.

M. K. SHIRAZI

Payām-i-Rūh: by Mr. Hamidullah "Afsar," B.A.—Indian Press Limited, Allahabad, 1927. Price Rs. 3.

It is a very nicely printed book in lithograph containing the collection of Urdu poems by "Afsar" who has already acquired wide reputation for his contributions to leading Urdu Up-country magazines. There are a few fine plates depicting different scenes of Indian life, mostly female. His poetic diction, though not quite new, reveals a good deal of his taste to popularise himself by following the footsteps of the Westerners, and he has undoubtedly been successful to a great extent in his attempt. His verses are melodious, simple and perfect. The words and expressions in which he clothes his thought are natural and familiar.

M. K. SHIRAZI

Dālī-Ka-Jog: By the same author. A small interesting and instructive book containing a number of short stories in nice Urdu prose. It can safely be recommended for use in high schools, as its stories can teach good morals to young students. The author seems to compile these after his long experience gained by coming in contact with people of different nationalities. He has not confined himself to the social life of the Moslems alone, but has written much of the Hindus also.

M. K. SHIRAZI

Ourselves

Birthday Honours

We offer our hearty congratulations to Prof. Jadunath Sarkar, M.A., C.I.E., and Prof. C. V. Raman, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., on the Knighthood recently conferred on them in recognition of their eminent services to the cause of the advancement of learning. Professor Raman's solid achievements in new scientific discoveries are more recent and being still in the prime of life he is yet rich in promise and we expect much greater things from him.

* * *

Sixtieth Birthday of Professor H. Lüders

The Syndicate of the Calcutta University has expressed its desire to convey to Professor H. Lüders its hearty congratulation on the celebration of his sixtieth birthday on the 25th June, 1929. The Syndicate has also desired on this occasion to place on record its appreciation of the valuable services rendered by the Professor to the cause of Indology and Oriental Learning wishing him many more years of useful and healthy life.

* * *

A New Doctor of Science

Mr. A. N. Singh, who did research work for four years at the Calcutta University under the Hardinge Professor of Higher Mathematics, has been unanimously recommended by Professor Hobson of Cambridge, Professor Whittaker of Edinburgh and Professor Hardy of Oxford, for the D. Sc. degree of the Calcutta University, on account of his original investigations on non-

differentiable functions, the results of which appeared in numerous papers in India, Europe, Japan and America. An interesting situation arose about a year ago on account of a result of Dr. Singh's being in direct conflict with a result of the famous Russian mathematician, Dr. A. Besikovitch, at present Cayley Lecturer of Mathematics at the Cambridge University. Dr. Singh's result was quoted with approval by Professor Hobson in his standard work on the theory of functions of a real variable and Dr. Besikovitch's result was mentioned as an important contribution in the treatise " Reelle *Funktionen*." of Professor Caratheodosy of the Munich University. On account of the extremely intricate and subtle nature of the subject, it is difficult to say with certainty which result is right. But Professor Lusin, the great Russian mathematician, has declared himself in favour of Dr. Singh and so has Professor Denjoy of the Paris University, as will appear from the following remarks of Professor Lusin taken from a French letter recently sent by him to Professor Ganesh Prasad from Paris: " I sent you, dear colleague, a letter relating to a theorem of M. Besikovitch. I wrote that, in my opinion, there are some mistakes in the result of Besikovitch so that the opposite result of your pupil, M. Singh, is perfectly correct. Moreover, M. Denjoy spoke to me recently of a result analogous to M. Singh's which he obtained recently without knowing the publication of M. Singh."

* * *

The Mouat Medal

The report on the research work carried on by Mr. Kshirod Chandra Mukhopadhyay, M.A., during the third year's term of his Premchand Roychand Studentship in Literary Subjects for the year 1925 has been adopted by the Syndicate and it has been decided that a Mouat Medal be awarded to the Scholar.

* * *

Jubilee Research Prizes in Arts and Science

The following subjects have been selected for the Jubilee Research Prizes in Arts and Science for the year 1931 :—

(1) Influence of English Romantic Poetry upon Modern Bengali Literature.

(2) The Problem of Irrigation in Bengal—How to solve it with special reference to its effect on Agriculture and the General Health of the Presidency.

* * *

University Lectures

Mr. Nagendranath Gupta will deliver, with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate already obtained, four lectures in the University on the following subjects, without remuneration, next cold weather, either in December, 1929, or January, 1930, as may be arranged hereafter :—

Rammohan Roy.
Iswarchandra Vidyasagar.
Bankimchandra Chatterjee.
Swami Vivekananda.

* * *

Result of the Preliminary Scientific. M.B. Examination, May, 1929.

The number of candidates registered for the Preliminary Scientific M.B. Examination, held in May, 1929 was 224 of whom 122 passed, 97 failed, 1 was expelled and 4 were absent.

The candidate bearing Roll Cal. No. 77 was declared to have passed the Preliminary Scientific M.B. Examination, May, 1929.

* * *

Result of the First M.B. Examination, May, 1929

The number of candidates registered for the First M.B. Examination (under the New Regulations) held in May, 1929, was 203, of whom 130 passed, 64 failed, none was expelled and 9 were absent.

* * *

Result of the Second M.B. Examination, May, 1929

The number of candidates registered for the Second M.B. Examination, held in May, 1929 was 410, of whom 305 passed, and 18 passed in Pharmacology only, 84 failed, none was expelled and 3 were absent. Of the successful candidates 14 obtained Honours in Pathology.

* * *

Result of the Third M.B. Examination, May, 1929

The number of candidates registered for the Third M.B. Examination held in May, 1929, was 163 of whom 103 passed, 59 failed, none was expelled, and 1 was absent ; out of those who have passed, the Roll Nos. Cal. Comb. 4, 5, 9, 14, 45, 49, 62, 65, who have failed or were absent in Pathology, should not be declared to have passed.

* * *

Result of the Final M.B. Examination, May, 1929

The number of candidates registered for Part I (New) of the Final M.B. Examination held in May, 1929, was 2, of whom 1 passed and 1 failed.

The number of candidates registered for Part I (Old) of the Examination was 1, who passed.

The number of candidates registered for Part II (New) of the Examination was 6, of whom 5 passed, and 1 failed who passed in Medical Jurisprudence only.

The number of candidates registered for Final M.B. (New Regulations) Examination was 313, of whom 126+2=128 passed, 180 failed, 4 were absent and 1 was expelled. Of the successful candidates none obtained Honours in any subject.

Of the successful candidates at the Final M.B. Examination (New Regulations) 1 failed in Pathology at the Second M.B. Examination and 1 failed in Jurisprudence at the Third M.B. Examination and they are therefore not declared to have passed the Final M.B. Examination completely.

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

AUGUST, 1929

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND INDIA

The United States of America is the strongest nation in the world. In international commerce, finance and industry she has out-ranked Great Britain. Her naval strength is second only to that of Great Britain; and among a certain section of Americans there is the justifiable desire that the American navy must be " second to none " in strength and defensive power. This attitude among the Americans is in conflict with the traditional British policy of maintaining the strongest fleet in the world. Therefore there is much talk about Anglo-American rivalry and possible conflict. In fact Prof. Scott Nearing and others in America (all who believe in the theory of economic determinism) and some communist leaders in Great Britain and Soviet Russia and some others regard that war between Great Britain and the United States of America is inevitable.

Acknowledging the existing economic and commercial competition and naval rivalry between Great Britain and the United States, I wish to emphasise the point, that no student of Real Politics and International Relations should be cocksure of an inevitable war between Great Britain and the United States. On the contrary, it is possible and, if not, probable that statesmen of Great Britain and America, for the preservation of the best interests, will be able to come to an amicable adjustment of all outstanding problems.

During the administration of President Cleveland, on the Venezuelan Question, the American Government practically sent an ultimatum to the British Foreign Office, on the ground that the British Government's activities against Venezuela constituted an unfriendly act towards the United States of America and violation of the Monroe Doctrine. This action of the American Government precipitated a crisis; but the far-sighted British statesmen submitted to America and the whole question was solved by arbitration. In fact this controversy led to careful exploration, by the ablest statesmen of both countries, of all the avenues by which the Anglo-American relations could be strengthened to such an extent that there would be less possibility of any armed conflict between these two nations. It must be said that credit goes to the British diplomats, especially men like Lord Balfour (then Mr.) and late Mr. Chamberlain (the father of the present British Secretary of State) for seeking Anglo-American co-operation in World Politics. Indeed this far-sightedness in British diplomacy brought about virtual Anglo-American co-operation in all major problems of world politics and world conflicts—such as the Spanish-American War, the Boxer Up-rising and the struggle for Open Door Policy in China, the Russo-Japanese War, the Algeciras Conference and the World War. One should not hastily believe that British Diplomacy has degenerated to such a state of impotency that, now in 1929-1930, when America is infinitely stronger than she was during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, England will tumble into a war with the United States of America. It is more conceivable that the British statesmen will seek a compromise and solution of the existing problems in Anglo-American relations than risk a war which would mean possible dissolution of the British Empire, if not its very destruction.

In this connection it may be pointed out that British Diplomacy in its relations with other Powers has always shown fearlessness and never hesitated to change its course if that was

necessary to serve British interests. For instance about 1901 British statesmen were serious about concluding an Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance against the Dual Alliance of France and Russia; but they abandoned the idea of an Anglo-German Alliance, and remained contented with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and cordial understanding with the United States of America. Great Britain was at the point of war with France in the Fashoda incident ; but British statesmen did not hesitate to conclude an Entente with France when such a possibility was open to them. They later on concluded the Triple Entente and in 1914 fought Germany with whom they were negotiating for an alliance in 1901.

These facts may be utilised by those who assert that an Anglo-American War is inevitable, to the effect that Great Britain under the leadership of unscrupulus diplomats may fight the United States as she did Germany, which was Britain's commercial and naval competitor. It may be further pointed out that since the days of Elizabeth, Great Britain fought Spain, Holland, France, Russia and Germany in succession because they challenged British power (especially naval power); and as to-day the United States of America is the greatest commercial and naval rival of Great Britain, war is inevitable. However, I may say that possibly there would not have been a World War, had German statesmen been careful enough in their relations with other nations and if they did not follow the path which led to virtual isolation of Germany in world politics. To be concrete, it may be safely asserted that if the German statesmen followed the path of Anglo-German Alliance or German-Russian Alliance then there would have been less chance of a World War and certainly no possibility of German defeat as it happened in the World War.

It cannot be disputed that in case of an Anglo-American War, if Great Britain is defeated then the inevitable result is the dissolution of the British Empire. Thus no British statesman will ever undertake the adventure of declaring war against

the United States, unless it seems conclusive that, through isolalation of the United States in world politics and other causes Great Britain would be the victor. Therefore it is reasonable to believe that British statesmen will never risk a war with the United States unless they are sure of receiving support from other Powers against America.

It is worth while to examine very briefly the existing trend of world politics and see if isolation of the United States of America can be brought about by British statesmen, even if they wished to carry out such a policy. To be sure to-day the Anglo-French Entente is stronger than ever. But this fact does not conclusively prove that France and her allies (Belgium, Poland, Czecho-Slavia, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia) will be willing to array themselves in a war against the United States of America in favor of Great Britain. For argument's sake, if we agree that because of the existence of the Anglo-French Entente, France and her allies will join Great Britain against the United States, even then there is not the remotest possibility of bringing about isolation of the United States in Europe; because Germany will naturally avail herself of the opportunity of rectifying her Eastern Prussian boundary and, if possible, receive her lost provinces. Russia will try to recover Bessarabia, Hungarians will try to avenge the wrong done to them and Italians will array against Jugo-Slavia. In Africa there will be revolt of the Egyptians and Moroccans, and in the Near East the Arabs will not submit to the existing condition of servitude ; and Turkey may take a stand to recover the disputed and rich territory of Iraq. Within the British Empire, some of the self-governing dominions, especially Ireland, Canada and South Africa, may refuse to fight against the United States and may declare their independence. In Asia, Great Britain's position will be difficult in India ; Chinese Nationalists will surely join America against France and Great Britain to recover Indo-China, Tibet and if possible Honkong. Indeed Japan will be a very powerful factor in such a conflict; but as there is no Anglo-Japanese Alliance

in existence, it will be to the advantage of Japan to remain neutral and consolidate her position economically as well as politically in Asia. Thus it is clear that without much effort on the part of the United States of America she will find powerful and effective allies in Europe, Africa and Asia. As the United States of America cannot be starved to submission as was the case with Germany in the World War, it will not be so easy to defeat America. A prolonged warfare will possibly be more disastrous to America's enemies than to herself. Thus it is reasonable to expect that British statesmen, in dealing with the United States, will be forced to adopt a more conciliatory attitude. It is interesting to note that both the French and British Governments have *officially* given up the Anglo-French Naval Pact, because it was not acceptable to the United States. Furthermore such a veteran statesman as Earl Grey in his recent speech has declared that the best way for England to follow, in dealing with the United States on the Naval question, is to allow the United States to build as many large cruisers as she wants to build and at the same time Great Britain should have as many small cruisers as she needs for her own national defence. There is much truth in the statement that an Anglo-American War will do incalculable harm to the whole world, especially the contending Powers, without any gain even to the victorious Power.

Although I am not in the confidence of the American statesmen who are directing the destiny of the nation, I know that the American policy is for world peace. The Kellogg Pact and the American Naval Programme (which I have defended in an article in "Forward," Calcutta) are to ensure peace and provide means of national defence and protection of American commerce. America is the largest creditor nation in the world; her industrial machinery is the best in the world; her export and import trade is constantly growing; her surplus capital is seeking new fields of investment; and for these reasons (if one wishes to ignore Amrican idealism which is the dominating

characteristic of American national life), America wants peace. America wants such changes in world economic and political condition as will afford really "Open Door" in business in all parts of the world. It seems to me conclusive that as America is not seeking or planning a war against Britain, and as Britain has more to lose than to gain by pursuing any policy which might lead to an Anglo-American War there is every reason to think that in course of time all outstanding Anglo-American disputes will be amicably settled in a process of adjustment. Britain will be forced to submit to America whenever the latte shows her stubborn determination to hold to her position : while in many instances America will show her magnanimous consideration for Britain and her Empire.

I am firmly convinced that American power is a factor for world peace and it will lead to the solution of many problems of human freedom without a war. This being my conviction, I feel that intimate economic and cultural relations between the United States and India will benefit both nations, especially the latter, even in regaining her national freedom. American history is full of incidents which demonstrate that America has furthered the cause of human freedom, without going into war, but by using her power and influence. America protected the newly-born republics of South America from the menace of the Holy Alliance by declaring her Monroe Doctrine. To be sure America fought Mexico and annexed some of the Mexican territories, but it was the American firm stand against the plan of Napoleon III, who wanted to build up a Mexican Empire, under French control, that saved Mexico from foreign domination. America did not join Japan against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, but now it is known that American diplomatic and financial support to Japan and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was a factor in Japanese victory. After the Boxer War when Russia tried virtually to annex Manchuria, it was the American determination which brought about the inauguration of a new era in Chinese politics, in the form of the "open door policy."

All the newly-created republics and monarchies of Europe, which came into existence after the World War, owe their very existence more to the *American doctrine of Self-determination*, propounded by the late President Woodrow Wilson, than any other thing. Although the treaty of Versailles decided that Japan should receive Shantung, yet it was American opposition to this that forced Japan to give up Shantung to China, and it was America which forced Japan to get out of Siberia. America accomplished these not by declaring war against Japan, but by inducing Great Britain to give up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance during the Washington Conference. During the recent Nationalist uprising in China, although America was forced to fire a few shots against Nanking, yet it was America, which without firing a shot has aided the Chinese Nationalists in recovering tariff autonomy; and America will possibly be the instrument to bring about the termination of the existing extra-territorial jurisdiction in China. It was the American advisers in Siam and the American Government which aided that Asian State to recover her full sovereignty. In Persia, American advisers paved the way for the present stable administration of Shah Reza; and to-day American financiers, in co-operation with German engineers, are building new rail-roads which will strengthen Persia politically as well as economically. In the Near East, America has done more for the education and alleviation of misery of suffering humanity than all the European nations. America did not accept an inch of territory as mandate in the Near East, when the British were anxious to entangle her in the political mess of the Orient, yet American Universities, Women's Colleges, hospitals, etc., are aiding the people of the Near East in the most constructive way to build up their future national life. Whatever semi-independence the people of Egypt enjoy to-day, is largely due to the support of the American people to the cause of Egyptian nationalism. *America did not declare a war against Great*

Britain to free the Irish people from British misrule and oppression; but it is known to all that the very existence of the Irish Free State is primarily due to American diplomatic pressure in its favour and American condemnation of the brutalities of the British "Black and Tans." Great Britain, which carried out a policy of subduing the German people through starvation, would have never given the Irish people—only four millions—their freedom unless she was forced to do so by American diplomacy and public opinion.

American contribution to the cause of political progress of the world is very considerable. To-day there are more republics than monarchies in the world; and all these republics have been influenced by American ideals and examples. Federalism in Government is primarily an American contribution. It is not generally recognized and known by Indian politicians of to-day that the American example of struggle for freedom is the spiritual fountain for the present-day movement for Indian Freedom which is being directed by the All-India National Congress. I may confidently say that the fathers of the Congress movement in India—especially the late Sir Surendra Nath Banerjea—thought of the American Congress held at Philadelphia which, in 1776, declared American Independence, as the source of inspiration. How often we have heard that the American policy in the Philippines is more liberal than that practised in India by the British; and the British imperialists often complained of American liberality as a source of inspiration to the discontented Indians. On the whole, Americans spend more money in India for the education of the Indian people than the Britishers, who live upon India's trade. During the terrible famines in India, Americans showed greater generosity to the people of India than the British. *It may be mentioned and emphasised that the idea of the establishment of the first Agricultural College for India originated in the mind of an American philanthropist who donated several thousand pounds to Lord Curzon for the purpose, and that was the origin of the*

present Agricultural College at Pusa. Responsible Indian educators, statesmen and scholars know that the American people may not be willing to go to war against Great Britain for India's freedom, but they are considerate of the Indian people and their national aspirations. *Even in the field of international diplomacy, whenever it has been possible for America to champion the cause of the Indian people on moral grounds, it has been done by her statesmen; and the best and most recent example is America's fight against British opium policy in India.*

In the past, Indian leaders did not consciously follow a path of international co-operation. Even men like Mahatma Gandhi did not see any special gain in courting international contact and cultivating international public opinion. But fortunately for India a new type of statesmen are in the arena who wish to emphasise the need of international action. *Educationally, economically, industrially and otherwise no nation can help India more than the United States of America. America has no political ambition in India and the American people realise that with the growth of freedom and better economic condition of the people of India, America will reap commercial advantages in open competition with other nations.*

Whatever may be the tendency of the Anglo-American relations, American sympathy and influence and co-operation with India will be a source of strength for India, and it will also lead to better understanding between the East and the West and thus promote the cause of World Peace. There are several thousand American businessmen and missionaries in India and there are several hundred America-returned Indian scholars and businessmen in India. These people, who can sympathise with one another because of their exceptional knowledge, should co-operate so that there will be more Indian students in American universities, more American Exchange professors in Indian universities ; and there may be chairs of American history and civilization in all important Indian universities and

facilities may be provided in American Universities for Indian professors to teach Indian history and civilization.

Closer cultural and economic understanding between India and America may become the most important stabilising factor in Anglo-American relations ensuring peace. As an American citizen, born in India, I feel that as America is the strongest nation in the world, as she is richer than India and have tremendous economic and industrial power and educational facilities, the initiative for the promotion of Indo-American cultural and economic relations should rest with the far-sighted and responsible American public. At the same time, unless the Indian educators and businessmen be active in rousing American idealism and interesting American industrialists and financiers regarding the possibilities of Indo-American co-operation, no one should expect any immediate appreciable activity on the part of Americans in promoting Indo-American friendship, through cultural and economic understanding.

TARAKNATH DAS

PLACE OF BRADLEY IN BRITISH THOUGHT

I

"When we start," writes Kant in the 'Introduction' to his *Prolegomena*, "with a thought that another has bequeathed to us, a thought well-grounded but not fully developed, we may have good hope by persevering reflexion to get further with it than the acute writer to whom we owe the first spark of light." With peculiar appropriateness does it apply to the case of Bradley's philosophy [and serve as the defining principle or reasonable excuse for the 'examination' here undertaken]. It is true that Bradley has been more often refuted than understood. But it will be going too far to contend, as Hoffding does, 'that the English criticism has not sufficiently recognised the profundity and energy of Bradley's thought.' On the contrary, it seems to me that the entire literature that has come into being by way of reaction and criticism is itself an eloquent testimony and, in fact, a living monument to the English recognition of the wonderful profundity and energy of Bradley's thought. If, as it has been happily expressed, 'veneration is not the same thing as idolatry' and thus a great thinker is 'more honoured by divergence than by obedience,' then, assuredly Bradley has been immortalised, and venerated all the more, in the heritage of reaction he has bequeathed to his philosophic contemporaries as well as successors. There could be conceived no better tribute to the genius of Bradley 'to whom British philosophy owed the impulse that gave it new life' and no more accurate estimate of his merits than the one made by Ward, as he observed, that his dialectic "has led those who can, to think; and so—it was his one ambition—he has taught English philosophers 'to deal systematically with first

principles.' For this 'disciplinary' uplift he merits the foremost place in 'contemporary British philosophy,' which is, I believe, unanimously accorded to him." It is, perhaps, too early to try to determine Bradley's place in philosophy; but there is no doubt that the aforesaid estimate,—coming, as it does, from one of his most unsparing and acute critics,—will only be confirmed by the growing verdict of the coming generation of philosophic inquirers. Bradley has, indeed, gathered up, in his capacious comprehension, probably all the threads of the 'great argument' we call contemporary philosophy, and there can hardly be conceived a better historical orientation of the outstanding problems of contemporary philosophy than to make Bradley's handling of these the settled point of departure in all future reconstruction in philosophy. If there be still the need of documentary evidence of Bradley's myriad-minded influence on English philosophers, one has only to refer to the Index of the two volumes (specially the first) of contemporary British Philosophy, and to frame one's judgment, from the ever-recurring illusion to Bradley, as to the place he occupies in Contemporary British Philosophy.

While it is just and fair to refer to the enormous influence which Bradley has wielded upon the formative phase of one of the most fruitful periods of British Philosophy, so far as constructive thinking is concerned, it is no use disguising the fact that his works have uniformly met with a mixed reception. No one, I believe, will dispute the historical fact that philosophy was (as it must necessarily be), mostly in a minor key throughout the greater part of the last century, which was mainly critical and reactionary rather than creative; reviewing its own past and vindicating its own existence, rather than opening up fresh channels of constructive thought. In an age which was thus distrustful of philosophical synthesis it is no wonder that his *magnum opus*, "*Appearance and Reality*," should be hailed, as it was done by E. Caird directly on its publication, as the greatest thing since Kant. Whether we in this age are

prepared to endorse that verdict or not, there is no denying the fact that it was *the biggest* attempt at metaphysical construction made in English philosophy during the last century. But it is exactly here that the danger lay—it is the very magnitude of the task to which he addressed himself, that awakened suspicion and distrust among a considerable section of his contemporaries. It is not, however, maintained that all the criticisms that had been thus conceived were altogether groundless. On the contrary, there appeared, as is quite natural and inevitable, in the execution of this gigantic undertaking certain defects too patent to be passed over. But these are only faults, it must be remembered of the greatness of the undertaking. It is a matter of common knowledge that in proportion to the magnitude of the forces with which mechanics have to deal, is the risk of error in their application to practice. Bradley's critics do not appear to have always risen to the height of this great speculative enterprise, and thus assessed at its proper worth the sweep of that subtle dialectic which brushes aside all that we ordinarily reckon as real—in the realm of science, art, morals, religion, including our own selves—to the limbo of appearance. Seldom did they stop to reckon with the fact that in assuming the rôle of critics they had been up against a philosophic thinker of extraordinary power and depth of insight, who had probably thought out and weighed most of the objections long before they thought of them, and therefore the alleged contradictions—if they were really such—were at once suggestive and significant. Accordingly, a good deal of criticisms heretofore urged against Bradley have proved ineffectual, on account of their being induced *ab extra* by philosophic thinkers, entrenched in their own specific points of view. Nowhere is it more acutely realised, than in criticising Bradley, that to have a cut-and-dried *Weltanschauung* of one's own is a doubtful asset, if not a positive handicap, on the part of a would-be critic. On the other hand, there would be no point in merely recounting and restating what he has actually said but in considering what he would, on a

consistent application of his own logic, lead us on to say. That is the best way in which a line of criticism can be made really fruitful and effective. And that is the modest plea,-the very *raison d'être* of the examination undertaken here, which seeks scrupulously to develop its thesis by following in the track, wherever possible, of Bradley's own suggestive criticisms and undeveloped hints in his later and revised writings as also the original ones.

As one proceeds to appraise and survey in its historical affiliations the contribution of an original thinker of the eminence of Bradley—although Bradley himself always disclaimed, with his characteristic modesty, any such originality—one is impressed with the apparent hopelessness of the task. At the transfiguring touch of his synthetic genius—which is in this respect typical of his own Absolute—the scattered lights of philosophic insight, that were culled from widely differing sources and blended in one common focus, are transformed and transmuted past all recognition of these as the things they were before such fusion. But just as on spectral analysis, the original colours that enter into the composition of white light can be studied in isolation from the resultant whole, so it may not be altogether futile to attempt a synoptic sketch of the influences that have presumably been operative in the moulding of Bradley's thought. The consensus of such historical criticisms would be, I think, to place Bradley in a line with three of the greatest system-builders—Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel—with him as the no less illustrious fourth, in spite of his avowed repudiation of 'system-making or systems home-grown or imported,' under the controlling lead, perhaps, of that inherited, typically English, distrust of 'system-building', whose efficacy in the domain of philosophical thinking cannot possibly be overrated. It has been no less customary to call him, though with questionable accuracy, an 'Hegelian' in spite of his own express disclaimer to that effect in the very 'Preface to the First Edition' of his 'Logic'. Höffding, however, thinks that 'if he must be classified, he must be

called far more a Kantian than a Hegelian', while others have accused Bradley of having 'unduly neglected' Kant. The best characterisation of Bradley's historical position we have had so far is the one, I think, which Ward gave in his critical notice on "*Appearance and Reality*" in *Mind* (Jan., 1894), wherein he observed *inter alia* that Bradley 'is Herbart and Hegel, Leibniz and Spinoza, Fechner and Feuerbach, all by turns. The one great thinker with whom he seems never really in touch is Kant ...It is said that we in England are threatened with an Hegelian invasion: if we are Mr. Bradley seems marked out to lead the Hegelian left.' As it stands, this analysis, accurate and informing as it is, may nevertheless appear, by reason of its very breadth, to be a doubtful compliment, and that is more or less what Bradley himself took it for, when he remarked in his 'reply to criticism' (*Mind*, 1894), that from Ward's 'sketch' of his 'mental characteristics' he is 'led to infer' that it 'must be such as to account for and justify anything.' So it is, as one unkind critic might say, so far as his system is meant to be a vindication of the all-encompassing Absolute. But, after all, nothing could more accurately delineate the nature of the constructive endeavour on Bradley's part than the analysis just referred to.

Most of Bradley's critics who have been preoccupied with the estimate of Kantian or Hegelian influence upon him have not, I dare say, attached sufficient importance to the qualified terms in which he spoke of those 'who insisted well, if perhaps incautiously, on the great claims of Kant and Hegel.' What has not received, however, the prominence it deserves in these historical sketches is the indubitable and far-reaching influence which Herbart exerted, both positively and negatively, on the formation of Bradley's philosophical position. Leaving aside for the present the consideration of the internal evidence of Herbart's influence on Bradley, I should like here to draw upon what may be called an external, though none the less authoritative and convincing, evidence on this point. Prof. Taylor, than

whom probably there is no one fit to speak more authoritatively, tells us in his commemorative notice on Bradley (*Mind*, Jan., 1925), that "though he urged wide and careful study of Hegel's works and treated Hegel's deliverance in all departments of thought as deserving of the gravest attention, he would accompany every recommendation with the qualification, 'but you must always remember that the man had a perfect itch for making out black to be white if he possibly could.' It was characteristic of him that one of the earliest pieces of advice I had from him.....was to make a thorough study of Herbart as an excellent corrective of Hegelian bias." When Bradley entered the philosophical arena, the prestige of the empirical philosophy of Mill and Spencer was still holding undisputed sway at all the principal seats of learning in England. It had, however, already begun to betray symptoms of exhaustion and decadence, and to recede before the advancing tide of idealism, born of increasing attention bestowed, under the auspices of Scottish thinkers mainly, upon the writings of Kant and especially of Hegel.

Strictly speaking, it was probably the poet-philosopher Coleridge, whom Mill hailed as 'the great awakener in this country of the spirit of philosophy within the bounds of traditional opinions,' who acknowledged his own obligations to Kant (with whose philosophy he is said to have made his acquaintance in 1801) in the distinction he drew in the *Biographia Literaria* between Imagination and Fancy (to which his friend and associate Wordsworth also subscribed) and elaborated in the *Aids to Reflection* in the form of that between Reason and Understanding—which is evidently of Kantian origin. It will be going too far to charge Coleridge with conscious literary plagiarism, and to accuse him, as Leslie Stephen does, of having 'simply appropriated from Schelling' his 'most coherent exposition.' Having reference to the unmistakable evidences of speculative depth and originality in his varied literary pursuits, no one can honestly disregard his own plea of

a 'genial coincidence of thought' as involving an undue strain on credulity. Later criticisms appear to have regained that lost equilibrium and judicious balance of mind, which should be the informing principle of all historical and literary criticism; and the brilliant introduction to the Oxford edition of the *Biographia Literaria* has rendered a signal service in this direction, so far as it urges with unanswerable and convincing logic that Coleridge had reached his characteristic position before he made the acquaintance of Kant, and later of Schelling. But Coleridge made no secret about his obligations to Kant—which he was ready to own as those of a pupil to the master—and naturally hailed with special joy the Kantian treatment of the question as being the weighty ratification of his own speculative venture. In estimating the seminal influence of Kant and Hegel on the rise and development of speculative idealism in Great Britain in the eighties of the last century, one cannot be too careful against the danger of being thrown off the balance. It was Caird (than whom probably no other accredited Hegelian in this country has stood in a more direct relationship to Hegel) who gave the right direction, as he made the pregnant remark in the 'Preface' to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883) that 'the literal importation of Kant and Hegel into another country and time would not be possible if it were desirable, or desirable if it were possible.' Therein consists, in point of fact, the peculiarity or individuality of the philosophical inheritance of British thinkers; for, as John Stuart Mill, writing in the forties of the last century, gave the true diagnosis in the *Dissertation* on Coleridge in which he declared that 'the spirit of philosophy in England, like that of religion, is still rootedly sectarian.' Bradley seems to have merely reinforced the same verdict, but unfortunately with a one-sided emphasis, when he said that "we inhabit an island, and our national bent of thought will, if we do not extend it, retain an insular character." But one can ill afford to forget the fact that the Critical Philosophy of Kant was avowedly more influenced by Locke and

the English empirical school generally than by any other indigenous school of thought. Here is a patent case of fruitful application of the principle of cross fertilisation in the realm of intellectual achievements.

Next came Carlyle—one of the younger contemporaries of Coleridge's, thoroughly saturated with the Transcendentalist Philosophy of Germany,—who had already in 1827 discerned in the Critical Philosophy an epoch-making power standing 'in respect of its probable influence on the moral culture of Europe on a line with the Reformation' (*Miscellaneous Essays*, Vol, I). Later appeared James Hutchison Stirling who declared of German philosophy in general and of Hegel in particular that "these books are not understood in England, yet require to be understood before any advance is possible," and gave to the world, under the title of *The Secret of Hegel* (1865), the result of his own prolonged wrestle with the writings of Hegel. Then followed in quick succession Green's elaborate Introduction to his edition of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* (1874), William Wallace's translations, with Prolegomena, of Hegel's *Logic* (1874) and Edward Caird's masterly treatise on *The Philosophy of Kant* (1877)—publications which may be truly said to mark the beginning of a new era for British philosophical enquiry. Now, in common allegiance to the new spirit abroad in the philosophical world, and ideas then in ferment nearer home, Bradley had brought out in 1876 his *Ethical Studies* which already evinced pronounced Hegelian affinities—affinities that came into prominent relief in the sustained application of the principle of Totality as underlying all knowledge and conduct. This I take to be also the essential message of Romanticism, and it is scarcely too much to say that we shall entirely miss the entire meaning and importance of the trend of Idealism of the seventies if we fail to interpret it in its historical connection with the whole Romantic movement of which it appears to be at once the justification and completion. It was, in short, the focus at which the spirit of

Romanticism found its self-conscious unity and expression. Thus, in Kant's philosophy we find its small voice making itself heard as early as in the *Dissertation* (1770) and more distinctly in the *Dialectic* of the first Critique, in the three Ideas of Reason (*Vernunft*) as distinguished from the categories of the Understanding (*Verstand*), envisaged further by the negative and problematical, though none the less indispensable, concept of a non-sensuous or 'intellectual' intuition with its inevitable suggestion of an intuitive understanding. This still feeble voice became, as is well known, more and more articulate and positive in affirmation in his later writings. Already in the *Dissertation* he speaks of a Divine intuition which, as a *principium objectivum* is a self-active, self-positing, creative intuition —an *intellectus archetypus* or *intuitus purus intellectualis*— corresponding nevertheless to the discursive understanding of ours in respect of its spontaneity exemplified in its application of the categories. For such an *intuitus intellectualis* the difference between sensibility and understanding would necessarily cease to function, and it would, therefore, cognise intelligible realities or *noumena* (*intelligibilia*) not only in a negative abstract fashion merely, as we do, but as they are in themselves.

On a closer inspection, however, of the three Critiques, it will be apparent that the contrast between our sensuous intuition and the notion of a non-sensuous intuition or intuitive understanding is being continually forced into prominence. In the *second edition*, Kant is much more emphatic, and, by way of reinforcing the suggestions thrown out in the first, he asserts unequivocally that "if one wishes to assume another kind of intuition than ours which is sensuous our functions of thought in its reference would have no sort of significance. Had we an intellectual intuition, not only should we not need the categories, but with such a constitution of the undertanding they would have absolutely no use;" and, in accordance with the constructive suggestion, herein advanced, draws the legitimate conclusion that knowledge of the Absolute can only be intuitive.

Now, this is in Kant a suggestion of fundamental importance, and in view of the far-reaching developments it acquired in post-Kantian philosophy, its importance must be recognised. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the entire period,—beginning with the tentative formulation of the principle and ending with a distict clarification of it in the *second edition*,—it must be admitted that Kant's language was all through hesitating, and uncertain, due probably to his characteristic conviction that such a self-positing Intelligence (which is traditionally equated to the Divine Mind or God) has a merely 'regulative,' and not a 'constitutive' validity. This uncertainty, I think, can be, to a large extent, traced to the essentially ambiguous treatment of the categories in the Transcendental Analytic of the first Critique—the treatment, namely, of categories, sometimes as *forms* of thought which are the *conditio sine quā non* of our knowledge of phenomena, and, sometimes as actual constituents which are planted out, so to speak, or immanent in objects of phenomena.[1] Thus, in the former case they are viewed more or less as abstractions, and there can be no question of their application to intelligible realities or noumena; while, in the latter, they express the very essence of understanding itself as it is realised in the object. Even in the latter case, they are, it is to be remembered, not really indifferent to the constitution of a manifold but are at all events determined, to a certain extent, by the material with which they are combined.

[1] If I might just note here, parenthetically, that in expounding the contrast between Kant and Hegel, Stace seems to me to have gone too far, when he contends that for Kant the categories are subjective mental processes as against Hegel's characterisation of them as objective, in the sense of being constitutive of every thing that is real. I should, on the contrary, maintain that, although the categories, as essentially applicable to data supplied from without, are confessedly limited to the world of phenomena, they are, according to Kant himself, as forms of the Transcendental Self, logically prior to any particular mind or mental process. The *Analytic of Pure Reason* at least furnishes a strong evidence against any such imputation of subjectivity to the categories.

All reasonable account of the advance from Kant to Hegel would I surmise, agree that the unmediated opposition—between the empirical and the transcendental, the *a posteriori* and the *a priori*, phenomenon and noumenon, Nature and Spirit, regulative and constitutive and the like—which stares one in the face from all parts of his system invited Hegel to supersede it, and he rose equal to the occasion by employing a dialectic suited to the exigencies of the situation. As the typical philosopher of the Restoration, Hegel achieved his signal success by overriding, on the one hand, the standpoint of formal abstract thinking for which opposites are incapable of 'sublation' (as in Kant and the philosophers of the *Aufklärung* period generally) and, on the other, that of mystical intuition for which opposites are given as identical (as in Schelling and the Romanticists in general), and, employing all through a dialectic, which proceeded by way of a roconciliation of opposites through self-mediation, in which they were not annulled but only 'sublated' (*aufgehoben*), that is, at once negated and conserved as 'moments' in a higher synthesis. Accordingly, on a renewed criticism and application of his superior dialectic, Hegel surmounted all those outstanding forms of opposition which Kant had failed to do. Hegel began by pointing out the mischief wrought, by the incautious use of the term 'transcendental' in Kant which he had borrowed from Scholastic metaphysics. But it is to be doubted whether Kant's interpretation of the transcendental self or of the unity of self-consciousness can, in strict consistency with the deeper strains of his critical reflection, be represented as lending countenance to the suggestion of a transcendental or pure ego invested with a mode of existence, confessedly indeterminate, but sufficiently determined to imply a distinction between the pure ego on the one hand, and things-in-themselves on the other, and further a mode of action of the one on the other. What Kant has admittedly failed to demonstrate with sufficient emphasis—which he was constrained to do in consonance with the strict requirements of a critical standpoint he sustained all through—is that

the transcendental doctrine of self-consciousness is only the treatment of self-consciousness as being involved in all experience of all thinking beings, and that, therefore, there is not, and cannot be, a transcendental self-consciousness that keeps state by itself or sits apart from all empirical consciousness.

It is, indeed, undeniable that the radical opposition between the synthesis of the transcendental principle of apperception and the synthesis of an intuitive understanding is one which was never surmounted fully by Kant himself, although, it was, no doubt, modified and softened to a certain extent in the course of his critical investigations. At the outset the opposition presents itself in a very decided fashion. It is true that an identity of knowing and being is, in a sense, already involved in the transcendental unity of apperception, so far as in the act indicated by the term 'I think,' subject and object fall together. But this identity is regarded as a purely analytical identity which can be presented neither as a notion nor an intuition—although it is contended that the analytical proposition 'I am' presupposes the synthetical proposition, namely "I am conscious of myself in the original synthetic unity of apperception, not as I *appear* to myself, nor even as I *am* in myself but only as 'I am.'" This presentation is only a thought and not an intuition. It is indeed significant to note that in a famous passage in the *Prolegomena*, Kant regards the presentation of the "I" or Ego, as a *feeling* of an existence without the least admixture of notion or conception, and as the only presentation of that to which all thinking stands in relation—an immediate thought or feeling in which subject and object are not as yet differentiated. There is, no doubt, some similarity between this Kantian contention and the Bradleian doctrine of immediate experience, but it does not go deep enough to suggest a presumptive influence of the former on the latter in this regard. For Kant, however, this is in the last resort that analytical unity which forms the foundation of the phenomenal world,

and in contrast thereto is posited the idea of a synthetical unity, which is both intuition and conception or notion, as an ideal of knowledge—a self-differentiating unity in which reality and truth, being and knowing would be one. Measured by such a standard, our knowledge must necessarily be pronounced limited and incomplete. This notion of an intuitive understanding which, as Kant perpetually reminds us, has merely a regulative validity, and is so far unreal for our experience, is nevertheless worked out in greater details, and in organic connection with rest of his system in the Critique of Judgment. Starting therein from the idea of end or purpose in nature, we are driven, so he contends, to assume as original ground (*Urgrund*), an absolutely necessary Being in which possibility and actuality do no longer fall apart. This would coincide with the notion of an intuitive understanding, as the very basis of our reflective judgments of value, for which the heterogeneity of thought and intuition would cease to exist. An understanding in this sense, or 'Architectonic,' would not proceed from the universal to the particular through the medium of notions, but would envisage the particular as determined in and through the universal. In other words, the whole of the experience of an intuitive understanding would be an organic whole, in relation to which the particular would not be given *ab extra*, but would be a product of the understanding itself, that is to say, would exist only in and through consciousness.

Whether we are prepared to regard this notion of an intuitive understanding, worked out in the third Critique, as the crowning phase of critical philosophy or not, it must however be admitted that it proved to be remarkably fruitful in its application to the development of post-Kantian thought. If a philosophical principle, like many others, is judged by its fruits and not so much by its roots, then, assuredly, this notion must be given a well-deserved prominence in all treatment of Kant's contribution to his philosophic successors. It could

not properly fructify on its native soil because of the restrictions with which it was perpetually hedged in by Kant. It was here that Hegel interposed, and argued that a principle which is regulative of our experience in its universal applicability, cannot be merely heuristic or formal in nature but must possess *ipso facto* constitutive validity as well. The synthesis of intelligence and its object which the unity of an intuitive understanding would demand, so Hegel contended, is a synthesis which absolutely includes differences within itself, over-reaching the opposition of receptivity and spontaneity, and generating through self-activity the particular as also the universal elements of the synthesis. Thus is also transcended the contrast of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* factors of our knowledge, and the *a posteriori* is exhibited as but the *a priori* in the making. Hegel was not at all impressed with Kant's solution of the historic conflict between Empiricism and Rationalism as championed by Locke and Leibniz. Kant tried to mediate, as it were, between the two extremes of a '*tabula rasa*' and a 'windowless monad' view of the mind, by maintaining that knowledge is partly *a priori* and partly *a posteriori*, inasmuch as the particular elements of experience come from without, while the necessary and universal factors from within. This position was, to a large extent, undermined by his further characterisation of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* factor as the form and matter respectively of knowledge ; for, if by form is meant the conditions under which an object is knowable, then, evidently it is impossible to separate the *a posteriori* factor of knowledge in any way from the *a priori*. Besides, if the mind, as Kant puts it, makes nature, it cannot certainly be opposed to nature after the manner in which one object is opposed to another. In point of fact Kant would conceive the opposition between the contingent or *a posteriori* element and the mind very much in the way in which one object is opposed to another, and thus place the mind, that knows objects, as one object alongside of other objects. Accordingly, everything in nature is, according

to Kant, *a posteriori* with the exception of the most general laws and relations ; but how precisely these latter are adapted to the former, remains for him, even unto the last, a standing enigma and an unsolved problem.

(To be continued)

SAROJKUMAR DAS

ECSTASY

" Sákhiri main Girdhárya ráng-rāti "

In the deep colour of my lover's love, my heart is dyed,
O my friend !
Dip my garment in the hues of the sunset,
For I am going to his bowers to meet him, to sing to him
songs of adoration :
Sun and moon, earth and sky, air and water, all will
vanish, human creatures die :
But my Lord is everlasting :
I shall have him for ever, and for aye :
In the golden lamp of devotion, the perfumed oil of my life,
shall I pour ;
Its flickering light will be for the Lord's service.
Now I am happy as few can be :
In me dwells my beloved :
In my Lord's love is my heart deeply dyed, O my soul !

(From Mira Bai's Hindi Songs)

CYRIL MODAK

TRANSFERABILITY OF OCCUPANCY HOLDINGS IN BENGAL

III

Since 1885 :—

It was intended in 1885 that the custom of transferring occupancy-rights should be left to crystallize itself into stronger and more definite shape. It was long before it was interfered with by the Legislature. But it was not so by the land-holding interests. As was foreseen by many and expressly pointed out by Mr. Amir Ali in his celebrated minute of dissent to the Select Committee's Report, the landlords demanded a Salami in every case of transfer, and it soon grew into a recognised custom in most parts of Bengal. In the meantime, the Government of Bengal has instituted settlement operations, and records of rights are available for the greater part of Bengal. The information recorded therein threw valuable light on the practice as it has grown in these years.

In his report in 1900, on the Settlement operations of Chittagong district, Mr. Allen writes that, occupancy-holdings in Chittagong are generally transferable, though the landlords usually realise a fee before they recognise the transfer. Mr. Jack wrote in 1915 in his report of Bakerganj settlement: "Each landlord, which means, each tenure-holder, has his own practice. In some estates, the sale of holdings is so far forbidden that it does not occur. Probably, this is the case also in individual tenures which belong to a determined landlord. In the great majority of estates and tenures, transfers of holdings occur, but the purchaser is only recognised by the landlord on the payment of Salami with or without a fresh Kabuliyat."[1]

The same author writing about the practice in Faridpur district says: "The right of transfer is in the same doubtful

[1] P, 166, Settlement Report.

state as in other districts of Eastern Bengal. Transfers occur with some frequency, but in most cases *Salami* is paid; and almost always, the theory is accepted by the tenants as well as the landlords that the consent of the landlord is necessary to a transfer and may be refused. On the other hand, no cases are traceable, in which the landlord is pushed a refusal, to the length of suing for eviction."

The practice obtaining in the Dacca district has been described thus by Mr. Ascoli in his Settlement Report submitted in 1917. "Transfers, it is true, are made freely by sale or gift, but the transfer is never recognised until the transferee has paid to the landlord a *Salami*, usually amounting to 25 per cent. or 33 per cent. of the purchase money, and has agreed to an enhancement of the rent usually varying from 4 to 5 annas in the rupee. So general was the custom, that it was not necessary to record the facts in the record; .....there are some landlords who refuse recognition, except on receipt of hundred per cent. of the purchase money; very frequent instances occurred of the refusal of some of the co-sharers to recognise a transfer, which the remaining co-sharers had admitted. In fact, instances came to light, where the recusant co-sharers had attempted to eject the transferee, and settle a third person on their fractional undivided share of the holding, a possibility intolerable to the law of any other country. In a very large number of cases tenants were found in occupation, who had held the land for twelve or more years, but owing to the extortionate demands of the landlords' *Naibs* were unable to obtain recognition, and were still compelled to pay their rent as *Marfatdars* of the transferer. In all cases where a transfer had been recognised, it was held that the original tenancy had lapsed, and that a new tenancy had been created by the landlords; this justified the enhancement of the rent....."[1]

[1] P. 117, Report of Settlement Operations in Dacca district.

About the conditions in Birbhum district, Mr. Robertson writes in his report on the settlement of portions of that district :

"In the Birbhum district, occupancy-raiyats freely sell their entire holdings, or parts of their holdings, but it is generally admitted that these transfers are not binding on the landlord unless formally recognised by him.....Landlords, however, do not withhold their sanction, when they are properly approached by the transferee, and readily grant mutation in the name of the transferee on the payment of a transfer fee. This fee is styled *Chauthe* and usually consists of one-fourth of the purchase-money."[1]

In his report on the Settlement of riparian areas in Pabna, Mr. Prance says that in case of transfers of raiyati-holdings, *Salami* is almost invariably paid.

In Jalpaiguri it is the almost invariable rule for the superior landlord to demand Nazar as the price of recognition of the new tenant, and to insist on an enhancement of rent. The Nazar is a variable factor as also the amount of increase of rent.[2]

These descriptions are typical of the state of affairs in the rural economy of Bengal, as described in the settlement reports. It is clear that the worst fears entertained during the discussions of 1885 have fully come true. The *Salami* is a universal fact; and what is worse, not being regularised by law, there is no uniform rate. The landlords screw out the utmost they can in each locality; and in many cases further exactions are made by treating the tenure as having expired in case of transfer, and enhancing the rent. The one inevitable result has been to lower the value of the occupancy title. But what has been still more disastrous, people have been shy in investing capital in the improvement of land; because they knew, in cases of transfer a substantial portion of the

[1] Jalpaiguri Settlement Report—by J. A. Milligan.

[2] *Ibid.*

money-value of these improvements could not be realised. During the past half century during which the Bengal Tenancy Act has been in operation nothing is more noticeable in the rural economy of Bengal than the way in which the improvement of land has bean neglected in spite of well-meant attempts of the legislature to encourage it from time to time. Doubtless many other factors are responsible for this; but nobody can doubt that the effect of the irregular and irresponsible exactions of *Salami* in case of transfer has been in this direction.

This result has been further brought about by the uncertain state in which things were left by the law of 1885. If the landlords twisted the law for their own benefit; the raiyats soon found out methods of evading it. When they transferred their holdings, they sometimes retained a nominal portion in their own hands to avoid the *Salami*. This gives a precarious position to the transferee, whose interest may be extinguished in case the other portion is abandoned by the transferer; also in case of any arrears, the landlord may sue the original tenant, and the tenancy may be sold without his knowledge. Then again no provisions had been made for the registration of the transfers in the landlord's Sherista; very often this was not done in order to avoid the landlord's fee; thus rents came to be paid in the name of the original holder, though he might have had ceased to have any connection with the holding long ago. Things become worse, when some of the co-sharer landlords refuse to recognise a transferee who has been recognised by others. Moreover it was not clear whether in the absence of a usage entitling a raiyat to sell his holding, the sale would be void *ab initio* or merely at the will of the landlord. Under the circumstances litigation arose on which no positive law could be applied. The extent to which things had proceeded may be realised from some remarkable figures given by Sir P. C. Mitter in his minute of dissent to the Report of the Select Committee on the Amendment

Bill of 1925. He says: "About 54 per cent. of Bengal's litigation is in rent-suits, 37 per cent. in money-suits (which in most cases are deferred rent-suits, because they are based on *Kistibandis* for arrears of rent). Practically therefore 91 per cent. of Bengal's litigation is based on rent-transactions." Under these conditions, things gradually came to a pass where the legislature had to intervene. In 1912, the High Court brought to the notice of the Government the serious difficulties in the existing law regarding the transfer of occupancy holdings, and suggested that proper remedy lay in legislation. The Government of Bengal took into serious consideration the suggestion of the High Court and initiated enquiries into the matter. As a result of these enquiries, it was thought that it would be prudent to defer legislation till the completion of settlement operations in a few districts which would enable Government to have more definite information and statistics on which to base action. The War also intervened, and the matter was not further proceeded with at that stage. But soon after the inauguration of the Bengal Legislative Council under the Government of India Act of 1919, a resolution was carried for the appointment of a Special Committee to consider and report what changes were necessary in the Bengal Tenancy Act. In consequence of this resolution a Committee was formed with Sir John Kerr as president which evolved a draft Bill and presented their report in December, 1922. This Bill and report were given wide publicity and were subject to keen scrutiny and thorough criticism. A very large number of opinions were received from public bodies and those interested in the question, and the Government drew up a Bill in 1925, substantially based on the draft of Kerr Committee. It was introduced in the December session of that year and was referred to a Select Committee composed of representatives of all the classes interested, experienced revenue officers and lawyers who, from their professional contact with the landed interests had aquired an intimate experience of

these questions. The Select Committee which submitted their report in July, 1926, was composed of eighteen members, of which fourteen submitted minutes of dissent. Nothing could show more significantly, the hopeless confusion in which the tenancy question had fallen at that time or the necessity of clear and definite legislation. The Select Committee recommeded the legalisation of transferability of occupancy-holding, subject to a landlord's fee of twenty-five per cent. of the value of the holding or six times the annual rent, whichever is greater, and a power of pre-emption to the immediate landlord on payment of ten per cent. of the value of the holding as compensation to the transferee.

As the Select Committee had altered the Bill in many important respects, the Government considered the matter again, and appointed a Special Committee for the purpose presided over by Sir Naliniranjan Chatterjee.

Great interest had been excited by the provisions of the Bill and as great a conflict of interest was evinced and diversity of opinions were expressed by the advocates of the causes of the tenants and the landlords as was done in 1885. But there was a general agreement as to the necessity of early and effective handling of the problem, which found expression in 1926, in a resolution in the Council to expedite the Bill, and a token cut of A.1- during the budget session.

The Government finally framed a Bill and introduced it in Council in 1928. As regards transferability it adopted the recommendations of the Select Committee. These were passed in the Council substantially in the form in which they were introduced, the only important change being that the landlord's fee was reduced to 20 per cent. of the value of the holding or five times the annual rent, whichever is greater. It is interesting to note that this portion of the Bill was considered on the same lines as in 1885. Hardly any new arguments were introduced. The Mahajan dread had its share ; the landlords demanded the right to oust the objectionable tenant ; even the

provisions of the Permanent Settlement were raked up to show that tenancy legislation was an infringement of the proprietary rights of the Zamindars. The Mohammedan group fought all through to protect the interests of the tenants ; but their efforts were hardly successful against the curious combination of the Government, the European group and the Swarajists. The provisions of the Bill affecting the transferability of occupancy-holdings as finally passed by the Council stand thus :

" The holding of an occupancy-raiyat, or a share or portion thereof, together with the right of occupancy therein, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be capable of being transferred in the same manner and to the same extent, as any other immovable property." Every such transfer should be by registered instrument, and no Registration will be granted unless a landlord's fee be paid.

This amounts :

(*a*) In case of a sale of a holding or portion or share thereof, in respect of which produce rent is payable, to 20 per cent. of the consideration money, as set forth in the instrument of transfer.

(*b*) In case of a holding, or a portion or share thereof, in respect of which money-rent is payable, to 20 per cent. of the consideration money as set forth in the instrument of transfer or five times the annual rent of the holding, or portion or share transferred, whichever is greater.

(*c*) In case of transer by exchange of a holding, or a portion or share thereof, to 5 per cent. of the value thereof, as set forth in the instrument of transfer, of $1\frac{1}{4}$ times the annual rent of the holding or share or portion transferred to each party to the transfer, whichever is greater, payable by each party.

(*d*) In case of a transfer by gift, of a holding, or a portion or share thereof, to 20 per cent. of the value thereof, as set forth in the instrument of transfer, or to five times the annual

rent of the holding, or the portion or share transferred, whichever is greater.

(*e*) In case of transfer by bequest, to 20 per cent. of value of the holding or portion or share thereof, as determined by court for purposes of stamp-duty for the grant of probate, or letters of administration, or to five times the annual rent, whichever is greater. Also :

(*a*) When the holding of an occupancy-raiyat or portion or share thereof, is sold in execution of a decree or certificate, signed under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, other than a decree or certificate for arrears of rent due in respect of the holding or dues recoverable as such, and niether the purchaser nor the decree-holder is the sole landlord, the court or the revenue officer, as the case may be, shall, before confirming the sale, require the purchaser to pay the landlord's fee, calculated at the rate of 20 per cent. of the purchase-money, or five times the annual rent of the holding, whichever is greater.

(*b*) When a mortgage of a holding of an occupancy-raiyat or portion or share thereof, is foreclosed, and the decree-holder is not himself the sole-landlord, the court shall, before making a decree or order absolute for the foreclosure, determine the market-value of the holding, and require the mortgagee to deposit the landlord's fee calculated at 20 per cent. of such market value.

The amendment gives the immediate landlord, in case of transfer of a raiyati-holding, a right of pre-emption by application to court, within two months of the notice to him and subject to a payment of 10 per cent. of the value of the holding as compensation. This excludes transfers :

(*a*) To a co-sharer in the tenancy whose existing interest has accrued otherwise than by purchase.

(*b*) In execution of a decree or certificate signed under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, for arrears of rent due in respect of such holdings or dues recoverable as such,

(*c*) By exchange.

(*d*) To husband or wife, adopted son or relation by consanguinity within three degrees of dower or testator.

The economic bearings of these provisions have been already discussed in connection with the Tenancy Bill of 1885, and they need not be reiterated. We have seen that the question was considered from the same view-points in 1928 as they were in 1885. But there was one important difference in the situation at these two dates. If the legislature had dealt with this question in 1885, it would have anticipated salutary economic and social changes, and given shape and direction to the forces which were working in the rural economy of Bengal. In 1928, it was faced with accomplished facts ;—facts which had been brought about by the systematic efforts of the powerful landholding interests to work out the land laws for their pecuniary benefit. It was called upon to give legal sanction to, and regularise practices, not because they were beneficial to the community but because they had so grown up in the body politic, that they could no longer be ignored or neglected. Nothing more impressed the legislators of 1928, so far as this question was concerned, than that they were not legislating in vacuo. On the one hand non-recognition of transferability could not be thought of ; on the other, it was too late to refuse to provide for a landlord's fee. A considerable portion of land had changed hands since 1885. The purchasers had invested their money in land not only in expectation of the authorised rent, but in expectation of all prospective incomes from that source. To take away from them the fees which had become customary and been recognised by law would have been gross injustice and caused severe distress. But still, when we consider the high rate at which the landlord's fee was fixed, we cannot but consider it as a severe blow to the interests of the tenants. Undoubtedly the custom had grown up in most places in Bengal and the fee demanded on transfer was very high. But we must remember that the law as it stood allowed free

transfer where the custom existed and that in many places, the landlord's fee was not so exorbitant as it was in general. The landlords invariably found it difficult to realise their Salami, and they could not get any where the transfers were not recorded in his *Sherista*. And it is well-known that this was not done in many cases. He also could not get any fee in case of part transfers, and it has been found by experience, "that in many cases, sale deeds are executed in such a way, as to show that the transfer is only of a part, and not of the whole holding."[1] In many cases also, the consideration money recorded in the instruments of transfer were put at a much lower figure than the sum actually paid. This was done in order to reduce the amount of the Salami, which was always calculated as a percentage on the consideration money.

As to the actual financial effects of the legislation, it is not possible to make an accurate estimate, because the figures of transfers of occupancy-holdings are not separately recorded. The following is a statement taken from the reports of the Registration Department, showing for the years 1922-27, the value of property transferred by registered instruments by gift, mortgage, sale or exchange.

1922	Rs.	35,12,41,083.
1923	,,	29,52,12,807.
1924	,,	30,26,97,158.
1925	,,	33,66,23,818.
1926	,,	31,15,56,243.
1927	,,	32,47,06,611.

In view of the fact that the great majority of landed property in Bengal consists of occupancy-holdings, it may be assumed that in a considerable proportion of these transfers, the landlords will be entitled to a landlord's fee ; and there can be no doubt that, under the present law, the number of transfers

[1] Minute of dissent by Babu Jogendra Ch. Chakravarty to the Report of Select Committee, 1926.

should be greatly enhanced. Assuming the value of occupancy-holdings or parts or shares thereof, which will be transferred annually in future, to be 16 crores, or about half that of the total amount transferred at present, the landlords should get an annual income from this source alone, of more than three crores of rupees : *i. e.*, more than the land-revenue which they pay to the Government and more than a fifth of the total rental which they receive from the raiyats.

(*Concluded.*)

J. C. GHOSH.

AFTER SUNSET

The moon beams played a game of hide-and-seek
With evening breezes in the swishing clumps
Of sedge. The moon waltzed with the clouds ; a meek
Star blinked and wept from jealousy, and lumps
Came in her throat. The somber shadows strung
The silver tears the sad star shed, and hung
The string of beads on thirsty trees...

LOUISE A. NELSON

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All perceive the presence of the spirit of unrest and discord now active in the human world. No land or nation is completely free from the struggle that this spirit has generated—a struggle unparalleled in extension and intensity. At times this spirit wears the form of a regenerator, presiding over the birth of silk-worm from cocoon. At other times it is Diana cross-legged, prolonging the throes attendant on the birth of a higher well-being of man. Without attempting to lift the veil from Future's face it is clear to the mortal eye that mankind is passing through deep and dark defiles of hate, contention and strife. Waves of opposition break and break against all authority of every sort and kind. Out of the world, before the observer's eye, arise defiance of all institutions—political, social, matrimonial, domestic, educational, economical and religious. But even in the midst of all confusion and contention peace surrounds the Temple of Aesthetics, whose gate is ever open to all. In that Temple is enshrined the sisterhood of Arts, the unchanging queens of the human heart. All the other Arts demand propitiatory education to taste their graces. But Poetry pours her favours on all alike, the educated and the uneducated man. She discerns the temperament that approaches her and modulates her favours. She sends not any empty away. The music charms the ear and soothes the mind. The words wing their way to the heart and rest there in joy, wiping the tear of the weeping eye and soothing the anguish of the bleeding heart. She paints in beauty the uglinesses of life, makes the dumb voiceful, the dead alive, removes discord and shows all as multiplications of one. Of this goddess the worshippers form a mystic brotherhood, with the individuality of each unimpaired. Language is the individuality and thought the Brotherhood the goddess ordains.

Let the foregoing serve as a prelude. Some centuries, perhaps, before the fall of Vijayanagar in 1318 there lived somewhere in India, most probably in Hindustan—a Buddhist monk of the name of Dharma Kīrti, whom there are few to know and fewer still to love. But modern research has shown that he was a poet, a rhetorician and a master of logic of the school, founded by Dinnāga, the greatest name connected with the system of academic logic of Buddhist India. Foreign Sanskritists were not unacquainted with his name, even before he attracted the attention of that eminent Bengali scholar, the late Pandit Satish Chandra Vidyabhusan. It may be pardonable to mention that the Russian scholar Sabagatski, during his visit to this country, pronounced Dinnāga the greatest logician of the world. In any case he is not likely to be forgotten so long as Kālidāsa is remembered. A pun on his name appears in "Meghaduta" as the commentator Mallinātha points out. (*Vide* Meghaduta, S. 14.)

The best account of Dharma Kirti is to be found in "Subhāṣitāvalī." It says:

"Dharmakirti is one of the older writers on Alaṁkāra. His work Bauddhasangati is mentioned by Subandhu in the Vasavadattā (p. 235, Ed. Hall). In all probability he is identical with the Buddhist philosopher of the same name who, according to Wassiljew, wrote a commentary to Dinnaga's Pramāṇasamuchchaya, as also the works Pramāṇavārttikh, Pramāṇavinischaya, and Prasannapada. A half verse by the philosophical writer is mentioned in the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadarsanasaṁgraha, p. 15." The rest is merely of scholarly interest and fit only for a foot-note.[1]

[1] "Verses by Dharmakirti are cited by Ānandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka (*E.g.* i.o. 1008 fol. 28b. 128b.), the Sārangadharapaddhati contains one, the Saduktikarṇāmrita eight."—Aufrecht in Weber's Indische Studien, XVI, 204.

The verse which Aufrecht goes on to give from the Sārangadharapaddhati under Dharmakīrti is: svachchhandam harinena ya, No. 657 above. Of the eight Aufrecht gives or cites from the Saduktikarṇāmrita, our book has only two: the verse already referred to: lāvaṇyadraviṇavyayo, No. 1712, which is here also ascribed to this writer, and sikhariṇi

It is to be noted that Mādhavāchārya, the prime minister of the last Hindu king of Vijayanagar mentions the name of Dharma Kīrti in connection with a citation of his philosophical opinion.

Of all his poetical productions the verses immediately to be noticed appear to be the most popular and the best known through centuries. They are like a gold coin with the effigy and inscription rubbed off while passing from hand to hand in rapid succession. They are quoted in the standard rhetorical work in Sanskrit—Sāhityadarpaṇam—but the poet's name is forgotten. The poet dies but poetry lives. Visvanātha Kabirāj, the author of Sāhityadarpaṅam lived in the 12th century. Dharma Kīrti must have lived long enough before the time for his work to be remembered and his name forgotten. He sings of the presence and absence of lovers, their union and separation.

सङ्गमविरहविकल्पे
वरमिह विरहो न सङ्गमस्तस्या ।
सा ङ्गे सैव तथैका
त्रिभुवनमपि तन्मयं विरहे ॥

An English rendering may not wholly destroy the beauty of the original :

Should Fate condemn this faithful heart
To choose my love or choose her absent self ;
Her absent self I'll hold more dear;
Present, she's the world to me;
Absent, by her the world is filled.

Next in order of time comes Vidyāpati who appears to have died in the early part of the 15th century. He was the

kva nu nāma, No. 2030, which is given anonymously. Two of the others : aṁsham pranam and assanto nabhyarthah—" belong," Aufrecht points out, " to Bhartrihari : and he explains the fact that they are in the Saduktikarṇāmrita ascribed to Dharmakīrti by the supposition that the compiler of that anthology took them as he found them quoted in Dharmakīrti's book on Alaṁkāra without troubling himself as to the real author."

(Peterson's Edn., p. 46.)

Court poet of Raja Siva Sinha of Mithila. He sings of his platonic love-worship of the queen Lakshmi, with the King's approval apparently. It is most interesting to note how he echoes Dharma Kīrti of whom, in all probability, he never heard :

নয়ন মরম তা সহ গেলই গেল।
তব ধরি জগ ভরি ফুলশর ভেল ।।

With her my eye and heart are gone—are gone
And now the world is filled with love alone.

Now let the seas and ocean be crossed. The "Golden Treasury" has stored an anonymous poem of the 16th or 17th century.

Present in Absence.

Absence, hear thou my protestation
Against thy strength,
Distance, and length ;
Do what thou canst for alteration :
For hearts of truest mettle
Absence doth join, and Time doth settle.
Who loves a mistress of such quality,
He soon hath found
Affection's ground
Beyond time, place, and all mortality.
To hearts that cannot vary
Absence is Presence, Time doth tarry.
By absence this good means I gain,
That I can catch her,
Where none can match her,
In some close corner of my brain :
There I embrace and kiss her ;
And so I both enjoy and miss her.

Anon.

Descending in time, in the 19th century a Bengali singer of Bansberia in the District of Hughli is met with. He is

Sridhar Kathak. His song of absent love still charms the ear and stirs the heart:—

যে বলে বিচ্ছেদ ভাল নয়
সেই ত ভাল নয়।
আমি জানি সেই ভাল
তাতে অতি সুখোদয়॥
আমি তো বিচ্ছেদে ব্রতী—
হয়েছি সখি সম্প্রতি
তাতে কি হয়েছে ক্ষতি
বরঞ্চ সুখ সঞ্চয়।
দিনান্তে প্রাণান্ত হতো
তবু নাহি দেখা দিত
এখন সে অবিরত
অন্তরে আছে উদয়॥

Whoever absence says is ill,
Himself he 's ever evil still.
Of absence I devotee be—
A store of joy gives absence me.
The end of day was near life's end
When far was sight of love, my friend,
In heart now love I ever see.

In another alcove can be seen Shelley and another Bengali of the same District and age as Sridhar—Ramnidhi Gupta—better known under the pet name of Nidhu Babu, singing and smiling, hand in hand. Shelley nearly closes "Epipsychidion" with these lines:—

As mountain springs under the morning sun,
We shall become the same we shall be one,
Spirit within two frames, Oh! wherefore two?
One passion in twin-hearts, which grows and grew
Till like two meteors of expanding flame
Those spheres instinct with it become the same
Touch, mingle, are transfigured; ever still
Burning, yet ever inconsumable:

In one another's substance finding food,
Like flames too pure and light and unimbued
To nourish their bright lives with baser prey,
Which point to Heaven and cannot pass away;
One hope within two wills, one will beneath
Two overshadowing minds, one life, one death,
One Heaven, one Hell, one immortality,
And one annihilation.

Nidhu Babu sings back :—

মনের মিলনে মিলে থাকব দুজনা,
তুমি কেবা আমি কেবা চেনা যাবেনা ॥

We are one by love's heart-spell,
One from one now none can tell.

Poetry holds another garden gate ajar. There the banyan of spirituality is in the close embrace of the creeper called Poetry. How many can with heart embrace the injunction to die in the flesh and live in the spirit. Even the symbolical teaching of the "Bhagavad Gita" is not within easy reach of general apprehension.

या निशा सर्व्वभूतानां तस्यां जागर्त्ति संयमी ।
यस्यां जागर्त्ति भूतानि सा निशा पश्यतो मुनेः ॥

What is night to all creatures there is awake the man of restraint ; that in which all creatures are awake is viewed as night by the seeing sage.

The idea enters the gate of heart through the ear on the wings of the sweet song of Jñānadas :

আমি ঘর কৈনু বাহির বাহির কৈনু ঘর ।
আমি পর কৈনু আপন আপন কৈনু পর ॥
আমি রাতি কৈনু দিন দিন কৈনু রাতি ।
না বুঝিনু বঁধু কিবা তোমারি পিরীতি ॥

My home now I unhome have made,
Unhome is now my one homestead ;
My own are strangers now to me,
Alone now strangers mine own be.
Now night is day and day is night,
And yet I see not Thy love's light!

There is a well-nigh illiterate Bengali religious sect, known as Bauls which is a corrupt form of the Sanskrit word Bātula, literally meaning the insane. Among them the spirit of the words heard wears a different form of word-mask. Playing his one-stringed instrument, dancing on one leg, while the foot of the other, curved at knee, beats time on empty space, the Baul with enraptured eyes sings :

মনে দে উল্টো চাবি
দেখতে পাবি
তোর মনের মানুষ আছে কোথা।

The other way thou turn heart's key
And Him of heart thine thou shalt see.

Here swims into memory the lines of Chandidās of Nānnur in Birbhum. He was of the 16th century :

মরম না জানে ধরম ব্যাখানে
এমন আছয়ে যারা,
কাজ নাই সখি তাদের কথায়
বাহিরে থাকুক তারা।
আমি বাহির দুয়ারে কপাট দিয়েছি
ভিতর দুয়ার খোলা,
তোরা নিসাড়া হইয়া আয়না সজনি
আঁধার পেরুলে আলা।

Wise in words unwise in truth
All such as are, these,
Out they stay, O friends of heart,
Words are not my care.

Outer door is closed, unclosed
Inner, heart-gate mine,
Enter soundless, friends, and pass
Gloom to pure sunshine.

There is an old Bengali song, reminiscent of verdant youth and a sad sweetness when youth's line is passed :

এমনি ভাবের পরিপাটি
না দেখলে প্রাণে মরি
দেখলে কাটাকাটি

Let it be dressed in fashion :—

They love so well, the husband wife,
That absence means the end of life,
And presence but a slashing knife.

Does not the mind its pointing finger turn to Shakespeare's proverb-like words?

"There's no living with her or without her."

Another word-wreath by the same hand woven peeps in sight.

Put not thy faith in princes.

Turn your ear now to the Sanskrit misogynist :

विश्वासो नैव कर्त्तव्यः
स्त्रीषु राजकुलेषु च ।

Unwise to put thy trust in women
Or royal descent.

A nearer kinship is found in Kalidas :—

प्रयोजनोपेक्षि तथाहि प्रभूणां
प्रायश्चलं गौरवमाश्रितेषु ।

Dependant's value to the lord
Must change with lordly needs accord.

Will it not be useful and pleasant to be reminded of Pope's line—

"He who talks much must almost talk in vain"

and its unconscious translation by Sarat Chandra :—

সে কহে বিস্তর মিছা, যে কহে বিস্তর।

Let Milton's "darkness visible" be placed by the side of Kalidas's "darkness by needle to be pierced" (सूचिभेद्यमिवान्धकारं) as rival claimants for admiration and a silent watch be kept from a distance.

The flowers are many, the basket is overfull. The present picker must proceed no further in search of joy that never can cloy. Each language has a garden of its own, closed to strangers. May favoured pickers which with skill fill fresh baskets is the hope with which the present picker makes his parting bow.

Sorrow shared the sorrow heals,
Love, when shared, new love reveals.

MOHINIMOHAN CHATTERJI

THE GUARDIAN GHOST

It was in November of 1887 that I first visited my old school-mate, Count De Gris, at his ancestral home. As I drove late at night toward the dim decaying walls of Gris Castle along the broad avenue of poplars which leads through the dense forest covering the mountain-side, I was filled with a strange and not altogether unpleasant feeling of fear. The ancient walls loomed fantastically in the white moonlight and a weird silence brooded over the scene. I could not resist an overpowering sense of awe that gripped my soul as I gazed upon the great grey stone structure. The deep baying of a hound echoed through the night.

Reaching the end of the drive, I jumped down from the carriage and walked up the steps to the heavy door. I pushed a button and a distant bell clanged. A stoop-shouldered man-servant came to the door. He led the way through gloomy halls while Joseph followed with my luggage. We finally reached a large, cheerfully lighted room. A bright blaze was aglow in the fire-place and seated before it was my old friend, De Gris. He rose quickly at our approach and clasped my hand warmly.

Seated at the table in the old dining hall we enjoyed a delightful supper, together with the wines for which De Gris is famous. We talked for some time of old friends and of things that had happened since last we met.

Finally I mentioned the fact the castle was supposed to be haunted. De Gris laughed and gazed into the fire for some moments. The flickering blaze lighted up his fine features. Suddenly he began his story :

" At the time when I was growing to manhood the fortunes of the De Gris family had grown less and less until finally it became necessary to dismiss all the servants but one. In truth,

the castle was all that remained to us. My proud old father would sooner have parted with his life than sell our home.

"It has been rumored for centuries through the neighboring villages that the castle is haunted. I, with the carelessness of youth, laughed at such a ridiculous notion. Little did I dream how soon I was to learn the truth of those whispers and find myself face to face with the ancient spectre himself. On several occasions, when I lay in my old four-posted bed in my lonesome chamber at the remote end of the north wing of the castle, through the deep silence of the night, soft moans and a sound that was strangely like the dragging of heavy chains over the stone flooring of the deserted halls came to my ears. I was a little afraid but it all seemed so ridiculous when the birds woke me in the cheerful sunshine of morning that it was soon forgotten. Future events, however, brought those sounds back to my mind.

"It was about this time that I first met Jeanne. With her deep black curls and midnight eyes she was the most lovely girl in all France to my eyes if not to all others. Her father, like most of the peasants, was miserably poor. I loved Jeanne very dearly and we had been betrothed for some time. One thing alone prevented our marriage—lack of money.

"One night I returned home after spending the evening with Jeanne. I walked alone through the forest to the castle. The clear sky was thickly set with brightest stars that gleamed like steel points through the cold wintry air. I was in a highly imaginative state of mind and a few dark clouds in the east seemed to form into all sorts of fantastic shapes. I felt a vague apprehension. Everything seemed to tell of some momentous event that was to come.

"I arrived at the castle and lighting a candle I hurried to my chamber in the remote end of the north wing. I bolted the door. Hurriedly I undressed and was soon in bed. Sleep seemed far away and I lay there for some time. A distant clock struck the hour of midnight. For some unknown reason

the tales of the spectre that haunted the castle came to my mind and try as I might I could not banish them.'

" What was that! Through the cold stillness drifted a low weird moaning and the clanking of heavy chains. It seemed more distinct than ever before and I could hear the horrible sounds draw closer...closer... closer to my chamber door. I could stand it no longer. I rose and lighted the candle on a table at the further end of my room. The dim candle light only increased my fears. I realized with consternation that the moaning and clanking of chains was without any doubt coming closer and closer. Then they stopped and I knew that the horrible presence stood just beyond the massive door of my chamber. I thanked God that it was bolted. Suddenly the candle flickered and went out. I stood petrified with terror. A loud knocking shook the heavy door and I jumped into my bed trembling like a leaf. You may think that I am mad, but I tell you, and I swear that it is true, that in some entirely inexplicable way the candle had been re-lighted and burned brightly. As I stared with horror at the door, it very slowly opened on hinges that creaked protestingly. Some strange fascination held my aching eyes on the opening door. Into the room came the most horrible figure that the most morbid imagination could possibly conjure into existence. My first thought was one of thankfulness that the form that went with such a visage was concealed in long black garments. But that face, oh God, how can I describe that face! Unbelieveably white teeth leered at me in a hellish grin from a face that was far from human. Its features, partly those of man, partly those of a beast, and partly something more than the human mind can grasp, were enough to make a sane man into a raving maniac at the first glance. How I passed through such an ordeal and preserved my reason is more than I can understand.

" The spectre seated himself in a chair close to my bed and I shrank as far as possible away from that loathsome figure. For some time the apparition stared at me with a singularly

piercing gaze. It seemed as if hours passed. I could scarcely repress a scream of horror. Finally the bloodless lips in that shrunken visage moved and in a voice that sounded like the rasp of a file on a piece of steel, the phantom spoke :

" ' You have been happy here,' said the spectre, ' but you and the girl you love have not been wise enough to realize the blessings fate has bestowed on you. You long for wealth. Because of your wish, I have come and I bring to you, the heir to the castle and its ghosts, the curse of wealth. Take it if you desire and only time will prove whether it will bring you happiness or misery.

" ' At the back of the fire-place,' continued my ghostly visitor, ' you will find, if you search carefully, a door cleverly concealed but easily opened. A stairway leads to the ancient dungeons that lie beneath the castle. The drawings on a parchment show the way to a certain room where you will find a steel casket filled with jewels.'

" The spectre opened a book that lay on the table and placing a sheet of time-worn parchment between the pages, he closed the volume and put it back on the table. He looked straight at me and as my gaze met those eyes, it was held by some strange hypnotic spell. I could not look away. The eyes grew closer and closer. I could feel the cold repulsive breath of the spectre on my face. I lost consciousness.

" I awoke to find the bright sunlight shining in through the window of the room. I laughed aloud at the strange dream I had experienced and whistled a merry tune as I dressed for breakfast. I started down the hall, but remembering that I usually read for an hour after breakfast in a comfortable chair by the fire-place, I returned for the book I had been reading. As I picked it up there fell to the floor from between its pages a yellowed parchment. I stooped to recover it and cold shivers ran up and down my spine. It was a crudely drawn chart showing a series of intricate passageways and rooms. It was the spectre's parchment.

" As I ate my breakfast I carefully considered the situation. I hesitated to believe in the supernatural and yet here, apparently, was positive proof. At least I would follow the chart and see if I could discover anything of value.

" I rang for my old faithful servant and sent him to Jeanne with a note giving a brief account of the affair. Within the hour he drove up in the carriage and helped Jeanne to the ground. I could see them from the window and I ran down to meet her. Sitting by the old fire-place I told Jeanne the story and contrary to my expectations she was quite serious about it and insisted that we should investigate.

" After a careful search, we found a concealed lever beneath a sliding panel in the mantel over the fire-place. Together we descended a flight of stone steps that led to the dungeons below. We followed the intricate passages that led from chamber to chamber. A flickering candle lighted our way and cast weird shadows on the stone floor. A damp decaying odour filled the air. Jeanne gave a little scream as a bat flew against the wall.

" Finally we reached a chamber marked on the parchment as the one where the treasure was supposed to be. In the centre of the chamber we found a pit. To our horror it was filled to the top with human bones. With a spade I had brought with me I dug into the bones. About three feet below the surface my spade rang against metal and I soon unearthed a large steel box. It required all my strength to lift it from the pit and place it on the dungeon floor. A few hard blows with the spade broke the rusty lock and I pried into the box. The candle light fell on the gleaming mass of precious stones. The iron box held a fortune in diamonds, emeralds and various other precious stones, some in ancient settings, but mostly unset, and obviously of great value.

" After considerable effort, with the help of the servant who had followed for fear that something might happen to us, I succeeded in getting the iron box up the stairs into the room above,

"I sold the jewels except one diamond which I had set as an engagement ring for Jeanne. They brought a large sum. Jeanne and I were married soon afterward. Within a year my proud old father died happy in his restored fortunes and left me master of Gris Castle. Here I have raised my sons and daughters and Jeanne and I have been very happy. Sometimes I think of the spectre's prophecy that the gems may bring misfortune, but life has been very pleasant and I do not fear the future. I will always remember with gratitude the service rendered me by the guardian ghost."

RICHARD B. BAILEY

THOUGHT TRIPS

I often climb the Himalayan hills,
Although I do not take the mortal part
Of me. I walk about the jungle growths,
And pick the rhododendrons ; and then my heart
Beats fast with envy since it cannot fly
About those winding hills with my real self.

LOUISE A. NELSON

THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE DUTY OF INDIAN NATIONALISTS

The thing that should receive the utmost attentive and earnest consideration of all the Indian Nationalists is the work of preparing the Constitution of India which will be acceptable by a Constituent Assembly composed of representatives of All Parties. It is a matter of good fortune that this work is progressing satisfactorily ; and it is quite possible that the next session of the All-India National Congress will take decisive measures for the unification of the various groups of Indian Nationalists into a united body, working for the attainment of freedom of India, by presenting a united front to the alien rulers.

Securing Dominion Status by India will mean nothing less than a peaceful revolution. Whether this peaceful revolution will be accomplished or not, will depend largely upon the ability of the Indian Nationalists to be prepared to continue the struggle for Indian independence by all possible means.

Attainment of freedom and its maintenance depends entirely upon National Power, supported by other forces from outside. Economic, commercial, scientific and industrial power of a nation is a great asset to the maintenance of its freedom ; but the actual power to carry on an offensive and defensive warfare against the enemy of a state is its greatest security. Economic, industrial and scientific power of a State enhances its offensive and defensive capacity and thus it becomes a serious factor in working out a programme of national defence.

Finance, Industry and Science must be utilised to the actual work of National Defence. It is needless to emphasise that without financial support there cannot be any national industry and without national industrial plants which may produce all kinds of war materials for defensive purposes and without

scientific direction and trained officers no nation can ever organize its national defence with effectiveness. There is much agitation, and justifiably necessary agitation, for the development of industry, scientific education and national commerce in India. Any success attained in these fields will help the cause of Indian National Defence. Yet without a National Defence Force, under trained officers, it would not be possible for India to assume the responsibility of Indian National Defence.

British opponents of Indian freedom at first disarmed the nation and deprived it of all facilities for military education for the Indian people and then they preach to the world that Great Britain would not give up her sacred duty of preserving peace in India and protecting the people from foreign invasions, by according self-government to the people who are not in a position to assume the responsibility of National Defence. The British motive of reducing the Indian people to helplessness in matters of Indian National Defence can be fully realised when one finds that Indians are only allowed to serve in the Indian army in most unimportant positions. They are practically debarred from the Artillery, Air-Service and the Department of Chemical Warfare. The Indian Government do not afford any opportunity to Indian officers in India.

In India it is generally said by the British officials that the country must be protected from foreign invasions. These possibilities are from Russia, Afghanistan, or through a combination of Russia, Afghanistan, Persia and Turkey against Great Britain. Thus the programme of Indian National Defence must be adequate to meet the possible combination of these war-like peoples. But the British Government is opposed to adopt adequate measures to train Indians who will be able to assume the responsibility for national defence, whereas in these countries vigorous measures are being adopted to increase the national military power.

In Russia, the Soviet authorities are not only anxious to transform every worker and peasant of the land as an effective

soldier, but they are anxious to train the largest number of future officers who may be drafted in time of national emergency. Thus the Soviet authorities have made military education compulsory in all schools. A Riga despatch published in the London "Times" gave the following interesting information :—

"*The Education Department in Moscow has issued instructions that the military preparation of school students is to be systematised and that a regular theoretical and practical study of modern methods of warfare is to be made an essential part of the curriculum not o ly in the Universities but in the middle schools. Officers of the Red Army must henceforth be engaged for regular "war wo k in schools". Each school must, moreover, organize a special military room under the name of "Voenny Ugolok" (war nook) and the aptest pupils must be formed into "military groups.*"

Russia is building thousands of fighting aeroplanes and training air-pilots to man them. Russian interest in Chemical Warfare is notorious. This is all being done under the most adverse economic and industrial conditions of Soviet Russia.

The Afghan people in general know the fact that because they could fight against the British as well as Russians, so they have succeeded in maintaining their independence. However His late Majesty King Amanullah of Afghanistan took leadership in modernising Afghanistan; and his special interest to reorganise Afghan military power might be of some interest to the Indian Nationalists and the Government of India. The London "Times" of October 31st published the following interesting news-item regarding the programme of military education in Afghanistan :—

"*His Majesty the King of Afghanistan has decided that his Army is to have a separate treasury and better qualified men both in the lower and the higher ranks. High school students, after finishing their ordinary courses, are to undergo a*

year's military training and then enter civil life as members of the Reserve of Officers. A Staff College is being opened at Khurd Zabitan ; 65 officers have gone to Russia, France and Italy and 20 are about to leave for England. Coloured uniforms have been abolished, except for two regiments and the grades of pay fo foreigners will be similar to those for Afghans in all departments. An Air Department has been formed, aerodromes are being made, and aeroplanes have been bought."

The Indian public must remember the fact that during the early part of October, "a party of 90 Afghan boys, the youngest of whom was eight years and the oldest fifteen," passed through India to go to Constantinople to receive military education for 10 years. The King of Afghanistan asked every employee of the Afghan Government to contribute at least one month's salary and every male Afghan to contribute three rupees to a fund which would be utilised to purchase fifty thousand rifles and several millions of rounds of ammunition from France. It was reported that the Government of Afghanistan had enlisted some fifty thousand men from the frontier tribes to augment the strength of the Afghan Army and to spread friendly feeling towards Afghanistan. Needless to say that Afghanistan, like France and Japan, introduced a kind of compulsory military service for all men within certain age limits.

The present ruler of Persia, His Majesty Riza Shah Pallavi, has risen to his present exalted position from a common soldier ; and he fully realises the importance of spreading military education among his people. Like the King of Afghanistan, he is doing all that is possible to spread military education among the Persian people. Literally, hundreds of Persian officers have been sent to foreign countries. Only the other day it was reported that a contingent of 123 Persian students arrived at Paris to acquire education as state scholars, whereas ten French professors started for Teheran to assume the duty of teachers in Persian educational institutions.

Turkey has survived even after the severe trial of the World War, only because her young leaders were expert military men as well as statesmen. The German Military Mission in Turkey, before and during the World War trained thousands of officers and the Government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha is not lagging behind any nation in taking all necessary measures to acquire great efficiency in all phases of Turkish National Defence.

On the Eastern frontier of India is the awakened China which is moving fast to assert her position as a great power in the world. The Chinese leaders have brought about national unity through their military power. They, especially General Chiang Kai Sek, fully realise the value of military training. It was the Russian officers who helped Dr. Sun Yat Sen to train the new leaders of China in the Military College of the Nationalist Government of Canton. Now the Russian officers and advisers have been discharged from the services of the National Government at Nankin, but the Chinese Nationalists are not unmindful of securing the most competent military advisers to re-organise and train the Chinese army which will be second to none in the world. It has been reported that Col. Bauer, formerly of the German General Staff, one of the Chief Assistants in the Artillery Divisions under General Ludendoff, has been appointed one of the advisers of the Nankin Government. Steps are being taken to spread military education in Chinese colleges and schools.

Japan, which spends much less money for the maintenance of her army and navy than India does, has possibly one of the best trained army and navy in the world. Japan has accomplished all these within less than 75 years and India under the British rule for over 150 years has not one school for training army officers.

If we examine the condition of the British Dominions we find that adequate measures are being taken by the Government and people of these nations to provide for adequate national defence. Measures have been adopted in South Africa to create

an efficient citizen army. In the Irish Free State steps are being taken by which, with comparatively small expenditure, they will have a very efficient force which will be supplemented by a large auxiliary force. The "London Observer" gave the following information on the subject :—

"By way of auxiliary to the standing Army of the Irish Free State, it is proposed to have a volunteer Force, which will undergo a short intensive training every summer, and thus be available for emergency work. The Minister expects a big response to this call for a voluntary force. A new military college for the training of officers is being established shortly at the Curragh."

Industrially, economically and even educationally India is in a better position than Afghanistan, Persia, Siam and Turkey, and many other countries, but India has no adequate facilities for giving military education to her own children. *The Irish Free State, with a population of about three millions, can establish a military college to train its officers, it can send its most intelligent officers to study in the United States and the Government of India cannot do what Ireland is doing !*

In the rejection of the Skeen Committee Report and also in the refusal of the Government of India to support the proposal of Lucknow University to give military education to its students, one finds the most eloquent of the British policy of keeping the people of India in utter helplessness from the standpoint of national defence. This being the case, there is greater responsibility for the Indian Nationalists to devise means for the promotion of military education in India which will be adequate for training the people of India to assume the responsibility of National Defence. *Just as Mahatma Gandhi collected a large sum of money for his Khaddar programme and used the amount to popularising spinning, etc., just as the All-India National Congress created its Khaddar Board, similarly the time has come to have a special Department of National Defence in*

connection with the All-India National Congress. Just as the King of Afghanistan raised a certain sum from contributions of the male citizens of Afghanistan to secure funds to meet military necessities of the nation, similarly a certain sum of money must be raised for the express purpose of military education in India. Just as in Bengal and other parts of India, through private enterprises many schools and colleges have been established to spread general and scientific education, similarly private institutions should promote military education in India.

During recent years some of the leaders of the Indian National Congress have taken a keen interest in educating the people about the importance of India's establishing foreign relations ; and it has produced some result ; and the All-India National Congress has adopted a programme of international work. Let us hope that during the coming session of the All-India National Congress some steps will be taken to formulate a definite national policy regarding Indian National Defence. *A nation's military strength has a great bearing on its foreign relations ; a weak nation can never receive favourable consideration in its relations with others. Thus it is to be hoped that those Indian Nationalists, who are interested in India's asserting her position as a free and independent nation will take some steps for spreading military education among the people. To facilitate this work, the All-India National Congress should have, among others, special departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defence, manned by the most efficient and far-sighted men.*

TARAKNATH DAS

TO EDITH

Even if I would forget
All love's sacred words,
I am plunged into remembrance anew
By the voices of birds.
In the still cool depths of lakes—
Blue like the tranquil skies,
I see the sweet reflection
Of your lovely eyes.
I see your form in saffron mists
Across the sea;
Your arms reach from the starry height
To plead with me.
Forget ? ah that was April, Sweet,
T'is June once more,
I now see what they meant to me,
Those Junes before.
Forget ? when all the world is you,
I can't, try as I will;
Forget ! when eyes are stars, and voices
Birdsong on a hill !
When birds fly songless to their nests,
And Nature withers in some fret;
When dreams are naught but bitterness
Beloved, then will I forget !

LELAND J. BERRY

THE ITALIAN ACADEMY[1]

The Italian Academy which owes its conception to Signor Mussolini, is now an accomplished fact and it will certainly rank as one of the most outstanding and significant manifestations of the Fascist Regime.

Although full details as to its regulation and scope of action are still lacking, yet its general organisation and purpose have been clearly set out and it is bound to occupy an important place in the national life.

Chronologically speaking, the Italian Academy is the youngest Academy in Europe, coming into existence long after similar institutions in France and Spain, but it will prove in no way inferior to its predecessors and will be fully equal to its task of gathering together and assimilating in a higher synthesis the experiences and results of the many Academies, scientific, literary and aritistic, that have followed one another in Italy since the 15th century and are still—many of them—carrying on an honourable career of useful activity. The specific work of these local institutions will not be interfered in any way by the Italian Academy, for the simple reason that the latter will exist as a full and complete expression of all the cultural energies of the country and will concentrate solely on national aims. It will also be a Government Institution and its future will be economically assured.

Given these premises, it is easy to understand the intense interest roused by the foundation of the Italian Academy, especially now that it is about to be officially opened and that the Press is beginning to announce the first list of members, the nucleus of thirty Academicians nominated by the Government who will afterwards themselves elect all future additions to their body.

[1] General Press, Florence, Italy.

Signor Mussolini has already nominated the President of the Academy in the person of H. E. Senator Tommaso Tittoni. formerly President of the Senate and the holder of many important political and diplomatic posts.

Senator Tittoni, now in his seventy-fifth year, is a man of high intellect and wide experience of men and things and there is general satisfaction that he should have been chosen as the official representative of Italian culture. Equally popular is the selection of the distinguished historian, Giovacchino Volpe, as Secretary of the Academy.

What is the general opinion of representative Italians on the new Academy? How are they impressed by this crowning feature in the national life of the country? In an interview with Ardengo Soffici we have been able to obtain his views on the subject, which are interesting as being those of a man who both as a writer, a painter and a critic, is one of the most typical and characteristic figure in contemporary Italy.

Still a young man when the war broke out, Ardengo Soffici was well known as a brilliant Journalist and he became noted as time went on for his eager participation in the political movements of Intervention and Fascism which had for their object the rebirth of the Italian nation, not only politically but morally. He has been a follower of Mussolini since 1915 and just as in the saddest phases of the war he never doubted the ultimate victory of the Allies, so during the most critical moments of the Fascist Revolution, he never lost faith in his Leader.

Soffici is the soul, the spiritual head of all fresh and youthful energies in Italy.

"The Italian Academy," said Soffici, "will stand out in the complex development of the Fascist State as the most characteristic manifestation of its creative capacity. Its mission is of primary importance, as constituting the spiritual centre of Italy, the fullest expression of her powers of realization in every branch of cultural activity."

According to Ardengo Soffici, an eminent Italian writer and painter of to-day, the Academy will be called upon to carry out a work of spiritual propulsion, control and guidance all the more necessary to-day owing to the perfect harmony that the Fascist State has succeeded in infusing into all other branches of national energy. He considers that the best guarantee of its success lies in the choice made of its first President, of whom he related the following anecdote :

" When Senator Tittoni was Italian Ambassador in Paris during the war, he paid frequent visits to the Italian Military Hospital and there made the acquaintance of my great friend, the French poet, Guillaume Apollinaire, who was brought in wounded from the front. A warm friendship sprang up between the diplomatist and the poet and during his convalescence, Apollinaire wrote to me telling me of all the kindness and attention he had received from the Ambassador and of his amazement at finding that in addition to all the special qualities needed for a high official post, Tittoni also possessed keen artistic intuition and a deep appreciative knowledge of literature and philosophy. This incident, though slight, gives a clear idea of the man."

The nomination of Giovacchino Volpe as Secretary of the Academy, is enthusiastically approved by Soffici who knew Volpe during the war when they were fellow-officers together in the same section and conceived a great admiration both for his character and intellect.

" With such men to direct it, the Italian Academy cannot fail to accomplish the task assigned to it by Mussolini, who to his accurate knowledge of men adds a clear vision of history. The Italian Academy is called upon to occupy a definite place in Italian history and will amply justify its creation."

CALIGULA'S GALLEYS [1]

Lake Nemi gives up its Secret

In the course of centuries, frequent efforts have been made, at different times, to raise the two Roman galleys that lie, embedded in mud and stones, at the bottom of Lake Nemi. The hazardous enterprise was first attempted in 1446 by Leon Battista Alberti, at the invitation of Cardinal Prospero Colonna, lord of the castles of Nemi and Genzano. A second attempt was made one hundred years later by the engineer and military architect, Francesco De Marchi, who made use of a kind of diving apparatus, invented, it is said by himself. A third attempt was made in 1827 by a certain Amnesio Fusconi who also employed a diving apparatus of his own invention. The scheme followed on each of these occasions, was to raise the galleys by means of ropes at grappling-irons attached to floating rafts. The result in each case was not only unsuccessful but positively disastrous for while the hull refused to move, the grappling-irons tore away a certain amount of the rotten timber and brought it up piecemeal.

In 1895 an antiquity-dealer, Eliseo Borghi, obtained permission from the Minister of Public Instruction to try and salvage the legendary galleys. Borghi failed in his main object but he succeeded in recovering some beautifully modelled bronze heads of wolves and lions, with rings through which the mooring cables passed, a head of Medusa, a transom and an augural hand and arm. The exquisite workmanship of these bronzes roused universal attention and admiration. They are purchased for 30,000 lire by the Director-General of Fine Arts, on behalf of the nation, and are now in the Terme Museum in Rome

[1] General Press, Florence, Italy.

Other bronzes that certainly once belonged to the Nemi galleys exist in various foreign museums, chief among them is a statue of Diana or Drusilla, the sister of the Emperor Caligula, the owner of the galleys. Spink, the London dealer in antiques, sold it to Lord Astor who presented it to the British Museum together with other small statues that would seem to have formed part of the same. Another bronze, retrieved from Nemi waters, is now in the Berlin Museum. It represents a helmet surmounted by the outstretched head of an eagle, with the beak almost on a level with the vizor, a symbol, perhaps, of the power of Imperial Rome.

Towards the end of 1895 the Italian Minister of Public Instruction gave orders that these partial attempts at salvage should cease, as they invariably resulted in damage to the framework of the galleys. At the same time, the Minister instructed the naval engineer, Vittorio Malfatti, to draw up a scheme that would make it possible to raise the vessels, bodily from the bottom of the lake.

Malfatti studied the question very carefully, not only in theory, but practically, on the spot. He succeeded in ascertaining the exact position of each of the two galleys and also their dimensions which he outlined by means of small buoys moored together by ropes. Thus it was discovered that the smaller of the two galleys and the one nearest the shore, is 208 ft. in length, with a beam of 65 ft. The galley lies on its left side, with its prow some 220 ft. from the shore and buried to a depth of 39 ft. below the surface of the waters. The stern which is a little over 60 ft. from the shore, is only submerged to the extent of 18 ft. The second and larger galley is 230 ft. long and has a beam of 78 ft. below the level of the lake. Its stern is 162 ft. distant from the shore and its prow lightly over 352 ft. This vessel is in a better state of preservation than the smaller one, as owing to its position, it has suffered less from former ruthless attempts at salvage.

It is close upon two thousand years since these gorgeous

pleasure-boats of the Emperor Caligula rode proudly upon the surface of Lake Nemi, elaborately decorated, encrusted with marbles, precious metals and scented woods and adorned with statuary. We know nothing about the causes that brought about their strange disappearance. Some scholars believe that they sank suddenly, possibly owing to a storm: others are of opinion that the disaster was due to carelessness or neglect and that the galleys had previously been stripped of all their artistic treasures. The number of beautiful bronzes and other objects that have been found close to the sunken vessels justify the hope that this last hypothesis is not correct and that the two pleasure boats went down fully equipped.

The truth will soon be known, thanks to the initiative of the Fascist Government which in April, 1927, definitely approved a scheme for recuperating the two galleys by draining off the waters of the lake with powerful electric pumps. Private enterprise in Italy at once came forward and offered financial and other aid for the realisation of this project in which Signor Mussolini takes the strongest personal interest. The necessary electric plant was installed on the shore of the lake; operations began on October 20th, 1928, in the presence of Signor Mussolini, and four pumps have worked uninterruptedly ever since, the water as it leaves the lake being diverted into an old Roman (or perhaps Etruscan) outlet driven through the hill-side into the Ariccia valley below and thence carried down to the sea at Ardea, some 15 miles away. It was a work of some difficulty to free this tunnel which was evidently used by the ancients for irrigation purposes, from all the mud that had silted up in it during the course of centuries. When once this was done and the outlet opened to its fullest extent, it proved easily capable of carrying off all the volume of water unceasingly poured into it.

Already 10 million cubic metres of water have been drained away and the level of the lake has been lowered by 17 ft. As the waters recede, the bed of the lake presents a most

desolate appearance, arid, stony, marked by cracks and fissures here and there by regular land-slips where the upper banks have given way and crumbled into ruin. The pumps continue to work at the rate of 2,000 cubic metres a second and it is calculated that by the middle of April the stern of the nearest galley should be plainly visible above the surface. Its position, fore and aft, is marked by two red and green buoys and at certain hours of the day, the long, dark outline can be discerned and it is possible from a small light row-boat brought into position right over the pull, to prod the timbers now only about one foot below the surface with a short stick and touch the long nails sticking out from the wood.

A few days more and we of the 20th century will be able to feast our eyes on the remains of the galley once trod by the footsteps of a Roman emperor. Another three months and the whole framework will have emerged from the waters, with all its secrets laid bare. It will take at least a year to make a thorough examination of it and to verify what it may contain of archæological value and artistic interest. Should it prove to have neither but to be merely a hulk of rotten timbers, then no further attempts will be made to raise it and possibly the drainage works will be stopped and the larger galley left to its fate at the bottom of the lake.

In any case, the Italian Government will have the credit of having solved the mystery of Caligula's galleys over which men's minds have brooded for centuries and which will now finally be laid to rest.

INDIA CENTRE OF HINDU ART AND CULTURE

Planned by India Society of America

The Second India Conference of America to be held in New York City, September 5, 6 and 7, 1929, to discuss India's present-day problems of cultural and international significance, and to make India better known to the world.

At the Annual Meeting of the India Society of America held in New York City, Mr. Ramlal Bajpai, Honorary Secretary of the Society, said in his report :—

The India Society of America was founded by Hari Govind Govil in 1924 with the co-operation of the leading Hindu residents of America and prominent American friends of India. In 1925 the Society was duly incorporated as a membership corporation under the laws of the State of New York with the following aims and objects :—

To promote a broader and a more intelligent understanding between the people of India and of America through the study and appreciation of Indian art, literature, philosophy and culture ; to disseminate a more accurate knowledge of the Indian people, their life and ideals.

These objects shall be accomplished by holding lectures, social gatherings, musical, dramatic and art presentations, distribution of books and printed literature of India, and to maintain permanent headquarters for carrying on this artistic and cultural works.

Artistic and Cultural Work.

During the short period of its existence the India Society of America has satisfied the great need of a medium for carrying on an artistic and cultural work on behalf of India whose

contribution to the world's civilization has been so great and which has an equally vital contribution to make to the culture of the New World which is emerging from the wreckage of the Old in the words of our great poet Rabindranath Tagore. The Society has been arranging various literary and social gatherings frequently at which distinguished Americans and prominent visitors from India and abroad have been introduced to the public.

Modern Hindu Art shown.

The India Society in co-operation with the Roerich Museum held the First Exhibition of Modern Hindu Paintings in New York City which was greatly appreciated by art-lovers of America. This exhibition consisting of fifty-two water-color paintings by contemporary Hindu artists assembled by Mr. O. C. Gangoly, editor of the "Rupam" and Vice-President of the Indian Society of Oriental Art, has been shown all over America in the important museums and art-centres. For the first time American art-lovers have been acquainted with a phase of Hindu cultural renaissance which has already found much appreciation in Paris, Berlin and London, but had so far remained practically unknown to America. This exhibition enabled the American art-lovers to appreciate more fully the work of young Hindu artists creating a new expression under the direction of Abanindranath Tagore, Nandalal Bose, Asit Kumar Halder and other artists, and to understand the ideals of Hindu art. It is through the appreciation of Hindu art and culture that India would be better known and understood in the West and thus win the everlasting friendship of America.

Second India Conference of America.

As a result of the decided achievements of the first India Conference of America it has been decided to make the India Conference of America an annual event. The Second India Conference of America will be held in New York City—the

metropolis of the world—from September 5th to 7th, 1929. Prominent scholars and leaders are expected to participate in this Conference. Our Indian scholars and leaders can do a signal service to our Mother India by participating in this Conference. We request them to present original papers on India's artistic, cultural, historical, social and educational, religious and philosophic and other subjects of international significance to be read at the Conference. All papers, communications and messages for the Conference should reach the Director, Mr. Hari G. Govil, India Society of America, 1107, Times Building, New York City, not later than the end of August. Four weeks should be allowed for the transit of the communication from India to America.

What India Conferences can do.

Speaking at the final session of the First India Conference of America, Dr. J. T. Sunderland, President of the Conference and well-known author of "India in Bondage: Her right to freedom," said as follows :—

The object of this Conference has been to allow us to do something in the way of letting the people of America know something more about India from reliable sources, something more about India not only in one direction but in various directions. The Conference was so planned so as to cover a variety of subjects. There have been addresses, lectures both from the platform and the radio, discussions, dinners, art exhibitions and musical presentations, social gatherings with a view to interpret the true India to us in America.

Prominent Speakers.

Eminent Americans, educators and public men and prominent Hindus have addressed these different meetings, among whom may be mentioned : Hari G. Govil, Director of the India Society and Organizing Director of the First India Conference at

America: "Renaissance in Hindu Art"; Hemendra K. Rakshit, editor of the Hindustanee Student "What ails India? An Economic Study." A Symposium on "India Free within or without the British Empire." Speakers: Prof. Herbert Adams Gibbons, Prof. of International Politics, Princeton University, Prof. Robert Morse Lovett, Editor, New Republic, Harry F. Ward, Prof. at the Union Theological Seminary, and Haridas T. Mazumdar, Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Keeper of the Indian Art at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts: "Recent Discoveries in Hindu Art and Archæology" Illustrated. Illustrated Lecture with music by Swami Gnaneshawarananda of the Vedanta Society. Dhan Gopal Mukherji, author of "Caste and Outcast," "My Brother's Face," etc., "What India has to contribute to Modern Civilization?" Dr. Alfred W. Martin, leader of the Ethical Culture Society of America, and Vice-President of the India Society of America, "Our Debt to Hindu Philosophy." Prof. George C. O. Haas, formerly of the American Oriental Society, "The Value of Hindu Philosophy in our Western Life." Dr. Vaman Ramchandra Kokatnur, Member of the Am. Chemical Society, "India's Contribution to Science." Mme. Sarojini Naidu, India's Greatest feminist leader, "Interpretation of India's Womanhood" at the first public appearance in New York City. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, editor of the "Nation."

India's Greatness.

"India has been a great contributor," said Dr. Sunderland, "as many of you know, to the world in many lines of civilization—in art, in literature, not only in religion. We think of India first in connection with religion. We are apt to do that because she has been so very prominent, the mother of two of the greatest religions of the world, but India has made large contributions to the world in literature, philosophy and in art, and to a greater degree than most; then in science also, and in various lines of thought. The Indian

people have been renowned from the beginning as thinkers, as intellectual people, people of high spiritual ideals, whose spirituality has gone widely over the world, indeed has been the spiritual teacher of the greatest continent in the world, Great Asia."

"And it is a pity that we of the West know so little of India and India's thought, and India's great place in the world of civilization. Well, the object of this Conference has been to give some new ideas, some new thought, some new information on these lines, to the American people.

Appreciation of Govil's Work.

"I want to express, and I am sure that it is not only for myself, but for all of you who have attended this Conference, my very great appreciation and gratitude toward Mr. Govil, the man who has originated the Conference and carried it through with remarkable zeal, interest and success. The amount of work Mr. Govil has put into this Conference, arranging for it, organizing it, and carrying it through, has been greater than most of us know. He certainly should have our profound gratitude for all that he has done.

India's Staunchest Friend in America.

"On behalf of the India Society of America, I wish to put on record our deep sense of gratitude and appreciation to Dr. J. T. Sunderland who presided at the various sessions of the Conference and greatly contributed to its success through his stirring addresses and discussions of India's life and culture, among which may be mentioned: Presidential address: America's interest in India's freedom, Why should India be free?; Illustrated Lecture on Picturesque India." Besides these, Dr. Sunderland through his active participation and presence at the various sessions greatly enhanced the significance of the Conference.

India Centre to be established in America.

As the outcome of the round-table discussions of the First India Conference, it has been proposed to establish a permanent India Centre of Hindu Art and Culture in America.

THE ONE IMMORTAL

"*Bâhj mâna châran kâmal abināsi*"

Oh, mind, adore the Lord's immortal lotus-feet!
All 'twixt earth and heaven like a mist will vanish ;
Of what avail will pilgrimage or fasting be ?
Fall at His immortal feet!
Be not mindful of the body ;
'Tis of dust,—to dust must soon return ;
Praise not life, 'tis but a bird of passage, in the evening must fly homeward ;
Adore the Master of that home.
Vain is this forsaking of gladness, this donning of the hermit's guise,
If being a saint you know not saintliness ;
Beware the wages sad of sin is death!
Lord, with folded hands thy frail devotee pleads :
' Save Mira from the cruel noose of sin and death.'

(*From Mira Bai's Hindi Songs*)

CYRIL MODAK

THE COMPOSITION OF THE GATHAS.[1]

If one tries to read the Avesta, one perceives immediately that it is an impossible task ; there is not a single chapter which has unity, nor a fragment that is continuous from beginning to end.[2]

And the explanation is this : The Avesta is neither a book nor a collection of books or complete pieces. It is a set of fragments, to speak the truth, a field of ruins, not of Greek ruins like those of Sélinonte where the temples, thrown down, rise and yet display their plan and fine arrangement, and stretching under the sun, glorify the luminous gods ; but (these are) shapeless ruins lying about without any order.

As J. Darmesteter has seen it, our Avesta is a collection of fragments preserved by chance which editors wholly devoid of skill and thought have placed side by side without any system.

The work does no credit to the Sassanian church : the extreme intellectual poverty is exposed there from one end to the other. But there the modern savant is the gainer ; if the fragments had been re-touched and reunified, the old state of the text which is now guessed would no longer have been disclosed. Thanks to the intellectual poverty of the editors, one disposes of the higly interesting authentic fragments.

The script gives some idea of the history of the text. The characters employed are Aramaic ; but the consonants are followed by signs indicating the vowels in the Greek manner. The two actions which are exercised in the Arsacide[3] era thus

[1] Translated from French—a lecture delivered by Prof. Meillet at the Upsala University.

[2] "It resembles more a collection of scattered verses than one continuous whole" Haug, p. 146. "Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis.

[3] This dynasty reigned in Parthia and Armenia from about 250 B. C. to A. D. 224 in Parthia and to 428 in Armenia.

are shown in the form in which the text has come down. Besides, the consonants have been differentiated from one another with the aid of a sort of diacritic marks, in a manner to note the differences not indicated by the Aramaic alphabet, specially the difference between occlusive and the spirant consonants.

This form of the text is not the most ancient. It has been preceded by a notation purely Semitic where the vowels were indicated whenever necessary by *matres lectiônis*, but where they do not appear systematically, and where the diacritic signs do not exist. M. Andreas has put in evidence that ancient form which it is necessary always to restitute when one wishes to explain the way how the text has been fixed in writing at the beginning.

The Greek influence is then wholly secondary and superficial. The only ancient influence is Aramaic. But the Aramaic script does not exert any more any profound influence on the civilisation. Neither in the Avestan language nor in other Iranian speeches, are to be found words borrowed from the Aramaic. While the Persian is penetrated by Arabic words, the old Persian and Pahlavi have not accepted any Aramaic vocabulary. The Pahlavi script could at first sight create an impression ; but it has been long known that Aramaic words from Pahlavi are only some masks covering Iranian words ; *min* is *ac* (*az*), *li* is *man*, *malkā* is *šāh*, *gabrā* is *mard*, and so on. If there had been any doubt, the Pahlavi texts from Turfan, those from the North as well as from the South, have proved conclusively that such doubts are totally unfounded.

The fact is singular ; generally speaking, borrowing a manner of writing indicates an influence of civilization. Here, the script alone has been borrowed. It is that breaking with the Babylonian tradition the Persian had recourse to the Syrians for the script ; the bureaus of the Achamanean empire are served with Aramaic. No doubt the monumental inscriptions are in cuneiform characters ; but the parallelism

between the Babylonian and néo-Susian texts explains it ; now, the extreme reduction of the number of characters employed shows that the Cuneiform Persian alphabet has been constituted after an Aramaic model. When one has written the Iranian with Aramaic characters—what was bound to happen later at the Arsacide era—, the Aramaic scribes had found it convenient to guard the Aramaic form from all the usual words so that at first sight the Pahlavi texts have an air of a medley of Iranian and Aramaic.

It is difficult to imagine at what moment the Avestan texts were written down by means of Aramaic characters similar to those with which the Pahlavi was written—no doubt at first the Pahlavi of the North which is represented by the Sassanian inscriptions worded in Chaldeo-Pahlavi, and by one portion of Turfan texts in western Iranian. To judge by diverse details and by differences of orthography which reflect the transposition in the alphabet which possessed subtle peculiarities and was employed later on, the texts of the gathas and others have been noted separately. But, when there has been transcription from the simple ancient alphabet to the new alphabet supplied with vowels and diacritic signs, that transcription was first made for the Gathas; and it is only after the addition of some new characters that the the transcription of recent (or later) texts has been done. A minute criticism would permit us no doubt if not to determine with precision, at least to sketch out the complicated history of these notations.

As for the original script, one would not try to determine if the first authors had written (the texts) or if the texts, confined at first to memory, have been written down after the occasion, and in that case, at what moment they had been fixed in writing for the first time.

One sees how there are many elements unknown or ill-determined in the history of the texts. But one sees also that, in all the epoch, the gathas have been treated quite differently from the later Avesta. They have been a precious survival of

of which the tradition has been saved on more than one occasion.

It remains to find out *in what consists* the document preserved with so much piety.

A cardinal fact is striking: the Gathas are in verse, and these verses constitute the strophes. In this repect they are like the Ṛgveda, which includes hymns rendered into strophes of varied types. Whether for the number of verses, or for the number of syllables in each verse, or for the position of the division in the verse, the strophes in the Gathas will bear comparison with those of the Vedas. There is no doubt that both of them are issues of the same Indo-Iranian type.

Between the Vedic verse and the Avestan verse—of the Gathas as of the later Avesta—there is nevertheless an important difference: the Vedic verse obeys definite laws of quantity in certain definite places; the Avestan verse does not. If, as indicated by numerous and well-defined similarities, the quantitative rhythm of verse attested by the similarity of Vedic and old Greek and confirmed by the quantitative nature of the rhythm of the language, had existed since the Indo-European, the Avestan verse has then lost one of the principal constituent elements in Indo-European verse. That change is explained by the fact that, in many positions, the quantity of the Iranian vowels has altered: the final vowels of the word have not the proper quantity; the prolongation of the phonic group tends to abridge the vowels in the middle of the group (contrast known between *dəmānəm* [with a common Iranian. *ā*] and *dəmanahyā*, between *čaθwārō* and *čaθwarasča*). In compensation the place of the stroke which in verses of more than eight syllables, is obligatory, has become fixed; it has lost the liberty which it had in Vedic and which was a heritage of Indo-European.

But if the metrical form of the strophes in the Gathas is close to that of the Vedas, the use is different. The Vedic hymn is a composite piece of work, one whole of which the

portions are continuous with as much rigour as might attend a lyrical poem. A Gatha of the Avesta offers on the contrary a series of strophes which correspond more or less to the same order of ideas, but which do not seem to present any regular sequence. The beginnings of each fragment are brusque ; each strophe forms a unity ; but from one strophe to the other there is an hiatus ; the whole thing is incoherent.

In his translation of the Gathas, M. Bartholomew is forced to mark, by analysis, the sequence of ideas. His exigences are modest ; he is content with forced sequences, of which the indications are very slight. Nevertheless he is unceasingly forced to declare that certain portions are separated from others, that portions of one hymn are not continuous, etc.

This fact calls for an explanation. To explain the brusqueness of such beginnings, M. Bartholomew has been led to admit that the verse pieces had succeeded sermons in prose, not preserved, which had been more precise and which had cleared up the versified part.

It is necessary to go farther. The most ancient Buddhist texts are composed of versified fragments, called Gathas, relieved by more or less brief prose fragments which clear them up. The more one rakes up the past, the more does the place of prose seem to be *slight*. But always there is something of prose. A similar arrangement would explain immediately the singular aspect of the Gathas of Avesta. There exists only the expressive portion, rigorously stated and consequently versified, of a predication of which the part containing free and running explanation having no fixed form had disappeared. Since then the incoherence of the text is but what can be expected—a thing natural : it means that the links have not come down. If the hypothesis is admitted, it makes the explanation easy, where the strophes have a continuity, it is because there was little break, or no break at all ; where there is a hiatus or break, it is because a free exposition in prose was lost between the preserved strophes. Hence it is vain to try to discover continuities

or sequences where none existed. The text does not become much more intelligible ; but one gives up the position to force it in order to introduce a cohesion which was wanting there by nature.

Now, the Buddhist composition, in prose for the explanations in verse for all that which is expressive and proper to be formulated with force, is not the only thing of its kind in the Indo-European world. It is an old usage which is found again and again.

In the Italian-Celtic world where, to judge by siriking similarities in religious and judicial vocabularies, are preserved the oldest Indo-European religious traditions, one finds again this same medley of prose and verse : The Irish epic is in prose, but interspersed with verses whenever the need for expression demands it ; and, just as prose is simple and clear, the verses are artificial, often obscure, decked with rare words. If one again takes up the Gathas of the Avesta, one understands whence comes the obscurity, and why almost in each strophe the vocabulary presents some difficulty, frequently making the whole of a strophe difficult, if not impossible, to understand.— Rome, penetrated by the influence of Hellenic scholarships has dropped traditional varieties ; but one finds there now and then the existence of mixed passages in prose and verse ; the learned Varron who knew the ancient usages has cultivated the satire in the style of the philosopher Meneppius, medley of prose and verse. And, though the famous passage of Titus Livy on the origin of the theatre in Rome (VII, 2) is so little clear, yet there one finds the medleys of metres : " *Qui non sicut ante Fescennino uersu similem incompositum temere ac rudem alternis iaciebant sed impletas modis saturas descripto iam ad tibicinem cantu motuque congruenti peragebant.*" " The writers do not fight, as one fought before now, with replies in a verse analogous to *fescennin*,[1] without rhythm, without a fixed plan,

[1] *Inconditis Uersibus*, as it has been said before.

without pains. They joy in satires, full of rhythmical varieties, with a song henceforth prepared to the accompaniment of a pipe and with appropriate stories." (From Lejay, *Histoire de la littérature latine des origines à Plaute*, p. 173 ff.)

The Iceland-Norwegian literature also knows the medley of prose and verse.

In conclusion one cannot but recall to mind the Greek drama where the lyrical strophes and lyrical monodies are intertwisted between some versified fragments in the type of verse which, following the testimony of Aristotle, differs least from prose. The great difference between the two portions is emphasised by the fact that the lyrical portions have a dialectal colour which separates them from the language of current speech and contain a number of rare words, whereas the *dialogue portions* are written in a language comparatively close to the current speech.

In the Avesta itself, the seven chapters in prose of Yasna, which present the same script as the gathas, include the fragments which may be cut out in verses of eight syllables. And the later Avesta is a medley of prose and verse. The medley comes often out of the juxtaposition of formerly independent fragments. But it does not lack cases where it appears to be old.

The hypothesis is then plausible in itself, following which one has in the Gāthas the verse portion only of a whole of which the prose has been lost. It remains to be seen how it works when applied to the texts. Almost each Gatha serves to illustrate this hypothesis. One would select here a famous Gatha, the complaint of the Spirit of the Cow, *y.* XXIX.

Following the old usage which is still at the basis of all the Gatha doctrine, the author realises in a sort of active person the whole thing that he considers. The Spirit of the Cow represents here all the bovine species. The word cow is not to have the French meaning, but with a generic value; in Strophe 5, it indicates the male, but it would be improper to translate it by "taureau" (bull); because the French term calls up essentially the idea of the "male," which here is of minor significance.

The first strophe begins abruptly. It is addressed to personages not named and not expressly designed. It is clear that this was preceded by a fragment in which the personages summoned were called.

1. xšmaibyā gəuš urvā gərəždā
kahmāi mā θwar(ō)ždūm kə mā tašaṭ
ā mā aēšmō hazascā
(rδmō) āhišayā dərəšcā təvišcā
nōiṭ mōi vāstā xšmaṭ anyō
aθā mōi sastā vohū vāstryā.[1]

"To you the Spirit of the Cows (or Kine) complains: why have you formed me? Who made me? Wrath and tyranny and brutality and force have come on me. I have no other pastor but you; give me then good pasture grounds."

One finds here the personages summoned to reply to the Spirit of the Cows. But without any other aid, one is transported among the forces which form the cow. Following the usage of the gathas, the active force is realised and it is the "maker of the cow" that intervenes.

2. adā tašā gəuš pərəsaṭ.
ašəm kaθā tōi gavōi ratuš
hyaṭ hīm dātā xšayantō
hadā vāstrā gaodāyō θwaxšō
kəm hōi uštā ahurəm
yə drəgvōdbīš āēšməm vādayōiṭ.

"Then the cow's maker has asked of Asha. How hadst thou a chieftain (spirit protecting) for the cows, so that you, who are the masters, you may give him with the pasture the care which

[1] One writes here the traditional text, which is the only sure data. It is well known that the vocalisation and the phonetic detail are not ancient.

comes back to the cow...? Whom would you have for the cow's master, who avoids wrath along with the wicked?''

3. The 3rd strophe bears the response to the question put; it does not imply, but it does no more exclude, a little of intermediate prose. One would not translate it because it is roughly clear in the detail. It is said there that the person here may not protect the cow.

It is proper however to criticise a detail. The words spoken are attributed to Asha, who was called by the instrumental. But, though such hypothesis has been made for more than one passage, it is not admissible that, in a text with an archaic form like that of the Gathas, the subject would be expressed by the instrumental. Either the principal subject was certainly indicated in the prose explanation which preceded or it is fully a divine undetermined personage, *aśā* means ''with Asha.'' Similarly *y.* XLIX, 7:

taṭcā vohū	mazdā sraotū manaŋha
sraotū ašā	gūšahvā tū ahurā

''and which he (?) hears with Vohū mano, which he hears with Asha; listen, thou, Ahura.''

Here ''he'' is not determined by the text itself, it is an unknown personage, or indicated in the prose portion.

4. The strophe 4 bears a general indication which prepares the intervention of Ahura Mazdā. One has a glimpse of the link, but a preparation is lacking:

mazdå saxvārδ mairišto
yā zī vāvδrδzōi pairi ciθīṭ
daēvāišcā mašyāišcā
yācā vaγδšaitē aipi-ciθīṭ
hvō vīcirō ahurō
aθā nō aŋhaṭ yaθā hvō vasaṭ.

"It is Mazdā who knows best the indications (?), those which were made in the past by demons and by men and those which would be made by the train of retinue; but it is Ahura who decides it; that it may be for us following his desire to him."

5. The Spirit of the Cows takes up the word without which nothing pays it attention, and the fact which is indicated only by the possessive adjective "my" implies an indroduction. Nothing helps us in guessing that the male would be, this time, accompanied by the female.

aṭ vā ustānāiš ahvā
zastāiš frīnəmnā ahurāi ā
mə urvā gəušcā azyå
hyaṭ mazd̰am dvaidī frasābyō
nōiṭ ərəžyōi fraŋyāitiš
nōiṭ fšuyentē drəgvasū pairī.

"And we (two), with our hands outstretched, we are to address our prayers to Ahura, my spirit and that of the cow with young, when we address ourselves to Mazdā for our demands. It is not for the just or saint that there should be destruction, it is not for the pastor to be on the side of the wicked."

6. This strophe is connected with the preceding; because the indication of the speaker figures in the strophe itself; the wholly prosaic beginning renders useless a fragment of prose in the middle:

aṭ ə vaocaṭ ahurō
mazdå vīdvå vafūš vyānayā
noiṭ aēvā ahū vistō
naēdā ratuš ašāṭcīṭ hacā
aṭ zī θwā fšuyantaēcā
vāstryāicā θwōrəštā tatašā.

"Then.....spoke Ahura Mazdā, who knew him,.....There is not, through Asa, neither master nor spirit. But it is for the pastor and the man of pasturage that the creator has created you."

7. Only, the pronoun in the 1st person dual which is read in the third verse of the Avestan Strophe shows that the "Spirit of the Cows" puts here the question. The strophe was accordingly drawn in by some indication.

təm āzūtōiš ahurō
maθrəm tašaṭ ašā hazaošō
mazdå gavōi xšvīdəmcā
hvōurušaēibyō spəntō sāsnayā
kastē vohū manaṅh ā
yə I dāyāṭ əəāvā marətaēibyō.

"The form of fat holy Ahura Mazdā has created in company with Asha for the cows, and also the milk for those who would consume it, by his teaching. Who art thou, with Vohū manō, whom we (two) look after in view of men ?"

8. The preceding strophe excludes, it seems, the case that the reply may come from Vohū manō, though that has been supposed, and one does not see in whose mouth else it can be placed. Here lacks still at least some indication necessary for the correct understanding of the passage. And that would appear so much to be an essential portion of the fragment: because the character of the prophet Zoroaster is there forcibly drawn :—

aēm mōi idā vistō
yə nə aēvō sāsnå gūšatā
zaraθuštrō spitamō
hvō nə mazdā vaštī ašāičā
čarəkərəθrā srāvayeṅhē
hyaṭ hōi hudəməm dyāi vaxeδrahyā.

"He is known to me here only who has heard my teachings, he comes, O Mazdā, to deliver the.....to us and to Ašā. That one gives him the.....of the religion."

9. That strophe is linked with the preceding one; the speaker is referred to in the beginning as in strophe 6.

aṭ v̌cā gəuš urvā raostā
  yə anaēšəm xš̨anmənə rādəm
v̌ācem nərəš̌ asūrahyā
  yəm ā vasəmī išā xšaθrīm
kadā yavā hvo aṅhaṭ
  yə hōi dadaṭ zastavaṭ avō.

" Then sighed the spirit of the cow : That I should have to rest satisfied with a protection without force, with the voice of a man without his strength, I who desire a chief commanding with his strength ! When should I ever see him who would give a material aid to him (Zoroaster) ? "

10. Then follow two strophes which Messrs. Bartholomew and Andreas-Wackernagel agree to publish by part; the Andreas-Wackernagel translation places them within italics. It is a sort of prayer which should reply mainly to the last wailing of the spirit of the cow. But one fails to find in what way that final prayer answers to the wailing and to the demand so precise in strophe 9. That some gap is left here for a prose fragment appears very plain.

yūžəm aēibyō ahurā
  aogō dātā ašā xšaθrəmčā
avat vohū manaṅhā
  yā hušəitīš rāmamčā dāṭ
azəmčiṭ ahyā mazdā
  θwam məṅhī paourvīm vaēdəm.

" O you, Ahura, Asa and Xsaθra, give them force and strength, and this, with Vohū manō, by which it may create good establishments and tranquillity. Me, O Mazdā, I have considered him as the first author of this. "

One thinks that the "he" who is referred to here is Zoroaster who would have at last found the means of necessary strength. But that is not said ; now, it is only intelligible if it is expressed in every portion. There had been surely a prose fragment lying between, containing many explanations of which one has just a glimpse.

11. Unfortunately the last strophe is obscure. The prayer addressed to Aŝa, Vohū manō, Xŝaθra and Ahura mazdā is distinctly visible ; but the detail suffers itself not to be exactly precise, one would not then try to translate the strophe, nor in the sequel connect it with what precedes.

Those passages which are translatable with certainty do not raise any doubt. The strophes are continuous only if we suppose that between them there runs a thread connecting them. That thread was the prose text, more or less formless, more or less improvised, which would precede the verse portions and which would intervene among them.

The same hypothesis is necessary, more or less clearly, for all the gatha texts. The strophes are portions of the same piece, they are not continuous hymns.

That hypothesis once admitted, it is easy to see how the text may be interpreted and one has the right to deduce it. One is not condemned to find at all costs between the strophes a bond which is sometimes apparent and sometimes wholly lacking.

PRIYARANJAN SEN

NATURE'S PALETTE

To watch the seasons come and go
Is worth a world of wealth to me,
For Nature never lacks bright paint
To make some zaffer days at sea,
Or jasper mornings in the woods.
She sweeps her brush along the slopes,
And leaves a mass of gold and red;
She dabs the fields with pink, and hopes
To leave enough to stain the sky.
She takes some of the blue she used
To tint the ocean waves, and dabs
Her brush in sunbeams and is amused
To find some dainty daffodils
About the dales. She mixes blue
With yellow and makes fields of cool
Green grass with scintillating dew.

LOUISE A. NELSON

THE NATIONAL CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF NANKING

A General Statement

One is familiar with the great number and variety of governmental and other institutions in Nanking, the new Capital of the National Government of China. The National Central University, the highest institution of learning located in the capital, however, distinguishes itself from all these in that it is an institution designed for the people who seek to *know* whereas all others are more intended for the people who seek to *do*. According to the well-known dictum of our President Sun, "To know is more difficult than to do," this University bears a most heavy responsibility toward the material and spiritual reconstruction of our nation and the culture and learning of the world.

As regards to its organization, the University is also quite different from all other universities in their ordinary sense. By an order of the National Government, the University has to adopt a system of organization similar to an "Academie" in France, known as the University District System. Thus, colleges and schools of all grades and other organizations of educational administration in Kiangsu province are under the control of the Chancellor of this University. In other words, this University is an institution of learning and also one of educational administrations. A complete link now binds together the primary schools, middle schools, colleges and the research institute into one unified system. This purpose is, of course, to connect learning with administration, and to make the organization of educational administration more akin to an organization of learning.

The general organization of this University comprises: (1) University Council—to this deliberative body is entrusted the

power of adopting regulations and plans for the whole University District. (2) Research Institute—the highest institution for research work in the District. (3) Division of Higher Education—it has charge over the University Proper and supervises all the private colleges and technical schools and also students studying abroad on government scholarship. (4) Division of General Education—it has direct control over both middle and primary schools in the District as well as the school education of the Hsiens and supervises all the private schools. (5) Division of Extension Education—it has control over the mass and adult education. (6) Secretariat—its function is to assist the Chancellor of the University to perform his manifold administrative duties. In addition to this, for auditing accounts and inspecting schools, there is a special accountant, and a number of inspectors. The central administrative staff consists of seventy-five members.

The Division of Higher Education has direct charge of the University Proper which consists of the following Colleges :

1.	College of Science	Nanking
.	College of Arts	Nanking
3.	College of Law	Nanking
4.	College of Education	Nanking
5.	College of Engineering (one part of it is located at Soochow) ...	Nanking
6.	College of Agriculture	Nanking
7.	College of Medicine	Wusung
8.	College of Commerce	Shanghai

Departments in the College of Science.

1. Department of Mathematics.
2. Department of Chemistry.
3. Department of Physics.
4. Department of Geography, Geology and Physiography.
5. Department of Biology.
6. Department of Psychology.

Departments in the College of Arts.

1. Department of Chinese Literature.
2. Department of Foreign Literature.
3. Department of Philosophy.
4. Department of History.
5. Department of Sociology.

Departments in the College of Law.

1. Department of Law.
2. Department of Political Science.
3. Department of Economics.

Departments in the College of Education.

1. Department of Education.
2. Department of Normal Training.
3 Department of Fine Arts.
4. Department of Physical Education.

Courses in the College of Medicine.

1. Course of Medicine.
2. Course of Surgery.
3. Course of Pediatrics.
4. Course of Obstetrics and Gynaecology.
5. Course of Ophthalmology, etc.
6. Fundamental Medical Course.

The College has also the following auxiliary institutions, *viz.*, (*a*) Hospital ; (*b*) School of Pharmacy ; (*c*) Nurse Training School ; (*d*) Midwifery School.

Courses in the College of Agriculture.

1. Section de la Bolanigue Agricole (Department of Agricultural Botany).
2. Section de la Zoologie Agricole (Department of Agricultural Zoology).

3. Section de la Technologie Agricole (Department of Agricultural Technology).

The Marine Product School in Wusung belongs to this college.

Courses in the College of Engineering.

1. Course of Mechanical Engineering.
2. Course of Electric Engineering.
3. Course of Civil Engineering.
4. Course of Chemical Engineering.
5. Course of Architecture.
6. Course of Dyeing and Weaving.
7. Course of Mining and Metallurgy.

Courses in the College of Commerce.

1. Course of Banking.
2. Course of Corporation Management.
3. Course of Accounting.
4. Course of International Trade.

The University Proper has also an administrative staff with the following officers :

1. Registrar.
2. Secretary.
3. Treasurer and Accountant.
4. Bursar.
5. Secretary of Publication.

The University Proper maintains the following libraries :

1. The University Library.
2. Library of Chinese Classics.

The whole faculty has now 255 teachers including professors, associate professors, instructors and assistants of whom 189 are teaching on full time. The administrative staff has 325 members, of whom 211 members are teaching concurrently. The total number of students was 2,060 in the year 1928. A-

to the material equipment of the University, it occupies a campus of 460 mow at the foot of Pei-che-kao, where are located Colleges of Science, Arts, Education, Engineering, Law and the University Administration and Library. The College of Agriculture at San Pei Lou, Nanking, has a campus of 217 mow and thirteen Experimental Stations, having a total area of about 5,300 mow ; the Marine Product School at Wusung, Shanghai, has about 98 mow ; the College of Medicine at Shanghai about 28 mow ; and the Library of Chinese Classics at Lung Pei Li, Nanking, about 7 mow. The construction of new buildings for class-rooms, dormitories and laboratories has begun. The value of the machine shops in the College of Engineering including equipment is estimated at approximately $150,000 ; the equipment in the Science Hall, $190,000 ; books in the University Library, $120,000 , and books in the Library of Chinese Classics, $500,000.

The scholarship fund for sending students abroad is $75,000. The allowances granted to those who were sent out formally by the Kiangsu Province (ten in England, four in U. S. A., one in France, and one in Belgium) are still continued. Besides those, the allowances granted to students studying abroad by the University are : ten in France, one in U. S. A., and eight in Japan. The Japanese part of Boxer Indemnity enables ten Chinese students to study in Japan.

The scope of work of the division of General Education is (1) to direct and supervise all the middle schools and primary schools in the district, (2) to supervise all the country and Hsien educational administration. The middle schools now under the control of the University are :

Nanking Middle School.
Nanking Girls' Middle School.
Chinkiang Middle School.
Soochow Girls' Middle School.
Soochow Middle School.

Changchow Middle School.
Wusih Middle School.
Shanghai Middle School.
Sungkiang Middle School.
Sungkiang Girls' Middle School.
T'aichang Middle School.
Nantung Middle School.
Yangchow Middle School.
Huaiying Middle School.
Huaian Middle School.
Yench'eng Middle School.
Tunghai Middle School.
Su T'sien Middle School.
Suchow Middle School.
Hsuchow Girls' Middle School.
Jukao Middle School.

There are 1,059 teachers and 8,030 students in the 21 middle schools mentioned above. In addition, there is a Training School for Kindergarten teachers and an Experimental School consisting of a junior school and a primary school. The middle school has generally three departments,—the senior middle school, the junior middle school, and the rural normal school. Each senior middle school offers three courses,—the general course, the commercial course, and the normal course. At present, there are, in the junior middle schools, 133 classes ; in the senior middle schools 56 classes of general course, 6 classes of commercial course, and 45 classes of normal course. The largest middle school consists of more than twenty classes incurring an annual expenditure of about $100,000. The vocational schools in the District includes :

Soochow Girls' Sericultural School.
Soochow Agricultural School.
Huaiying Agricultural School.

The Experimental Primary Schools in the District are: (These Primary Schools are attached to the middle School)

Nanking Experimental Primary School.
Nanking Experimental Primary School (in the Girls' School).
Chinkiang Experimental Primary School.
Wusih Experimental Primary School.
Soochow Experimental Primary School.
Soochow Experimental Primary School (in the Girls' School).
Shanghai Experimental Primary School.
T'aichang Experimental Primary School.
Yangchow Experimental Primary School.
Huaiying Experimental Primary School.
Hsuchow Experimental Primary School.
Hsuchow Experimental Primary School (in the Girls' School).
Nantung Experimental Primary School.
Sungkiang Experimental Primary School.

There are 164 classes, 315 teachers and 5,700 students in the above-mentioned 16 experimental primary schools. Besides, there are 30 more classes of experimental primary schools which belong to rural normal schools. As to the improvement of the Hsien education we take the following steps: (1) to secure right personnel; (2) to augment the amount of fund. Since the establishment of the University, we have taken measures in re-organizing the Hsien bureaus of education. We have raised the standard and the qualification of the Hsien superintendents of education, increased their salaries, and set definite rules for the reconstruction of those organizations. We have begun to levy the eight-cent land surtax in order to inforce compulsory and popular education. Better training of teachers and closer inspection and supervision will be our next line of endeavor. The following statistics shows the number of teachers and students of all the schools in Kiangsu Province:

Kinds of Schools.	Total number of teachers.	Total number of students.
Middle School	1,095	8,030
District Normal Schools and Junior Middle School	1,300	12,000
Experimental Primary School	315	5,700
Primary School	18,000	4,57,000

The main work of Division of Extension Education is threefold. It takes charge of the mass education, social education, and the education for farmers. Under this Division, relating the work of mass education, there have been established

1. Library ... ... Soochow
2. Popular Education Institute ... Nanking
3. Public Playground ... ... Nanking

Various kinds of conferences have been held with a view to improving all branches of extension work. For the present, we lay more emphasis on the work of mass education and the education for farmers. We have designed 30 per cent. of the newly-levied eight-cent land surtax (about $1,400,000) to meet the expense of mass education in every Hsien ; and as for the purpose of training teachers, we have established an institute for the training of mass education workers in Wusih. In this Institute, 128 students recommended by the Hsien bureaux of education, are taken in the first year. This school has, attached to it, three experimental schools, three public libraries, two public tea-houses, and women's popular education department, one public theatre, and one experimental farm ; and issues a weekly publication called " People's Weekly." The school is located at Tsai-jo, Wusih, occupying a ground of about 100 mow and housed in six spacious buildings with two new buildings soon to be finished. As for the education for farmers instructions have been given to all the Hsien bureaux of education to plan for the establishment of Farmer's Institutes to be

maintained by a great part of money raised from the special tax on "Shih-po." The Division has already started a Farmer's Institute by the side of Tang Shan, Nanking. As to the training of special workers for rural service, the Division is also planning to establish a Farmers' School at Wusih. A normal class will be first opened for the farmers and attached to it will be established experimental farms ; exhibitions of agricultural products and co-operative societies will be planned for in the near future. Now in this "Period of Political Tutelage," the importance of the education of the common people is but self-evident. Hence the influence of the work of this Division needs no further explanation.

The total expenditure of the whole University District is met by the taxes designated by the National Government as the special education fund. These taxes collected and kept in custody by the Kiangsu Educational Fund Office, are : (1) butchers' tax ; (2) license tax ; (3) part of land surtax ; (4) $1,800,000 of the land tax. The total expense of the District in 1927 is $4,430,000 of which $1,895,000 is for Higher Education ($1,750,000 for the University Proper ; $75,000 for students abroad ; $30,000 for the Library of Chinese Classics ; $40,000 for the Marine Product School) ; $1,720,000 for General Education ; $200,000 for Extension Education; and $600,000 for the subsidy granted to Tung-che College, Chi-nan College, and Labors' College.

Every Hsien is responsible for raising its education fund to meet the expense of the school. There are six sources of revenue : (1) special school tax ; (2) education surtax ; (3) income from the public houses and land ; (4) tuition fees ; (5) miscellaneous tax ; (6) other incomes. The total expenditure for education in the whole province, in the year 1927, is about $5,784,000. When the University was formerly established, new measures were taken to enforce compulsory education. In the winter of 1927, a proposal was adopted by the Provincial Government to the effect that the eight-cent land surtax be gradually increased

to 16 cents per mow. Acting according to this resolution, the Hsien Governments have begun to levy the said tax. The total sum of the whole province will be approximately $4,000,000 a year. We shall set aside 70 per cent. of the revenue for the compulsory education and the rest, 30 per cent., for mass education. Therefore in 1928, the country education fund will be approximately $10,000 and every Hsien will get sufficient amount of money to run its schools.

The national Central University is the first one to put into practice the novel system of University District, similar to that of the "Academie" of France. What have been already achieved and what it seeks to achieve are briefly set forth here. As the task is not only great and delicate but also new, its final success will depend upon the zealous effort and co-operation of its members and the ardent support and sympathy of the public.[1]

CHANG NAI-YEN

[1] From "The China Critic."

THE VARSITY "BLUE"

In the West, one of the honours most coveted by the undergraduate, and most prized by the holder, is the University "blue." Its possessor would as little think of attending the Oxford *vs.* Cambridge boat-race, say, without "sporting his blue," as a Chelsea pensioner would think of leaving his medals behind on some public occasion. Nor is the "blue" without its commercial value. The posts of junior clerk in the City, junior master in the school, junior lecturer in the University, junior house-surgeon in the Hospital—these all leading to higher and more responsible positions—are (other things being more or less equal) awarded to candidates who have won their "blue." And it needs but a modicum of reflection for the normal individual to decide that this cult of the "blue" is not so unfounded on reason and good-sense as it may at first appear to be. Through specialisation, education has made long strides in recent years. Increasing knowledge in particular branches of science and the arts, on the other hand, has been attended by a certain loss on the side of *liberality* ; and it is coming more and more to be recognised that in the man who has to play his part among men, sportsmanship, which is a matter not so much of brawn as of attitude and of character, and of which the hall-mark is the "blue," is the natural complement of scholarship.

Calcutta University awards no "blues." The statement is made without hint of reproach. No one is more alive than the writer to the difficulty of arousing in the mass of Calcutta students an active interest in sports. Persistent efforts on the part of the affiliated Colleges *have,* nevertheless, aroused such interest to a considerable degree : the time when the statement that the University awards no "blues" will be made *with* reproach is not far distant : and the thesis of the present article is that the time for the inauguration of the Varsity "blue" in Calcutta is now ripe. The machinery is all ready.

For some years the University itself has been running an Inter-Collegiate Cricket League and Lansdowne Shield Competition with a view to selecting a representative University Eleven to play against His Excellency the Governor's Eleven at Eden Gardens. If a man qualifies himself by taking part in, say, seventy-five per cent., of his College matches, distinguishes himself in the trials, and finally is selected to play against "The Governor's Eleven," then surely he has proved himself to be—literally, considering the number of matriculated students in Calcutta—"a man in a thousand," and worthy of a University distinction.

In other branches of sport, such as Association Football, Hockey, Tennis and pure Athletics, the selection of students worthy of a "blue" would present as little difficulty. Several years ago there was started by the late Dr. George Ewan of the Scottish Churches College a University Inter-Collegiate Football League which has ever since been enthusiastically supported by the leading Colleges in Calcutta and district. Since then a similar Hocky League has come into existence through the zeal of Mr. W. Owens, late of the Scottish Churches College, while a Duke Cup Tennis Competition (run on slightly different lines) owes its management to St. Paul's. These established competitions would facilitate the work of a University Selection Committee.

It is proposed that this year (the League funds being in a healthy condition) a representative University Football Eleven be selected to travel to Patna or Dacca to engage in an Inter-University match. Those who are chosen might be awarded a "blue." If an annual Inter-University match prove to be too expensive a luxury under existing conditions, one of the premier Calcutta clubs, Mohan Bagan or Calcutta F. C., might be persuaded to field a team against the Varsity Eleven in a trial game and hand over the "gate" towards expenses. Better still if unnecessary expense can be avoided: and unnecessary expense *would* be avoided if the "test" matches in Football, Hockey and Tennis were to be, as in Cricket, matches

against "The Governor's Team." His Excellency's interest in sport is not confined to Cricket ; and in his capacity as Chancellor he might with some confidence be approached on the question of his annually providing teams to oppose representative University teams, if he were assured that by so linking up University sport with the larger world of sport outside, he would be extending and deepening the interest in games, raising the standard of play, and facilitating the awarding of "blues," in the University of which he is the official head.

In Athletics proper, the awarding of "blues" would present no difficulty whatsoever, inasmuch as a man's prowess, under normal weather and ground conditions, is gauged with mathematical accuracy by his time, height, or distance in any particular championship event. For several years an annual University Inter-Collegiate Sports Meeting has been held in the Eden Gardens under the auspices of the University Institute. This year the Meeting was admirably conducted, and the performances of at least four students were worthy of recognition by their University.

Last year, the Indian team proved itself invincible in the Olympic Hockey games. An M. C. C. Eleven has already toured India, and it is possible that within the next fifteen years India will have entered upon regular series of "test" matches with England, Australia, S. Africa, and the West Indies. This year saw India represented for the first time in the British Open Golf Championship, and Indians have played frequently in the World's Lawn Tennis Championships. It would be a matter of pride to those who interest themselves in the Athletics of our Colleges, if in the near future one, A. B., "the old Calcutta 'Blue,' " were to be chosen as a representative of India in these and similar events of world-wide popularity. This is (not the only way, to be sure, but) one of the ways in which Calcutta University may be enabled to continue to command the respect of the world as a seat of *liberal* education,

ARTHUR MOWAT

"BHĀRHUT JĀTAKAS" IN A NEW LIGHT

The application of the term 'Jātaka' at the time of the erection of the 'Stupa of Bhārhut' did not involve any idea of predestination of a Bodhisatta to become a Buddha for, tracing the Bodhisatta idea from the 5th Century A.D. back to the time of the Pāli Nikāyas we find a gradual diminution of its scope until in the inscriptions of Bhārhut it totally disappears.

This is a very bold assertion calculated to undermine the theory, that the very word 'Jātaka' which has been found inscribed several times in the bas-reliefs of Bhārhut carries with it a meaning inseparable from the Bodhisatta who must be the hero of each story contained therein ; this being so, the theory requires very careful handling and investigation into all available facts.

To proceed from the known to the less known, we have to be very clear about our definition of Bodhisatta which underwent notable changes according to diverse modifications in the interpretation of Buddhism itself. Now, before discussing its origin and how it came to be first applied, it would not be unwise to state at the very outset that a Bodhisatta has generally been accepted as a being who in his desire to become a Buddha has had systematically to pass through different re-births fulfilling certain virtues in a progressive scale before attaining Buddhahood. In the case of the Buddha (*i.e.*, Gotama Buddha) his "Bodhisatta is invariably the hero of the 'Apaṇṇaka' and other Births in which during a long period [1] the Teacher and Leader, desirous of the salvation of mankind, fulfilled the vast conditions of Buddhahood."—(The Nidānakathā, Introduction to the Jātakas of 5th Century A.D.)

The number of such rebirths is by no means a fixed one and depends upon the degree of perfection attained by the

[1] "Cattāri ca asaṃkheyyāni kappāni ca satasahassāni."

aspirant in each rebirth being inversely proportional to the amount of exertion he puts forth during his evolution.

According to Pāli "Jātaka-Aṭṭhakathā" collected by Fausböll, the number of rebirths which Gotama Buddha passed through as Bodhisatta is 550. This being a round number the actual number of stories in the collection comes to only 547 of which again some are repetitions and must be regarded as separate birth-stories of Bodhisatta or 'Jātakas.'

Every story in this collection is associated with a Bodhisatta who necessarily becomes its hero either human or non-human but in the case of a story containing no hero the Bodhisatta is a tree-divinity to pronounce its moral. Though faulty, still the manner in which attempts were made to link these stories individually with a Bodhisatta excites one's sympathy with the author for his enthusiasm in establishing the Bodhisatta theory of 4th Century A.D. These stories which have been accepted as pre-Buddhistic, belonging to the stock of ancient Indian folklores, contain in their Jātaka forms of 4th Century A.D. a Bodhisatta each, which perhaps at that time constituted the only reason of their being put into a collection and thus saved from oblivion.

In the 'Milinda-Pañha' a work composed about the beginning of the Christian Era, the notion that Gotama Buddha had for 4 'asaṃkheyyas' and 100,000 (one hundred thousand) 'kalpas' passed through various existences fulfilling the conditions of Buddhahood before its attainment, was still strong. (Milinda, pp. 232, 287, Trenckner's Edition.) The name of the Buddha Anomadassi belonging to the list of 18 additional Buddhas appears in connection with the especial characteristics of Buddhas (Milinda, p. 216). This fact along with the mention of Vipassi and Kassapa Buddhas (p. 221, Milinda) makes it sure, that the theory of 24 previous Buddhas as advanced by the "Buddhavaṃsa" was known and accepted. We also find among others 22 birth-stories of the Bodhisatta but not called Jātakas (Milinda,

pp. 200-203), illustrating the fact that, in previous births the Buddha was simply an equal of Devadatta in respect of fame and rank even sometimes his inferior, though always devoted to good works while the other was addicted to wickedness only. That is to say, the stories from original 'Jātakas' were being utilised at this time for some specific reason, *viz.*, to bring into clear relief the contrasting features of Gotama and his opponent Devadatta in their previous births with a view to explaining the diametrically opposite tendencies of their present births crystallising out of their previous 'karma.'

Immediately after the narration of these 'Boddhisatta births, the author takes us to the subject-matter of a very important story about the chastity of 'Amarā Dəvi,' the queen of Mahosadha (Milinda, pp. 205-207) but does not hint at its being in the least connected with the Bodhisatta of Buddha Gotama, though the self-same story forms the central theme of a Jātaka of Bhārhut (Yavamajhakiya Jātaka on a pillar in the S. W. Quadrant). On the strength of the aforesaid evidences we may very well argue that at the time of 'Milinda' all the stories of the original Jātaka collection were not indiscriminately made use of to illustrate Bodhisatta births and that whenever they were utilised they were so done to illustrate a particular aspect of his career.

In the next place, as to the interpretation of a Jātaka of the 4th Century A.D., serving mainly to illustrate an existence of Bodhisatta, we must considerably modify our views in the light of evidence supplied by the 'Milinda.' In the 'Milinda' a Jātaka-Bhānaka who was an inhabitant of an ideal city, (p. 341) while reciting stories from Jātakas did not certainly narrate them with a view to illustrating the different careers of the Bodhisatta but did it simply to inculcate certain morals of Buddhism for the enlightenment of his audience. This will be made clear from quotations from the text explaining the characteristics and virtues possessed of which a 'bhikkhu'

became an 'Arahat.' (Milinda, p. 363.) The morals of the follo wing 'Jātakas' are quoted in illustration :—

1. Bhāsitaṃ p'etam mahārāja Bhagavatā devātidevena "*Vidhura Puṇṇa Jātake.*" (For moral, *vide* Milinda, p. 372.)[1]

2. Bhāsitaṃ p'etaṃ ... "*Sutasoma Jātake*"
(For moral, *vide* Milinda, p. 381.)

3. Bhāsitaṃ p'etaṃ ... "*Kanha Jātake*"
(For moral, *vide* Milinda, p. 384.)

4. Bhāsitaṃ p'etaṃ ... "*Cakkavā Jātake*"
(For moral, *vide* Milinda, p. 402.)

5. Bhāsitaṃ p'etaṃ ... "*Cullanārada Jātake*"
(Milinda, p. 403).

6. Bhāsitaṃ p'etaṃ ... "*Bhallāṭiya Jātake*"
dvinnam kinnarānaṃ (Milinda, p. 406).

Not in any one of the verses given in the text under each of the above 'Jātakas' which are quoted by name, the career of the Bodhisatta is even indirectly hinted at, they on the other hand in their versified form corroborate the statement, that the Jātaka stories originally existed in verses. (Dr. Rhys Davids, Introduction to Buddhist Birth Stories, p. 70-lxx). These verses as preserved in our Ceylonese Collection seldom refer to any Bodhisatta but, as a rule, only give the substance of the 'Atitavatthu' that is, the story proper and its moral in each case[2] and thus might have quite reasonably served in the time of Milinda mainly as incentives to good deeds to be practised by all, (aṅgāni gahetabbāni, p. 380).

In the 'Milinda,' the definition of a Bodhisatta seems also to be confounding. In the statement, that all the Bodhisattas must, as a rule, give away in charity their sons and daughters (Sabbe'pi mahārāja Bodhisattā puttadāraṃ dinnaṃti"—

[1] It should be noted that the Jātaka title of 'Milinda' is more in agreement with that of 'Bhārhut' containing two characters and less so with the corresponding Jātaka title of the collection retaining only one. (Fausböll, No. 545 entitled Vidhura Paṇḍita J.)

[2] The verses from "kukuta Jātaka," No. 383 of Fausböll's collection, will very appropriately illustrate our point.

'Milinda,' p. 274) we are confronted with the question whether by 'Bodhisatta' is meant only human Bodhisattas of exalted characters fulfilling the 'pāramitas' (special conditions of Buddhahood),—a view, which if accepted, would considerably diminish the scope of the term as compared with that of the Jātaka Bodhisatta where it means the hero of any and every story in the collection.

In 'Milinda,' Bodhisattas are also shown the path to the attainment of the 10 attributes possessed by the Buddhas, *viz.*, (1) agedhatā—absence of greediness, (2) nirālayatā—homelessness, (3) cāgo—sacrifice, (4) pahānaṃ—renunciation, (5) apunarāvattitā—non-return to worldly life, (6) Sukhumatā—subtleness, (7) mahantatā—vastness, (8) duranubodhatā—abstruseness, (9) dullabhatā—rareness and (10) asadisatā—matchlessness. It is unnecessary to add that 'tiracchāna' or non-human Bodhisattas cannot be contemplated under the category of Bodhisattas here. (Milinda, p. 276.) We shall not also be surprised if we find, as we proceed on to earlier stages, the number of non-human Bodhisattas becoming less and less and human Bodhisattas surpassing in skill and virtue those of later times. It may also be noted that the story of Vessantara Bodhisatta in the 'Milinda' is not given the epithet 'Jātaka' (p. 274).

The works entitled 'Cariyapiṭaka' and 'Buddhavaṃsa' perhaps mark the next earlier stage of Pali literature. Both are several times referred to indirectly in the Milinda specially the 'Cariya-piṭaka,' which is mentioned by name in connection with the account of Vessantara Bodhisatta.

These two works are important landmarks in the whole history of Buddhism in that they clearly indicate a stage of its development when a notable departure was made from the original Doctrine by launching the new theory of 'pāramitās' in the former with the addition of 18 Buddhas in the latter, to wit,—Dipaṃkara, Kondanna, Maṅgala, Sumana, Revata, Sobhita, Anomadassi, Paduma, Nārada, Padumattara, Sumedha,

Sujāta, Piyadassi, Atthadassi, Dhammadassi, Siddhattha, Tissa and Phussa—to the already existing and recognised six premier Buddhas of the Nikāyas, *viz.*, Vipassi, Sikhi, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Konāgamana and Kassapa. This theory of 'pāramitā' and that of the 18 Buddhas referred to above were unknown to the Nikāyas (excepting, of course, a few later works of the Khuddaka Nikāya) so far available.

The theory of 'Pāramitās' lays down that a being, of course a male, has to attain perfection in all the 'pāramitā' virtues which are essentially 10, *viz.*, (1) Dāna, (2) Sila, (3) Nekkhamma, (4) Sacca, (5) Paññā, (6) Viriya, (7) Khanti, (8) Adhiṭṭhāna, (9) Mettā and (10) Upekhā but subdivided into 30 as each of the 10 above, in its turn, becomes reducible to 3 of higher, ordinary and lower degrees, before he can attain Buddhahood and deliver mankind from suffering. And this necessitates his passing through various existences as a Bodhisatta (*i.e.*, a would-be Buddha) attaining and gaining perfection in successive re-births until he reaches Buddhahood.

> "Kappe ca satasahasse caturo ca asaṇkheyye
> ettha antare yaṃ caritaṃ sabbaṃ taṃ bodhipācanaṃ"
> "*Cariyapiṭaka.*"

The 'Cariyapiṭaka' has devoted 10 'cariya' existences or birth-stories of the Boddhisatta of Gotama Buddha to 'Dānapārami,' 10 to Silapārami, 6 to Nekkhammapārami, 6 to Sacca, 2 to Mettā and 1 to Upekhā, while the rest of the 'pāramis,' *viz.*, Paññā, Viriya, Khanti and Adhiṭṭhāna have unfortunately gone without any illustration. It is evident from the nature of the work that the author had originally an idea of devoting 10 existences or birth-stories available from the Jātaka collection to each of the 10 "pāramitās" and complete his work with 100 pāramitā stories of the Bodhisatta; but why he failed is not very easy to say now. One thing is however certain, that the author exclusively depended for his materials upon

the versified Jātaka-tales which he not seldom quotes verbatim. Verses from "kaṇhādipāyana Jātaka," No. 444 of the collection, are reproduced word for word in the verses under the corresponding 'cariya-story' illustrating Saccapārami; verses from Jātaka No. 35 entitled Vaṭṭa Jātaka occur word for word in Vaṭṭapotaka cariyam of Saccapārami, likewise verses of Maccha Jātaka No. 75 are also found incorporated in the Cariyapiṭaka under the cariya of Macchārajā and so on. He was chiefly concerned in bringing out the moral elements of the Bodhisatta and consequently left out of view the humour, fun and even moral of the older stories. A comparison of the 'Vānarinda Jātaka with the 'Kapirājacariyaṃ' of the 'Cariyapiṭaka' will fully bear out our remark. The story of "Saccasvhaya paṇḍita" of Saccapārami, consisting only of a single verse, omits all the details of the older story so that we have the bare statement that the Buddha in a former birth by his truth preserved the world. "This brevity," observes Rev. Dr. Morris, M.A., LL.D., the editor of the works, "makes it somewhat difficult to harmonise the two versions of these old birth-stories." This observation is perfectly correct in view of the fact that, in the absence of a common purpose in these two versions there can hardly be any harmonisation. And, it being highly improbable that the Bodhisatta should appear in two different colours at once in one and the same story of these versions, it necessarily follows that, the much older Jātaka-tales supplied morals from Buddhism and were generally incentives to good deeds to be practised by mankind whereas these cariya-stories which were selected out of them were newly formulated and improved upon their originals with a view to illustrate the practice of virtue (pāramitās) by the Bodhisatta and being thus made to order necessarily differed from the original a good deal in form and ideal barring all chances of harmonisation.

The 'Buddhavaṃsa' is also conspicuous in that it advances for the first time in Pāli the theory, that Gotama Buddha

is the resultant of Brāhman Sumedha, who on account of his devotion and attachment to Dipaṃkara Buddha, the earliest of the 24 Buddhas previous to Gotama, had his prayer granted to become a Buddha, in consequence of which he had to pass through innumerable existences though denoted by the number 550 irrespective of species for a period of 4 'asaṃkheyyas' and one hundred thousand kalpas in fulfilment of the 'pāramitās' before attaining Buddhahood. The work gives only an account of 24 existences each of which was devoted to the services of each Buddha of the list.

Thus, the Bodhisatta idea in its technical sense originating in the 'Buddhavaṃsa' necessarily involves three conditions without which it cannot stand. These are: (1) the beginning of the Bodhisatta period from the birth of Sumedha Brāhman, (2) the duration of the period and (3) its place in relation to 24 previous Buddhas. Without the 24 Buddhas previous to Gotama which are a necessary adjunct to the Bodhisātta theory, a Bodhisatta in its technical sense cannot be conceived. He must have his place among the 24 Buddhas in the process of Buddhahood which otherwise is impossible of attainment. The birth as a Bodhisatta cannot therefore be regarded as independent or voluntary as an incarnation (Matsya or Bhāgavat Purāṇa) but as a birth on compulsion. It is also a significant feature of Bodhisattaism as gathered from the available data at our disposal, that there was a marked tendency towards the inclusion of more and more animal elements from the Jātaka-tales for the illustration of the career of the Bodhisātta as time went from Buddhavaṃsa onwards. In the Buddhavaṃsa the percentage is 4%, in the Cariyapitaka it is 33%, in the 'Milinda' about 50% and in the Jātaka Commentary every animal hero of a story is the Bodhisatta.

Therefore, it certainly took a considerably long time after the 'Milinda' for such ordinary jātakas of Bhārhut as Biḍala, Kukuṭa, Secha, Uda, Laṭuva, Kinara, etc., with the title 'Jātaka' attached to them, to have been recognised as the

previous birth-stories of the Buddha in the Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā of the 5th Century A.D. in Ceylon.

The next earlier stage in the literature of the Pāli canon is that of the Nikāyas and the Vinaya which throw, as a rule, a quite distinct light on the Bodhisatta implying only the person of the Gotama Buddha so long as he did not attain Bodhi. And therefore, with the Bodhisatta are connected such incidents of his life as took place before his enlightenment, attaining which he was recognised as Tathāgata or Buddha or Bhagavā—the terms which are synonymous and have never been used in connection with any event prior to Buddhahood.

(1) *Digha Nikāya.*—P. T. S., Vol. II, pp. 12-15. "Dhammatā esa bhikkhave, yadā Bodhisatto Tusitakāyā cavitvā, etc." Mahāpadāna Suttanta ; " Mahāparinibbāna " Suttanta p. 108.

(2) *Saṃyutta Nikāya.*—"Nidāna Saṃyutta," XII, P.T.S., Part II, p. 10.

(3) *Aṅguttara Nikāya.*—Catukka Nipāta, " Cattāro acchariya abhuta dhammā." P.T.S., Part II, p. 130.

(4) *Khuddaka Nikāya.*— ' Suttanipāta, ' Nālakasuttaṃ,'

" So Bodhisatto ratanavaro atulyo
manussaloke hitasukhāya jāto
Sakyānaṃ gāme janapade lumbineyye
tenmha tuṭṭha atiriva kalyarupā."

' Bodhisatta ' is invariably used in contradistinction to the Buddha-state in the life of one and the same person. And the most significant feature in the early Nikāyas about the absence of the technical Bodhisatta as applied to his anterior births in post-Buddhavaṃsa literature, lies in the recognition of these births as great kings or sages without the denomination of Bodhisatta or the implication that these births formed some links in the chain of Bodhisatta evolution. Such is at least the case with the Mahā-Govinda and Mahā-Sudassana Suttanta. In the conclusion of the former, the Buddha simply says, " Sarāmi' ahaṃ Pancasikha, ahaṃ tena samayena Mahā-Govinda-brāhmano ahosiṃ, etc.,"

and in the latter "Na kho pana Ānanda evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ aññο nuna tena samayena rājā Mahā Sudassano ahaṃ tena samayena rājā, ahosiṃ" without the least implication of the Bodhisatta idea which is conspicuous by its absence. Neither are we to be taken aback for the statement put into the mouth of the Buddha that there were various births (never as animals) which he remembered having assumed in the past by means of 'pubbenivāsānussatiñānaṃ'. The following passage from the Majjhima Nikāya (Mahā Sīhanāda Suttaṃ 12.) :—

"Amutrāsim evaṃnāmo evaṃgotto evaṃvaṇṇo evamāhāro evaṃsukhadukkhapatisaṃvedi evamāyupriyanto tato cuto amutra udapādim, etc.,"

cannot be applied to the animal births of the Jātakas.

Moreover, the identical passage, being also used in connection with an ordinary Bhikkhu, seems to be very vague in its import and apart from its usefulness as an illustration of knowing one's rebirths by the faculty of 'Pubbenivāsānusatiñānaṃ' in a general way, it can hardly be taken to refer to any law regulating the anterior births of the Buddha (Aṅguttara Nikāya, Tika Nipāta, § 58, para. 3).

These births are generally to be looked upon as disconnected and independent births required for the guidance and salvation of many, assumed according to the needs of the time and conforming more to the theory of incarnation than to Buddhalogy or Bodhisatta-ism as expressed in the following passage :—

"Pure purattha purimāsu jātisu,
Manussa-bhūto bahunnaṃ sukhāvaho
Ubbega-uttāsa-bhayāpanudano
Guttisu rakkhāvaranesu ussuko."

'*Digha Nikāya, Lakkhaṇa-Suttanta.*' [1]

And further, not only is the Bodhisatta in its technical sense absent in the Nikāyas but there is on the contrary, a particular doctrine called Dhammādāsa explained by the Buddha in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta, by means of which a true

[1] *c.f.* 'Paritrāṇāya sādhūnāṃ vināçāya ca duṣkṛtāṃ
dharmasaṃsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yuge yuge.'
—Bhagavat Gītā, Ch, IV, No. 8.

lay-disciple (ariyasavaka) having faith in the Buddha, could easily locate his own fate as well as the fates of others after death. This doctrine very clearly points out, among others, that there can be no animal birth for such a disciple and that he is not likely to be reborn for the eighth time. (Digha Nikāya, Vol. II, P.T.S., pp. 93, 94.—"Khinatiracchāna yoniyo," etc.; 'na te bhavaṃ aṭṭhamaṃ ādīyanti'-Ratanasuttaṃ, Sutta-nipāta ; Aṇguttara Nikāya, Vol. I, Ānanda vagga, section 75, p. 222, Tika Nipāta). Therefore, this doctrine makes it highly improbable that the Brāhman Sumedha in the time of earlier Nikāya literature should have undergone as Bodhisatta so many animal and other inferior births of the Jātaka tales in return for his services and deep attachment to his master Buddha Dipaṃkara. And the most convincing proof regarding the absence of the Bodhisatta idea of Buddhavaṃsa from this literature is afforded by its recognition of only 6 previous Buddhas in lieu of 24 mentioned in the former, a conception of later times without which the arising of technical Bodhisatta was not possible. Hence, the technical Bodhisatta being no longer to be found in the literature of the period, the identification of the main actor of a Jātaka tale with the Bodhisatta (for such a collection did exist at the time as it is referred to in the Vinaya Piṭaka and admitted by all the schools to have been one of the earliest divisions of the Buddhist canon) is wrong and misleading.

The 'Vinaya Piṭaka' goes even further. Not content with mentioning the 'Jātakas' as one of the earliest subdivisions of the doctrine of Gotama Buddha, it asserts that the 'Jātaka' also formed a part of the doctrine of each of the six Buddhas, *viz.*, (1) Vipassi, (2) Sikhi, (3) Vessabhu, (4) Kakusandha (5) Konāgamana and (6) Kassapa, who preceded him (Vinaya, Sutta Vibhaṅga, Part I, pp. 8 and 9) and thus practically dismisses the idea of associating only with the Bodhisatta of Gotama Buddha the 'jātaka' sculptures of Bhārhut where also are to be found the six other Buddhas referred to above, represented

with great prominence. The Bodhisattas, if at all, may as well be of these six Buddhas and not of Gotama Buddha alone. The fact is, however, that such Bodhisatta theory was altogether unknown in connection with the above six Buddhas previous to Gotama and as such it should be totally rejected from the Stupa of Bhārhut.

The following 'Jātakas' have been traced in the Vinaya and the Nikāyas existing as stories illustrating only morals from Buddhism without referring to the Bodhisatta or any independent previous birth of the Buddha :—

1.	Jātaka No. 1,	"Apaṇṇaka J."	belonging to	'Pāyāsi Suttanta of D. Nikāya.
2.	,, ,, 10	"Sukhavihāri J."	,, ,,	"Cullavagga," p. 183 of Vinaya.
3.	,, ,, 37	"Tittira J."	,, ,,	,, p. 161 ,,
4.	,, ,, 91	"Litta J."	,, ,,	"Pāyāsi Suttanta" of D. Nikāya.
5.	,, ,, 253	"Manikaṇṭha J."	,, ,,	"Pārājika," Vol III, p. 145 of Vinaya P.
6.	,, ,, 371	"Kosala J."	,, ,,	"Mahāvagga," p. 342 of Vinaya P.

These by no means exhausting the list others may be found as well.

The Bhārhut labels with their literature in broken Pāli and therefore pointing to a still earlier date, in this respect open up a fresh avenue of enquiry landing us on to the region of "Bhāgavatism" by associating with Bhagavā even the scenes from the unenlightened period of the Buddha's life which the earliest of Pāli canonical works have failed to do. Two of these scenes are only available at present, *viz.* :—

1. Bhagavato ūkranti (A Pillar in N.E. Quadrant).
2. Bhagavato Culamaho (A Western Gate corner pillar)

The very term 'ūkranti' is non-Pāli and probably means the descent of an 'Avatāra' or an incarnation of Bhagavān. (Pāli, okkanti, Skt. avakrānti *i.e.* u in Bhārhutequals o in Pāli).

In the earliest Canonical works belonging both to Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna schools these scenes are associated with the Bodhisatta, meaning of course the unenlightened person of the Buddha, and never with Bhagavā or Buddha or Tathāgata.

The usual custom of designating the Buddha as Bhagavā after his enlightenment has been particularly observed here along with the recognition of the six previous Buddhas also as Bhagavās in the following scenes :—

Examples of Bhagavān Sākyamuni :—

(1) Bhagavato Sakamunino Bodho
(2) Bhagavato Dhamacakaṃ.
(3) Ajātasata Bhagavato Vaṃdate.
(4) Erapato Nāgarāja Bhagavato Vaṃdate.
(5) Bahuhathika āsanaṃ Bhagavato Mahādevasa.

Of the six previous Buddhas :—

(1) Bhagavato Vipasino Bodhi
(2) Bhagavato Sikhino Bodhi (though this pillar is lost still it can be located).
(3) Bhagavato Vesabhuno Bodhi Sālo.
(4) Bhagavato kakusadhasa Bodhi.
(5) Bhagavato konāgamenasa Bodhi, and
(6) Bhagavato Kasapasa Bodhi.

Thus the Bhārhut sculpture has definitely testified to its ignorance of even the personal Bodhisatta which originated with the Nikāyas and developed into technical Bodhisatta after the "Buddhavaṁsa" and the "Cariyapitaka."

This proves the gradual diminution of the scope of the term Bodhisatta in tracing the idea from the time of the Jātaka—Aṭṭhakathās of the 5th Century A.D. back to the time of the Pāli Nikāyas and then to the Bhārhut Stupa where it ceases to be altogether.

The above conclusion which is reached by external evidence alone can also be obtained by internal quite independently and can be briefly stated thus.

The peculiar religious belief underlying the Jātaka collection of the 5th Century A.D. as expressed in the eagerness to associate each Jātaka with a Bodhisatta of the Buddha is conspicuously absent in the labels of Bhārhut. If the title 'Jātaka' of Bhārhut necessarily implied the predestination of a Bodhisatta to have acquired its religious importance and special significance, which it certainly did in the 5th Century A.D. on account of its association with the Bodhisatta, then, does it not stand to reason that it must be found as a rule attached to all the labels on bas-reliefs dwelling on the birth-stories of the Bodhisatta? Or in other words, if the title 'Jātaka' carried with it the inherent idea of a Bodhisatta and was regarded sacred on that account, then a jātaka-story upon a sacred 'stupa' must also be found, as a rule, to possess this very title. If, without the Bodhisatta who is its keynote no Jātaka can be accepted, then, without the title 'Jātaka' no Bodhisatta can be accepted by implication. Under this scheme the Bhārhut Jātaka-bas-reliefs group themselves into three well defined categories which are—

(*a*) Those that contain the title 'Jātaka.'

(*b*) Those that contain only the names of principal characters in the story but not the title Jātaka.

(*c*) Those that neither have the names of characters nor the title 'Jātaka.'.

Under the category (*a*), the following bas-reliefs may be placed :—(1) Vitura Punakiya Jātaka.

(2) Mugapakaya Jātaka.

(3) Sujāta Gahuta Jātaka.

(4) Biḍala Jātaka Kukuta Jātaka.

(5) Secha Jātaka

(6) Bhisaharaniya Jātaka

(7) Isisingiya Jātaka, etc.

The following may be cited under (*b*) :—

(1) Usukāro Janako rājā Sivali devi

(2) Citupāda Sila.

(3) Digha tapasi sise anusasati.

(4) Miga samadakam cetaya.

(5) Dusito giri dadati na.

(6) Dadnikamo cakamo.

(7) Asadā vadhu susāne sigāla ñati, etc.

The subject-matter of the following 'bas-reliefs' may be brought under (*c*) :—

(1) The story of Kuraṅga Miga Jātaka.

(2) Do. Mahākapi Jātaka, on the 8th pillar in the S. E. Quadrant.

(3) The story of Camma Sātaka Jātaka, and

(4) The story of Āramadusaka Jātaka found on the copings.

The bas-reliefs of (*b*) and (*c*) omitting the title 'Jātaka' leave no doubt as to the absence of the Bodhisatta idea in them as the title Jātaka must have been the only vehicle of this idea if it existed at all at the time in question.

There can only be some misgivings as to whether or not some Bodhisatta was implied by the bas-reliefs under category (*a*) containing the word 'Jātaka.' But a careful examination of these titles convincingly leads us to the conclusion that the word 'Jātaka' in them signifies nothing more nor less than what is commonly denoted by the term 'story.'

In the first place, a comparison of the nomenclature followed in the Bhārhut and the Jātaka collection proves beyond doubt that there is not the least agreement between them and to call some of the titles identical is a misnomer. We give below a few observations on their difference.

(*a*) In the Jātaka collection the title 'Jātaka' seems to have been applied to the main actor, *i.e.*, the Bodhisatta of the

story in contradistinction to its application to more than one character in the Bhārhut labels proving its use in the sense of a story. Examples :—

Jātaka titles in the collection.	Jātaka titles in the Bhārhut.
Vidhura Paṇḍita Jātaka	Vitura Punakiya J.
Sujāta Jātaka	Sujāta gahuta J.
Kukuṭa Jātaka	Biḍala J., Kukuṭa J., etc.

(*b*) Under the notion of Bodhisatta the title Jātaka in the Jātaka collection is invariably joined to the word denoting main actor or action undergoing no modification and itself is subordinated to it, but in the Bhārhut Jātaka (in its story sense) it remains unaltered and prominent while the main word being subordinated to it is used adjectively thus proving, in the former, that the personality is the main concern and, in the latter, the moral or the story is the central idea. Examples :—

Makhādeva Jātaka	Makhādeviya J.
Chaddanta ,,	Chadantiya J.
Mugapakka or better Temiya Jātaka.	Mugapakaya J.
Bhisaharaṇa Jātaka	Bhisaharaniya J., etc.

(*c*) Where the application of the word 'Jātaka' to the main actor was found impossible owing to the prevalence of the accepted nomenclature a change seems to have been effected by altering the title of the story from the general to the particular :—

Dubbhiya Makkata Jātaka from Secha Jātaka.
Andhabhuta Jātaka ,, Yam Bamano Avāyesi Jātaka.
Mahā Ummagga Jātaka ,, Yavamajhakiya J.
Dabba puppha ,, Uda Jātaka.

(*d*) So much was the need felt for a change of the current notion of Jātaka in its story sense, that it was found justifiable

to alter a title of the original even if it was already favourable to the acceptance of the Bodhisatta theory :—

Nacca Jātaka from Haṃsa Jātaka and
Kakkaṭaka Jātaka from Nāga Jātaka.

The percentage of such titles is of course very small.

(*e*) A total change of original nomenclature in favour of the Bodhisatta is evident in the Mugapakka Jātaka of the collection being better designated as Temiya Jātaka after the corresponding Temiya caritaṃ of the Cariyapitaka, which shows the influence of the Bodhisatta idea as advanced by the work on the nomenclature of later Jātaka stories.

The inferences which can be drawn from these data are the following :—

(1) The word Jātaka when used originally meant a story illustrating some moral with special reference to Buddhism.

(2) The nomenclature of these Jātakas was variable and not fixed.

(3) Due to different interpretations of Bodhisatta-ism, the Jātaka nomenclature underwent such modification in a particular school as suited best its own views.

The last point will be better understood in the light of the following evidence.

With the Mahāyāna Buddhists among whom the ' Avadāna ' collections serve to illustrate the careers of the Bodhisatta, Kunalavadāna was taken to be the birth-story not of the Bodhisatta of Gotama, but of the Bodhisatta of a future Buddha.

In Tibetan, the very first Jātaka equates its Bodhisatta not with the Bodhisatta of Gotama but with a Lama who necessarily becomes the Bodhisatta of a future Buddha. (S. C. Dass, Translation of Tibetan Jātakas.)

'Mahāvastu' mentions among others the following Jātakas (Page 244, Buddhists Birth-stories—Dr. Rhys Davids):—

(1) Uruvilva kāsyapādikādāsyapānam Jātakam.
(2) Ajñāta kaundinna J.
(3) Bhadravargikānam J.
(4) Purnasya maitrāyani putrasya J.
(5) Jasodharāye hārapradāna J.

The last of these titles seems to indicate that the word 'jātaka' originally implied a story and not a birth-story of the Bodhisatta, while as regards the others referring as they do to the immediate disciples of Buddha Gotama, they cannot ordinarily be associated with the Bodhisatta of that very personality.

Whatever signification they might have received later on from tradition surcharged with the developed Bodhisatta theories, they could not under those very titles refer to him originally.

The Pali Jātaka-stories of the collection, one and all refer under a different nomenclature to the Bodhisatta of Gotama Buddha only. There is thus a discrepancy not only as to nomenclature but with regard to that which is generally held to be the principal feature of the Jātaka tale and which is its identification varying according to different schools.

Conclusion.

The Jātakas of 'Bharhut,' therefore, have to be taken in their ordinary sense meaning stories or fables told by the Master in illustration of his Doctrine and not in the special sense in which the Buddhists used them in later times implying birth-stories of the Bodhisatta before he became the Buddha.

The fact that the great Buddha, whom to represent in human form was considered impious in the sculpture and who was accorded worship bordering on divine worship, should have been represented by either a human or an animal form, be it in a previous birth, was an impossibility. To accept that the donors who came to revere and worship the sacred memory

of their Master in a fitting manner should have thought it proper to connect his holy person with some being, human or animal, in a former birth before his own person could be represented in human form, is beyond all common sense. The truth is that, the four kinds of devotees, *viz.*, Bhikkhu, Bhikkhuni, Upāsaka and Upāsikā, who came to pour forth their heart's tribute by gifts of pillars and rail-bars or copings had but one end in view, *i.e.*, to worship the Master and perpetuate his Doctrine. Their love and esteem for him had not yet given them an opportunity of thinking how he came to attain Buddhahood or what constituted the process of becoming a Buddha. 'Yo mayā dhammo ca vinayo desito so vo mam' accayena satthā.' "The Doctrine and Discipline which I have taught shall be your Teacher when I am gone," with these words the Buddha admonished his disciples when bidding them farewell for the last time before his final departure. Surely, while worshipping the Master, the devotees of Bhārhut could not afford to ignore his saintly teachings. They, therefore, undertook to put down in pictorial forms on the railings, like Emperor Asoka doing in words on his edicts, giving some the title Jātaka, some simply the name of the place or of the actors and some no title at all, the eternal and evergreen Doctrine of their Master, to be followed and revered by all mankind.

GOKULDAS DE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHELLEY

According to Brailsford "the history of the French Revolution in England begins with a sermon and ends with a poem." In other words it begins with Dr. Richard Price's famous sermon delivered after the fall of the Bastille on the 14th of July, 1789, and ends with the publication of Shelley's *Hellas* in 1822.[1]

The sermon was delivered to the Revolution Society of England—a dissenter's club which celebrated on 4th November [2] the English Revolution of 1688 and which received some recognition from the French National Assembly, on the 27th August, 1789, the French issued their Declaration of the Rights of Man. This is intimately connected with Rousseau's well-known idea of the sovereignty of the people, the central theme of his Social Contract (1760). In England the sovereignty of the people meant after 1688 something more than a blow to the royal claims of absolute supremacy in the State, for in the struggle for supreme authority between the Church and the State in the reign of William the real question at issue was this question of the ultimate seat of that sovereignty. The oath of allegiance created a schism in the church and accentuated the controversial aspect of this political problem. The Non-juring schism virtually revived the old political Divine Right controversy only in a disguised and somewhat new form.

This idea of the sovereignty of the people was elaborated by Thomas Paine in his logically written pamphlet called the

[1] Writing to Godwin on 10th January, 1812, Shelley says, "I am writing 'An inquiry into the causes of the failure of the French Revolution to benefit mankind.' This is preceded by "The Sublimest interest of Poetry, lofty and exalted achievements, the proselytism of the world, the equalization of its inhabitants, were to me (while at Oxford) the soul of my soul."

[2] *Cf.* Paine's "Rights of Man," Part I (Page 10) of Everyman's Library edition).

Rights[1] of Man principally meant to be an answer to Burke's Reflections on the Revolutions in France (1790) which, as we know, was that great Conservative Whig political philosopher's remarkable reply to Dr. Price's sermon preached at the Old Jewry to his Non-conformist Radicals, holding out to mankind the hope of human perfection by a reconstruction of all existing human institutions and a regeneration of the very nature of man. Shelley practically based his political philosophy on such a scheme. In effect this was the realisation of the ideal of man's perfectibility[2] as enunciated by one of the members of the (French) *Club de l'Entresol* (a connecting link between the upper and the lower strata of society), Abbéde Saint-Pierre. Godwin accepted the idea of perfectibility in a modified way basing it upon his theory of the human mind. In his *Political Justice*[3] he attempts an analysis of the human mind and rejecting as absurd the doctrine of innate principles ascribes man's character to the influence of opinions which, in their turn, depend, he holds, on external circumstances. Godwin definitely states that though man is perfectible "it is not meant that he is capable of being brought to perfection," whereas Shelley often presents to us in his poetry pictures of human perfection in his grand idealistic vision of the millennium. Greater importance is attached by Shelley to passion than to reason in effecting man's perfection and herein too Shelley does not slavishly follow Godwin. To what extent perfectibility became associated with Godwin is

[1] First edition of 1791 dedicated to George Washington and the Second Part of 1792 dedicated to M. de La Fayette.

[2] *Cf. Political Justice*, Book I, Chapters IV, V and VII (especially page 93 of Vol. I). Condorcet's philosophical fame is chiefly associated with his "Sketch for an Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind" of which the fundamental idea is that of human perfectibility according to which in the 9th stage of human progress from the stage of barbarian intellectual advance ended with the political and moral Revolution of 1789, made illustrious by Newton's discoveries, those regarding human nature by Locke and Condillac and of Society by Torgot, Price and Rousseau. [Encyclopædia Britannica.]

[3] *Cf. Revolt of Islam*, V. LII.

clear from the slightly bantering tone of Keats in referring to Dilke as a "Godwin-perfectibility" man in his letter of 29th October, 1818, to his brother George in America. Passion for perfection is the keynote to Shelley's poetry of revolt and he was never a rebel merely for rebellion's sake.

Writing to Hogg Shelley says, "if you clear up some doubts which remain, dissipate some hopes relative to the perfectibility of man, generally considered as well as individually, I will willingly submit to the system, which at present I cannot but strongly reprobate."[1] To Miss Hitchener he writes—"You say that equality is unattainable; so will I observe, is perfection; yet they both symbolize in their nature, they both demand, that an unremitting tendency towards themselves should be made; and the nearer society approaches towards this point the happier will it be."[2] In another letter (of August 10, 1811) to her we have, "Intellectual equality could never be obviated until moral perfection be attained: then all distinctions would be levelled." Once more writing to her on October 26 of the same year Shelley says—"Every error conquered, every mind enlightened, is so much added to the progression of human perfectibility." Even the immature poem, *Queen Mab*, contains the line—"Every heart contains perfection's germ" (Section V, l. 146). Here[3] the young poet tells us that though man as he is may be degraded, yet selfishness is destined to decay and then will "spring all virtue, all delight, all love," and "a brighter morn awaits the human day." The passionate reformer-poet next holds up before us a captivating vision of

> "How sweet a scene will earth become!
> Of purest spirits, a pure dwelling place.

[1] Letter to Hogg of January 11, 1811.

[2] Letter to Elizabeth Hitchener of July 25, 1811.

[3] *Queen Mab*, Section VIII, presents a contrast between man as he was in the past and man as he will be as the result of the mighty change that will regulate the world. Shelley sees a vision of a new golden age in this future of man when man will stand "an equal amidst equals" even with the birds and beasts. The last dozen lines of this section briefly describe this state of perfection.

Symphonious with the planetary spheres ;
When man, with changeless nature coalescing,
Will undertake regeneration's work."[1]

Then will the happy earth become the reality of heaven

" Where care and sorrow, impotence and crime,
Langour, disease and ignorance dare not come."

Addressing this happy Earth Shelley says—

" Genius has seen thee in her passionate dreams ;
And dim forebodings of thy loveliness,
Haunting the human heart, have there entwined
Those rooted hopes of some sweet place of bliss,
Where friends and lovers meet to part no more."

* * *

" Thus human things were perfected, and earth.
Even as a child beneath its mother's love,
Was strengthened in all excellence, and grew
Farer and nobler with each passing year."

Finally there is the exhortation :

" Yet, human Spirit! bravely hold thy course,
Let virtue teach thee firmly to pursue
The gradual paths of an aspiring change :
For birth and life and death, and that strange state
Before the naked soul has found its home,
All tend to perfect happiness." * * * *

(*Queen Mab*, Section IX.)

Mention has been made of the influence of Dr. Price[2] on Shelley. Dr. Price was a rationalist and a philanthropist, powerfully influenced by the new rationalistic and critical spirit with

[1] *Queen Mab*, VI.
[2] *The Calcutta Review*, February, 1929, p. 226.

which France was inoculated by Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* (1721), Voltaire's merciless [1] hostility to the two establishments, the church and the state, embodied in his *Letters on the English* (1734), Rousseau's *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* [2] (1753), Morelli's *Code of Nature* (one of the earliest works on socialism) and, finally, Mercier de la Riviere's *Natural and Essential Order of Political Studies* (1767) which promulgated the doctrines of the new school of French Economists, called the Physiocrats, who largely shaped the ideas of Turgot, the Finance Minister of Louis XVI (1774-1776).

"Intellectualism in various attractive or oracular forms, made popular by writers like Paine and Godwin, next (*i.e.*, after 1810) seized upon Shelley's mind" and his spirit "became passionately fond of the fearless, triumphant, if rather cold and dry solutions of all problems of matter and mind, of state and individual, which made up the doctrines of the age of Enlightenment—"Aufklärung." [3] The foundation for this intellectualism in Shelley was laid by the writings of Locke and Hume and the superstructure was the work of some of the Encyclopædists and of Price, Priestley, Paine and Godwin. Shelley's enthusiasm for infinite perfectibility of mankind, his belief that amelioration of human affairs depends chiefly on abolition of the domination of kings and priests, his demand for liberty of conscience and the right to resist authority whenever it is abused, his ideas about moral purity being an absolute need in zealous patriots, education alone being sufficient to make men free and happy, ignorance being the parent of bigotry, persecution and slavery, and love of mankind having for its aim the spread of

[1] Shelley too always directed his vigorous attacks against what he called "despotism and superstition" which are inseparably connected together in his mind, under various names such as "faith and slavery," "faith and empires," "bigot's creed and tyrant's rod" and "tyranny and falsehood." *Cf. Queen Mab*, V. 19, VI. 61-63, VIII. 185-86, IX. 106, 126-27 and 191.

[2] *Cf.* Godwin's *Political Justice*, Book I, Ch. IV (Foot-note), and Shelley's Notes on Section V of "Queen Mab."

[3] Introduction to the Poetical Works of Percy B. Shelley by A. H. Koszul (1907).

truth, virtue and liberty, his vigorous attack on the National Debt and plan for provision for the old age of the poor—may be traced to this influence of Price on him. Most of these are, no doubt, found in Godwin's *Political Justice*, but Godwin too made use of a number of ideas on which Price was the first in England to lay great stress in his writings and sermons, though Price cannot claim to have given to his scattered thoughts and ideas the force and glory of first principles resulting from a philosophical discussion of their origin and foundations That honour was reserved for Godwin. Shelley began to be influenced by Godwin's philosophical discussions even so early as his Eton days and the extent of Godwin's influence was very great as Shelleys' letters too abundantly testify.[1] Still it seems to us that some writers on Shelley have a tendency to overstate it. The impression produced by such exaggeration not only deprives Shelley of all originality of thought but reduces him to a mere echo of Godwin's less passionate voice. It is difficult, for instance, to accept without modification critical verdicts like this :—"It would be no exaggeration to say that Godwin formed Shelleys' mind, and that *Prometheus Unbound* and *Hellas* were the greatest of Godwin's work," or, "If close personal intercourse brought some disillusionment (in Shelley) regarding Godwin's private character, it only *deepened* his intellectual influence, and confirmed Shelley's *life-long* adhesion to his system"[2] (Italics mine). We have noted[3] that many more men and systems of thought have gone to the forming of Shelley's mind, which, again, was constantly growing from stage to stage, than Godwin and his system and shall try to show that Shelley's adherence to the Godwinian philosophy was surely not life-long. Readers of Shelley's poetry distinctly discern how that influence begins to wane and tends to slowly

[1] *Cf.* (specially) Letters to Godwin of January 10, 1812, of January 16, 1812, and of March 8, 1812.

[2] "Shelley, Godwin, and their Circle," pp. 174 and 217.

[3] *The Calcutta Review*, February, 1929, p. 225,

disappear after the year of the composition of the *Revolt of Islam*, and they cannot forget that Shelley was the author of *Adonais* and *Epipsychidion* as much as of *Queen Mab* or *Revolt of Islam*. Even the Preface to the *Revolt of Islam* strikes a significant new note suggesting how in Shelley's growing mind the law of Necessity which is so dominant in *Queen Mab* yields place to a new law—the law of Love.[1] "Love," says Shelley at the conclusion of that Preface, "is celebrated everywhere as the sole law[2] which should govern the moral world" and this is anything but Godwinism. The ideas of the Godwinian system enter, no doubt, very largely into Shelley's *Queen Mab* but we remember with what vehemence Shelley condemned in 1821 this early and immature production showing unmistakably his changed attitude and convictions. We shall refer to that change later on. A more accurate estimate of the real extent of Godwin's influence on Shelley's political and social views as recorded in his early productions will be ensured if we give here a very brief summary of those portions of Godwin's *Political Justice* which may lend support to the view that "*Queen Mab* is nothing but Godwin in verse," even though the prose notes do not always "quote or summarize him," some of the important quotations or summaries being from Holbach's "System of Nature," and from Lucretius, Pliny, Laplace, Bailly, Sale's Koran, Hume, Locke, Condorcet and even Spinoza.

[1] An indication of this new phase in Shelley's thought is found even in Section VIII of *Queen Mab* where as a result of a mighty change full of hope for humanity there dawns the reign of love and

> "All things are recreated, and the flame
> Of consentaneous love inspires all life."

Cf. also "Yet slow and gradual dawned the morn of love" (IX.38) and

> *** Earth has seen Love's brightest roses on the scaffold bloom,
> Mingling with freedom's fadeless laurels there,
> And presaging the truth of visioned bliss" (IX, 176-179).

[2] *Rev. of Islam*, V. XIV.

> "A nation
> Made free by love; a mighty brotherhood
> Linked by a jealous interchange of good."

A brief summary of the necessary portions of *Political Justice* :—

Godwin refers to writers on politics from Sydney and Locke to Paine as well as Rousseau[1] and Helvetius. He believes that the last two writers have taken a more comprehensive view of the subject. With Locke he strongly condemns despotism as worse than anarchy.

That form of political society is acceptable which is conducive to the general benefit. Besides securing to man his life and property, it must ensure him the "employment of his faculties according to the dictates of his understanding." Individuals must be made "to contribute most substantially to the general improvement and happiness."[2]

He next examines into "the extent of the influence" that is to be ascribed to political[3] institutions" and concludes that the scope of Governments is much wider than writers generally admit, for men's morals can be altered only by regenerating their political institutions.

Chapters II to VIII of Book I of *Political Justice* is therefore devoted to the consideration of existing evils in political society which should be ascribed to public[4] institutions and can be proved as capable of removal and remedy. His view is that history is little better than a shameful record of crimes which proves to what extent man[5] has always been a formidable enemy of man. Shelley reproduces *verbatim* Godwin in his letter to Hookham of 17th December, 1812, in the sentence—"I mean that record of crimes and miseries, History." But in his fragmentary essay "on the Literature, the Arts, and the Manners of the Athenians," Shelley

[1] Portions of *Queen Mab* (especially Sections III and IV) are more Rousseauistic than Godwinian.

[2] Q. M., II, 59-64.

[3] Q. M., IV. 90-108. Referring to his own poems he says to Hookham (in his letter of 2nd January, 1813)—"They are, in a great measure, abrupt and obscure,—all breathing hatred of Government and religion, but, I think, not too openly for publication."

[4] Q. M., IV, VIII. 42-48. *Rev. of Isl.*, I. 38. 1-3; II, 2.8-9.

[5] Q. M., IV.

observes that "The study of modern History is the study of kings, financiers, statesmen, and priests. The history of ancient Greece is the study of legislators, philosophers, and poets ; it is the history of men, compared with the history of titles. What the Greeks were, was a reality, not a promise. And what we are, and hope to be, is derived, as it were, from the influence and inspiration of these glorious generations."

Monarchies are successful projects of enslaving mankind by means of bloodshed, violence and murder.[1] In illustration of this view he makes a wide survey of history and refers to Cambyses; Darius, Xerxes, Alexander, etc., and makes a passing mention of irruptions of Goths, Vandals, Huns, etc., and of Mahomet, Charlemagne, the Crusades, Gengiskan, Tamerlane and Aurangzebe.

He then dilates on barbarous penal laws and their iniquitous administration. Then follows (in Books II and III) his investigation into the fundamental principles of society and government. Here Paine's "Common Sense" is quoted with approval. The conclusion runs thus :—"Society is produced by our wants and government by overwickedness.[2] Society is in every state a blessing, government even in its best state but a necessary evil." Government is nothing but regulated force.

The first kind of authority is the authority of [3] reason but with government is associated that kind of authority of which the violation is followed into a penalty.

Any kind of government considered good in the abstract should not be thrust upon a people without reference to the actual state of the public mind. Different forms of government are best adapted to the conditions of different nations.

[1] Q. M., IV. 106-202

[2] This is reproduced *verbatim* by Shelley in his "Address to the Irish People" 1812).

[3] Q. M., VII, IX, which is virtually a song of praise and thanks to the Age of Reason. *Cf.* "Thus steadily the happy ferment worked ;
Reason was free, etc." ll. 48 *et seq.*

Immutable reason is the true legislator. He is opposed to rash rebellion and revolutionary anarchy. He devotes a separate chapter to Justice (of which the criterion is the general good), one to Equality, one to the Social contract theory (which he attempts to demolish and shatter) and one to Legislation. In Book IV the discussion of "the mode in which speculative opinions of individuals are to be rendered effectual for the melioration of society" is considered to be the first branch of the subject of miscellaneous considerations appertaining to politics and society.

Godwin thinks that men will now cease to view governments with superstitious reverence or false patriotism and they will "exercise the piercing search of truth upon the mysteries of governments" till "out of this a new order of things will arise" when "a spirit of impartiality shall prevail and loyalty shall decay" followed by "demolition of monopolies and usurpation," not however, as "the offspring of crude projects and precipitate measures."

Regarding resistance by the people (the whole nation or the majority) he sounds a warning against sudden innovators inclined violently to interrupt calm, incessant progress and advocates a spirit of enquiry and increase and dissemination of political knowledge. A minority advanced in ideas, cannot be justified to prematurely goad the masses into an abstract position of excellence for which they are not prepared, for, imposition on others "of our sentiments by force is the most detestable species of persecution." "To dragoon men into the adoption of what we think right is an intolerable tyranny. To scrutinise men's thoughts and punish their opinions is of all kinds of despotism the most odious. Make men wise and by that very operation you make them free."

"Force is an expedient the use of which is much to be deplored. It corrupts the man that employs it and the man upon whom it is employed," and can be allowed as an expedient only when the mischief sought to be prevented by its use is

greater than the mischief violence involves and also the good likely to result from intervention of force greater than the good likely to result from omitting it.

Being an advocate of mild, gradual, though incessant, progress Godwin is against revolutions.[1] Revolution is pregnant with tyranny. He relies more on independence of mind. Institutions are sure to change with the change in the political opinions of the community. He will trust to reason more than to violent innovation. Politicians ought to endeavour to postpone revolutions even when they cannot prevent them.

Godwin admits the utility of social communication and of the diffusion of ideas but points out a number of objections to Political Associations. The main objections are :—(1) Only a number of men, *i.e.*, a part, pose for the whole; (2) the intemperate and the artful generally get the upper hand; (3) counter-associations in favour of a different set of political tenets are likely to be engendered; (4) they give premium to harangue and declamation; (5) they obscure truth which dwells with contemplation but can scarcely be acquired in crowded halls and amidst noisy debates ; (6) they make man lose a sense of proportion by tempting debaters to dilate on trivial matters and create restlessness and tumult; and (7) they may foment party spirit, prevent men from thinking for themselves and enquiring independently as individuals. Here the disciple stands directly opposed to the master.[2]

He condemns[3] tyrannicide on moral grounds as an undesirable mode of counteracting injustice for " in the midst of plots and conspiracies there is neither truth, nor confidence, nor love, nor humanity." He condemns assassination.

[1] *Cf.* Shelley's letter of January 7, 1872, to Miss Hitchener : " Popular insurrections and revolutions I look upon with discountenance."

[2] *Cf.* Shelley's Letters of March 8, 1812, and March 18, 1812, to Godwin.

[3] *Revolt of Islam*, V, XXXII to XXXVI.

Opposing Burke who considers prejudices to be useful, Godwin wants men to be guided by pure reason and undiluted truth. He will depend on the power and operation of opinion in meliorating the institutions of society, the object of which is the welfare of the whole community and of mankind.

Incidentally Godwin gives his idea of the true *equalisation of man* and the duty of reformers in Book IV, Ch. IX. "Not to pull down," he says, "those who are exalted, and reduce all to a naked and savage equality, but to raise those who are abased, to communicate to every man all genuine pleasures, to elevate every man to all true wisdom, and to make all men participators of a liberal and comprehensive benevolence." Yet Godwin refutes optimism as such whereas Shelley is an incorrigible optimist.

(*To be continued*).

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

Reviews

Economic Organisation of Indian Villages, Vol. II. By N. G. Ranga, B.Litt. (Oxon.), pp. 207, published by Taraporewala Sons & Co. Price Rs. 2.

This is a striking book making an exact study of some of the dry villages of the Andhra country. Apart from the usual conventional foreword and introduction, the book is divided into two unequal parts. Part I consists of four chapters covering 46 pages in length. Part II, which is decidedly more valuable than Part I, consists of six chapters running over 124 pages. There are two appendices dealing with a study of deltaic villages and the colonisation policy of H. E. the Nizam of Hyderabad. The inevitable errata and the indispensable index form the last few pages of the book.

Part I is a passionate plea to encourage the immigration of Kammas, Reddis and Telagas into Hyderabad. In view of the fact that a carefully planned scheme has been hatched by the Development Department itself, these few pages have lost their real significance and as the author attaches more value to this part than the second one, certain misstatements have to be corrected. On page 3, he remarks that "unfortunately neither the Indian public nor the Indian Economists have noticed the great importance of and necessity for internal migration of ryots from congested parts of the country to the under-developed and undeveloped parts." Every Indian Economist, who had occasion to discuss the population question, pointed out the urgent necessity of carrying out a policy of internal immigration. The Bengal and the Punjab Governments have systematically kept this problem in mind and have done something in their respective Provinces. In view of these efforts, the above statement is absolutely unwarranted. His suggestion of Labour Exchanges again is nothing new. Several of the Indian Economists including this reviewer have pointed out, years ago, the feasability of these plans. In Nov. 1926, while commenting on 'Population as an indication of Economic Progress (see Calcutta Review, Nov. 1926, pp. 235 to 281), I remarked that "More fluidity of labour is required. A systematic internal migration from one province to another can be carefully arranged by the Labour Exchanges." It is indeed unfortunate that he has not taken stock of all that has been already stated by previous writers before he has formulated his own

suggestions. If such an honest attempt were done, it becomes easily apparent that his suggestions for the material improvement of agriculture are neither new nor original. Even the compulsory system of registration of rural loans at authorised rates which is considered "novel" is not entirely a new suggestion to Indian Economists. His scheme to liquidate agricultural indebtedness and prevent improvident borrowing resolves itself finally into a Punchayet, whose members are to be elected by lottery guided by a paid permanent secretary of the District Federation of Agricultural Punchayet, which has to act as the connecting link between the different Government departments and the people. On the Presidency Federation falls the duty of chalking out the national programme of agricultural development. The revivification of Punchayets and their power and even the system of the method of election by lottery are not new nor novel schemes. The Punchayet has to keep watch and ward over every ryot's affairs and advise him to behave better. Verily, is not the village co-operative credit society intended for the same? Has it succeeded ? What guarantee is there that the Punchayets would fare better ? The entire prohibition of money-lending on pain of confiscation is the ultimate remedy advocated by the author. Surely this is a negative remedy which checks further indebtedness. The very publicity which this remedy requires would be disliked by the villagers. The right of appeal against the Puchayets' decision creates further litigious tendencies.

After all the problem is not so easy as the author considers it to be. The same old remedies against fragmentation of land pointed out by other writers from a reference to foreign countries are repeated and they lose all value, if they are repeated at such a late hour as this, after the Royal Commission on Agriculture has fully thrashed it out. Though he realises the place of women in village economy and instances the hackneyed examples of Denmark, Belgium and England, he forgets the importance of the rural teacher who alone can act as a useful lever in the village uplift movement of the country. Commenting on rural road transport system years after the Jayakar Committee, there is not a single mention of this highly useful and practical report anywhere. So many other terminological inexactitudes can be pointed out but attention must be drawn to the main excellences of the book. As a realistic description of the village conditions at a particular time, the book is of immense utility. The original suggestions of the Ryots' Associations to the Government have been duly emphasized and set in the proper economic light. The agricultural budgets and the labour budgets of some of the families in the three dry villages speak volumes of the industry of the author.

Had the data on which the material has been collected, been made public, the value of the book would have been heightened to a greater extent.

The author can easily improve the results of his study by making an intensive study of the effects of the Land Revenue policy of the Government on the villages. He could easily have pointed out how unscientific is the levy of land revenue on agricultural income. The smaller ryots who form the bulk of the agricultural class have to pay fixed cash demand and it violates the most basic principle of taxation, namely the correlation between the ability of the tax-payer and the tax burden borne by him. The Taxation Enquiry Committee pointed out long ago the necessity of reconsidering the fundamental principle underlying the levying of land revenue. It is the duty of every economist, who makes a realistic study of village life in Madras to point out how the smaller ryots daily becoming smaller, are called upon to pay land revenue settled nearly three decades back. A discussion of the average incidence of land revenue is unfortunately omitted in this otherwise interesting study. It is beyond my comprehension how a trained social worker of his stamp neglects the discussion of the land revenue which offends not only all canons of social justice but those of public economy at the same time.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

"**Studies in Spenser.**" By Mohini Mohan Bhattacharyya. Lecturer in English, University of Calcutta.

These five "Studies" are as it were by-products of the author's work in estimating the part played by Spenser's study of Plato in the whole body of his work. They are fascinating in themselves, interesting also as showing the varied ways in which Platonic ideas other than that of Love attracted the poet, and also the by-paths through which pure Platonism reached Spenser, and in its passage was coloured and modified.

The first Chapter deals with Justice and the author shows how, beyond the usually accepted idea that Spenser's conception of this virtue is almost purely Aristotelian, there is much that can be referred to Plato, and that the "*Republic*" contributes as much as the "*Ethics*" to Spenser's complete conception. The chapter on Spenser and Pico della Mirandola is especially interesting as showing how the purely Platonic doctrines of Love and of Beauty come to Spenser at what may almost be called third hand, the stages being Plotinus, Benevieni, Pico, with Ficino entering as it were by a side-wind. The care with which the author disentangles the threads of influence is admirable. A slighter, but

equally pleasant, study is that on Spenser's theory of poetry, and the flakes of Plato the critic that are embedded in his theory.

In " Spenser and Bruno " Mr. Bhattacharyya breaks almost fresh ground. The possibility of Giordano Bruno's work influencing Spenser has been somewhat discounted by Mr. Oliver Elton in his " *Modern* Studies," who, however, admits the possibility of links in the Canto " *Of Mutabilitie.*" Mr. Bhattacharyya very valiantly breaks a lance in these lists, and must be left to uphold his thesis, which he shares with Miss Winstanley, of connection between the " *Fowre Hymnes* " and Bruno's particular brand of Neo-Platonism.

The last chapter is a detailed examination of one of the most delightful of Renaissance themes in its relation to Spenser—the much-canvassed idea of the perfect gentleman. The general influence of Castiglione's *Cortegiano* in English is well-recognised, but here the author shows in detail the great debt in both idea and in phrase which the poet owes to the *Courtier.*

The whole book is an example of honest scholarship, well-documented, well-planned, well-written, and does vast credit to the writer and to the school of English studies in the University.

J. W. H.

A Plea for Open Air Schools in India. By S. C. Chatterji, B.Sc., L.T. (All.), M.Ed. (Leeds), Bombay: D. B. Taraporewala Sons and Co., 1928.

Mr. Chatterji, it appears, has made a special study of educational problems in India and abroad and this book is an outcome of his investigations conducted on special lines. In this highly interesting brochure written with a practical purpose and on a particular type of schools to be started for the improvement of the health of young people whose physique is already a little impaired, the reader will find ample food for serious thought. Questions may indeed be raised with regard to the details of the plan as given by him ; they may be judged to be misconceived or may be found unsatisfactory in their working ; but its merits are pronounced enough and all who have thought of India's supreme need will thank him for his contribution to the literature on the subject. Even people beyond his immediate objective will greatly profit from a study of his book by following hygienic principles which are here combined with the working of the school. Prevention is better than cure and healthy children will not lose much by keeping regular hours, eschewing rich food and staying out as much in the open as possible.

Let us now turn to the details as given in the book and examine them. In its dietics it recommends " tea, coffee, cocoa or milk according to the climate of the place " for the afternoon, but the food value of coffee and tea is more than open to question, and one wonders how they could be recommended for children ailing from physical troubles. Equally doubtful is the meat prescribed for midday meal, for we must consider that we have before us young children who have already suffered some sort of shipwreck in the matter of health—and who urgently require rehabilitation. Regarding slow mastication, the author justly takes to task those guardians who are careless about their wards—" the children are not given sufficient time for breakfast." But guardians and teachers may insist or admonish—so long as the timing for our schools is what it is, boys will be boys and food will continue to be swallowed, not chewed. At least in schools like those suggested by Mr. Chatterji, why not hold the classes in the morning and again in the early hours of the afternoon just before the play hours ? That would be quite feasible, because where the students and the teachers both live close to the school there can be no difficulties for such an arrangement. The author's remarks on the abuse of opium (p. 18) are, we believe, quite misplaced ; for the class of people that would send out boys to an improved type of schools would most probably never use the pernicious dose. In the matter of open-air exercise, it is difficult to understand why ordinary drill is excluded. Simple drill and slow or quick marches by themselves are sure to be beneficial, not injurious. To revert to dietics: it is recommended that milk should be " cooked " (page 51) to prevent tubercular infection ; but does not Koch's *Bacillus tuberculosis* prove too strong to be kept out in this manner ? Surely it is a wiser plan to arrange for regular examination of cows to be maintained by the school authorities for milk supply. It is not correct to say that Tagore's Santiniketan stands out quite apart from our universities, nor to suggest that it has no relation with the children of public schools, for students from Santiniketan are regularly sent up for the university examinations and consequently their teaching cannot ignore the fact altogether.

The book should prove welcome to all who are interested in educational institutions, and minority representation is more urgently necessary in education than in politics. We trust that the plans and suggestions embodied here will receive attention from the authorities.

P. R. S.

The Religion of Zarathushtra. By I. J. S. Taraporewala. Theosophical Publishing House. Adyar, Madras, 1926.

This small brochure written in a simple and beautiful style by Prof. Taraporewala for the information of non-Zoroastrians gives the essential elements of the religion of the Parsis and will find a ready welcome with all students of world religions. The book consists of nine chapters; first two chapters, giving a historical account of the Aryans of old Iran and of the Prophet himself, are followed by five others in which the doctrine, *e.g.*, about good and evil, has been brought out, briefly but with sufficient clearness. There is an interesting chapter on some Zoroastrian customs and ceremonies—at the initiation or Navjot, marriage and death—which will go very far in identifying much in the Parsis as akin to the Hindus. The concluding chapter is a brilliant retrospect and prospect of the Parsis as they have been and will be—an instructive and agreeable speculation on the future of the Zoroastrian religion which all students of humanity will read with appreciation. The ideal of *Service of Humanity*, a critical examination of so-called superstitions, the recognition of a large element of Indian influence in Islamic culture and the emphatic repetition of the three commandments of God to all mankind—Humata, Hukhta, Huvarshta—Good Thought, Good Word, Good Deed—all these features recommend the book, and its value and usefulness are enhanced by the addition of an appendix containing a few important selections from the Avesta in translation followed by an index contributing to the excellence of the book.

P. R. S.

Indian After-dinner Stories, Vol. I. By A S. Panchapakesa Ayyar. M.A. (Oxon.), I.C.S. ; D. B. Taraporewala Sons & Co., 1928.

This is a new venture, for here in India after-dinner stories are not very much in evidence,—we get more leisure in the afternoon than at any other time and may still justly be held accountable for silence and taciturnity specially when at or after our meals. But that is altogether immaterial in our enjoyment of this store of innocent laughter provided for our delectation by Mr. Ayyar. A second edition has been called forth and this shows that the book has found an appreciative public. The author observes in his introduction that his object has been "to provide some healthy laughter and at the same time to shake some of our deep-rooted prejudices by exhibiting them in their comic aspect." It is delightful to note that he has been partly successful and smiles and criticism combine here and the book will supply a long-felt need of the lighter but not the

less important side of Indian life. What strikes us, however, is that in these one hundred and twenty stories, told in a straightforward simple style the desire to instruct is too apparent and the laugh does not rise spontaneous to the lips; *e.g.*, in stories No. XXXIX and No. CXVII. There is considerable scope for improvement in this direction.

P. R. S.

Baroda and its Libraries. By Newton Mohun Dutt, Curator of State Libraries, Baroda, with Rules for Libraries and Library Associations and an extensive bibliography. The get-up of the book is good.

The Library movement in Baroda is a part of the scheme of compulsory elementary mass education for boys and girls throughout the Baroda State introduced and developed by His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda. His Highness the Maharaja Saheb rightly realises the fact that elementary mass education can hardly be useful to boys and girls in any rural areas unless they are supplemented by a network of free public libraries which would keep literacy alive and enable men and women to resort to sources of knowledge hitherto not open to them. These free public libraries must not contain English books alone which can be beneficial to few English-knowing readers but vernacular books as well.

The centre of these movements lies in the Library in Baroda with its adjuncts, the Oriental Institute, the women's library, the juvenile library and the visual instruction branch. Next, there are 45 district and town libraries with 19,000 readers and 2,22,000 books. Next to them, come 661 villages, libraries with about 37,000 readers and about 2,50,000 books. The villages which do not possess libraries are served by the travelling libraries, which in 1926-27, circulated 13,400 books to 123 centres.

In the Baroda Central Library, "Open Access" system has been introduced, which allows the registered borrowers the privilege of free access to most of the shelves, and thus enables them to handle and examine the books before making their final selection. This system which is almost universal in America, and is becoming more and more popular in Great Britain, makes the library a real live workshop. The "open access" system has its own dangers and drawbacks which can be avoided by using common sense and business methods. This system which is found more helpful to the readers, and also as cheap as the old-fashioned method, has, to our knowledge, been adopted nowhere in India except in the Baroda Central Library.

Mr. Newton Dutt, the author, rightly points out that "one important function of a public library is not only to furnish books, but also to act as a kind of general information bureau." Every conscientious librarian must extend his hearty welcome to all inquirers, and spare no efforts to help them in every way. Mr. Dutt who has been connected with the library movement in Baroda for about 15 years, has produced a most valuable book out of his own experience. The work contains a graphic description of the rise and development of the libraries in Baroda and the methods employed there. The Baroda Library system is an up-to-date organisation which many European countries will do well to imitate. Mr. Dutt is to be congratulated on the production of this interesting work which is a mine of information to those who are connected with library management.

A. GUHA

When Parliaments Fail—a Synthetic View from the Gallery. By a Sympathiser. Published by Thacker, Spink and Co., Calcutta and Simla.

Writing in 1769, Rousseau predicted that only a race of gods could work democracy well, so perfect a form of government was not made for men. The history of Europe has so far proved the truth of his statement. The last war was ostensibly fought to make the world safe for democracy. It did upset one Czar, one Emperor, one Kaiser and a few Kaiserlings ; but it brought about the advent of Cæsar the most deadly opponent of democracy. The Sympathiser gives short thumbnail sketches of the legislatures of France, England, Germany and Italy actually at work. The descriptions are full of humour, and all the failings of these parliaments are mercilessly brought out. The account of a session of the League of Nations at Geneva is particularly good. The author seems to prefer Fascism to 'chamberfuls of jellyfishes and limpets who pullulate elsewhere.' He brings out well the fact that everywhere Europe's parliaments are in chains ; and he suggests various remedies to make the parliaments more 'perfectible.'

X. Y. Z.

Ourselves

MR. PRAMATHANATH BANERJEE, M.A., B.L., BARRISTER-AT-LAW

It is with the greatest pleasure that we welcome back in our midst Mr. Pramathanath Banerjee, M.A., B.L., Barrister-at-Law, the Honorary Secretary of the *Calcutta Review*, who had gone to England in February 1928 to qualify himself for the Bar which he has done with great credit, adding one more laurel to his achievements. The students and the teachers in the University had alike keenly felt his absence from India for the last 18 months. We have no doubt we shall all be benefited by his experience which he has gathered in the course of his sojourn in the various countries of Europe when he takes up his work in the University with his usual zeal and enthusiasm.



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SEPTEMBER, 1929

PLACE OF BRADLEY IN BRITISH THOUGHT

II

Hegel took up the problem at this stage, and rejected the Kantian reconciliation of the issue between Rationalism and Empiricism. What he insisted instead is, in brief, the thesis that from one point of view all knowledge is *a posteriori*, while, from another point of view, all knowledge is *a priori*. All knowledge is *a posteriori*, because no knowledge whatsoever is possible except through experience—not even the knowledge of self which, as Kant had already shown, is only possible in relation to the not-self ; again, all knowledge is *a priori* inasmuch as knowledge is no mere introduction of foreign material into the mind, but is really the result of the mind's own activity or volition. Hegel thus takes the problem of knowledge out of the region of miracle, so to say, and shows that the harmony between the two elements is neither accidental nor pre-established in any way. In so doing he goes to his Greek compeer Aristotle who, while holding all knowledge to be derived from experience, maintained at the same time that the full development of the knowledge of the intelligible world is one with the evolution of thought and self-consciousness. This is one of the important lines along which Hegel advanced beyond Kant. The advance from Kant to Hegel, however, is too large

a theme to be entered upon here; but I must here mention, in brief, for the purpose of my historical sketch, the two other specific lines (arising out of the one just mentioned) along which this advance was to a large extent determined. These two very important steps may be roughly presented as follows :—(*i*) Unlike Kant who conceived knowledge to be the exclusive business of understanding (*Verstand*) and thus culminating in science, Hegel represented knowledge as being essentially the function of reason (*Vernunft*) and, thus, completing itself in metaphysics or philosophy (to which Kant would not allow the title of 'science'), and, accordingly, Hegel added a new set of categories—altogether beyond the purview of Kant's critical philosophy—the categories, namely, of Teleology and Self-determination, recognised under the head of the third division of his *Logic*. (*ii*) Unlike Kant for whom such categories as Causality and Reciprocity were the final scientific determinations of Nature, Hegel sought, by the still higher and richer categories of the unity of Subject and Object, to connect and harmonise the forms of intuition with the forms of understanding in a way that had not been possible for Kant with his faith pinned to those two categories of science.

As compared, therefore, with Kant's interpretation of experience, the positive advances achieved by Hegel may be summed up under two heads: (*a*) Kant had conceived the subject and the object to be necessarily correlative, inasmuch as the subject seemed to him to be essentially instrumental in *making* the object. For Hegel, however, the subject no more *makes* the object than the object *makes* the subject—both being in their correlation constitutive of the concrete life of mind. (*b*) Kant, again, had insisted that the relationship of subject and object disappeared as soon as the elements of sense were left behind. Hegel, on the contrary, persisted in regarding the relationship as still characteristic of experience, even though the latter was not *sense* experience, but experience on a higher level. Arguing further, on these constructive lines, Hegel is

enabled to break down the insuperable barrier between phenomena and things in themselves which Kant had set up in his own philosophy. Stace, I think, is right in maintaining that the advance from Kant to Hegel was rendered possible by the steady abandonment, on the part of post-Kantian writers, of the Kantian *Ding an sich* as an inscrutable *Jenseits*. Hegel at least has justified this contention, so far as he understood Kant to have meant by phenomena only the ultimate realities, which in their totality are but partial manifestations of one concrete whole. Accordingly, the distinction between appearance and reality becomes in Hegel, not so much the distinction between the less and the more real, but between the part and the whole, and therefore, everything finite or determined which indicates by its ' ragged edges ' that it is ' torn out of a wider context ' contains an element of negation in the Spinozistic sense or, in Bradley's language, an essential ' ideality.'

In working out in full the logical implications of this procedure, Hegel has, it is sometimes contended, (*a*) minimised the irreducible antithesis of appearance and reality to its vanishing limit and (*b*) given a somewhat easy deduction of the natural world from a system of pure thoughts. In other words, in trying to escape the Scylla of Kantian thing-in-itself with its consequential agnosticism, Hegel has only, so it is urged, fallen into the Charybdis of a vicious panlogism with its characteristic gnosticism that claims to have expounded the content of the Absolute in the seventy categories and odd recognised in his *Logic*. Although there are to be found in Hegel's writings incautious statements that seem to justify these charges, I do not yet think that they are tenable in the form in which they are usually pressed. In the first place, it would appear, on a consistent application of Hegel's fundamental principle, that the distinction of reality and appearance can only, in a legitimate sense, hold good within the realm of thought and that to convert a distinction, which is a distinction within thought, and, indeed, indispensable for thought, into a distinction between

thought itself and things, would be a gross instance of hypostatising a logical abstraction. On the positive side, Hegel's principle would demand the construction of the term 'reality' as a system of facts so related to one another as to enter into conscious experience, and to be interpretable in terms of self-consciousness; while, negatively, it would call for the rejection of any ultimate dualism in the realm of existence. For to hold that what constitutes the real existence of anything is its relation to self-consciousness is tantamount to denying *totidem verbis* that we can, in any intelligible sense, deduce or explain conscious experience as an effect occasioned by something that is not related to self-consciousness, and thus a world of things in themselves, viewed in its self-containedness, would be no more than a mere abstraction. Therefore, although we are bound to deny the existence of an unknowable realm we do yet admit, and indeed must admit, that there is much in reality that is unknown.

Secondly, on a faithful and judicious rendering of what Hegel meant by 'thought,' it will be apparent that he does not, as has frequently been alleged, attempt to deduce concrete fact from pure thought. His aim in the *Logic* is mainly to disentangle from the concrete facts of experience what he conceives to be the universal principles or 'categories' that constitute the warp and woof, so to speak, of the texture of intelligible reality. Having thus abstracted from the concrete mass of experience its universal features, he proceeds to exhibit these categories as standing in a relation of necessary implication of one another, so that starting from the most abstract and inadequate of them we must logically proceed to the higher and more adequate. But what Hegel does not most certainly mean to assert is that the logical scheme is for him identical with the scheme of nature. In fact he clearly recognises that there are in the world of facts elements that escape the logical treatment of more general principles. All misconception on this point can be successfully encountered

if it is remembered that 'thought' for Hegel means the system of objective contents, and it would be doing no violence to Hegel's procedure if we substituted the term 'Truth' for 'Thought.' What is implied, in other words, by Thought, is Truth which is comprised of truths, that are not dependent for their being upon being apprehended, but are actual realities. "Thoughts" as his oft-quoted dictum expresses it, "do not stand between us and things, shutting us off from the things; they rather shut us together with them." Thus Thought (as distinguished from the process of thinking in the individual mind) is, for Hegel, objective, that is, a system of universals which imposes on a concrete fact a certain form it is bound to exemplify.

It is precisely on the same grounds, as Stace points out, that Plato held all universals to be objective. In his earlier theory, at any rate, Plato construed all universals as 'Ideas' (in his own sense of the term εἰδη) or objective essences. The main ground for regarding them objective was the belief that any particular thing was just a congeries of universals. A stone, it would be argued for example, possesses the characteristics of whiteness, roundness, hardness, etc., and could we enumerate all its characteristics, we should exhaust the nature of the stone. Were not then the universals objective, neither would the stone be. From Hegel's point of view the argument would seem at first sight to have proved too much; for, the characteristics in question are no more than sensuous universals. Following Kant, Hegel expressly distinguishes the categories from sensuous universals, on the ground that the categories are logically prior to all experience while sensuous universals cannot similarly be said to be presupposed in all experience. The Platonic Idea, in Hegel's view, 'is the Universal, not as the formal Universal, but as implicitly and explicitly existent as reality' and in thus being 'both universal thought and the existent,' the 'Idea was still too fresh and new' (*History of Philosophy*, Vol. II). But in

contending that sensuous universals are objective and real, and so far the ultimate principles of the world, it seems that Plato was on the right line of advance, while Hegel, in denying that they are so, involved himself in error. In fact this is the very crux of his dialectic evolution, accounting for the summary treatment of sense-experience and the entire realm of physical nature, and also the standing difficulty of making the transition from the *Logic* to the *Philosophy of nature*. No doubt what Hegel wished to maintain is that the categories as the logical condition of all experience are the presupposition of that part of experience which consists in sensuous universals and, therefore, as compared with the latter which have only a dependent or derivative objectivity, the former may be said to possess an independent objective being. But, according to Hegel's own principle, this logical priority has at the same time an ontological validity and thus suggests the possibility of deducing sensuous universals from the categories. This is in truth what Hegel is trying to accomplish in the Second Book of the *Encyclopœdia*, the *Naturphilosophie*. But this attempt on his part, both as a whole and in detail, must be pronounced a failure. Justly has it been said of Hegel that 'nature was for him always a kind of step-child,' and, failing to certify or legitimatise its origin from Reason or Absolute Idea as the sum of categories, he cast an indelible slur on it—that it was irrational and inexplicable. Nature is what he calls "*Begriff* in its side-by-sidedness" and thus the opposite of Idea of Reason. But since Reason is the realm of necessity, nature must be characterised by its opposite, namely, contingency. Hegel, however, does not recognise that he here lays himself open to Hume's contention that necessity has no meaning as applied to the realm of matters of fact or external nature, and that there can conceivably be given no reason why any thing in nature should be what it is. It simply *is* so, and does not reason itself into existence. The cryptic utterances 'I am'

and 'I am that I am,' construed philosophically, mean that the universe exists and its nature is what it is.

Hegel could have, however, successfully coped with the difficulty by summoning to his aid his own omnipotent 'dialectic of opposites' which disarms all absolute opposition or antagonism. Accordingly, he was well within his rights to argue that as there cannot be any absolute severance between the rational and irrational, the irrational would at the same time be rational and therefore exist. Instead of pursuing this line of reflection which he should have done in strict consistency with his own dialectical procedure—what he actually does say is that any particular existent, such as a stone, is so irrational that it lies beyond the dominion of Idea or Reason and is incapable of deduction therefrom. Such a *hiatus* in his all-encompassing *Logic* amounted to a surrender of its claims to universality and absolutism ; and, with its inevitable suggestion of a dualism, it proved to be the rock on which the rigid monism of the Hegelian system was destined to split itself. Truly, for a system of panlogism, such as Hegel's, the admission of a realm of contingency or irrational is suicidal on the very face of it. If it really is what it purports to be—if it really means that all that is real is rational—then surely reason and unreason 'cannot equals abide' in such a system. Indeed, without a philosophy of nature you cannot have a panlogism, and with it you cannot abide by it. The undisguised contempt with which Hegel throughout treats of nature has had its full share of revenge in the rise of that full-blooded naturalism, positivism and materialism in the wake of Hegel's death which has its historic justification. Even in its literal application it is true that you may try to drive out nature, and nature (as the saying goes) will always come back, but it will not always come back as nature. Indeed, as is often the case, the vengeance comes full circle ! The seed of dualism which the *Naturphilosophie* nurtured within itself proved fatal at once to the universality as well as the spirituality of logic. The process of spiritualising

nature that was carried out under the ægis of the Absolute Spirit was so complete that it bordered in the end upon a mechanism, as crude as that spiritual view of the world, for which the irreducible antithesis of nature and spirit has ceased to exist. In short, what was meant to be a thorough-going or absolute spiritualisation of nature turned out, by a natural nemesis, as it were, to be the naturalisation of the spirit.

The discovery of this basic dualism in Hegel's procedure has been the source of a salutary reaction against the somewhat 'cheap and easy Monism' achieved by his omnipotent 'dialectic of opposites' which may, not unjustly, be said to have committed itself to 'making out black to be white,' if it possibly could. After the monistic spell had to a certain extent worked itself out, the vital points in his system that came to be viewed with suspicion and to call for rejection are (*i*) the all-round identification of Truth and Existence, (*ii*) the absence of any intelligible connection between the historical development of consciousness in time and the logical development of thought which transcends time, (*iii*) the characterisation of *all* reality as spiritual, and (*iv*) too little interval, if any, allowed between the *act* of thinking and the *object* of thought, between the notion of the 'Idea' and the 'Idea as such,' between human and Absolute knowledge. All these shortcomings of his system are traceable to the effort to resolve the irreducible duality in our experience, in his anxiety to surmount that dualism between mind and matter, or spirit and nature, which, though a discredited relic of mediævalism, has yet had an eventful history in modern philosophy as the peculiarly luckless legacy of Cartesian thought. It has all throgh its long-drawn career appeared in the protean rôles of subjectivism, phenomenalism, relativism or agnosticism and the like, and Hegel's effort to override this dualism has undoubtedly been a move in the right direction—save in the fact that he has somewhat overshot the mark. In his zeal to inculcate the truth that man's knowledge of Reality is knowledge of the Absolute, he apparently forgot

to reckon with the fact that the whole content of Absolute knowledge had not been revealed to the author of the *Logic*. From the proposition that the categories of human knowledge are not merely subjective, but integral elements in reality—which in itself is a perfectly legitimate assertion—it does not necessarily follow that men's knowledge of the Absolute is co-extensive with the Absolute. The second proposition is clearly a *non sequitur* from the first, and is untenable and absurd in itself.

In his extreme recoil, from 'the result arrived at by the Critical philosophy' which 'bade man go and feed on mere husks and chaff' [1] (*Logic*, Sec. 28), he would not acknowledge any limitation in the categories for fear of a relapse into the utter abstraction of the 'thing-in-itself.' But to hold that the categories of Logic do not constitute a complete explication of the nature of the Absolute is not to set up an impassable barrier between our knowledge and reality. So far as they go they *do* reveal the nature of reality, but, assuredly, there is more in Reality than is dreamt of even in Hegel's Logic. What has apparently escaped Hegel is the possibility of a third alternative—namely, that what we know, we know truly, but we do not know all. In this respect, Bradley's Absolute has a redeeming grace. "The Absolute," as Prof. Taylor assures us, "when all is said, remained in his view a transcendent mystery; it never became as it tends to become in the hands of some 'Idealists' transparent." Still he is no mere 'worshipper of the Unknown.' While admitting 'the healthy scepticism for which all knowledge in a sense is vanity' and confirming 'the irresistible impression that all is beyond us,' he is yet convinced that 'there is no reality at all anywhere except in appearance, and in our appearance we can discover the main nature of reality'—whose 'nature cannot be exhausted, but it can be known in abstract.' [1] But that does not imply for him any light-hearted scepticism or despair of knowledge or truth,

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 549-50. Hereinafter called *A. & R.*

nor any disparagement of the task of philosophy. "For myself" as he emphasised in his latest utterance on the subject, "abstraction, inconsistency and onesidedness belong necessarily to the path of knowledge."[1] How far Bradley was justified in prescribing the remedy he did for this inevitable 'abstraction' and 'onesidedness' is a different matter altogether. One thing, however, is certain: although 'reality is concrete, while the truest truth must still be more or less abstract'[2] 'philosophy always will be hard, and what it promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its unity and worth.'[3]

Returning once more to the *Ethical Studies*,—the publication of which in 1876 was, to Bosanquet, 'an epoch-making event, not merely as restating and concluding the discussion of Hedonism, but because of a philosophical significance which far transcended that particular subject-matter'—one finds the central teaching, neglecting differences of emphasis, to have been on the Hegelian lines. It is embodied mainly in the famous chapter on 'My Station and its Duties' and also in the 'Concluding Remarks.' The teaching is no other than the application of the 'concrete universal' of experience as the typical reality, superseding the abstract 'Good Will' of Kant as the 'law universal,' and furnishing through its particulars a content in which the universal end lives and grows within the individual will. What the *Ethical Studies* did for morals, the *Principles of Logic*, accomplished in the sphere of logic and was, in a sense, epoch-making, so far as it marked the close of an old and the beginning of a new era in logical inquiry. But herein for the first time his avowed breach with Hegelianism comes into prominent relief. 'For Hegel himself,'

[1] *Logic* (2nd ed.). pp. 723, 727-8.

[2] *A. & R.*, p. 397.

[3] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 106. Herienafter called T. & R.

as he very accurately confesses in the 'Preface,' 'assuredly I think him a great philosopher; but I never could have called myself an Hegelian, partly because I cannot say that I have mastered his system, and partly because I could not accept what seems his main principle, or at least part of that principle.' One who has gone carefully through the penultimate, as well as the last, paragraph of the second volume of his *Logic* cannot possibly be left in doubt as to wherein he dissented from Hegel. The divergence in question is symptomatic of that 'academic scepticism' or 'sceptical study of first principles' on the part of typically English thinkers, which has proved in the history of philosophical thinking to be an invaluable asset. It is that inherited distrust of hasty generalisation which led Francis Bacon to formulate the vocation of 'man as the servant and interpreter of nature' to be no other than to scan nature's ways with patient circumspection and not to win easy success by 'anticipations of nature.'

It is the same instinctive suspicion of all premature philosophical synthesis that induced Green to remark with reference to Hegel's idealism that 'it must all be done over again.' Although, in working out the results of the Kantian criticism of knowledge and morals, he was not a little influenced by Hegel, yet 'to Hegel he latterly stood,' as Caird writes, 'in a somewhat doubtful relation; for while in the main, he accepted Hegel's criticism of Kant, and held also that something *like* Hegel's idealism must be the result of the development of Kantian principles rightly understood, he yet regarded the actual Hegelian system with a certain suspicion as something too ambitious, or, at least, premature.' No less clearly did Green define his own attitude to Hegel as he expressed himself in the following terms: 'Hegel's doctrine has been before the world now for half a century and though it has affected the current science and philosophy to a degree which those who depreciate it seem curiously to ignore, yet as a doctrine it has not made way. It may be doubted whether it has thoroughly

satisfied even those among us who regard it as the last word of philosophy. When we think out the problem left by previous inquirers, we find ourselves led to it by an intellectual necessity; but on reflection we become aware that we are Hegelian, so to speak, with only a fraction of our thought—on the Sundays of "speculation," not on the weekdays of "ordinary thought."[1] Besides the indefensible opposition between 'speculation' and 'ordinary thought' or science, as more or less esoteric and exoteric respectively, what Green specially takes exception to, in Hegel, is that 'if thought and reality are to be identified, thought must be other than the discursive activity exhibited in our inferences and analyses,' and also other than 'the process of philosophising, though Hegel himself, by what seems to us the one essential aberration of his doctrine, treats this process as a sort of movement of the absolute thought.' Summarily speaking, Green suspects 'that all along Hegel's method has stood in the way of an acceptance of his conclusion, because he, at any rate, seemed to arrive at his conclusion as to the spirituality of the world, not by interrogating the world, but by interrogating his own thoughts,' and ends by dissociating himself entirely from his 'dialectical' method. As one of the most 'faithful' of Hegel's disciples, Edward Caird has tried, of course, to defend the master by saying that this censure of Hegel's central teaching and the dialectical method in particular is 'not valid against Hegel.' What Hegel would have answered in his defence, Caird thinks, is that all Reality is relative to intelligence and is the manifestation of it, and the distinction of subject and object is created and overcome by intelligence; therefore, the various phases of Reality are at the same time modes of intelligence, and intelligence being an integral part of the Absolute, an investigation of the objective world is also a study of the forms of intelligence, which are as much forms of the Absolute thought as of our intelligence. Thus if Thought is identified with Reality, it is also opposed

[1] *Works*, III, pp. 141-2 *sqq.*

by Hegel to it, for Thought as the subject of knowledge, is the correlative of, and, therefore, opposed to the object of knowledge. And it is with Thought as the ultimate unity, as the Absolute, that Hegel is said to have identified Reality, and not with it as the mere subject of knowledge.

By drawing attention to the distinction of cardinal importance in Hegel's thought (which Green is alleged to have slurred over) Caird tries to obviate the force of Green's criticism. But has Caird been quite successful in the line of defence he thus takes, by way of a fresh exegesis of Hegel's writings? Taking Hegel's procedure as a whole into consideration, I think the question must be answered in the negative. In spite of the aforesaid exegesis, I believe, Green's criticism that 'a well-grounded conviction has made men refuse to believe that any dialectic of the discursive intelligence would instruct them in the reality of the world, or that this reality could consist in thought in any sense in which thought can be identified with such an intellectual process,' stands. Bradley had reinforced the same line of criticism in a far more resolute and effective manner in his own verdict on the point: 'unless thought stands for something that falls beyond mere intelligence, if "thinking" is not used with some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word, a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be purely rational.' The added emphasis on the qualifying adverb 'purely' in the *second edition* of the *Logic* (p. 595) makes the point of criticism all the more invulnerable. The point is whether 'thought' as we know it in our own experience (and, that is our only availing resource, however exoteric) can ever—even when it is written with a capital T—overreach the distinction between the *act* and the *object* of thought. It is all very well to urge (as Mr. Turner does in support of his thesis that Hegel's use of 'Idea' and 'ideality' is not at variance with the central contention of realism) that Hegel intended by the 'Idea as such' to refer to Reality as the object of Thought,

inasmuch as he distinguishes 'the idea as such' from the 'notion of the Idea,' the first being the 'object' (*Gegenstand*) of the second[1]—the 'thinking idea,' by means of which the logico-metaphysical nature of the *Idea as such* enters into the thinking consciousness.' But does Hegel's 'dialectic' suffer in the end this last vestige of difference between Thought and Reality as the object of Thought, which is strictly necessitated by the description of the latter as *Gegenstand*? I think not. Accordingly, what Bradley affirms as the concluding reflection of his logical inquiry seems to me to be—which from contextual criticism appears to be highly plausible—at the same time the most effective criticism of Hegel's procedure as a whole and in detail, as exemplified by his dialectic: "No cheap and easy Monism can stand before an enquiry into logic."

Now the divergence from Hegel, which is already in sight towards the close of the Logic, is fully envisaged from the metaphysical side in *Appearance and Reality* (1893) and with a distinct change of emphasis in the *Essays on Truth and Reality* (1914). Although Bradley thinks that the metaphysical position worked out by him in these two volumes is, in all essentials, in agreement with what he takes to be the central teaching of Hegel, yet it may, in all fairness, be affirmed that he did deviate in many important respects from Hegel's results. "There is" to quote the famous lines with which Bradley closes his *Appearance*, "a great saying of Hegel's, a saying too well-known, and one which, without some explanation, I should not like to endorse. But I will end with something not very different, something perhaps more certainly the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real." What he definitely rejects of Hegel is the 'dialectic' method with its mechanical movement through the triad of 'thesis,' 'anti-thesis' and 'synthesis,'

[1] *Logic* (sec. 236).

which is, to a large extent, responsible for imparting to his system the air of a 'cheap and easy Monism.' Without departing altogether from what he conceives to be a sound principle in Hegel, he yet upholds his own firm conviction that "there is a world of appearance and there is a sensuous curtain, and to seek to deny the presence of this or to identify it with reality is mistaken. But for the truth I come back always to that doctrine of Hegel, that 'there is nothing behind the curtain other than that which is in front of it.' For what is in front of it is the Absolute that is at once one with the knower and behind him." [1]

SAROJ KUMAR DAS

[1] T. & R., p. 218.

THE NEW GERMANY AND THE FUTURE[1]

" One who carefully observes and makes comparative study of the activities of various European nations becomes easily convinced that the German people are bound to play a very important part in the world of to-morrow. To-day there is no more the question of German ability to save their country from the chaos which followed the World War, but the problem that is agitating the German nation as a whole is the desire of a great people to take an active and leading part in world affairs.

" Of course the questions of the revision of the Dawes Plan and the payment of Reparations, evacuation of the Rhineland, rectification of the Eastern frontier, self-determination of the German people and thus the union of Austria and Germany under a federal government, are problems that are agitating the German people, especially statesmen and party politicians. To me, it is certain that it is only a question of time—a few years —when these problems will be solved satisfactorily to Germany, through peaceful means. Dissensions among various political parties is one of the greatest obstacles in the way of Germany's peaceful assertion in the World Politics. Political ascendency of Germany is of great importance, in so far as it is a necessary requisite for Germany's assertion in economic and cultural fields.

" However the recent recovery of German finance and industry in general, and the scientific researches conducted by universities and private laboratories, inspires my very genuine admiration for the German people. I may say that practical Americans give full recognition to the worth of the German people. I may only mention the fact that the American Engineering Society has decided to confer its *gold-medal* (the mark of the highest recognition), this year to a German scientist, Prof.

[1] Statement made by Dr. Taraknath Das at an interview with Mr. Walther Kurt Feder at the Regina Palast Hotel, Munich.

Dr...., the present President of the Higher Technical Institute of Munich, for his original contributions in Physics, especially in Radio. May I say that the work of the Deutsches Museum of Munich has attracted world recognition and the people of the United States of America wish to establish a similar museum at Chicago, and America has already sought advice from German experts on this subject? The new project of establishing a technical library and research institute in connection with the Deutsches Museum of Munich will be a distinct gain to the world of science. The German people should be congratulated for it.

" There is every indication that German leadership will assert itself in the cultural field and peaceful progress of the world. Inspite of the limitations imposed upon her, Germany is leading the world in scientific and industrial achievements. Germany was prevented by the Treaty of Versailles from building certain types of airships, but to-day in the field of commercial aviation, she has made the greatest progress. Three years ago, when Dr. Eckner crossed the Atlantic with the Zeppelin built for the American Government it became apparent to the whole world that the German people won a signal victory in the field of science and technique. The successful crossing of the Atlantic from Europe to America by Captain Kohl and Baron von Hunefeld has established a world record. It is confidently expected that Dr. Eckner's new " Graf Zeppelin " will not only cross the Atlantic safely, but demonstrate new and greater achievements of German scientists, and this will promote co-operation between Germany and America.

" After the World War, Germany was stripped of her merchant marine. But within the short space of ten years she has very nearly recovered her pre-war prominence. In fact by 1929, when the Norddeutscher Lloyd will have their two new ships—*New Bremen* and *Europa*—playing between Bremen and New York, they will be the fastest ships in the world and they will represent the latest development in the science of ship-building.

"One cannot but admire heartily the fact that under the distinguished leadership of Geheimer-rat Prof. Dr. Duisberg and others, German Chemical Industry has recovered its pre-war prominence. Unfortunately Germany is not blessed with all the raw materials necessary for a great industrial nation; yet German chemists are doing wonderful work in the field of new discoveries and producing new substitutes for various raw materials.

"These are very encouraging facts. Yet I often ask the question—'What should Germany do to attain cultural leadership of the world?' The first essential step towards cultural leadership is the establishment of cultural contacts. Happily for Germany, to revive cultural associations, many German scholars have begun to visit cultural centres of the Western world. On the other hand, in recognition of high attainments in science and industry, scholars and technical experts from various Western countries have begun to visit German universities and industrial centres. This will certainly help Germany in asserting her cultural leadership in the West. But that is not enough. German leaders should adopt some systematic means to spread German culture among the hundreds of millions of people of the awakened Orient. May I emphasise the point that to-day because Germany has no colonies in Asia and because she has no imperial designs, the peoples of the Orient—Japan, China, Siam, India, Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, etc.—do not entertain any suspicion towards Germany? Is it too much to expect that under the leadership of the German Academy, exchange of professors between German and Oriental universities should be promoted? Germany should invite best equipped Oriental scholars to study in her universities. German universities should arrange for scholarships to selected Oriental students. In short Germany should take the leadership in bringing about cultural fellowship between the East and the West and thus promote World Peace."

THE WAY TO HINDU SOLIDARITY [1]

To help to rationalise and liberalise Hinduism, to cultivate public spirit in the younger generation, to promote plain living and high thinking, to help to solidarise the Hindu people and the Indian people, utterly distracted at present, and broken into thousands of incongruous and mutually repellant fractions, without a common soul, without a common intelligence, without a common interest and ideal to guide them as a beacon-light in the darkness—this was the motive which brought about the birth of the Central Hindu College and nourished its infancy and childhood. I like to believe that this same motive continues to inspire it in its blooming adolescence as the Hindu University.

No people have finer ideals in their traditions than the Hindus; none have more sadly perverted and distorted their ideals and dragged them in the mire as we have done. No people have more far-reaching solutions of human problems in all departments of life; none are so mismanaging them in practice. The most burning problem of the day, in the terms most in vogue at present, is the reconciling of the individual and society, of the one and the many. In Religion and Ethics, in Dharma and Law—spiritual and temporal—the seers of the Vedas make this reconciliation on the largest possible scale, by saying

यस्तु सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मन्येवानुपश्यति ।
सर्वभूतेषु चात्मानं ततो न विजुगुप्सते ॥

Isha Upanishad.

* Address delivered by Dr. Bhagavan Das at the Benares Hindu University Convocation on December 1st, 1928, on the occasion of the conferment on him of the honorary degree of D Lit. by the University.

And Vyāsa, the arranger of the Vedas, adds,

आत्मनः प्रतिकूलानि परेषां न समाचरेत् ।
यद्यदात्मनि चेच्छेत तत्परस्यापि चिंतयेत् ॥

Mahābhārat, Shāntiparva.

" See God in your Self and in all, and see all in God, *i.e.*, your Self ; and therefore do unto others as you would be done by, and do not do unto them what ye would that they should not do unto you." Manu, Vyāsa and Krishṇa tell us—

बुद्धौ शरणमन्विच्छ ··· बुद्धिनाशात्प्रणश्यति ॥

Gītā.

प्रत्यक्षं चानुमानं च शास्त्रं च विविधागमम् ।
त्रयं सुविहितं कार्यं धर्मशुद्धिमभीप्सता ।
यस्तर्केणानुसंधत्ते स धर्मं वेद नेतरः ॥

Manu.

हेतुभिर्धर्ममन्विच्छेन्न लोकं विरसं चरेत् ।

Mahābhārat, Shāntiparva.

" Seek refuge in rationality; he who loses reason, loses himself." " Cultivate Reason diligently; he who does not know the reason for the law, cannot really know the law ; reason, reasonableness, rationality, is the only ratio-maker, relation-maker, synthesiser, reconciler. Base your laws, spiritual and temporal, on the accumulated stores of science, checked by first-hand observation and critical argument."

In Science and Philosophy, Krishṇa has described the ideal :

यदा भूतपृथग्भावमेकस्थमनुपश्यति ।
तत एव च विस्तारं ब्रह्म संपद्यते तदा ॥

Gītā.

" Knowledge is completed and self-realisation is fulfilled, only when the many has been traced back to the One, and the One traced out into the Many." Organised knowledge is Science;

completely organised knowledge is Philosophy. The seeing of similarity in diversity is science, the science of the Finite; the seeing of Unity in diversity is Philosophy, the Science of the Infinite.

In Politics, Manu has declared

सर्वं परवशं दुखं सर्वमात्मवशं सुखम् ।

Manu.

and the Upanishat says

आत्मानंदः, आत्मक्रीड़ः, आत्मतृप्तः स्वराड् भवति ।

Chhāndogya.

" The rule of the Self is happiness, the rule of another is misery ; the rule of the self, Ātma, not of the Body, which is the first " other," the rule of the higher self moved by philanthropy, not of the lower self moved by the selfish baser passions." And Shaṅkara explains

राजा प्रजानां स्वामी स्याद् राज्ञः स्वामी पुरोहितः ।

Shukranīti.

" The King, *i.e.*, the executive authority, is the ruler of the people ; but the wise man ' who has been placed in front,' has been selected and elected by the people as their well-wisher, the maker of beneficent laws, धर्मकार्येषु, धर्मनिर्माणकार्येषु, लोकहिताय लोकैः पुरः अग्रे हितः प्रणिहितः पुरोहितः—he is the ruler, the controller, of the executive authority, symbolised by the King."

In Economics, the problem of the conflict between individualism and socialism, between the claims of the individual and of society, has its direct origin. This problem is soluble only by a proper social organisation, as is becoming recognised in the West also. Our ancient ideal solution is the *varṇa, āshrama dharma, samāja-vyavasthā*, and *loka-sangraha*. Krishṇa and Vyāsa say

चातुर्वर्ण्यं मया सृष्टं गुणकर्मविभागशः ।
कर्माणि प्रविभक्तानि स्वभावप्रभवैर्गुणैः ॥

Gītā.

ब्राह्मं सर्वं जगत्सृष्टं कर्मभिर्भिन्नतां गतम् ॥

Mahābhārat, Vanaparvā.

"Human nature divides human beings into four broad vocational classes or orders, the four natural estates of every civilised realm. Social organisation requires that every one should perform his appropriate special function. Difference of temperament and specialisation of functions have produced the difference of orders." This ancient social organisation based on the firm rational ground of Karma, *i.e.*, specific temperamental function and worked out in practice with all its essential implications of the *vibhāgā* of *Karma* and *jīvikā* and *eshaṇā* and *ṭoshaṇā*, the division of labour, the equitable partition, in accordance with the vocational aptitude and the special temperament of each individual, of functions and duties, of corresponding rights and means of living, of necessaries as well as comforts, and of the ambitions and prizes of life, which serve as the indispensable spurs to activity and bring out the best powers of each—(the failure to provide which spurs is the greatest weakness of modern socialist schemes)—this ancient social organisation was calculated to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But shifted from that basis to one of mere *janma*, mere birth, and ignoring all individual fitness and vocational aptitude, it has become the source of the greatest misery and confusion to our people, a curse instead of a blessing.

Finally, in the department of Education, which is the very foundation of civilised life, the old ideal was the *gurukula*. Here only can the special temperament and the peculiar vocational aptitude of each individual be ascertained and properly cultivated, so that he may take his proper place in the social organisation. Manu, our first law-giver, has said :

आचार्यस्त्वस्य यां जातिं विधिवद् वेदपारगः ।
उत्पादयति सावित्र्या सा सत्या साऽजराऽमरा ॥

Manu.

By a little stretching, in accordance with the needs of the day, we may well intrepret this to mean that the true and proper *varṇa* of the student was specified by the head of the *Gurukula*, the University, at the *Samāvartana*, the Convocation ceremony of the ancient time, and his entrance into appropriate vocation and successful life made easy thereby.

Such I believe are the traditional ideals of this land, and we have cast them into the mire and wandered far away from them. I wish to believe that this great Institution will lift them up carefully and tenderly, will wash them clean, will set them on high, will advance them forwards, and will invite the Indian people to come to them and follow them. If I were not allowed to hold this belief, my heart would feel ill at ease under the honour you have conferred on me to-day. But I see good signs around me, and many reasons to hope and believe that the younger generation, even among those sections of our people which have so far preferred the narrower and more separative views and interpretations, are slowly but steadily turning to the broader, more rational and liberal and solidarising views of Hinduism, and I trust that this Hindu University will help on the good work more and more strongly, day after day, in the future.

I therefore offer grateful thanks to the authorities of this University for their kind gift to me, and I pray with all my heart that this great institution may prosper and increase from day to day, and nobly do its duty to the motherland.

BHAGAVAN DAS

THE WILD ROSE

The wild rose whispers in the breeze,
I know not what it sings,—
But dim—remembered Past doth seize
My pulse with million things ;
What aches in me, what stirs my deep?
And ages fraught with dreams do leap ;—

The dripping cave in ancient hills
Where, of a rainy day,
Midst murmurs wild of misty rills
A Caveman quiet I lay,—
I saw the wild rose trembling fair
Amidst my loved barbarian's hair.

The wild rose sparkles in the sun,
I know not what it hints ;—
But Babel dawnings half begun
Glimmer thro' its tints ;
I stood entranced above the Tower
And hailed it glancing thro' the bower.

The wild rose opes its petals deep,
I know not why it wails,—
But twilight Egypt wakes from sleep,
Her wonders all unveils ;
It saw my gipsy phantom gleam
Thro' fanes where now the mummies dream

The wild rose glistens in the dew,
Its meaning none can say,—
But dreams of Hellas come anew

Dim, confused and grey.
Meseems I saw the wild rose shine
On Enna field of Proserpine.

The wild rose keeps within its fold
The notes of Sappihic lyre,
When Alcaeus pined in Lesbos old
And Phaon flashed with fire ;
It trembled when on Colchis strand
I stood a-thrill with Jason's band.

It toss'd its head by Trojan field
And quiver'd in my view ;
Thro' elfin ramblings joy did yield
To us Odysseus' crew ;
It cheered Ulysses' fading hope
Who dizzy dreamed of Penelope.

Within its heart it keeps of old
Helen's joys and fears ;
Its chalice softly doth enfold
The sad Œnone's tears,
Methinks as Paris saw the flower
That chid me sweet in Ida's bower.

The wild rose tingled in the wood
Mid glamours that are gone,
When an Aryan here I stood
In Ind and hymned the dawn ;
It moans for things it ne'er can see
To-day, and tearful pities me.

It takes me far, I farther move
Thro' lands of tilting knights,
Thro' dreams delirious, flaming love,

And passions holy fights ;
Midst ringing tourney's dizzy hour
My damsel rained on me the flower.

Time recedes, all limits cease,
Then steals the dawn anew,
When along the dusty breeze
My spacious spirit flew ;
I rolled thro' seas, I shone in star,
And twinkled in the gossamer.

I smelt thy hint, thou stirred to be,
And I thy only pair,—
Thro' years mysterious beck'ning me—
My lyric love and fair ;
A symbol thou of crimson deep
Of which my soul doth image keep.

The wild rose fades away in gloom,
It sickens, pales and dies.
"Alas for love. Is this thy doom?"
The ancient mate thus cries ;—
The flower whispers from the sod
"I'll greet thee in the breast of God."

H. BHATTACHARYYA

PRASAṄGĀNUMĀNA

In view of the importance of Prasaṅgānumāna as a logical weapon used with telling effect in the philosophical literature of medieval India and in view of the divergence of opinion regarding its validity as an instrument of knowledge, we propose to give an exposition of the nature and function of prasaṅgānumāna. It is a hypothetical negative argument devised to point out logical defects in the position of the adversary. The word 'prasaṅga' has been given as the synonym of 'tarka' by Vācaspati Miśra and 'tarka,' though included in the list of the sixteen logical categories enunciated in the first aphorism of the Nyāyasūtra, is not regarded as an independent instrument of valid knowledge by the Naiyāyikas. It is regarded as an indirect proof, requisitioned to strengthen the desired conclusion by showing that the contradictory is not a supposable alternative. Tarka has been defined by Jayanta as "Presumptive evidence in favour of one of the two doubtful alternatives by showing the reason conducive to the establishment of the thesis."[1] "In tarka, or indirect proof, we start with a wrong assumption and show how it leads to absurdities..... The admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major."[2] "The older Nyāya admits eleven kinds of tarka, which the modern reduce to five, of which the chief is the *reductio ad absurdum*, called pramāṇabādhitārthaprasaṅga. The other four are ātmāśraya, or *ignoratio elenchi*; anyonyāśraya, or mutual dependence; cakraka, or circular reasoning, and anavasthā, or infinite regress. Even the *reductio ad absurdum* is re-

[1] 'Sandigdhe'rthe'nyatarapakṣānukūlakāraṇadarśanāt tasmin sambhāvanāpratyayastarkaḥ.'—N.M., p. 8.

[2] *Vide* Prof. Radhakrishnan's 'Indian Philosophy,' Vol. II, p. 114. *Cf.* 'Sa cāyaṁ tarko vyāpakābhāvavattvena nirṇīte dharmiṇi vyāpyasyāhāryāropād vyāpakasyāhāryāropalakṣaṇaḥ.' (C. K. Tarkālaṅkāra's ṭīkā on Nyāya-Kusumāñjalī, p. 5.)

[3] *Op. cit.*

garded as a case of fallacious reasoning, since it derives a conclusion which is absurd!" Prasaṅgasādhana can be subsumed under the last variety of tarka, *viz.*, the '*reductio ad absurdum*,' subject to a necessary qualification. Prasaṅgasādhana differs in a very material respect from '*reductio ad absurdum*,' *viz.*, that whereas the latter is requisitioned to prove the justice or correctness of a particular syllogistic argument by showing the contradictory supposition to be false, the former is employed for exactly the opposite purpose. According to modern Nyāya '*reductio ad absurdum*' has a two-fold utility; first, it serves to establish the universal proposition, the major premise, in which the invariable concomitance of the middle term with the major term is enunciated (vyāptigrāhaka); secondly, it serves to prove the correctness of the conclusion established (viṣayapariśodhaka). The last variety corresponds to the '*reductio ad absurdum*' of European logic, which "consists in showing that the supposition of the contradictory of the given conclusion is false and so, by opposition, the given argument is correct." The logical procedure is however the same, *viz.*, showing the absurdity of the contradictory supposition. The logical principle and procedure are also the same in the case of prasaṅgānumāna and tarka; the difference lies in the application. The former is employed for demonstrating the falsity of a given argument—thereby showing the logical necessity of the contradictory position being accepted. In fact, prasaṅgasādhana can be included under 'pratibandhī,' a variety of tarka enunciated by older Naiyāyikas.

The ordinary rule of debate requires that the middle term must be acceptable to both the parties (ubhayasiddha) and that the probandum (sādhya) must be a true fact. But the requisite conditions of prasaṅgānumāna are that, (1) the probans (hetu) is false and assumed for argument's sake on the statement of the opponent and is not accepted as true by the arguer (vādin) himself, and (2) consequently the probandum is a false

issue, which is forced upon the adversary. (3) The main implication of such argument is of course the truth of the contradictory position, which decisively invalidates the assumption of the adversary. This form of argument has been very frequently employed with advantage by Buddhist philosophers against their adversaries. It is, however, significant that Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* is very emphatic on the point that the probans must be approved by both the parties in a debate. He has, therefore, included in his catalogue of fallacious reasons those middle terms, which are not accepted by either of the parties (vādin or prativādin). It is plain, therefore, that prasaṅga-hetu (a falsely assumed middle term) has no place in the scheme of Dharmakīrti's logic, and probably also in Dignāga's system,[1] which has been mainly followed by Dharmakīrti. In the Nyāyapraveśa and the Hetutattvopadeśa of Jetāri [2] also, a middle term, which is not approved by common consent, has been declared to be a fallacious reason.

Although the attitude of the orthodox Buddhist logicians is not friendly to such forms of argument, it is undeniable that it has played a very prominent part in the evolution of philosophical thought in India. Candrakīrti, in the course of his comments on the first verse of the Mādhyamika Kārikā of Nāgārjuna, has taken elaborate pains to elucidate the Mādhyamika's position in logic. Notwithstanding the fact that the metaphysical position of absolute scepticism, which he adopts, precludes him from admitting the truth of, and

[1] The present writer is indebted to Prof. S. N. Dāsgupta and Prof. G. Tucci for the privilege of looking into the proofs of Dignāga's Nyāyamukha, translated into English from the Chinese version of the same by Prof. G. Tucci. It is gratifying that the present writer's conjecture has been confirmed, as Dignāga is insistent on the middle term being accepted by common consent.

[2] The Hetutattvopadeśa of Jetāri is lost in the Sanskrit original, but it has been reconstructed from Tibetan by my pupil, Mr. Durgacaran Chatterjee, M.A. The reconstructed text with the Tibetan version and copious critical notes and an informing introduction is ready for printing. When published, it will be welcomed as a really scholarly work.

so advancing at his own initiative, any of the premises of a syllogistic argument, the Mādhyamika can, Candrakīrti argues, refute the arguments of his antagonists without prejudice to his philosophical predilections by the aid of Prasaṅgānumāna. He, however, declines to be committed to the necessity of the contradictory proposition being established, as a Mādhyamika cannot have *ex hypothesi* any position of his own. He thinks that his duty consists in showing contradiction in the adversary's position and not proving any paricular thesis of his own. In fact, he has no thesis in philosophy save and except that nothing can be proved.[1] A divergence of opinion, regarding the necessity of the contradictory position being accepted, which is the third condition of prasaṅgānumāna, seems to have been responsible for the two main divisions of Nāgārjuna's followers into the Prāsaṅgika and Svātrantika schools, the latter insisting on the necessity of independent arguments for the refutation of the contradictory implication of a prasaṅgānumāna. So in this respect, the historical importance of prasaṅgānumāna cannot be overestimated. Śrīdhara, in his Nyāyakandalī, makes mention of prasaṅgasādhana, which is the same thing as prasaṅgānumāna, sādhana and anumāna being synonymously used. He says "Prasaṅgasādhana is not employed for establishing one's thesis, but for bringing home an undesirable contingency in the opponent's position. And an undesirable contingency can be brought home by means of the data which are admitted by the opponent himself. It is not necessary that the argument, in order to be valid, should be recognised as valid and true by the arguer himself. The opponent cannot make a grievance of it and refuse to be convinced, though he himself admits every word of the argument to be true." [2]

[1] 'Tataśca parapratijñāpratiṣedhamātraphalatvāt prasaṅgāpādanasya nāsti prasaṅgaviparyayāpattiḥ. Tathā cācāryo bhūyasā prasaṅgāpattimukhenaiva paroktāni nirākarotisma.' *Vide* Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti under Kār. I of M.K., p. 6. (B.T S.).

[2] Prasaṅgāpādanañca na svapakṣasādhanāyopādīyate, kintu parasya aniṣṭāpādanār-

Śāntarakṣita, who is believed to have flourished in the 8th century, and his disciple, Kamalaśīla, have made use of prasaṅgānumāna in several places in the Tattvasaṅgraha and the Pañjikā. In course of refuting the Mīmāṁsā argument 'that the Vedas are eternal and self-evident truths, as they are not the handiwork of any human author,' Śāntarakṣita points out that the Vedas would become unmeaning, if they were independent of an author, as the truth or falsity of a statement is relative to the veracity or mendacity of the speaker, and the speaker being absent, the truth or otherwise of the Vedic statements would become impossible of ascertainment. Kamalaśīla in his Pañjikā observes in this connexion that the argument (of Śāntarakṣita) is a prasaṅgasādhana and not an independent argument, as the conclusion is obviously contrary to experience (the Vedas having a determinate meaning), and the reason, akartṛkatva (independence of human authorship), is not approved by both the parties. But these two contingencies are allowable in a hypothetical argument of the type of *reductio ad absurdum*.[1]

The Naiyāyikas, however, do not subscribe to the aforesaid position, of the Buddhists. They do not recognise prasaṅgasādhana as a logically justifiable form of argument. They are insistent in their demand that the middle term must be a real datum, attested by experience and approved by both the parties and not a mere hypothetical entity. Any infringement of the above dictum will make the fallacy of 'unproven middle term' inevitable. Śaṅkarasvāmin, an older Naiyāyika, emphatically avers that whether the argument be a hypothetical or

tham. Parāniṣṭāpādanañca tadabhyupagamasiddhaireva dharmādibhiḥ śakyam āpādayitum. Tatra pramāṇena svapratītir anapekṣaṇīyā; na hy evam paraḥ pratyavasthātum arhati tavāsiddhā dharmādayo, nāhaṁ svasiddheṣvapiteṣu pratipādya iti.

N. K., p. 197,

[1] Prasaṅgasādhanam etad draṣṭavyam, anyathā hi svātantryeṇa sādhane dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ syāt. Tathā hi 'Agnihotram juhuyāt svarga-kāma' ityadi vākyād arthapratītir bhavanty upalabhyata eva, na ca dṛṣṭamapathotuṁ śakyate, na ca akartṛkatvam ubhayasiddham ityasiddhaś ca hetuḥ syāt, prasaṅgasādhane tu dvayam apy aduṣṭam.' T. S. P. P. 437., under śls. 1502-3,

an independent one, the probans must be attested by one's own personal experience ; otherwise it (the probans) will fail to be appropriate. Kamalaśīla observes that the penalty of violation of this principle will be the fallacy of unproven middle term.[1]

Jayantabhaṭṭa, the author of the Nyāyamañjarī, has an occasion to speak of prasaṅgasādhana in connexion with his animadversion on Kumārila for his denial of an omniscient yogin. Kumārila declares that even the supersensuous perception of a yogin is not competent to envisage the real nature of dharma (duty). Jayantabhaṭṭa in opposing Kumārila says, "if yogic perception be an established fact, your argument is vitiated by self-contradiction ; if however it is non-existent, the middle term is unproven in respect of an unreal subject (āśrayāsiddha). You have yourself stated the dictum in rebutting the doctrine of subjective idealism (of the Buddhists) that no inference is possible from unreal data merely on the strength of other people's belief. And as a (supposed) middle term, accepted only by the adversary, cannot prove the probandum, so also a (supposed) minor term, accepted only by the opponent, is not an acceptable datum."[2]

"It may be argued that it is a case of prasaṅgasādhana and prasaṅga means the demonstration of a defect in an opponent's position by means of the data accepted by the latter..... No, this cannot be approved. Because, prasaṅgasādhana is a form of argument, which is as unreal as a fresco-painting

[1] Śaṅkarasvāmin is an older Naiyāyika, who is completely ignored in the Brāhminical works and so would have been totally forgotten but for the quotations of his views in the Tattvasaṅgraha and the Pañjikā. The opinion referred to is embodied in the following verse : Svātantryeṇa prasaṅgena sādhanaṁ yat pravarttate.
Svayaṁ tadupalabdhau hi satyaṁ saṅgacchate na tu,
T. S., Śl. 614.

'Anyathā hyasiddhatādoṣaḥ syāt.' T. S. P., under the above.

[2] Parasaṁsiddhamūlaṁ ca nānumānaṁ prakalpate.
Uktaṁ bhavadbhir evedaṁ nirālambanadūṣaṇam.
Sādhyasiddhir yathā nāsti parasiddhena hetunā.
Tathaiva dharmisiddhatvaṁ parasiddhyā na yujyate. N. M., p, 102.

without on a wall. Certainly a dissertation on the fragrance or otherwise of a sky-flower cannot be a justifiable procedure.''[1]

The refusal of the Naiyāyika to regard prasaṅgānumāna as a valid means of cognition stands on a par with their denial of tarka as an independent means of knowledge. Hemacandra Sūri in his Pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā and Ratnakīrti in his 'Kṣaṇa-bhaṅgasiddhi' have elaborately criticised the Naiyāyika position and they have made no scruple to declare that the denial of validity to tarka is due to the cussedness of the Naiyāyika and has no logic in its support. Without taking sides, we can legitimately hold that prasaṅgasādhana has been wielded as a potent logical weapon in the tangled controversies of the medieval age and is regarded as the only acceptable form of argument by the Mādhyamika school. Whatever be the logical merits of it as a valid syllogistic reasoning, the historical importance of prasaṅgasādhana cannot he underrated by any scrupulous student of Indian thought.[2]

SATKARI MOOKERJEE

[1] Tatraitat syāt prasaṅgasādhanamidam, prasaṅgaś ca paraprasiddhyā parasyāniṣṭāpādanam ucyate.....Naitadevam.

Prasaṅgasādhanaṁ nāma nāstyeva paramārthataḥ.
Taddhi kuḍyaṁ vinā tatra citrakarmeva lakṣyate.
Na hi nabhaḥkusumasya saurabhāsaurabhavicāro yuktaḥ.

Nyāyamañjarī, pp. 102-103.

[2] For a convenient understanding of the nature and function of prasaṅgasādhana as an invalidating form of argument we propose to give a concrete illustration in Aristotelian syllogistic form as follows :—

(A) The Mīmāṁsaka's argument—
All statements that have no authors are infallible,
Vedic statements are those that have no authors.
∴ Vedic statements are infallible.

(B) The Buddhist's argument—
All statements that have no authors are unmeaning,
Vedic statements are those that have no authors.
∴ Vedic statements are unmeaning.

The syllogism (B) is a prasaṅgasādhana in relation to the syllogism (A), as the latter is invalidated by the former.

N.B.—I thank my friends Dr. Susil Kumar Maitra, M.A., Ph.D., and Mr. Asananda Nag, B.A., an astute student of Indian and European philosophy, for drawing my notice to the *inappropriateness* of my using the terminology of European logic for elucidating the concepts of Indian logic. There is a fundamental difference between Indian *Nyāya* and European syllogism in that the former is not content with formal consistency alone, but insists on the material truth of the premises and the conclusion, whereas formal consistency is the only criterion of Aristotelian syllogism. In fact, the whole controversy in connexion with prasaṅgasādhana would not have arisen at all, if formal consistency had been regarded as the satisfying test of an argument by Indian logicians. But my apology for the use of European terms is that they are the nearest equivalents of Indian logical concepts and in this I have only followed in the footsteps of veteran scholars like the late Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Dr. Ganganath Jha, Prof. Radhakrishnan and others, The readers are requested to bear this distinction in mind to guard against an obvious misunderstanding.

THE FASCIST MOVEMENT IN ITALY

II

It has been widely advertised both within the borders of Italy and in foreign countries that the magic touch of Mussolini's hand at once arrested the rapid decline of the *lira* and forced it up, reduced expenditure, increased the revenue, considerably retrenched the over-crowded Civil Service, balanced the State budget, stopped strikes and lock-outs, increased the productivity of the country, established law and order, and enhanced the national prestige in foreign countries. In short, Mussolini has been credited with having effected a miraculous transformation in every branch of Italian life.

When the Fascists came into power the deficit in the budget was estimated at four milliards. The progressive improvement of the budget during the five years after the War gave the following figures : twenty-two milliards deficit in 1918; seven milliards in 1919 ; seventeen milliards in 1920 ; fifteen milliards in 1921 ; four milliards in 1922. Considering the strain imposed by the War, the financial resources of the country and the state of the budget of other countries like France and Germany, it must be conceded that the work of the previous Governments was not negligible. Moreover, various measures had already been initiated by the pre-Fascist Cabinets to cope with the remaining deficit and the budget would have been balanced soon.

The financial policy of the Fascist Government was decidedly unsound from the economic standpoint. Thus while the State was staggering under a huge budgetary deficit, Mussolini's Government, among others, repealed the Giolittan legislation relating to the inscription of securities and the levy of death duties. The consequent deficit in the revenue was sought to be made good by taxing the poorer and working classes and by the time-honoured method of inflation.

Contrary to his repeated promises, Mussolini has failed to

effect any appreciable retrenchment in the Public Services. In one respect the State expenditure has presumably gone up, for, Mussolini has to maintain a larger secret service as well as a numerous body of propagandists both at home and abroad. The budget figures are most unreliable and, it is said, much window-dressing is practised here. Moreover, there is another circumstance which is fraught with grave consequences, and this is that a few persons, who are not necessarily honest,[1] prudent and patriotic, are able to dispose of milliards of public money even in the interests of private concerns, without either public or parliamentary control.

Soon after his accession to power, Mussolini declared that he would bring about a rapid rise in the *lira*. But here the Black Shirt, with his bludgeon and castor-oil bottle, could not help the 'Duce,' and between 1922 and 1925, the 'lira depreciated nearly a third'; and inflation chiefly accounts for this depreciation. It is only recently that Mussolini adopted the sound policy of devaluation which resulted in a greater stability of internal prices. On December 21st, 1927, Mussolini announced the return of Italian currency to a gold basis with the stabilisation of the *lira* at 92·46 to the pound sterling.[2]

A Royal Decree of January 15th, 1923, instituted the "Volunteer Militia for National Safety," to be recruited from among the Fascists whose character and qualities are vouched for by the Prime Minister and the Fascista authorities to whom he delegates his powers. The force "is at the service of God and the Fatherland and *under the orders of the head of the Government.*" The necessity for such a Militia is plain enough. Mussolini knows that he does not enjoy the confidence of the majority of the people; and he cares but little for this

[1] *Cf.* Prezzolini; Fascism, pp. 60-61, "With a few notable exceptions rumour had it that corruption was practised in the Fascist Government...It is a significant fact that Fascists who had been poor before the "March on Rome" became "rich after a year of political life, whereas honest politics have always tended to render their protagonist poor."

[2] The Annual Register, 1927, p. 149.

confidence, as he himself says, "I declare that, if possible, I want to govern with the consent of the majority of the people, but whilst waiting for this consent to be formed ..I collect the maximum available force.....Should consent be lacking, force still remains. In all the measures the Government takes, we shall put before this people this dilemma: either accept them from a high spirit of patriotism or submit to them. This is how I conceive the state and how I understand the art of governing the nation."[1] So a purely party militia has been formed at the expense of the taxpayers to insure the perpetuation of Fascist rule even against the will of the people.

One of the first measures of Mussolini was to force, through a timid Parliament under threat of violence, an Electoral Reform Bill[2] which would ensure a substantial majority to Fascism in the Chamber even though it might be in a decided minority in the country.

The mock Elections of 1924 were held under this law; and although all sorts of violence, intimidation, etc., were freely indulged in by Mussolini's "disciplined" Fascist Militia, the Opposition Parties were able to secure an unexpectedly large number of votes.

Mussolini often speaks in terms of the State and the Nation. "The State," declares the Dictator, "does not represent a party, it represents the nation as a whole, it includes all, is over all, protects all, and fights any attempt made against its inviolable sovereignty." The State certainly represents the nation; but who constitutes the nation? The Fascisti. In

[1] Speech delivered on March 7th, 1923. *Vide* "Mussolini as revealed in his Speches" (English edition) by Baron Severeno, pp. 272-73. Mussolini always believes in forced consent.

[2] The lines of the Bill were as follows: The whole kingdom to be considered as one constituency, divided into fifteen electoral districts to facilitate voting in each district, no party to be allowed to put forward candidates for more than two-thirds of the seats allotted; the results of the whole Kingdom to be added up. The party obtaining the greatest number of votes—provided they were more than 25 p. c. of the total—to win two-thirds of the seats in the Chamber, the remaining third being proportionately divided among the other competing lists.

practice, none but a Fascist is a patriot or a citizen. Fascism is synonymous with 'nation,' with State, hence the significance of such epithets as "Fascist State," 'National Fascist Militia,' etc., and naturally, therefore, the State fights any attempt made against her, that is, it fights against anybody who dares to defy Fascism.[1]

"All power to all Fascism,"—this is the motto repeatedly preached by Fascist leaders. But conscious that the power of Fascism rests not upon the will of the people, but on force, the Fascists are bent on consolidating their position both in the economic and in the political field. For this purpose, the Syndicates Law, which breaks up the population into Syndicates, has been promulgated. "The Syndicates—every kind of activity in a given district is to have two, one for employers and the other for employed—are the foundations upon which the Syndicalist State is being built. Next, as we ascend, come the Provincial Federations, which are themselves formed by the Syndicates in each province. Over these again are twelve National Federations, six for employers and six for employed, representing industry, commerce, agriculture, banking and transport by land, air and water, together with two special bodies for the professions and the handicraftsmen. Then come the two confederations, into which the Syndicalist State is divided, themselves constituted by the twelve National Federations, and finally, at the apex of the pyramid stands the Minister of Corporations, Mussolini himself, with the National Council of Federations." [2]

This Syndicalist reform ensures the 'fascistisation' of the organisations of capitalists and labourers and is simply a means of perpetuating the domination of the Fascist party. For instance, according to the law, one syndicate only can obtain legal recognition for each category in a given district ; and it

[1] *Cf.* the case of Russia where "dictatorship of the proletariat" actually means "the dictatorship of the class-conscious proletariat," *i.e.*, the Communist Party only.

[2] The Round Table, June, 1927, pp. 498-99.

must include (or in the case of an employers' association, must employ labourers who include) at least ten per cent. of the workers in the trade which it represents. The directors of these Syndicates must give proof of capacity, morality and unswerving national loyalty ; legal recognition may, therefore, be withheld from any association which is or seems to be anti-Fascist in character. As regards membership of these associations, "a good political conduct from a national point of view" is the *sine qua non* of entry. The plain meaning of this apparently innocent proviso is that the door is closed against one who is not—or what is worse—who does not pretend to be, a Fascist. Although these associations may not represent more than a bare one-tenth of all the members of a given category, the decisions agreed to by them in regard to wage-contracts, labour disputes, and so on, are legally binding upon the entire category even though the majority may be deadly opposed to such decisions.

The president or the secretary of any association may be nominated or elected, according to the constitution of the association. But these officers must have the approval of the Ministry of the Interior, this approval being revocable at any time. The above-named officers are to be aided by a Council of directors, elected by the members of the association. These Councils are under the supervision of the Prefect and the Provincial Assembly, and in the case of associations larger than provincial, of the ministry concerned. The latter may dissolve these Councils and put complete powers in the hands of the president and the secretary of the association. All precaution has thus been taken to ensure absolute control over the employers' and employees' organisations, by the Government.

Article 13 of the Syndicate Law provides that "all controversies relating to the governing of collective labour relation, whether they concern the application of collective contracts and other existing regulations, or whether they concern demands for new labour conditions, are subject to the jurisdiction of the

Courts of Appeal acting as Labour Tribunals." The Labour Court shall consist of three magistrates to whom shall be added from time to time two citizens with an expert knowledge of the problems of production and labour. The Court would pass judgment in cases of the application of existing contracts in conformity with the laws respecting the interpretation and execution of contracts, and in cases of the formulation of new conditions of labour (*i.e.*, when the dispute arises from a claim either of the employers or of the employees that the existing contract is no longer just in the light of the new economic situation), according to equity, adjusting the interests of the employers to those of the employees and in every case safeguarding the superior interests of production.

As a corollary to the above, strikes and lock-outs have been declared illegal and provisions have been made for inflicting heavy punishments on those who participate in and especially those who foment, strikes and lock-outs.[1]

The success of this bold and radical experiment must depend on the impartiality and integrity of the Labour Tribunals. If the past be any indication of the future we may say that impartiality and justice can hardly be expected from these judges. 'Judges and Magistrates are looked upon as employees of the State, which means of Fascism'—and in delivering judgments they are expected, if not forced, to respect the wishes of the Fascist Government and their underlings. As regards the experts, it is true that they are not to be representatives of either employers or employees ; but they are to be citizens of "exemplary and immaculate moral and political conduct," which really means that they are to be true and tried Fascists. It is no wonder, therefore, that "the regulation of industrial relations is governed by purely political, one might even say partisan, considerations rather than by economic ones."[2] One

[1] *Vide* Political Science Quarterly, June, 1927; "Italy's New Syndicalist Constitution" by H. W. Schneider.

[2] *Vide* The Round Table, June, 1927, pp 500-501. To-day the Fascist Government is able to control and coerce the associations of both employers and workers. But how long

cannot help concluding that this elaborate and complicated Syndicalist Law should more aptly be looked upon as a weapon for party dominance than as a sincere attempt to solve the vexed problem of the conflict of Capital and Labour.

Having consolidated his position in the economic sphere, Mussolini has now turned his attention to the political field. We have seen that soon after his seizure of the reins of Government Mussolini promulgated an Electoral Law which practically guaranteed a standing majority to the Fascist Party in the Chamber of Deputies. Violence and intimidation were used both within and without the Parliament and it was reduced to a mere ornamental body. Still discordant voices were sometimes heard within the Chamber. To stifle the least opposition within Parliament the Fascist Government have passed the Law dated May 17th, 1928, which has abolished the existing Parliament. Under it "the directing committees of the federations of employers and employees and a few other Fascist cultural associations will draw up a list of a thousand candidates. This goes to the Grand Fascist Council in Rome and the names of 400 deputies will be selected by it, partly from the list and partly from candidates of its own choosing. The names finally selected will be published in the Official Gazette, and the third Sunday afterwards the citizens will be invited to signify their approval or disapproval by writing on a ballot paper the simple word, 'Yes' or 'No.'" [1]

The first plebiscite is to be held on the 24th March, 1929, the anniversary of the foundation of Fascism. As usual this plebiscite will be attended with Fascist coercion and intimidation and the result of voting will reveal to the whole world, as Mussolini intends to show, the great popularity of the Fascist rule. A more glaring mockery of elections could hardly be conceived. The fact that the candidates are to be proposed by

will these associations meekly bow down to its fiats, especially after the strong hand of Mussolini will have been removed ?

[1] The Round Table, December, 1928.

the federations of employers and employees has led some persons to believe that instead of the old political Parliament Italy will have a Chamber of practical men to help the Executive with valuable advice—of men who are experts in the various branches of industry, agriculture, science, etc. This would certainly have been an interesting experiment. But nothing of the sort is contemplated. "There is no representation," observe the Government in their report to Parliament on the Bill, "of the interests of categories, but a choice from among the various categories, of men capable of furthering the historical aims of the nation." The Corporative Parliament will, therefore, be composed, not of business men selected for their special technical knowledge, but of men who are of genuine and proved Fascist faith.

When the Bill came before the Senate one Senator pointed out that the whole machinery would hinge upon the Grand Fascist Council, a revolutionary body formed after the march on Rome, with no basis in law. To meet this pointed criticism the Grand Council drew up a law for its own "Constitutionalisation." It has become the supreme organ co-ordinating all the activities of the Regime and will be in fact above the Chamber as well as the Senate. At the head of the Grand Council stands Mussolini in his capacity as Prime Minister and Head of the Government. The Premier is "of right" President of the Grand Council. He summons the Council and fixes the order of the day. Next to him stands the Secretary to the Fascist Party who is *ex-officio* Secretary to the Grand Council. The other members fall under three categories. Firstly, those who have belonged to the Grand Council for at least three years in their capacity as members of Government ; and some ex-Secretaries of the Fascist Party. Secondly, those who are qualified by reason of the functions they exercise, namely, the Presidents of the Senate and of the Chamber, the Secretaries of State, the General Commanding the Voluntary Militia, and some others. All the persons falling under the above categories are appointed

by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister. The third category includes ' persons who have deserved well of the nation and of the cause of the Fascist revolution' and are appointed by the Prime Minister on his own motion ; he has also the right to dismiss them. Thus all authority over the Grand Council is vested in the Premier.

The duties and powers of the Grand Council are very wide. It must be consulted on all questions of a ' constitutional character '—questions dealing with the succession to the Throne and the Royal prerogatives, the composition and functions of the Grand Council itself, of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies ; the powers and privileges of the Prime Minister ; the organisation of the Syndicates and Corporations ; the relations between the State and the Holy See ; and certain international treaties. The Grand Council also draws up a list of persons considered suitable to fill up vacancies in the Ministry, besides keeping in reserve a list of names from among which, when a vacancy occurs, the Crown may choose the Head of the Government.[1]

In view of these most important duties of the Grand Council, especially of its duty of selecting finally the members of the proposed Chamber, it is absolutely essential that this body should be in the closest sympathy with the Government and should always be amenable to their wishes. Like the above-mentioned Syndicalist reform, this law ' fastens the Fascist regime more firmly than ever upon the neck of the Italian people. State, Government and Party have now been bound together inextricably.' This law is one more proof, if further proof be needed, of the well-known motto "All power to Fascism."

The virtual suppression of Parliament soon after the Fascists came into power brought in its train the suppression of local self-government. Almost all the Municipal Boards were dissolved. The Municipalities are now administered by Podes-

[1] *Vide* The Fortnightly Review, January, 1928 : " The Law of the Fascist Grand Council."

tas nominated by the Prefects who are themselves the nominees of Mussolini. Many of these Podestas are men of violence and often unworthy of the position they occupy. 'Citizens pay rates and taxes which are becoming heavier from day to day, but they have no voice in public affairs.'

Woe to the Italian who does not happen to be a Fascist, for, prosperity and security are not in his way. As things stand, "membership of the Fascist Party is a second and more important form of Italian citizenship ; to be without it is to forego civil rights and to lose liberty of voting, domicile, movement, work, speech and even thought." [1] Italian life in all its manifestations must bear the hall-mark of Fascism. The Calendar dates from the coming of the Fascists into power. At school teachers have to accept the Fascist creed. University professors have to swear allegiance to the regime.

The independence of the Judiciary hardly exists.[2] The Judges have become an instrument of oppression in the hands of the Fascists. One instance will make this clear. Recently a law has been passed providing for capital punishment in cases of attempts upon the life of the King or the Prime Minister, and offences against the security of the State. Now, a man had shot a couple of Fascists. The Judges sentenced him to death on the ground that a man who kills a Fascist 'is guilty of an attempt against the Security of the State.' [3] The famous Matteoti murder trial will rank among the most glaring instances of the perversion of justice in the world.

Fascism is incredibly intolerant of criticism ; it wants that the people should submit to its rule without the slightest whisper or criticism against it. The Parliament does not practically function, the platform has been suppressed, and last, but not

[1] Matteoti : The Fascisti Exposed, p. 61. This view does not appear to be an exaggerated one.

[2] Even the lawyers have not escaped. "It is now established by law in Italy that anti-nationalists, that is, opponents of Fascism, may not exercise the profession of a barrister...." Nitti : Bolshevism, Fascism and Democracy, p. 87.

[3] *Vide* The Round Table, December, 1928 : "Italy in 1928."

the least, the Press, the great modern vehicle of thought, has been subjected to the harshest and most unprecedented censorship and repression. The newspapers can offer no criticism of the Administration and the Party ; the Prefects inform them every morning what to write and what not to write. As a matter of fact, they have only to cry hallelujah to Mussolini and his Party. A deadly monotony pervades the entire Italian Press. The public have ceased to take any interest in the Italian papers.

In the latter part of 1926 an attempt was made on Mussolini's life [1] and as a result a series of the most repressive laws was promulgated. The Press law has been more stiffened; the movements of Italians, especially of those who are suspected of having been or being in the smallest degree anti-Fascist, are watched very carefully by an elaborate secret service; the passport law is most vexatious and troublesome. Anti-Fascism is visited with long terms of imprisonment or deportation. All the political parties except the Fascist Party have been dissolved ; and any attempt to revive them is punished by three to five years' imprisonment. The Fascists have, indeed, carried things to such a point that even literary, scientific and artistic clubs are under their control. A number of other repressive measures could be mentioned.

We have so long briefly noticed the origin, progress and ultimate triumph of Fascism. It has already held the reins of Government for more than six years. All these years there has been too much talk and enthusiasm about Mussolini and Fascism in most of the war-weary European countries. The reason is not far to seek. Distracted and demoralised by the multifarious difficulties which are the legacy of the horrible War the like of which the world has never known before, many foreigners wonder whether the Fascists may not have a plan for themselves. But they are sure to be disappointed. There is nothing

[1] It is not unlikely, as Nitti suggests, p. 91, that a series of attempts on Mussolini's life have been got up in order to have an excuse for violence.

strikingly new in Mussolini's creed,[1] if he has any creed or philosophy at all. The arguments he uses to discredit liberty, democracy, parliament and elections, and to extol autocracy, force, bureaucracy, obedience, etc., have more than once been used before by despotic rulers and dictators. The relative merits of parliamentary democracy and 'dictatorial' autocracy are a topic which is very frequently discussed. Doubts are expressed if "parliamentary institutions will be able to survive the discredit into which they are fallen and their impotence to solve the great moral, economic, political and social problems facing the nations." Like all other human institutions parliamentary institutions are admittedly imperfect. But then, dictatorships are no panacea for the ills from which the post-War world is suffering; the problems referred to above, "are in themselves, grave, difficult, complex, and even insoluble, and... the fault does not lie with the political instruments" if no solution is found which is at once speedy, complete and acceptable.

Fascism is not Aladdin's Lamp that could work miracles. Under Fascist rule Italy, it may be boldly asserted, has not become extraordinarily happy and prosperous. On a fortnight's acquaintance with the fashionable hotels and the professional guides, as one observer[2] writes, a laudatory view of Fascism is justified. "In 1927," continues the same writer, "the whole country seems to be suffused with discontent on the one hand and unmistakable suppression on the other. Freedom of speech and of thought is visibly suppressed. The population seems to live in continual fear and apprehension. Espionage is rampant.....Though in public nervousness is rife, in private criticism has become outspoken. Four years ago opinion amongst the middle classes was generally favourable to the Government.

[1] In this respect Bolshevism is of interest to the student of Economics and of Sociology; for, with all its defects, Bolshevism represents an ideal inasmuch as it has for its aim the reconstruction of society on an entirely new basis.

[2] A correspondent to "Nation and Atheneum," Oct. 22nd, 1927.

Now, from all quarters one hears complaints and criticisms."... ' There is an acute economic crisis; the cost of living has gone up; taxation is incredibly heavy.' *It is not contended that Fascism has done nothing for Italy, for it must be admitted that under Mussolini the prestige of Italy abroad has greatly increased, and her voice has now considerable weight in European diplomacy. But the fact remains that the benefits conferred by it might as well have been conferred by other governments and, what needs greater emphasis, that these benefits are more than neutralised by the loss of personal safety, political liberty and other requisites of civilised existence.*

But the end of Fascism is not yet. Mussolini has often notified all those whom it may concern that he was not going to abdicate power till he could help doing it; and he has at his back the Fascist Militia ' an armed oligarchy, some hundred thousand young men of the middle and lower middle classes ' who are certainly not going to relax their grip on power..... It is true that, of late, Fascism " has lost a good deal of industrialist and agriculturist sympathy without breaking down the mistrust of the masses," and that 'practically all the intellectual elements are against it.' It may be true that Mussolini's personal popularity is waning, that the magic of his name is disappearing..... Nevertheless he is unquestionably the one strong man in Italy. And at present there is in Italy no individual or party strong enough to supplant him. Fascism may, therefore, continue, even as it is to-day, for years to come.

In the meantime, the Fascist military occupation of Italy is likely to benefit the world, especially the western world, in at least two ways. In the first place, its horrors will bring home to the minds of men that with all its defects Democracy is far better than dictatorship; and in the second, Fascism is a warning to the upholders of democratic institutions to set their own houses in order, that is, to replace false democracy by true democracy. In a way, the Fascist dictatorship in Italy may be regarded as the culminating point of Italian political evolution.

For, as the able historian Professor Ferrero observes, "We in Italy have never known a true and genuine representative system. The democracy which to-day is on its trial [1] [and was buried down in October, 1922] was a fraudulent imitation, which cloaked a personal dictatorship and the rule of a small clique, and never more so than under the long regime which has taken its name from Signor Giolitti....." [2]

In conclusion, let us hope with Don Sturzo, the well-known founder and Leader of the Popular Party and now an exile in England, that "To-day in the torment of a dictatorship that has superseded an already tottering Political Class, is the time for the ripening of the germs of a second Risorgimento, in which Italy shall reconquer her freedom and realise true democracy. For, inspite of everything, and to-day more than ever, the trend of the Modern State is towards Democracy." [3]

(Concluded)

ABANI BHUSAN RUDRA

[1] Written before the march on Rome.

[2] Ferrero : Four years of Fascism. *Cf.* also "The History of European Liberalism" by Prof. Ruggiero who, speaking about Italy, observes : 'An impressive façade of Liberalism and Democracy concealed a decadent governing class and a non-political populace."

[3] Sturzo : Italy and Fascism, p. 239.

SOME ASPECTS OF INSPIRATION IN MUSIC AND POETRY

Most of our readers will know what inspiration is, they will have heard of it at some time or other in their lives, and it is not improbable that a large number of them have actually experienced on several occasions some faint unexplainable craving after the beautiful in life, prompted perhaps by the sight of a beautiful picture or a poem, or, if neither of these, by the liquid beauty of some cadence of music that stole upon the listening ear like sunshine steals in golden glory across the blackness of a dismal plain.

I have listened to a large number of people at various times who have attempted, in most cases with poor results, to explain the cause and effect of inspiration upon the cultured ear. I have heard it said on more than one occasion that it is only a chosen few who are susceptible to that state of mind that inspiration shall be pleased to call them. This is a great mistake, and a wrong thing to say, for I would venture to state, without fear of contradiction, that everyone is inspired at some period or other in their life to do certain things, some write a book, others contrive to make a mechanical device, others a medicinal cure or preparation, others compose music ; and so I might go on detailing examples where inspiration is a direct incentive towards the conception of something that is not in existence, at least, not in the knowledge of the person concerned.

Nor is inspiration reserved to one sex alone. I could enumerate to my readers countless examples where woman has been unconsciously or, in many cases, consciously urged to some deed or act of beauty through the direct agency of inspiration, a point that destroys sex prejudice.

Painters are inspired, musicians are inspired, poets are inspired, singers are inspired, in fact all branches of art embrace

inspiration, for it is the mainstay by which art exists and flourishes.

Inspiration is conveyed by very many and devious ways. I could give as examples the shrill sweet piping of a bird at dusk, the glory of an autumnal sunset, the awe-inspiring scene of a storm, a glade of sunlit trees, a busy market scene, the peaceful tranquillity of a hill-side stream, or the placid quietness of a fishing harbour at mid-afternoon. Inspiration can be found almost everywhere that boasts any pretence toward beauty at all. The next time that you go for a walk just try to capture a little of the inspiration that lies in the beauty of the surrounding scenery, thus you will obtain for yourself a slight taste of the delicious nectar by which artists work.

Many of the world's greatest poets and writers drew their inspiration largely from two sources—Nature and Love. For a typical example of this I would recommend my readers to the works of Lord Tennyson, Robert Browning, Longfellow, and Robert Burns; in the poems of these great men I am sure they would find much that is beautiful and helpful in their studies of literature.

In the West huge numbers of songs and poems are written and published every year; from many of these poems composers receive the inspiration to write a beautiful song or aria. Whilst I was in the studio of a notable Midland musician recently, he played one of his latest compositions over to me on his piano; it was a delightful fragment of song, the inspiration for which came from a poem by Percy Shelley. This is the secret of the source of a large amount of music, even if composers do not adapt their music to the words and publish the final combination as a song, they read poems to create "atmosphere" in their minds, from which springs the elusive inspiration.

Music is not so popular in the East as in the West, at least it is of a totally different calibre, and so many of my readers will not be on intimate terms with the life-histories of

many of the more famous music composers of the Western hemispheres, but I propose to cite various incidents below that occurred in the lives of a number of them whilst in search of inspiration. Firstly, we hear of Gluck, one of the earliest operatic composers, seeking inspiration amid the haunts of Dame Nature. He wrote some of his very best music sitting in the middle of a beautiful green meadow with his beloved piano before him and a bottle of wine at his elbow. Here with the most natural and lovely music in the whole world, the music of God's own creation, flowing around him sweetly and without cease, he wrote some of those pieces of music that are still the delight of the Western world of music.

Sacchini, the Italian composer, presents a very peculiar case. He found that he wrote music best when his cats were playing around his feet! Now it is very difficult indeed to trace any connection whatever between cats and musical inspiration, at least, it is to me; perhaps their dainty style of walking suggests to the mind some intricate dance rhythm. Some little time ago a pianoforte composition entitled "Kitten of the Keys" won quite a measure of popularity before it faded into the inevitable obscurity of second-rate music. It represented, or suggested, by means of cleverly arranged musical progressions, a cat walking up and down a pianoforte keyboard, which, strange to relate, is a proceeding of which they seem quite fond. Sacchini also drew quite an amount of inspiration from the society of pretty women.

Rossini, who was another Italian, wrote most successfully when under the influence of rich red wine and sparkling champagne. Paisiello noted down nearly all of his delightful works whilst reclining in bed, where he could recline in absolute comfort and pursue the elusive Muse at his own leisure.

Beethoven, the great and immortal German composer, would spend hours in the solitary depths of forests in search of musical thought; the divine voice of the Creator spoke to Beethoven through the medium of the whirling breeze and the

singing birds, and it is this same voice that underlies all his works. He would venture out in the midst of a violent rain-storm to glory in the awesome majesty of it all. What a noble mental picture that suggasts to our minds, reader—a wild howling night, a rain-washed meadow or wooded dell, and Beethoven, exultant and enthralled, striding .across the fields, his long hair flowing out behind him caught in the playful fingers of the breeze, the thunder rumbling angrily and the lightning flashing its fearful challenge to mere man. As we listen to his compositions it all rises before us, the lightning, the thunder, the calm before, and after, the storm, the singing of birds, and the voice of the Supreme Musician of all.

So much then for the methods of the great musicians. They have sought by means of notes of music to convey their impressions and ideals of life and thought, as the poet and writer have by means of the written word. Edgar Allan Poe, the American poet, declares that the origin or the desire to write poetry or music, which are very closely allied, lies in a thirst for a wilder, boundless beauty than earth itself supplies. Also that the resultant poetry or music is the imperfect effort to satisfy this immortal longing. For it is only in the pleasurable contemplation of Beauty that we obtain elevation of the soul, and through the elevation of the soul, attainment of the Divine. Beautiful thoughts, words, characters, actions, lovely surroundings and aims are surely the ultimate endeavour of Education.

A poem, to be truly worthy of the name, must be beautiful in all ways, in tone, atmosphere, metre, imagination and form. This is where inspiration plays its part. No amount of careful deliberation and careful arrangement of words on the part of an uninspired person will produce the beautiful effect of an inspired line like the following :—

> " Night's candles have burnt out and jocund Day
> Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops."

The poet himself, when called upon, could not explain his arrangement of the words; all he knew was, that in a moment of inspiration those same words in the formation given above came readily to his hand, and if they had not been written down at once, would have been lost for ever.

LELAND J. BERRY

MILTON'S 'SATAN'

Beeching remarks that the successor to Aristotle's praise of Homer as a "sufficient" poet of human nature is "not Milton but Shakespeare." In the main, Beeching's observation is just. Milton's chief consideration was to preach the lesson that liberty consists in obedience to God's will, and in order to carry out his purpose he bowed to certain (often accidental) conceptions of God and His angels, of Adam and Eve, of Sin and Death, as they were revealed to him in the Old Testament and later historical and Theological books.

The consistency of treatment which had, throughout the centuries, characterised the other personages employed by Milton in his epic had, however, never in like measure characterised the Satan of literature and popular imagination. Mentioned only three times in the Old Testament,[1] Satan was first connected with the Serpent of the Garden in the Books of the "Intermediate" period. By New Testament times he had become firmly fixed in the minds of men as a personal being, the originator and instigator of sin and death, the source of all the ills that flesh is heir to, the head of a hierarchy of evil spirits, the great antagonist of God and mankind. For a thousand years and more, the popular explanation of the Atonement through suffering was that the Crucifixion was a ransom offered to Satan for the redemption of Man. For many centuries after the explosion of that belief the moral struggle continued to be regarded as a personal fight with Satan. Meanwhile the alleged physical appearance of the Devil underwent radical changes. As "the accuser of our brethren" he had still the undimmed lustre of an archangel. In *Revelation*[2] he becomes "a great red dragon, having seven heads and ten horns, and seven crowns upon his heads"— a thing of

[1] Chron. XXI, 1 ; Job. I, 6 ; Zech. III, 1.
[2] XIII, 1.

dread, yet of splendour. After his fall from his "bright eminence" the splendour fades and, in the medieval imagination, disappears entirely, leaving only an ogre-like personification of ghoulish gruesomeness, with the horns and hoofs of a satyr. With the rise of the modern drama, however, we discover traces of another change, which seems to harbinger the Mephistopheles—a "tricksy spirit"—of Goethe: a change, moreover, which was due; for in the Morality plays the dreaded ghoul of the Middle Ages had come to be little more formidable than the butt of the Clown—

> I am gone, sir,
> And anon, sir,
> I'll be with you again,
> In a trice,
> Like to the old vice,
> Your need to sustain;
> Who, with dagger of lath,
> In his rage and his wrath,
> Cries, ah, ha! to the devil:
> Like a mad lad,
> Pare thy nails, dad;
> Adieu, goodman devil.[1]

Milton, therefore, in the absence of one generally accepted notion of Satan, could fashion that gentleman as he pleased: and the artist in him did not fail to take the opportunity offered for the presentation of an original character. Widely different is his creation from all previous pictures of the Enemy. Gone is the gruesomeness which characterises the Satan of Tasso or of Dante. Nor is the Satan here, as in the English Moralities, a subject of laughter among groundlings. As Shakespeare transformed Vice, the satellite of Satan, into immortal fools and jesters, so Milton has humanised Satan himself. The result is that Satan immediately becomes the most interesting character in *Paradise Lost*. He certainly is the most original; and in some

[1] *Twelfth Night*, IV, 2. For the Satan of literature, see Masson's *The Three Devils*,

degree he supplies that human interest the want of which Dr. Johnson, fairly enough, brings as a general charge against Milton's epic.[1] He is both heroic and humane, so that modern sentiment[2] has given him the position of the real hero of the poem—a position, it may be remarked, which the Puritan in Milton never intended him to occupy. A lone and splendid figure, he faces Sin and Death, Chaos, and the assembled host of Gabriel unflinchingly.[3] A pillar of strength to his fallen followers, who rejoice in "their matchless chief" and recognise his superiority to themselves,[4] he nevertheless refrains from issuing arbitrary commands which he may well be supposed to be entitled to issue. He imposes his will on the other fallen angels, but only after debate has shown that his proposals are in closest keeping with the general weal.[5] Possessed of the spirit of *noblesse oblige*, alone he launches out into the scarce known terrors of Chaos in order to blaze a trail from Hell to Earth and conquer the new World for his subjects.[6] Like Macbeth, he has all the pride which arises from consciousness of merit: unlike Coriolanus, he has no trace of arrogance towards inferiors. He has sensibility and sportsmanship. At the thought of his responsibility for the sorry plight of his followers he sheds "tears such as angels weep."[7] The innate divinity, the sheer grace and happy innocence of Adam and Eve, touch him profoundly. "Public reason just," high considerations of State, alone restrain him from obeying his natural inclination to spare his defenceless quarry even at the risk of eternal damnation.[8] At the very moment when all his hopes and schemes are about to come to fruition, Eve's

> every air
> Of gesture or least action overawed
> His malice, and with rapine sweet bereaved
> His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought:

[1] Essay on *Milton*. [2] Dating from Dryden.
[3] II, 648-870 ; 871-1009 ; IV, 977-90. [4] I, 331-55 ; II, 486-7.
[5] II, 1-380 (Contrast God's manner of imposing His will, V, 600-15.
[6] II, 465-6 ; 871-1055. [7] I, 604-20. [8] IV, 358-94.

That space the Evil One abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remained
Stupidly good, of enmity disarmed,
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge.[1]

As in the case of Macbeth, conscience[2] all but comes between him and the object of his "pride and worse ambition," and remorse stops just short of repentance and reparation—

Oh ! then, at last relent ! Is there no place
Left for repentance, none for pardon left ?
None left but by submi ssion : and that word
Disdain forbids me,[3]

a sentiment which, considering the general character of Milton's God, the reader heartily endorses.

It is the tragic splendour of this figure which, from the first line to the last, dominates the interest of the reader of *Paradise Lost*. Satan is the mainspring of the action to which alone, if at all to any other element in the poem, he is subordinated. Only as a background to his heroic opposition to the

[1] IX, 459-66.

[2] A word which, as used in IV, 23, has been a source of difficulty to those critics who refuse to accept Milton's Satan as he is, but must resolve him into something more nearly approaching their conception of what Satan ought to be. According to such critics, the word here contains nothing of its modern meaning, *viz.*, "the moral sense which determines right and wrong," and is used in the older sense which Shakespeare gives it in "Thus conscience does make cowards of us all," *viz.*, "speculation on the future," "thinking of the event." " Satan's pain," says Scott, "is due not to the sense of guilt but to the fact of failure. He is not restrained by inward prickings but by calculation of consequences." Milton, however, elsewhere uses the word in its modern sense, *e.g.*,

And I will place within them as a guide
My umpire Conscience, (III, 194-5)

and it is difficult, in the light of such passages as IV, 42-8, 71-2. 79-86, 109, 358-92, to believe that the modern meaning is not here combined with the older meaning. Satan's case seems to be somewhat similar to that of Macbeth. In a famous passage (I, 7, 1-12), Macbeth states that he is restrained from the act of murdering Duncan through fear of the consequences. In reality it is his conscience which holds him back. So here with Satan. No matter what words Milton chooses to put into Satan's mouth at this place, the reader feels that other considerations. besides a sense of failure and a fear of the consequences of further exciting the anger of God, are part-cause, at least, of Satan's anguish.

[3] IV, 79-82.

will of an arbitrary God do Heaven and Hell and the terrestrial World knit themselves into a comprehensive whole which finds a mirror in every mind. It is in terms of his splendid strength, resolution and humanity that all the other main characters are interpreted in the mind of the reader. God is all-powerful and all-wise, as Milton intended him to be ; but only because He is strong enough to overthrow Satan's powers and possesses the fore-knowledge which enables Him to anticipate Satan's wily scheme of revenge. But in the reader's estimation He comes far short of Satan because He possesses nothing of Satan's statesmanship, dignity acquired through suffering, and humanity. The first parents of man are never convincingly "Godlike" in stature until measured against Satan. Adam's sentiments certainly, Eve's less certainly, are never "sentiment to which every bosom returns an echo" until the Temptation and Fall bring them within the scope of human experience. So with the "machining" persons. Gabriel, for example, wages unequal war with Satan in Heaven ; and the reader takes his true measure in the passage[1] where he needs his whole host to back him when opposed to one who, though still "of regal port," is quite alone and has, besides, lost something of his former splendour. Raphael, for all the apparent dignity of his service in keeping the rebels shut up in Hell, and for all the splendour of his account of the war in Heaven, never comes into direct touch with Satan, and so is never quite redeemed from unheroic affability and garrulity. Milton may have *intended* merely to create in Satan an opponent worthy of God and Man. *In effect*, the whole vast universe, and God and all God's creatures act merely as a foil and a background to set off Satan's heroism in the pursuit of evil.

It is not so difficult as it may seem to reconcile with this estimate the decline of Satan's character in the later Books. Books IV and V would be interesting if for nothing else than

[1] IV, 977-1015.

that in them the reader first becomes aware of this shrinkage, which, bare bone as it is, has provided food in plenty for commentators and critics. True enough, in the later Books Satan loses something of his former proportions while the other characters almost in equal proportion increase in stature. Like a pricked balloon the heroic figures of the first Books becomes deflated to the accompaniment of an "exploding hiss."[1] His face becomes "disfigured,"[2] "with passions foul obscured."[3] His "faded splendour wan" is emphasised to the point of insistence.[4] As his own "lewd hireling" climbed into "his Church" in later times, so, like "a prowling wolf" or "thief," he overleaps the rampart of Paradise.[5] There he assumes the repulsive form of a cormorant[6] or a toad.[7] His specious arguments fail to impress Gabriel, who readily finds a joint in his harness.[8] Abdiel carries off the honours of debate with him.[9] He turns tail at a sign from Heaven.[10] In the later Books he meets his match in personal conflict with Michael,[11] dreads the vigilance of Uriel and Gabriel,[12] enters into a "serpent, subtlest beast of all the field,"[13] stands in fear of Adam,[14] and, contrary to the expectations of Eve,[15] welcomes the opportunity of measuring swords with the weaker woman,[16] and fawns before her,[17] and tells gross lies to her,[18] in order to seduce her from her allegiance to God. After the Fall he slinks into the woods and plays the eaves dropper[19] before finally doffing the cloak of his pristine splendour in Hell. There he becomes an empty and facetious boaster, innocent of the great leader's appreciation of the forces arrayed against him, and is met by "a dismal univer-

[1] X, 546.
[2] IV, 127.
[3] IV, 571.
[4] IV, 835-73.
[5] IV, 180-93.
[6] IV, 196.
[7] IV, 800.
[8] IV, 954-5.
[9] V, 803-907.
[10] IV, 990-1015.
[11] VI, 296-353.
[12] IX, 151-62.
[13] IX, 187-8.
[14] IX, 482-8.
[15] IX, 382-3.
[16] IX, 479-80.
[17] IX, 526.
[18] IX, 568 ff.
[19] X, 332-44

sal hiss" instead of the anticipated "universal shout and high applause."[1] Finally, "he is punished in the shape he sinned"—

> down he fell
> A monstrous serpent on his belly prone,
> Reluctant, but in vain,[2]—

while Hell itself, the scene of his former triumphs, becomes by anticipation the cesspool of the universe.[3]

In the light of one of the common practices of Shakespeare this shrinkage in Satan's character seems fairly simple of explanation. Shakespeare, for artistic or moral reasons, did not scruple, towards the end of a play, to cause a character (a character who had been useful to him and whose very usefulness led the creative artist in him to explore his possibilities to an extent which ultimately threatened to subvert his dramatic purpose) to sink into the background or to disappear altogether. The Fool in *King Lear*, for example, for purely dramatic and artistic reasons is made to disappear. He has done his work, and his presence is undesirable on an already overcrowded stage. A reason of a more moral nature is behind the deliberate suppression of Shylock and the rejection of Falstaff, either of which affords material for comparison with Milton's suppression of Satan.

As Milton had a moral purpose in writing *Paradise Lost*, so (to treat Falstaff only) Shakespeare had an ulterior purpose in writing the dramas of *Henry IV*, 1 and 2, and *Henry V*. In the first two plays he set out to justify the unruly youth of Prince Henry, whom he intended in the third to set forth as the ideal king. Milton's moral purpose was "to justify the ways of God to men."

In order to fulfil his purpose, Shakespeare introduced a butt for Prince Henry in the person of Falstaff, a coarse, sensuous

[1] X, 460-509. [2] X, 513-17.
[3] X, 629-40.

fellow who loved sack. Henry deliberately associated with Falstaff and his disreputable company to win a reputation for evil living, in order that when he came to ascend the throne the contrast between the virtuous life he then intended to lead and the evil life of his youth might astound the nation. But unfortunately for Shakespeare's purpose (though fortunately for posterity) Falstaff almost immediately fired the dramatist's creative imagination. Out of his colossal material Shakespeare struck a perennial spring of living, imperturbable humour. When, therefore, Henry the Prince became Henry the King, Shakespeare's ulterior purpose came into direct conflict with his creative instinct. Would he, in accordance with his original design, allow Henry to reject this child of his imagination and thus run the risk of condemning Henry as the prig that historically he was and dramatically he must not be? Or was he to fling all consideration of historical accuracy to the winds and allow Falstaff to continue in Henry's good graces, and so to continue to sweeten with a spice of humour an all too self-sufficing nature? The dramatist's original purpose outweighed artistic considerations, and the reader rises from the trilogy in a sense disappointed.

Like Shakespeare's Prince Henry Milton's God has faults. Nevertheless, the moral purpose of Milton was to justify God's ways to men. In order to carry out his purpose he must employ Satan. Satan, as Falstaff did in Shakespeare's case, immediately fired the poet's imagination. For the moment Milton was on the side of the Devil, though not on the side of Evil; and through Satan, as through no other character, he gave vent to his personal emotions. Here was one whose main fault was hatred of oppression and tyranny; who, like the Prometheus of Milton's beloved mythology, defied (though not, it is true, in the interests of men) an autocratic God; who, as Milton himself had done, threw all his pent-up forces into conflict with an irresponsible monarch. Accordingly, much of Milton's own heroic spirit is to be discovered in Milton's Satan—his hatred of

tyranny, his splendid self-sufficiency, his jealousy of the interests of his party ; and it is this sublime subjectivity of treatment which enables Satan to win our applause. But, as Shakespeare had done in the case of Falstaff, Milton inevitably came to a point where he recognised that the monopolisation of the reader's interest by Satan would never do. How could he, labouring under the limitations of language, find terms in which to delineate a God superior, or Man only less (if at all) inferior, to Satan? What, moreover, would become of his moral purpose? Satan was too heroic for the scheme of his poem. He must be robbed of something of the splendour that had been his in the first Books, in order that God and his favoured Man might have a chance. He must somehow be pushed into the background. He must become a toad, a wily serpent, a liar and an empty boaster, in order to prepare for his complete absence in the final episode.

Nevertheless, it is the Shylock, the Falstaff and the Satan who were shaped in the first white heat of imagination that abide in the memory.

ARTHUR MOWAT

MERE ANATOMY

"Where nobody gets old and godly and grave,
Where nobody gets old and crafty and wise,
Where nobody gets old and bitter of tongue."

W. B. YEATS.

At some time or other over the adolescent mentality hovers the shadow of "getting old," the spectre of decay and death. One may be in the very springtide of existence, enjoying uninterrupted vitality and still-expectant ambition, yet suddenly be aware, to the astonishment of those who experience its reality, of the impending autumn of life, a prevision of the end towards which one is ever approaching. Of a surety this foreboding does not often cloud the healthy mind; the Damocleian sword is all but invisible to our mercifully obtuse sensibilities.

"The skies, they are not always raining
Nor grey the twelvemonth through,"

sings the poet, and in our youth we are more given to dreaming delightful futures than brooding upon past failures or anticipating new defeats. Yet, with all our hope, the subtle erosions of every day that eat into our lives become, of a sudden, all too apparent: we see ourselves as one disfigured might behold for the first time unbandaged her once lovely face in the glass. Years of false comfort drop away from us; we stand naked and shivering to the winds of time. And always before these emotional crises comes a perceptible lull in our activities. Perhaps we are lying outstretched on the warm sands after bathing, or staring idly through a window at drab skies; may be we are sitting strangely calm after recent exultation, or merely pausing for a moment in the pursuit of our daily routine. But

whatever the complexion of our thoughts, or however contented we may have been up to that minute, it is as inconsequent as the passage of a cloud in summer. Without warning the nameless horror confronts us. We are thrust into the presence of decay, of inevitable rottenness, and of death. We become terribly aware of our gross and uncertain physical texture ; we can almost feel, with the invalid Thompson, "the turn o' the worm" beneath our "appointed sod." From a compact young person of twenty or so we are rapidly transmuted into an impermanent clockwork of ill-assorted bones and protoplasm. Heartbeats cease to be heartbeats ; they become a monotonous funeral knell.

I have known a multitude of otherwise happy hours marred by this sense of canker and ultimate dissolution ; mornings when the chance irritation of a broken tooth in the mouth has sufficed to annul the benison of early sunshine ; whole days spoilt by the thought of wearing spectacle, while one's sight grows steadily weaker, until even strenuous discontent must be undermined and perish with old age.

Then suddenly all these thoughts (though true enough in their time) are blown clean out of mind. We rejoice ; our insane appetites for existence lead us to wallow in Barbellion and Brooke, we ape bacchantic frenzies ; we forget that we are dying. "Gold is the world, and my heart's golden," we shout to a rejuvenated universe. Plans are made whereby we shall leave our mark on time—we dream of fame and love and the satisfaction of great things achieved. Our new-found vitality (as though sagely uncertain of its presented home) strives pitifully for some permanent establishment among the chiselled stone and chanted verses of art. We even resolve to take the fields of action by storm, to win our Waterloo instead of dreaming them ; though idlers and weaklings as we are, born out of our "due time," it is only too obvious that we shall never have strength enough to elucidate our own halting reveries, much less act the *Rôle Splendide* to an admiring gallery. Like

a sea-anemone in mid-current we sway in the tides of life, and like the anemone's our little frenzies count for nothing in the end. When our youth has flowed over us inaction alone remains; we are left to wonder at former melodramatic postures, to deplore those splendidly exuberant forces that promised us so much and gave so little, and to stand stiffly erect with our time-frayed edges until neap-tide and high-tide alike lose significance to those who can differentiate no longer between them.

F. V. WELLS

PETITION

"Ab pálák úghādó Dīnānāth."

Open your eyes, O Lord of the poor, long long have I
waited in silence before thee:
Friends have all fallen away, none loveth me now:
Yet, have I not in thee a friend ever true?
My storm-tossed canoe in mid-ocean is wrecked:
Open your eyes and behold!
The day brings no joy and the night yields no rest;
Like a lotus unwatered I wither!
I cannot forget the anguish caused by the arrow of
forlornness, not for a moment:
Say, who save you can save me?
Ahalya turned into stone for her wickedness, at a touch of
your foot was ransomed:
Will I add more than a pennyweight to the burdens you've
taken for others?
Open your eyes and relieve me from the burden of sin!
In *Raidās*, my Guru I found, and on the very Root of
Creation my life-graft he implanted:
The way when the Guru showed, like a spark intermingling
with flame, my life found its meaning in you.

(*From Mira Bai's Hindi Songs*)

CYRIL MODAK

ROSENKRANZ, THE PHILOSOPHER

Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz was born at Magdeburg, on the 23rd of April, 1805 A.D. Of his school career very little is known. But there is evidence that he studied at the Universities of Berlin, Heidelberg and Halle. In 1824 he took up residence in Berlin, and earned distinction first as an exponent of Schleimacher and then as a disciple of Hegel. This change, *viz.*, from the philosophy of Schleimacher to that of Hegel, concurred with the course of his destiny, for Rosenkranz was born to apply the principles and methods of "Germany's National Philosopher" to education, history, literature, theology and philosophy. It had become a fashion in the early period of the nineteenth century to hail Hegel as the oracle of philosophy. But it was not the voice of fashion that beckoned Rosenkranz. It was his own insight which could grasp the inner meanings of Hegel's theories that led him to those quarters where he was to find the material for his life-work. At 26 years of age he began his career as a University teacher, and within two years, in 1833, he became Professor of Philosophy at Königsberg, occupying the chair made famous by the celebrated Herbart, who had held it for 24 years, and later by the more celebrated Kant, who had held it for 34 years before him.

In 1830, about a year before he began his professional career, his first literary work, "History of German Poetry in the Middle Ages," had been published. In 1837 his first philosophical treatise, "Psychology," saw the light. It began to dawn on the philosophical circles of Germany that an interpreter of Hegel had begun his work. 1842 saw his "History of the Kantian Philosophy" being circulated even amongst fastidious critics. Between 1839 and 1848 his "Studies" were

published. While in 1848 his "Paedagogik als System"—the work that concerns us, as trying to estimate his work for Education, most deeply, the work that created a sensation throughout the German-speaking areas of Europe, the work that for the first time in the history of Pedagogy philosophized on Education—was given to the world. Herbart, Rousseau before him, Pestalozzi and Froebel had been at work to give to Education a rational and a psychological basis. Europe was being lashed awake to the importance of 'developing' the pupil on lines that were in accordance with the Laws of Nature and hence best suited to the needs of young minds. Europe was in a ferment. Political revolution, social reformation, religious Protestantism, and now, educational reorganization were arresting the minds of men. "Reform" was hailed even by men on the street, and men behind a plough. It was at such a time that Rosenkranz applied principles of psychology, and of ethics, and 'Hegelianized' theories on education, hitherto advanced but without a recommending hall-mark. "This work," says William T. Harris in the Editor's Preface to the English translation, "on its appearance, made an epoch in the educational theory in Germany. It brought to bear on this subject the broadest philosophy of modern times, and furnished a standard by which the value of the ideas severally discussed by radicals and conservatives, could be ascertained. It found the truth lying partly on the territory of the established order and partly on the territory of the reformers—Ratich, Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and their followers."

Let us leave this work for a moment, and after a brief survey of the other works of Rosenkranz, return for a short review of this important thesis. In 1844 his "Life of Hegel" proved to Germany that Rosenkranz was an avowed disciple of Hegel, and his unusual activity as a teacher and author was, in an Upanishadic phrase, "to earn reputation for his master." "Aesthetics of the Ugly" appeared in 1853; "Science of the Logical Idea" in 1859, then came "Hegel as Germany's National

Philosopher," the disciple's last tribute to his *guru*, in 1870. Interesting, yea even fascinating, as a study of this work is, it would be beyond the province of this essay. Nine years later Rosenkranz obeyed the Summons to the eternal silence, having creditably accomplished what he had set himself to do.

To return to his "Paedagogik als System," we find an English translation by Anna C. Brackett which appeared as "Pedagogics as a System," reprinted from the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1872-74. Good as this translation was, it bore traces of misinterpretations. But if it soon died a natural death it was not so much because of intrinsic demerit as that of having fulfilled its mission. It had aroused sufficient interest in this work of Rosenkranz amongst English-speaking thinkers, and in 1886 it appeared in a revised form, as "the Philosophy of Education," being the first volume of the excellent International Education Series, edited by William T. Harris, and published by Messrs. Appleton & Co., of New York. Those and more of his English readers began to realize the truth of his words and the importance of his service to the cause of education. His claim to the esteem of educationists did not lie in the discovery of new methods of teaching such as were experimented by Pestalozzi or Jacotot. He had not followed in the wake of Comenius or Herbert. Yet his work furnishes a key to many a problem discussed with much volubility but left only half-solved by educational reformers from Comenius down to Herbert Spencer. His fame was earned by his genius for application. "In this application of the Philosophy of Hegel to the problem of education, Rosenkranz so formulated his grasp upon the theoretical, practical, and historical material as to have practically determined the course of serious reflection in this field since his time." [1]

Pestalozzi had spent all his energy in emphasizing the principle of *An-Schaung*—intuition. Rosenrkanz laid great stress

[1] Cyclopaedia of Education, Vol. V, p. 205.

on the principle of *Sellest-Entfremdung*—self-estrangement. The significance of this principle as lying at the foundation of his Philosophy of Education must be understood at the outset if we are to understand him aright. Man must estrange himself from his first or animal nature and assimilate himself to his second or ideal nature by habit," says Rosenkranz. By constantly removing his gaze from that which affects him through his senses, man should fix his attention to that which affects him through intuition. This principle in its essence is nothing new to students of Indian Philosophy, particularly the Upanishads, who know how " *Yoga* teaches the withdrawing of the organs of sense from their objects and, concentrating them on the Inner Self, endeavours to shake itself free from the world of plurality and to secure union with the *Ātman*."[1] This conquering of the senses in the march for Self-realization was early taught in India. The senses were said to be obstacles in the way to the highest fruition of life, *viz.*, union with the *Ātman*. The animal or sensuous nature was thus to be divorced and the ideal or spiritual nature was to be espoused by man. Dr. Radhakumud Mookerjee observes, " Thus the Gopatha Brāhmana requires the *brahmacharin* to overcome the same passions, *viz.*, caste-pride, fame, sleep, anger, boasting, personal beauty and fragrance."[2]

This was taught so that the student might come to his great work of acquiring knowledge without the fear of external distractions. It was required[3] that a *brahmacharin*, before he could learn the highest knowledge, should show that he is calm and unperturbed in mind,[4] self-restrained,[5] and self-denying,[6] patient[7] and collected.[8] Having gained control over himself the student could feel the subtler joy of the mind, having refined his nature he could appreciate intellectual beauty, having assimilated himself with his ideal nature he could perceive the

[1] Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 63.

[2] *Gopatha Brāhmana*, II. 1. 2. 1-9

Katha Up : II. 24. [4] *Śānta.* [5] *dānta.* [6] *udārata.* [7] *titiksha.* [8] *Samādiita.*

loftier and the serener meaning of life and its mysteries. Thus it seems that the end of this principle of self-estrangement is the acquirement of culture, that endeavours first to whet the sharp contrast of the unkown to the known, the strange to the familiar, the false to the true ; and secondly to create a feeling of ' wonder,' which Plato thinks lies at the root of knowledge, from which the tree of knowledge grows. Have we not this feeling of ' wonder ' created in the mind of Narada, when, after being well-versed in all the branches of science and knowledge then known, he was told by Sānatkumar that he knew "only words"? " Culture," says Rosenkranz, " must intensify the distinction between the subject and the object, or that of immediateness, though it has again to absorb this distinction into itself; in this way the union of the two may be more complete and lasting." Newman's idea of Liberal Knowledge, Arnold's idea of Sweetness and Light, Huxley's idea of Culture were not essentially new. Rosenkranz had expressed, though differently, the same idea, which yet was not his but Hegel's, and not Hegel's either, for it had been expressed centuries before him by Indian *Rishis*. Thus it happens that the oldest idea may be dressed in modern robes and sent to promenade the bowers of fame!

We pass on to the part of his book devoted to educational psychology, which should be of peculiar charm to Indian teachers as the phases that relate to *intellectual* and moral powers and their development are so analogous to these phases as comprehended by ancient *Rishis*. Rosenkranz rightly remarks, " The fostering of the sense of truth, from the earliest years up, is the surest way of leading the pupil to gain the *power* of thinking." Rousseau was on the right track when he proclaimed that illustrations were misleading and as such should be discarded and the child should be taken to realities : and Europe thought that Rousseau was speaking of some strange inconceivable doctrine. Had Rousseau been an Indian he would have found less fame, and very little, if any, of the

praise that was his! "Thus, let a *brāhman*, after he has done with learning, wish to stand by real strength (knowledge of the self which enables us to dispense with all other knowledge)."[1] Truth alone brings strength. Much learning apart from truth is debilitating. If the mind is trained to select the truth it has gained the power of thinking; for, thinking is a process of analysis preparatory to rejecting the error. Further, the German philosopher observes, "The unprejudiced, disinterested yielding to truth, as well as the effort to shun all deception and false seeming, is of the greatest value in strengthening the power of reflection, as this considers nothing of value but the actually existing objective interaction of things and events." Education is not filling the mind with a futile lumber of facts, theories and words; but it is to inspire 'Self-activity' in a Froebelian phrase; it is to awaken a keen ethical consciousness which is dormant in the child. The mind is to be cultured enough to appreciate what is true, beautiful, and just; and it is to be strengthened enough to seek untiringly justice, beauty, and truth. Every method and every principle of education are means to this end.

It will now be understood better why Rosenkranz devotes quite a large number of pages to corrective and retributive punishment. This too is an educational means to the end that a sense of truth might be fostered; and punishment fails to be justifiable the moment it ceases to be such an educational means. The distinction is of special value in deciding upon the kind of punishment to adopt in Indian schools where pupils have rather a precocious sense of honour and dignity! "Every punishment," we are told, "is merely as a means to some end, and, in so far, transitory. The pupil must always be deeply conscious that it is very painful to his instructor to be obliged to punish him. This pathos of another's solicitude for his cure, which he perceives in the mien, in the tone of the voice, in the hesitation with which

[1] *Brihadaraṇyāka*, III. 5. 1.

the punishment is administered, will become a purifying fire for his soul." It is not restriction, not coercion, but the chastisement that pains the heart of the receiver more than it wounds his body, that will have an educative value and impress on his mind the ugliness of error and sin, the monstrosity of breaking an ethical law. A penitent frame of mind will be moulded in him, and purely for the sake of truth he will turn from falsehood. Punishment is dangerous when it makes the mind revolt. Hence the psychological effect of punishment needs to be borne in mind so that the educator, like Pestalozzi's "Gertrude," might exercise his ingenuity and tact, and save punishment from abuse; by enriching and drawing upon the pupil's conscience.

Philosopher as he was, it is nothing unnatural to find Rosenkranz consider religious education the last and highest form of the particular elements of education, the *summum bonum* of the whole process of learning. He does not want an able Byron, a clever Macaulay, or a sage Rousseau turned out from the shrines of education. "The pupil," he says, must (1) become civilized; *i.e.*, he must learn to govern, as a thing external to him, his natural egotism, and make the forms which civilized society has adopted, his own. (2) He must become imbued with morality; *i.e.*, he must learn to determine his actions, not only with reference to what is agreeable and useful, but to the principle of the good; he must become internally free, form a character, and must habitually look upon the necessity of freedom as the absolute measure of his actions. (3) He must become religious; *i.e.*, he must discern that the world, with all its changes, himself included, is only phenomenal; the affirmative side of this insight into the emptiness of the finite and transitory (which man would so willingly make everlasting) is the consciousness of the absolute existing in and for itself." Here Rosenkranz comes nearer to the essence of Indian philosophical speculation down from the dim ages when Vedic hymns were being composed to the brighter epochs of

Ramkrishna Paramahamsa. What else was the repeated cry of the Upanishads if it was not, "As all birds go towards the tree intended for their abode, so all these go to the Supreme Self?"[1] We are told, "Life is a festival where we may show *tapas* or self-abnegation, *dāna* or charity, *ārjavam* or justice, *ahimsa* or non-injury to life, and *Satyavācanam* or truthfulness."[2] It is said, "the Infinite is bliss, there is no joy in the finite,"[3] the law of morality is an invitation or a challenge, as we look at it, to become perfect. That perfection can hardly be approached without rigorous self-discipline. For, discipline brings self-realization. This is what the Upanishadic thinkers enunciated. But, strange as it may seem and ironical, it is an irony of fate that even in India, to-day, this principle of harmonious and consummate development is followed most superficially, if at all. The letter may be followed, but the spirit of it is by no means followed. If Education in India, in these modern times, stands sorely in need of reform, it is primarily with regard to this threefold principle which lays stress on the unfolding of the cultural, moral, and religious consciousness of the pupil. In ancient India it was kept to the forefront in all schemes of education.[4] We find[5] asceticism,[6] self-control, and sacrifice, similar to self-governance in social life, self-restraint in moral life, and self-sacrifice in religious life as enunciated by Rosenkranz. In recent times we have R. A. Lamb's appeal, "Teachers should never forget that their business is to educate and not merely to instruct, that they must not only inculcate in the minds of the pupils the elements of knowledge but also lay in them the foundations of character, foundations which lie, as I am not weary in repeating, in conscience, and courage, and courtesy." But do our school

[1] *Prasna Up.* IV. 7.
[2] *Chhand. Up.* III. 16 and *Tait. Up.* I. 9.
[3] *Chhand. Up.* VII. 1. 4.
[4] *Cf.* Keay's "Ancient Indian Education," pp. 19-20.
[5] *Kena. Up.* IV. 8. [6] *tápas.*

curriculum and school-instruction subserve this end? One must be frank enough to admit that the much-blamed mission schools only, from the times of the early Jesuit Settlers to this day, have done something in this direction, and oftener than not continue to do something. But apart from this, at least for a century of English education in India this culture-aim, this civic-responsibility-aim, and this religious-aim of education have been divorced from all educational policies and organizations. This is one of the salient causes of the present discontent in the educational domain, and a timely demand for reform. This has given the impetus, or at least an acceleration to the impetus, to the institution of Aryasamaj *Gurukuls* and Tagore's *Shāntiniketan.* It is a reform similar to that which Newman advocated in his Idea of a University, a reform that must bring truer, ampler culture into the lives of the thousands that our educational institutions are sending out session by session, that is needed in India.

We come next to the distinction of the three stages of theoretical culture in religion—(*a*) *pious feeling*, (*b*) *enjoyment of rituals*, (*c*) *interest in dogmas as such*—to which Rosenkranz adds the three practical stages—(*a*) *Self-consecration*, (*b*) *performance* of *religious cremonies*, (*c*) *trust in the divine government of the world.* For, he says, "Feeling as immediate knowledge of God, and the consecration of the objects of sense to holy purposes by means of piety, imagination with all its images, and the church services with their symbolism and ceremonial observances; finally the comprehending of religion in its highest spiritual meaning, and the reconciliation of man with his lot as the internal emancipation from the dominion of external events—all these correspond to each other." Who will deny that this is a salutary and a very desirable end of education? The epithets *Sānta, dānta, upárata* are applicable, then, to an educated man who has passed through all the disciplinary process of education, if not as the Upanishadic teachers expected, as prerequisites of

instruction :[1] But in how many cases out of every thousand so-called educated persons will these epithets be truly applicable ? Materialists, agnostics, or atheists do not, according to this view, speak highly of their *alma maters*.

Finally, he gives us an account of the system of "active," "individual." and "humanitarian" education. In the military type of Persia we see the "active" system, when all energies were focussed on conquest and enlarging territorial frontiers. We see something of this type in the period of Chandragupta, and the *Arthaśastra*[2] treats rather fully of this "active" system. In the classical type of Greece and Rome we have the "individual" system, when æsthetic development of individual tastes and personal expressions was emphasized. We see something of this type in the period which Vātsyāyana describes in his celebrated *Kāma-sūtra*.[3] In the monkish type of monastic Europe we have the "humanitarian" system, when men of religious orders spent their lives in ennobling the lives of pupils, who were often stray children. We see something of this type in the period of Buddhist[4] supremacy and up to the reign of Harsha.

From this culminates "free education," whereby in the words of Rosenkranz, "the individual ought to be educated into a self-consciousness of the essential equality and freedom of all men, so that he shall recognize and acknowledge himself in each one and in all." What Rosenkranz stated in such precise words needs to be underlined to-day as a guidance to all educationists in India, who have at heart the well-being of their country. "This essential and solid unity of all men," says Rosenkranz, "must not degenerate into the insipidity of a humanity without distinctions, but instead it must realize the

[1] Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volumes, Vol. III, p. 226, Prof. Radhakumud Mookerjee's essay on Ancient Hindu Education.

[2] *Vide* R. Shāmashastry's excellent translation, Ch. V.

[3] Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.

[4] *Vide Vinaya Piṭaka*, Mahavāgga, I. 25., etc. Also Phanindranath Bose's "Indian Teachers in China."

form of a concrete individuality and nationality, and transfigure the idiosyncrasy of its nation into a broad humanity." The advantages that will ensue from such an education must be many and far-reaching. Social good-will, political co-operation, and religious tolerance will be fostered among the coming race. No more will there be an intellectual mendicancy amongst us, asking for doles of culture from foreign universities; but we shall have princes in the realms of thought: and Indians shall be again, as assuredly they once were, 'a peculiar people, a royal priesthood.' For, "the unrestricted striving after *beauty*, *truth*, and *freedom*, presently and of its own accord, and not merely through ecclesiastical intermediation, will lead to religion," says Rosenkranz. Something analogous to this seems to have been hinted at by Indian thinkers in the *trivárga*, or the threefold functions of man, signified by *dhárma*, *ártha*, and *kāma*, whereby *moksa* could be attained, which is the end of man's highest aspirations. Perhaps it may be suggested that *dharma* can be taken to mean a striving after *truth*, *ártha* a striving after *freedom*, and *kāma* a striving after *beauty* in the highest and most exalted sense. Education serves this purpose.

We must not forget, however, that in Lawrie's words, our pupil "is fit for more than this. He can rise above mere world-citizenship and become a citizen of a city not made with hands. He can rise to the contemplation of ideas and regard them face to face. The True is an idea—it is the motive inspiration of scientific inquiry; the Beautiful is an idea—it is the subtle perception of the harmony and ideal of the concrete world; the Good is an idea—it is the comprehension of the divine purpose of the universal movement.[1] This, as we saw advanced by Rosenkranz at an earlier stage, is the goal of knowledge, devotion, and deeds, the goal of man's conduct, the goal of man's entire life as set before him by Education. It may be called—though perhaps a little adventurously—

[1] Training for Teachers, p. 104.

Satchitānanda, in terms of Indian Philosophy, where the good corresponds to *chit*, and the Beautiful to *ānanda*. So it is we realize that Education is to give man a practical and yet an ideal philosophy that will yield solace in times of sorrow, and lead to ever-widening realms of intellectual delight. Rosenkranz reminds us of the Philosophy of Education that is buried in the volumes of ancient lore in India: and it seems high time that we realized. "Any attempt to foist even the most satisfactory of Europen systems of education upon India would be doomed to failure, and even if successful would be a great disaster."[1] Indian educationists, and those in authority would do well to rethink the problem in the light of Indian thought.

CYRIL MODAK

[1] Keay's "Ancient Indian Education," p. 7.

THE MAGIC CARPET

There appeared in the "Morning Post" of June 20th, 1928, an article by Sirdar Akbal Ali Shah entitled "That English Orient," in which the writer poked kindly fun at the stereotyped English idea of the East,—turbans and fezes (rapidly being replaced by straw hats and bowlers, alas!) gorgeous shoes with curly toes, costly silken robes, handsome sheikhs, sherbet, nargilehs, lattice-encased houris, passion, intrigue and the "Arabian Nights." He deplores the incongruity of costume as presented on the stage and on the screen. "What would you think of a theatrical producer who in a serious drama allowed a player to appear on the stage in a silk hat, a morning coat, a pair of 'plus fours.' Yet incongruities in Eastern dress no less absurd than this are to be witnessed almost every day on the English stage and in the illustrations of stories in English magazines and books." Mr. Tsung Hu in a letter to the "Observer" in 1925 also stresses this point when criticising Mr. Lytton Strachey's "Son of Heaven." "Scenery and dresses are very interesting from modern European art viewpoint, only appear absurd and misleading like musical-comedy style... If you will please, as I crave, forgive unskilful pun: Mr. Strachey has stracheyed the point perhaps too much." The English idea is akin to the child's idea that the King and Queen always wear golden crowns and ride in a Cinderella coach, and is as real as the Japan of the "Geisha" operetta. Flowery *cliches* and exotic similes have sprung up anent the Orient. We are either treated to a saccharine and voluptuous vision of impossibility or dragged into depression by a "Mother India." As the grocer said to the lady who hesitated between two brands of tea, "Why not mix it?" Every country has a glamorous and a sordid side. Every country has its Yoshiwara,

its social problems, its below-surface life. Every country has its gay, joyous, beautiful aspect. The stories of the "Thousand Nights and One Night" told and doubtless embellished by the professional story-teller to a gaping circle of *illiterati* would doubtless hypnotise some velvet-eyed boy into a dream of swooning beauty, precious stones of the size of pigeons' eggs (this seems to be the stock size for precious stones!) and a Solomonic glory of riches, and like the rest of us he would suddenly be jerked out of his dreams and brought to earth by the advent of some commonplace incident. And over here we have compounded our East of a mixture of Arabian Nights and E. M. Hull. We have wrapped ourselves in a golden tissue veil of Orientalism as unreal as the wonder stories of Sir John Mandeville. We have drugged ourselves with fictitious opium, and chewed the betel of ignorance. Should we not blush when an Italian says, as one said to me the other day, "You think of us in terms of organ-grinders and ice-cream." Every Chinese is not a drug fiend, every Japanese girl a Geisha, every Spaniard a potential stabber, nor every Indian immensely rich. (This is a common delusion.) Then there are the eternal, infernal epithets applied to the Orient, and to its peoples. The Chinese are "inscrutable" (American: "poker-face"). The East is "mysterious" and possesses "glamour." China is "sinister." Sir Denison Ross in his "Eastern Art and Literature" (Benn) says, "Another fallacious expression is that of the 'Unchanging East,' and describes it rather as "enduring." Moreover he says, "I would therefore merely regard the distinction we make between East and West as a recognition of that mutual ignorance which the people of Europe and the various peoples of the East share and which is in our time being rapidly reduced, *but which can only be finally removed when both parties have taken more trouble to study each other.*" (The italics are mine.) We will let him have the final word.

GWENDOLINE GOODWIN

WIRELESS AND ITS POSSIBILITIES

A Short Review.

As we are often in the habit of discussing what in all probability were the greatest discoveries during the time of our forefathers, so will our descendants discuss in the dim future the events of outstanding importance in our own age, and without doubt they will look upon the discovery of wireless as one of the greatest of all times.

To the general public in India, wireless signifies nothing beyond the fact that it is a wonderful invention, in which the ether waves that surround us have been harnessed by means of delicate and complicated instruments to transmit signals, and which does away with telegraph wires and posts—with the incidental trouble of laying them out for hundreds or even thousands of miles in order to establish communication.

Dr. Hertz and Signor Marconi first discovered the method of transmission of sound signals by wireless and startled the world. Since then still more startling discoveries have been made and such has been the rapid progress of this all-engrossing science that it has been looked upon by scientists of all nations as an inexhaustible field for exploration, and the Big Powers are ever on the *qui vive* with regard to experiments carried on by their scientific wizards in this line.

In the earliest days of wireless communication it was only possible to transmit messages by the aid of code signals and the transmission of the spoken word by means of wireless telephony was no more than a vague hope for the future. But this hope, wild though it must have seemed at that time, was realised in a much shorter space of time than the most fervent enthusiasts of this wonderful discovery had dared to hope.

By the ingenious use of high-frequency continuous waves, and the modulations of the same by means of microphonic

currents of speech frequency, the transmission of speech and music by wireless—or broadcasting as it is popularly called—is now a matter of everyday experience.

It is somewhat difficult to trace with any degree of accuracy the actual growth of this fascinating science, but broadcasting as an independent branch of wireless was first experimented with just previous to the outbreak of the Great War. At that time only a few amateur enthusiasts, who more or less understood the wonderful discovery of Signor Marconi, dabbled in it, realising its wonderful possibilities. At the present time it has become a hobby followed by thousands, nay, millions, of both old and young people and is the main topic of conversation throughout Great Britain, France, America and Germany.

Some idea of the extraordinary hold which broadcasting has got over the Americans alone can be gathered from the fact that during the last year it was estimated that manufacturers of receiving apparatus sold approximately 1,000,000 sets, and that makers of home-made sets numbered 500,000. The money spent on the new hobby was calculated to have reached the enormous amount of £30,000,000, while it was assumed that some 6,000,000, people "listened in" daily. In Great Britain also, the number of applicants for experimental licenses in receiving and constructing wireless sets is approximated as being near a million—while applicants for transmitters' licenses number something like 10,000 already.

It is a remarkable fact that in both these countries quite ten per cent. of the applicants were boys under eighteen!

Partial success has also been already gained in the next phase of wireless—that of television or transmitting pictures and drawings by wireless. To start with it is, of course, assumed that the transmission to be effective must be instantaneous. Up to the time of writing, however, a practical method has not yet been discovered by which the instantaneous transmission of a picture as a whole could be effected.

In the following lines, however, I will attempt to give a very brief and rough outline of the method employed by a French scientist, M. Belin. But by this method neither is the transmission of the picture instantaneous nor is it done as a whole.

The picture is first of all broken up into small parts and each is transmitted separately. Two cylinders—something like those used on the old-fashioned phonograph—are employed; one of these cylinders is placed in the transmitting and the other in the receiving instrument, and both are made to revolve at exactly the same speed. Each of these parts are then engraved on separate transmitting cylinders in such a way that its features stand out in relief. These cylinders are then fitted to the trasmitting machine, *one at a time*. A microphone on the instrument is so arranged that when the cylinder is fitted, it makes contact against the surface of the cylinder. Hence it will be seen that if the cylinder rotates, the pressure against the contact point communicating with the microphone, will be greater when a raised portion of the cylinder is passing it than when a hollow portion is passing. The correspondingly varying microphone currents thus produced have a modulating influence upon the high-frequency wireless waves sent out from the transmitting station. These modulated waves are then made to influence a light beam in the receiving instrument in such a way that when the beam falls on the receiving cylinder, which is covered with photographically sensitised paper and which is also rotating at the same speed as the cylinder in the transmitting instrument, light and dark impressions are made which correspond to the raised or hollow portions of the transmitting cylinder. Thus part by part the whole picture is gradually transmitted. Attempts are being made to try and find a method by which pictures could be *broadcasted* but as yet no remarkable success has been attained. But, judging from the almost incredible rapidity with which discovery after discovery, invention after invention, has been made in radio communication within the last few years, it would be safe to presume that it will

not be long before this problem of television is satisfactorily solved.

What the future of wireless may develop into it is difficult to guess, but a word on a few more of the lines in which experiments are being carried out and a picture of wireless in the future as drawn by Professor A. M. Low, one of England's greatest scientists, will not be amiss here.

Broadcasting a recent speech in London, Professor Low traced the advance of wireless and said that, from the transmission of mere sound signals by means of ether waves, wireless has already made it possible for two people, thousands of miles apart, to speak to one another, as clearly—and in most cases much more so as if they were speaking on the ordinary telephone. Continuing, Professor Low pointed out that transmission of pictures has already been partially successful and the next step—and in his opinion, the most important step—is that of perfecting directional wireless transmission and reception. This is most important because at present there is no protection or secrecy in transmission, and an important wireless message, whether spoken or sent by spark, spreads out in every direction and is therefore liable to be picked up by a hundred and one hostile forces which may happen to have the proper receiving apparatus. The disadvantage in this is obvious, and can only be rectified when we are able to transmit a message in one particular direction and are sure that the message cannot be received by any other station but the one for which it is meant. Although some advance has been made in this direction—and the World War gave it a mighty impetus—it is still in a very crude state, and is fraught with difficulties which prevent it being used to much advantage.

Once this has been achieved, however, we shall not have long to wait before directional transmission will be further developed—we shall have warships and aeroplanes with full armaments, completely controlled by wireless from a central base, being sent out to bombard enemy ports and towns. Thus

by means of wireless, war would be entirely revolutionised and would become terrible in its simplicity of economy and preparation, and the terrible rapidity with which it could be propagated. There would be no need of soldiers or sailors. It would just be a war carried on from the wireless and other scientific laboratories of the belligerent powers—it would be a horrible, ruthless war, which would paralyse any nation not among the first in the field of science.

A nation would naturally strain to keep up to the scientific standard set up by its neighbours in order to escape such a fate. Knowing the disastrous consequences of a scientific war, nations would hesitate before adopting it as a means of settling a dispute and this would tend to develop peace and settlement by arbitration. That Professor Low has drawn a most probable picture of the future of wireless, cannot be disputed, and the very fact that at least one big Power is already engaged in experimenting with wireless on these lines, goes to prove that such a future may not be far off.

Transmission of light by wireless is another big problem in which scientists are engrossed. It is a known fact that light waves cannot penetrate opaque substances. Wireless waves can. It is now the aim of scientists to discover some means of transmitting light waves along the electro-magnetic waves used in wireless transmission.

All these facts go to prove that the possibilities of the future developments of wireless are legion.

Much has been done—and is still being done—to establish an Empire wireless chain and slowly but surely the outposts of the vast British Empire are being linked together. Stations in Australia, Canada, South Africa, India and elsewhere have been established and brought up to a high state of efficiency.

On the Indian Government and the Universities in particular, which have produced men like Sir J. C. Bose and Sir P. C. Roy, to say nothing of many others who hold the highest places in the scientific world, lies the responsibility of seeing to

it that India is not left behind in the development of this new science. It is up to them to arouse enthusiasm and encourage experimenters, not only among their big scientists but also among the student class—for mass help in experimenting in wireless is essential to rapid progress—and thus bring India out of the mist of distance and old-fashionedness, and help in the establishment of rapid world communication which would not only assist in stimulating international commerce, but also would bring about closer and more friendly relations between all the countries of the world, and thus aid the progress of civilisation and international peace.

T. NEMO

LAW AND THE OTHER SCIENCES [1]

So long as Law was conceived (as it was by the dominating School of English jurists of the last century) as no more and no less than the expressed will of the sovereign authority, and it did not matter to Jurisprudence what, in regard to any particular matter, gave that will one direction rather than another, Jurisprudence was the simplest of subjects for study. All one had to do was to analyse the "elements" of law as it was supposed to have been at all times and in all places, *viz.*, as a command *simpliciter* of the sovereign authority in a politically organised community. The Science of Law thus in a manner began and ended with its morphology. The life of law (and practically also all its contents) having been abstracted from it and discarded as irrelevant, anything like a physiology or a history of law could be no part of the Science of Jurisprudence.[2] It was on the bare outward structure of law that all attention was concentrated, function being ignored as of no account. Law was what it was, its purpose did not matter. In the hands of the analytical jurist, not Law but its shell became the one single object of solicitude to this noble science.

One of the chief preoccupations of the English jurists of the Analytical School accordingly was to guard against the danger of students of the Science of Jurisprudence being led into imagining that legal rights had any moral implication whatsoever and to decry the Fates that had left the English language with not one single word to stand for their notion of rights

[1] Read at a meeting of the Law Association of the Dacca University on 9th February, 1929.

[2] See Holland's Jurisprudence, Ch. I, specially the last five paragraphs. Even he is unable to exclude from the discussion all references to "objects" and "wants." But he has in the end to kill Law in order that he may anatomise it.

without rightness.[1] Teleology had by all means to be as rigidly excluded from the Science of Jurisprudence as it had been supposed to be from the physical sciences, so completely did the prevailing mechanical outlook of the times obsess all views concerning scientific knowledge. Darwin and his fellow biologists had not had time yet to intrude life into this paradise of forces and resultants. Teleology was an illusion—a worn-out superstition.

Having banished purpose, particularly ethical purpose, beyond its boundaries, has this Jurisprudence succeeded in guarding its frontiers against the old enemy and others perhaps more insidious and powerful than Ethics ? Did not its very definition of Law mean an abject surrender to Politics ? Law is what the sovereign political authority makes it. Who is the sovereign political authority ? Who else but the authority which in an organised State can at any given moment mobilise the largest amount of *force* to compel obedience from all else to its commands ? One day it may be a personal autocrat, an organised usurping group the next, to be dislodged and displaced the day following by another group which, provided it is sufficiently nondescript and lacking in homogeneity, is to be honoured with the title of Democracy. Might must in every case determine right, in Law as in Politics. Should there be a number of organised bodies simultaneously exerting their "will to command" at a given moment, the one power which would be able to overcome the others, or it may be the resultant diagonal of all the warring forces would determine the rule of right. This, in substance, was the Science of Politics as conceived by the Analytical Jurists. Under their management, Jurisprudence settled down comfortably as an annexe or apanage to a highly mechanised Politics which fitted in so admirably with the prevailing philosophy of the times.

[1] See Holland, *opus citus*, Ch. VII, particularly the passage where he decries the existence of more than an etymological connection between 'right' and the *eulogistic* adjective 'right.'

I have formulated the political philosophy of the Analytical Jurists in much cruder language perhaps than any of them would actually do in words ; but this, I venture to think, is the essence of what they have said and meant. But crude as these views may appear to many, that ought not to prevent us from recognising the element of truth there is in what they say. Under the Brahmin rule of Hindu India, for instance, the law was pronouncedly pro Brahmin. The British administration in India has been, for all its professions to the contrary, as emphatically pro-British. The English law which was very one-sided and pro-landlord during the rule of the landowning aristocracy has with the advent of the Industrial Revolution taken on a decidedly capitalistic complexion. It is unnecessary to multiply instances. But the point which those who draw hasty generalisations from these manifestations of the "big stick" in the communal economy overlook, is that though the law in every instance exhibits a decided bias in favour of the ruling community, it is never entirely the law of might, pure and simple. The manifestation of might is at every step materially tempered and not infrequently deflected and occasionally even reversed by considerations of justice. It will not be difficult on behalf of any one of these systems of Government (provided they have had a long enough chance) to put up a spirited plea that, if not the bases of the system, its ultimate tendencies at any rate were instinct with the spirit of justice, and each of these systems can be shown to have made its own distinct contribution to the human heritage of right political behaviour. Was not even slavery in its inception a benevolent institution, seeing that it helped to replace the previously existing war of total extermination of captured enemies?

They overlook further that a notion once clearly apprehended of what is right and just as between members of the ruling class has a tendency (according to a law of its being) to overspread its originally narrow limits and embrace within it the relations of the ruling community and the ruled. The one

poser which no ruling power can quite comfortably get over is the trite one, that what is sauce for the gander ought to be sauce also for the goose, for underlying it lies the grand principle, the golden rule of all just conduct, moral, political and legal: "Do unto others as you would be done by"—a principle which has found enunciation in almost identical language in all times and climes and still requires reaffirmation every day of our lives. The subterfuges which are being constantly set up to block the privileges of the mighty from percolating downwards, break down on account of their patent sophistry when confronted by it. How otherwise, to cite two commonplace instances, explain the amelioration of the law of slavery in Ancient Rome or the enfranchisement of women all the world over within recent years?

No one denies that the shifting of the centre of power in a political community tends necessarily to a re-adjustment of the law in favour of the enfranchised. Nor do I contest that in special circumstances a change in the political centre of gravity may be a necessary condition to a change in the law. An obstinately stupid ruling class will always precipitate a revolution. But what I desire to stress here is that, normally, the laws of a people at any given point of time are, as a whole, more just and moral in general than their makers, and that the power which makes for this apparently paradoxical state of things is the force of Conscience—the force which, be it remembered, in the bulk, is always ahead of the laws.

What I have just said in relation to Politics is equally true of Law's relations to Economics. Since Karl Marx showed the way, political interpretations of history have run more and more in economic channels and the economic in political. Politics, it is even alleged, merely stages for the drama of history events which deep down are determined by Economics. The proposition is undoubtedly in a great measure true of recent history. Religious wars and alliances are now entirely out of date. Dynastic ambitions and wars of royal succession no longer

suffice to make history. Though personal ambitions may still be a potent disturbing factor, Politics at the present day appears to be indissolubly wedded to Economics, and not in University curricula only. Both Politics and Economics, again, have gone enthusiastically to school to the new science of Biology. Both appreciate, as they never before did, the need of organising people and nations to be fit in order that they may survive. But it is well to bear in mind that neither has committed itself to the dogma that the physically and economically weak *should not* survive and must therefore be weeded out. "Make the unfit fit or at the very worst innocuous and the fit more and more fit," is the refrain which time and again punctuates the noisy orchestra of national and international politics—and this refrain is the voice, not of Politics, nor of Economics, but the still small voice of Conscience, making itself heard above the din and clamour of conflicts between the exploiter and the exploited, which undoubtedly go to make so damnably large a part of modern public life.

In passing be it noted that neither Politics nor Economics, singly or together, exhaust all human interests (I do not know whether the Freudian discoveries have been claimed by either), whereas Law touches all or nearly all human interests at many points. But both Politics and Economics provide valuable raw material for law to work upon and they certainly furnish knowledge which illumines the processes of law and law-making as nothing else ever did before. Good Politics and sound Economics react beneficially on Law just as the vices of bad Politics and perverted Economics tend to pass, as though by a kind of osmosis, into the law. Knowledge, at the present day, of the fundamentals of Politics and Economics is indeed coming to be an indispensable equipment of every scientific maker of laws. A law-maker who is at the same time not a passable, if not an expert, student of the political and economic sciences will, I believe, come to be regarded, in the not very remote future, as a dangerous anachronism. Even now a lawyer who aims at

being something more than a legal practitioner can hardly afford to neglect these sciences.

But all this is very far from saying that Law is and must remain an annexe or apanage to either Politics or Economics or to both in close alliance. On the contrary I affirm that the moment Politics and Economics have passed, in regard to any matter, beyond the classifying and assorting stage, the moment they come to the point of formulating practical ends, they have to submit these for consideration by the Legislator. The aspirations of Politics and Economics cannot become dynamic without the aid of Law. But Law will not lend its aid merely because political or economic considerations demand it. It will not, unless taken by surprise, accept the norm offered by Politics or Economics as law, if somehow it does not agree and fit in with its general scheme of morals. If by accident it should happen to do so, such a law would be sure to become a dead letter. It is therefore generally speaking not Politics or Economics which make laws, but it is Law which has to be persuaded to mould a new political or economic proposition into a living and working tissue within the body politic.

I have mentioned Biology. The debt of all the modern social sciences to this young science is incalculable. What has come to be known as Sociological Jurisprudence owes its origin to the impact of this science on Jurisprudence. It dominates the Science of Jurisprudence to-day quite as much as the mechanical interpretation of the Universe ushered in a century ago by a too exclusive study of Physics and Chemistry dominated the School of Analytical Jurists. Political, Economic and Legal phenomena are rarely sought to be explained away in these days as the resultants of this, that and the other blind non-purposive forces. At the present moment, Biology interposes as a buffer state between these sciences and a purely mechanical explanation of the phenomena they deal with. Not until the physical sciences have been able to storm the citadel of Life, and of Social Life, need any fear be entertained that they will invest

the fortresses of Mind. Law in common with the other social sciences deals with things which appertain to something more than Life: Social life (even amongst animals) is, I suspect, suffused with mind. These human sciences, at any rate, have to take into account, at every step, amongst other facts (not excluding material and biological facts), facts concerning human psychology. Law and the other allied sciences have, therefore, to be on guard against too much even of Biology.

For whilst Biology has served Law by saving it from the mechanics of Physics and Chemistry, she is by no means averse from forging other fetters to bind Law on her own account. There was a period when all social phenomena were sought to be explained as the reactions upon life of the environment, as "tropisms" of some sort or other. It looked almost as if the social sciences had been saved from the clutches of Mechanics only to be handed over to Geophysics. But this could not be but other than a passing phase. The tendency now is to regard geography and environment as *factors* in the evolution of legal and other human institutions. "Factor," I suppose, is the right word in the context. Economics, Biology, Politics, Psychology—all contribute "factors" in the evolution of law, and there is no department of life which does not do the same in one way or another.

Therefore the Science of Law will seek enlightenment from every quarter, from Biology and Psychology just as it will from Politics and Economics. It is said that Law is slipping away from Religion, if it has not done so altogether; just as it used to be said that it had rid itself once for all of the prudish chaperonage of Ethics. I hope, I have demonstrated that the last proposition, to say the least, is very largely wide of the truth. As I have shown on a previous occasion, if there is one thing more than another which constantly dominates Law, it is Morals. Law has in consequence ceased from the preposterous task of organising Morals and is ceasing in increasing measures to organise Religion. But that is not to say that Law has

banished Religion from the lives of men. The feast of life spreads immeasurably beyond the bounds of law. Law is permeated and fed by morals which outspread law. There may be a Religion outspreading and permeating even moral laws. Faith in the higher destiny of man—a destiny which will not fulfil itself in some remote millennium but must be daily conquered by the organised efforts of generations of men—each one striving to think and do and give his best to the common weal may, who knows, form an integral part of this Religion.

There can be no greater mistake than to suppose that Law is a self-sufficient institution. Law can no more do without the other human institutions than these can do without Law. The object of this Essay, is by no means to "declare the Independence of Law" or of the Science of Law. The history of law itself would be a standing refutation of any such claim. There have been times indeed when one or other of the 'factors' of law seemed to all appearance to have run away with law. Law appears from such history as we have of it (and it is like all History partial and imperfect at the best, though less so than general history or the history of Politics and Economics, for Law's records have as a rule been better preserved than theirs) to have been dominated in turn by Theology, Politics, Economics and what not. Law has undoubtedly allowed itself to be influenced in different degrees at different times by religious, ethical, political and economic considerations and not always in the most beneficial manner. But all through, it has maintained its individuality as a distinct social institution. The attempt by this or that science of necessary relations (within whose domain cause is uniformly followed by necessary effect) to grab at it has invariably failed, and failed because laws are not mechanical contrivances but parts and parcels of a rational institution determined by more or less consciously conceived ends which are and have to be realised by means of selective processes (many times repeated) of trial and error.

The claim of one science still remains to be disposed of. If

it could ever be established that all laws are predetermined by the nature of the working of the human mind, then I admit that the Science of Law would dissolve in Psychology. I mention this because the attempt has been made to reduce laws into resultants of clashes according to fixed laws between a hypothetical group-monster-mind and the minds of the individuals composing the group. It is a well known fact that groups of people under the stress of emotional infection (for instance, of fanaticism of fear) do often behave in irrational unison. But this is no more evidence of a monster "group mind" than the outbreak, say, of epidemic influenza, in a populous district makes it a monster group-disease. The idea of a "group mind" appears to have originated in what was supposed to have been observed as a fact amongst savage people. It is a fact that savages observe a kind of law and order more constantly indeed than do their civilised fellow men—even though there is with them no political power to enforce it. To the civilised observer, many of the rules of savage law to which they habitually conform appear naturally to be uncouth and irrational. Observed by his own special idol, the state, the fountain of all laws, he could apparently find no explanation of this bewildering hypertrophy of law in savage societies except by supposing amongst politically amorphous savage tribes the existence of a "group sentiment" or even a "group mind" performing for them the function which in civilised societies is supposed to belong to the State, that of coercing individuals of the group into a course of altruistic actions which may be and often are chronically opposed to his personal inclinations and passions. To be able to arrive at a rational joint decision is, according to this school, apparently a special and exclusive acquisition of the over-civilised Westerner, and must therefore necessarily be beyond the reach of mere savages. Recent observations have demonstrated the fatuity of these speculations. The "horde," the "group mind" and the other "group" concepts of older anthropologists (including, I am glad to say, "group" marriage) are indeed appearing

to be even worse figments of the theorists' imagination than the much abused "noble savage" of Rousseau. "The Savage," according to Bronislaw Malinowski (an investigator who has spent years amongst savages and has first-hand knowledge of his subject), "is neither an extreme collectivist nor an intransigent individualist—he is, like man in general, a mixture of both."

The truth of the matter is that man from the moment he outgrew the anthropoid, and very probably from long before that, and certainly ever since, has been worrying and reasoning his way through, singly or in group as his lot may have been cast, in every sort and condition of environment, aided often no doubt by luck, pursued as often by evil fortune and his own ignorance, his successes being everywhere measurable mainly by the extent and the manner of his use of his rational faculties, the very faculties on the strength of which he secured his pre-eminence over the elements on the one hand and the brute beasts around him on the other. Last year I came across and read a series of articles in the *Juridical Review*, the aim of which was to reconstruct the science of Jurisprudence on new bases supposed to be supplied by "Group or Crowd-Psychology." They provided highly interesting reading, very brainy and ingenious, and gripping in a rather eerie sort of way, but likewise very false.

It is clear therefore that whilst all may be grist to the mill that grinds the Law, Law itself is not grist to any other Science, except no doubt to Anthropology, for Anthropology is the science of the whole man and not of this or that human institution separated from the others. That the various social sciences are now beginning to fall into line with, instead of over each other, is partly at least due to this new science, at whose counting house the accounts of each are kept and balanced, and I for one would always prefer to see the Science of Law studied as one of several departments of Anthropology rather than as an independent self-sufficient science. But even this

affiliation as a department of what in the main is an observational Science will not abate one jot from its ultimate subordination to Reason and Conscience. Law at bottom is rational and moral and has to be so till the end of time or humanity.

N. N. GHOSE

YOURS FOR EVER

"Shyām tóri ārati lāgi hó."

I am thirsting for your love, my Beloved!
I shall make this body a lamp, and my tender heart shall be its wick;
I shall fill it with the scented oil of my young love,
And burn it night and day at your shrine, Oh Beloved!
For your love I will sacrifice all the wealth of my youth;
Your name shall be the crown of my head.
I am longing for you, for, the season of the swing has come;
But you are not beside me!
Clouds gather on my brows and my eyes shed heavy showers.
My parents gave me to you, I have become yours for ever!
I have become yours for ever, who but you can be my Lord?
Your separation troubles my breast;
Make me your own!
Make me perfect like you, O Lord of Perfection.

(*From Mira Bai's Hindi Songs*)

GRIL MODAK

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF PHILOSOPHY

What is, and should be, the starting point of philosophy is a question as important and all-engrossing as the correct conception of philosophy itself. If philosophy is to mean a consistent account of the life and universe as a whole in all its phases, relations and inter-relations, a philosophical enquiry may take its rise in any one of the multifarious interests which may possibly engage the mind of the enquirer into the riddles of the universe. Again these interests may vary according to environmental diversities, as much as to the imagination of the thinker. Hence it is that in the cosmosophical interest of the average Greek mind we find that philosophy starts with an enquiry into the wondrous working of the elemental nature. Thus philosophy with Plato begins with curiosity, with the inquisitive tendency of the mind to unravel the enigmas of external nature. Such a curiosity can so long furnish a starting point of philosophy as the mind is lost in admiration of the objective world without being conscious of its own self-sufficiency as a conscious interpreter of it. But as soon as it has outgrown its childlike bewilderment in the midst of overwhelming influences of the world of nature, and has come to its self-conscious independence and mastery over nature, it begins to doubt and disbelieve all that comes to it from the external source. Hence we find that modern philosophy takes its start from doubt. And this principle of doubt again assumes either of the two forms: Sometimes it takes the form of disbelieving everything except whatever comes by way of positive experience and discarding everything that is thrust upon the mind by any extraneous authority; at other times, this principle of doubt adopts a method of more radical sifting of all evidence coming either from objective nature or from subjective experience until

and unless it has come upon a principle of certitude which by its self-evidence may form the indubitable type of all knowing and being. This principle is, as known to all students of philosophy, the principle of self-consciousness and that all modern idealistic philosophy is founded on the bedrock of this principle of self-consciousness.

In both the above accounts of the origin of philosophical enquiry we find that it is the intellectual satisfaction that is the moving power which set the mind to philosophise, be it of the form of crude impulse of curiosity or of the methodical doubting by way of reaching the indubitable in our quest of truth. Another current of thought which stimulates thinking in modern times, is the pragmatic interest which studies and evaluates nothing for its own sake but everything as a source of fruitful activity. It tells us that we must know things as true only because they serve us some practical purpose. This pragmatic attitude again has developed into a wider interest by rising to be humanistic in that it has no longer to be satisfied with the position that a thing is true and an idea or a judgment correct only because it leads to a successful fruition, but because it has a wider outlook that it satisfies our needs as human beings. Thus humanistic outlook is only a widened pragmatism, including as it does the whole problem of human interest, and according to humanism philosophy will have its rise in the practical and useful consequences leading to a satisfaction of human needs in so far as it refers to any human concern, whether ethical, æsthetic, metaphysical or theological. A history of thought not unfrequently bears witness to either curiosity, doubt or practical consequences as the alternate sources of philosophical inquiry. But are these only motive forces that stimulate human mind to inquire into the universe of which the man finds himself a miserably handicapped member? The universe with all its complexity and its unfathomable mysteries, with all its multifarious relations into which he is hopelessly entangled, darkening and encrusting his

spiritual life under an overgrowth of passions and desires which are not its own, presents to him a picture of veritable prison-house from which he ever makes an endeavour to escape. And actuated by such a frantic desire of escape he seeks out the light which would illumine his way thereto. To gain back the original purity and freedom from all excrescences of misery, evil and pain the human soul cries out in distress and perhaps with a note of warning to all who are in the same plight, "Know thyself." Have a knowledge of your own self in its purity, in its freedom from all accretions of the non-soul and you are saved. Thus philosophy begins with an ethical evaluation of the self by discriminating the self from the contaminating not-self. Elaborate consideration of the elements, foreign to and therefore contaminating the soul and of the ways and means whereby to expurgate the soul from such retarding elements, is found in the philosophies of both Europe and India beginning from Socrates through the Stoics down to Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Schopenhauer on the one side and on the other, from the entire teaching of the Upanishads, and from the Nyaya system to a certain extent and from the Samkhya and Vedanta systems in particular. For a careful student of the history of Indian and European thought citations corroborative of what is pointed out here would certainly sound superfluous. But as an indication of what we mean, reference to some of the leading philosophers subscribing to this view-point may not be out of place. Spinoza in his *Ethicus* P. V, Prop. II, observes: "If we remove a disturbance of the spirit or emotion from the thought of an external cause and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed." To Spinoza it is the bondage of the self to passions and emotions arising from the sensuous life that set the thinking mind to enquire into the nature of that bondage, and the life of intuition which can break through that life of bondage, that formed the starting point of

philosophy. To Kant philosophy in its positive aspects may rightly be asserted to have arisen out of his view of the moral will which is free from the excrescences or retarding content of the life of sensibility, though he paves the way for this standpoint of his by his negative and destructive criticism of speculative reason. And Fichte, his logical follower, carried to the farthest consequences the ethical basis of philosophy by an apotheosis of the transcendental ego as the moral order of the universe ; while ethical philosophy is established to be the right sort of philosophy by Schopenhauer who posits that the ultimate reality is Will and the human will which is more or less contaminated by ratio or reason is proportionately miserable and the human effort must be directed to the elimination of reason from the will and that is philosophy.

When we look to the systems of Indian philosophy we find that all of them have, in varying degrees, a reference to the ethical interest which has prompted the Indian thinkers to formulate a view of life and the universe. Even the system of Châr bâka, the reputed heterodox system of thought which has a diametrically opposite view of morality and religion to those of the fundamentals of the orthodox systems, has also its rise in a view of life which though not appealing to the orthodox school, yet after all is the moral consideration of how a life should be lived with the maximum satisfaction of the sensuous. It is a philosophy not of non-moral or amoral origin but traceable to the hedonistic interest. Philosophy in India is pre-eminently an art of life rather than a theory of the universe. It is primarily interested in laying down the ways and means to the attainment of a beatific existence, free at once from the ignorance and the consequent appendages that deprive the self-translucent ego of the clear vision which is its natural possession, an analysis, description, comparison and other intellectual modes of survey of the contents of the objective world in so far as they have any bearing on and therefore influence over the spiritual self, having only a secondary interest in it. It is the attain-

ment of the *Nihsreyasa* or the *sumum bonum* by way of the destruction of the triple misery that forms the burden of all the Indian systems. Nowhere else than in India has been the practical aspect of philosophy more adequately recognised; philosophy in India is a discipline that we are to live up to rather than an intellectual satisfaction of the curious. To refer to a few masters of Indian philosophy out of many, Gàutama starts his system of Nyâya philosophy with stating that we must thoroughly discuss the categories as preliminary to the attainment of *Nihsreyasa* (Nyâya Sûtra, Chapter I). Îswaŕa Krishna introduces his system in the same strain when he states that since every individual is found stricken with threefold misery there arises the necessity of enquiry into the means of destruction thereof and clearly elucidates, how the liberated soul, after it has attained the *sumum bonum, viz.*, its original purity which is absolute freedom from its contamination with the cosmic principle, by his famous illustration of the dancing girl retiring from the stage at the conclusion of a dramatic performance before an audience whose minds have seen through, and therefore have been satiated in, their fascination for and therefore become indifferent to her. From this it is apparent that in Sâṃkhya too a speculative philosophy has secondary importance in so far as it helps the individual self to regain its original freedom by knowing the world and is content for what it is worth. Here also we have the Socratic view of philosophy that 'knowledge is virtue,' that knowledge is not for its own sake but for the sake of attaining a virtuous life. The Vedânta system in its variety of phases may best be described as a philosophy of self-culture and self-realisation. Moksha or liberation, whose positive side is the intuitive grasp of the unity between the finite and the infinite consciousness, has its negative side in a gradual falling off of the influence of Karma. Thus the doctrine of Karma which is one of the main points of community amongst all the Indian systems, receives a searching and comprehensive consideration from the writers

of the Vedânta, whether as a disciplinary precondition preparing the mind for the heights of Vedantic thought or as the routine of life to be followed by an inquirer into Brahman and as resulting in or conducive to the attainment of Jeevanmukti, Videhamukti or Kramamukti.

The Bauddha and the Jaina systems are ethical in their origin and culmination perhaps more than any other Indian systems. They may be described as the ethico-pluralistic reactions against the orthodox semi-ethical Brahmanical systems which are more or less entangled in metaphysical subtleties to the extent of suffocating men's minds in their thin atmosphere of absolutism. And hence Buddhism turning them away from lucubrations about the unseen to what is seen, from the giddy height of metaphysics to the more tangible world of experience, by pointing out that we are but the results of an ever-continuing potency of Saṃskâra, of Avidyâ and Vâsanâ which keep the cycle of birth and death going on and that Nirvâna or cessation of this cycle of birth and death may be attained by the destruction of this potency of Saṃskâra to be effected by following the eightfold path of life and conduct laid down by the Buddha, the main spirit of whose teaching is disinterested service and love to humanity. Buddhism is a system of ethics before being a system of speculative philosophy in any sense of it.

Jainism, too, like Buddhism, is more practical than speculative in its interest. But unlike Buddhism which is anti-metaphysical Jainism has given place to the problems of metaphysics as necessary parts of itself—a fact which is accountable perhaps by its being a link between the metaphysics of the Upanishads and ethical phenomenalism of Buddhistic thought,—but the fact remains that the goal of Jainism is the attainment of Jeenahood or that level of existence which is even higher than and beyond that of the gods, not by theoretical knowledge or even by a life of intuition but by following a course of moral discipline laid down in the system. The Jeena or the Conqueror and the Ârhata or the Deserving is not any superhuman

being but a mortal among mortals exalted into an all-perfect being with the superlative of conative, emotive and intellectual powers. The importance of self-discipline has been emphasised by the Jaina thinkers to indicate that Godhead is not a thing of the other world, but lies within human powers and is attainable by a course of rigorous drill of the moral potentialities of man. In Jainism Karma has been given a more metaphysical complexion than in the orthodox schools or in Buddhism. In fact it is with the Jaina a material principle which clings to the Jeeva or the individual soul in various degrees of force and retards in proportion his advance towards Jeenahood, in much the same way as the *materia prima* of Leibnitz clouds and confuses the representation of the *monads* or potential soul-units ; and the materialised soul as the result of influx of Karma (*ásrava*) gradually rises into being a free (*mukta*) personality by the processes of *Saṃvara* (stoppage of karmic influx) and *nirjara* (annihilation of karmic matter attaching to the soul) and thus gains back its original purity and clearness which is Jeenahood.

A careful orientation of the urges of philosophic inquiry emerging in different times and climes and under diverse influences as briefly outlined above, may at least suggest that the philosophic inquisitiveness though taking its rise in some cases in wonder or curiosity and in others in the critical spirit of doubt as to unsifted materials of knowledge, either thrust upon the mind by authority or poured into it from external experience, has a deeper fountainhead imbedded in the moral nature of man. Just as it is an undeniable epistemological fact that all knowledge is self-knowledge, even so the objective of all knowledge and philosophy may be said to be self-amelioration. In this sense therefore knowledge for its own sake apart from all reference to its ultimate purpose of self-amelioration has no real significance for a self-conscious soul. A child is curious, and loses itself in admiration and wonder as to whatever presents itself to its mind in the first instance, but its mind is not yet self-conscious. A young man may doubt and disbelieve things

because it has learnt to be critical by his experience of being frustrated very often by hard facts of reality. Thus curiosity or intellectual rebuff may have their occasion to arise so long as the mind of man has not transcended either childlike admiration or youthful overcautiousness. But as soon as there begins a crystallisation of the fluids of exuberent thoughts, an introspective self-examination makes its appearance in the psychical life of man and the result is a complete veering round of the flow of conscious life from the objective to the subjective. The same remarks hold good of the conscious life in general and not simply of an individual mental life. Just as with the development of individual consciousness from boyhood to age there is a steady advancement from a mere outward or objective thinking to a thinking of things nearer home, even so the race-mind begins with the outward and culminates in the inward ways of thinking of its more vital problems. In this sense therefore there is some truth in saying that Indian philosophy in general occupies the highest point on the scale of maturescence in that its general trend of inquiry, as already pointed out, is characterised by an evaluation of the individual self as it is and as it should be. It is interesting to note that in the light of the above suggestion the Comtean gradation of knowledge from *theology* which assigns every phenomenon to divine personality, through *metaphysics* where mind deals with abstract powers, to *positive science* which accepts neither personal powers nor metaphysical abstractions but only whatever is revealed through sense-experience and generalisations therefrom, is a *reductio ad absurdum* of what we have tried to emphasise. Philosophy, if it be not reduced to phenomenology but allowed to retain its transcendental character, a *met*-emperic illumination of the world of becoming, it cannot be lost in its mere analysis of the latter and must have a mooring in the realm of spiritual reality. A scientific consideration of facts, "scientific method in philosophy," or "logical atomism" to which all so-called scientific philosophy is attempted to be reduced, may at best be a means

and cannot be an end of all philosophical inquiry which has its rise, to repeat our point of view, only in the need of ameliorating or betterment of man's spiritual existence.

Again, if philosophy has its rise in the ethical evaluation of the self, we cannot pass over in this connection the question of values and its bearing on the nature of philosophy itself. The question of values, specially of moral values, is one of the principal determinants of the currents of modern philosophy. The Indian conception of the origin of philosophy, no less than that of Spinoza, Kant or Schopenhauer in Europe, is an anticipation of the present-day doctrine of values, which seems to cover and interpret all possible problems of philosophy in terms of good and bad; and one can predict with no little confidence that all future philosophy will be the philosophy of values. Now if that be so and if it is also evident that all values are after all subjective, that is, have meaning and importance only in relation to the self which evaluates things by reference to itself, our proposition that an articulate philosophy has its source more properly in moral evaluation than in mere intellectual curiosity or suspension of judgment or in dry and abstract logicism, stands the test of time and reason; and we venture to declare it against Russell's position that "the philosophy therefore, which is to be genuinely inspired by the scientific spirit, must deal with somewhat dry and abstract matters, and must not hope to find an answer to the practical problems of life"—(Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 40). The present-day philosophy of values certainly brings out more explicitly what was lying implicit on all philosophical inquiry; and in view of this we may observe that the philosophy of values is but "a new name for some old ways of thinking." Its special importance consists in indicating that the ethical values are not simply the inspiration of philosophy but also the crowning of it. The distinction between what is factual and what is ideal can never be an absolute one. The relation between the factual and the ideal is grossly misconceived if the problems of

the life and universe are considered apart from values and if the values are left over as something consequential; but the real situation seems to be that "moral experience and the moral order of which we are conscious, are part of the material which we have to take into account before we have a right to accept any philosophical theory or to adopt it as an adequate point of view for the interpretation of reality as a whole." (Dr. Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 501.)

HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA

STRAY THOUGHTS

A Sunless Day

It was a holiday and I wanted to enjoy it. It proved otherwise. I opened my eyes with the lark but did not like to come out of my warm room. Streaks of morning rays entered through the window chinks to tell me that the world was astir with life and that I was getting behind time. A long night's composure in a solitary room with nothing else to think of induced in me a vein of idle imaginings. I had no idea that the trifling incidents of my uneventful life of which I had forgotten everything had left some unconscious impressions in me. They arose in my mind with bewildering swiftness and for sometime I could not disentangle myself from their association. At last I leapt from my bed and stood on my legs.

I was surprised to find that the sun was not yet up. I searched for him in the sky but found no trace of him and wondered where he could be. Was he detained in the other world where his services were requisitioned after the usual hours. There was a vacancy in the upper regions. The shooting twigs of leaves on the tree-tops looked pale and motionless. The winged creatures of the air flew about the place with subdued mirth. The morning breeze was not pregnant with the incense of fresh-blown blossoms. The village river was gliding on smoothly but a sympathetic heart might easily detect that her naked bosom heaved tremulously at the cheerless aspect of the sky. The dewy drops on the tiny grass-blades had lost their lustrous whiteness and looked opaque. The blue eyes of little children, beautiful in their innocence, did not reflect the light of the heaven.

My mind grew dark. It was a holiday, no doubt, but not a day for mirth.

Rashranjan Basu

AN IMPERIAL ACHIEVEMENT

BILLINGHAM AS A BASIS OF EMPIRE

The Empire is becoming conscious of itself as a unit in the world, as a factor in world history. Most people are learning to think of all parts of the Empire, including the United Kingdom, as the parts of an economic whole. They have not yet, however, given a form to this idea. It has yet to be given practical effect. But the new idea of Empire is steadily gaining adherents.

There can be no real fortune for an Empire which is uncertain as to its food supply. Before the Empire can take that true place destined for it, it is essential to know that in the last resort the Empire is self-supporting in the all-important matter of food. The British Empire can go forward with the knowledge that its plans for being self-supporting are extremely well advanced. As regards this matter of the food supply we are taking a most energetic course. The process of applying fertilisers to the soil has been developed. The great synthetic fertiliser plant at Billingham in Co. Durham, is indeed one of the most famous triumphs not merely of British but of Imperial industrial enterprise.

It is a triumph because the fertiliser industry is one of the biggest scientific developments of recent times, and one in which Britain has played a most active and honourable part. During the latter half of the nineteenth century it was more and more clearly realised that the future progress of humanity depended upon the discovery of a suitable fertiliser. The use of certain natural deposits and composts was no real solution of the problem of future foodstuffs. The supply of them was strictly limited and must in time be exhausted as inevitably as must the natural fertility of the soil itself. It was clear that

some sort of fertiliser must be invented which drew upon the infinite source of the air—and of that compound of it, nitrogen, which most affects the soil. Sir William Crookes put the matter in a nutshell when he said that the progress of human civilisation must cease unless man learnt how to fix nitrogen from the air.

The fixation of nitrogen from the air, the fixation of it in the form of fertlisers—this is the work of Billingham, this is the work which has been in progress since 1919. In the words of the chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries—"Our programme is the ambitious one of making the Empire self-supporting in the fields of nitrogenous and other fertilisers. But the programme is even more far-reaching; it aims at co-operating, with the agricultural experts of the Empire in determining by experiment, and illustrating by demonstration, the maximum economic use of all fertilisers.

"From 1921 to 1926," said Lord Melchett when speaking of the future of Billingham, "the world production of nitrogen has doubled itself, and we may conclude that the future annual increase will be at the rate of about 10% per annum. To maintain this annual increase will mean an increased output annually of from 125,000 tons of nitrogen upwards. We ourselves are doing our best to take our place in meeting the increasing demand."

The plant at Billingham before the end of 1929 will be producing 2,500 tons of products per day, a large percentage of which is in the form of sulphate—a yearly total of our three quarters of a million tons. If the ammonia building compels most admiration from the point of view of mechanical magic it is probably the sulphate plant which perhaps appeals most vividly to the eye. The finished product—sulphate of ammonia—comes pouring through the roof and piles in pyramids on the floor with a steady hiss of falling crystals. Higher and higher grows the white pyramid and still higher until its removal—when another takes its place. In colour, in fineness, in density

Billingham sulphate of ammonia never varies. You can tell it anywhere and you can tell its effect also. Wherever it is strewn it fertilises. It makes a finer, richer crop.

Billingham is making the Empire self-supporting in this vital matter of nitrogen fertilisers. It is giving the Empire a foundation of security as regards the food supply. On this foundation we can build a unit, an economic unit, of greater power and greater influence than the world has ever seen. The achievement of Billingham is a rock on which we may safely build.

JULIAN HALL.

LOVE IS LIFE

I.

Twin sister thou of life, O Love,
To life is veiled thy face,
Untouch'd thou art by mind and sense
Of my grief-laden race.
In heart I feel I live in thee,
—Is thy embrace a dream ?
Ah ! no, thy smile peeps through hate-cloud
—A sweet, unvision'd gleam !
O how can I with thee unite—
And feel I live a life—
A life beyond this death, called life
—A life unlived in strife.
An endless strife this life I live
—One lives, another dies
Night dies, lives day, joy dies, lives pain,
From pain joy-songs arise.
Of life and death the wheel goes round.
—That *was* is life—a bound re-bound !
And change is pain and life is change,
And Love is Love and joy—how strange !
In Loves sweet phases peace was strife
And strife is peace and death is life.
O, kill me love and make me thine
All dark in me in Love all shine.

II.

O Love, within me when I love
I find three tyrants there.
Their names ? One's Greed to make fresh gains,
To lose my gain the Fear,

The other sits in gorgeous state,
  Her rule can none withstand,
Her name's Desire to paint with self
  The world by wave of wand.
O Love, but cast thy magic eye
  On ruins of heart—that's me,
And raise a palace for thy self,
  These ruins so none shall see.
In wonder may I lay me down
  Within thy magic hall,
In silent rapture may I view
  Thy self in me and all !
My greed be Love, my fear be love,
And Thou Desire, below above !

III.

O why createst Thou this all,
  O why preservest life,
And why thou wavest killing hand—
  O why this endless strife ?
O wash mine eyes with love that's Thee
And life sweet Love is, was, shall be.

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI.

CATEGORIES OF SOCIETAL SPECULATION IN EUR-AMERICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

From Herder to Sorokin (1776-1928)

1920. March-May. **Lavergne**: *L'Annee Politique francaise et etrangere* (French and Foreign Political Year).

He considers the parliaments of to-day to be defective for two reasons.

First, the legislators are ignorant of economic and social questions. Secondly, the *corps sociaux* (social bodies) are not integrated in the state. The professors and engineers possess hardly any political voice. And while the state oppresses the individual, the individual oppresses the state. The individual has been saved by universal suffrage. It is now time to endow the social groups with authority.

Professional representation may correct the abuses of the modern parliamentary systems. According to Lavergne, three different ideas are involved in the concept of professional representation. First, it may imply the representation of professional interests. This may be either (*i*) individualistic, for instance, when the principle of "universal suffrage" is enjoyed by electors not territorially (*i.e.*, as inhabitants of districts, provinces, etc.), but as agriculturists, commercial people and members of the other professions, or (*ii*) syndicalistic, *i.e.*, associational by which the electors vote not as individuals but as members of professional unions or groups. Secondly, professional representation may imply the representation of technical skill or professional technique, *e.g.*, of the artisan, the engineer, the scholar, etc. And in the third place, it may imply the representation (competency) of efficiency or social values, *e.g.*,

such as are embodied in persons "sufficiently educated," "who possess real education and the maximum of personal disinterestedness," *e.g.*, scientific associations and so forth. The third item which assigns importance to the men of science had been emphasized by **Renan** in *Reforme Intellectuelle et Morale.*

Lavergne strongly recommends the reconstruction of both houses, the *Chambre* and the *Senat,* on the professional basis thus explained.

Each house is to be composed of members representing half and half; the interests of the individuals as well as of the groups. The groups or social bodies would be (*i*) scientific associates, (*ii*) economic associates, and (*iii*) associates of general interest.

There will thus be three different kinds of universal suffrage in operation. First is the one with which the world is familiar and this in regard to the representation of individual interests. Secondly, there will be the corporate suffrage comprising the economic and scientific associates. Finally the social suffrage would touch the associates of general interest. Parliament thus reconstituted would thus be at once territorial and professional.

The idea of professional groups and progressional representation is to be seen in **Martin**: *L'Organisation professionalle,* (professional organization), 1905.

All the members of a profession in every region ought to be organized as units for the purposes of public life, says he. The electoral and constitutional regime of the country might be reformed on that basis. The interdependence of two persons functioning in the same industry is more intimate than that of two inhabitants of the same place. It would be natural if the professional groups were represented in the councils of the state.

An extremely idealistic scheme of parliamentary reorganization on the professional basis was furnished by **Benoist** in *La Crise de l'Etat moderne* (The Crisis of the Modern State), 1897.

According to him the universal suffrage ought to be the basis of the modern state, and the professions should be the basis of the constituency. For a *Chambre* of 500 members he

would, according to the French populations of 1893, therefore grant 225 seats to the cultivators (at a time when they have only 38 places), 164 to the industrial classes (at a time when they have only 45), 17 to transport, 48 to commerce and so forth. The liberal professions should in his calculation get only 13 seats (while they actually possess 196), the public administrates only 8 (while they actually possess 43), etc. But in several articles contributed to the *Echo de Paris* during 1926 Benoist criticizes his own scheme of 1897 as being too "quantitative" without reference to quality. "It was contented with counting, it did not weigh."

1926. **Schnee**: *German Colonisation. Past and Future.* An Ex-Governor of German colonial Africa publishes this book in England and has it armed with a foreword by W. H. Dawson, the British German expert. Schnee seeks to prove that the argument of alleged maladministration on which the Peace of Versailles robbed Germany of her colonies is unsupported by facts. The colonies should therefore be restored to Germany as a "mandatory" under the League of Nations, *cf.* **Schacht**: *Neue Kolonial Politik* (New Colonial Policy), 1926.

1927. **Lautand** *and* **Poudeux**: *La Representation Professionalle* (Professional Representation).

The French Revolution (1789) established *parliamentarisme* in France on the British model. Parliamentarism has been established in other countries of Europe during the nineteenth century. In the meantime, as says **See** in *Les Origines du Capitalisme Moderne.* "Origins of Modern Capitalism" (1926) the industrial revolution has given rise to the "working men's question" in the place of the eighteenth century "problem of the peasant." The working class question has led to the "syndicalist" (trade union) movement which according to **Benoist** *in L'Organisation du Travail,* "Organization of Labour," is not an entity within the framework of the state but stands beside it, facing it, nay, in opposition to it. Hence the *crise de l'Etat moderne* (crisis of the modern state).

Since the days of **St. Simon** there has been no end of criticism of parliamentarism, *i.e.*, of "purely political institutions." Especially during the post-war period the critiques are legion in every country. The very fact that the British Labour Party has to interfere in politics shows that even in England, the "mother of parliaments," parliament has become "relatively impotent." The "purely political institutions" are in capable of solving the economic problems. Hence the attempts in different countries to try "other forms" of government in the place of "parliamentary democracy," *viz.* (1) the dictatorship of a class *e.g.*, in Russia, (2) the dictatorship of an individual, *e.g.*, in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland and Greece, (3) the parliamentary system "tempered by the military dictatorship," devoid in any case of democratic government, *e.g.*, in Germany. As regards the "methods" of government, one can notice in most of these dictatorships the creation of "professional representation" *by the side* of the parliament which they have "strangled but not radically suppressed."

The fundamental problem consists in translating the social and economic revolution of the nineteenth century into the political constitutions. "An economic and social 1789" is the objective. Parliamentary facts and ideas are to be harmonized with the idea of association and the syndical (trade union) fact. Further, the idea and fact of multiplicity of corporate groups are to be harmonized with the idea and fact of the unity of the state.

The Political Revolution of 1789 has had its expression in the universal suffrage, representation of parties and of multiple opinions. The industrial revolution which has given birth to modern capitalism ought to have its own political expression, and that is the professional representations, the representation of efficiency, interest and profession. There are two forms in which it is likely to embody itself: (1) that of mere consultative committees without sovereign powers, (2) a representative system based on new orders or types of constituency enjoying

powers of sovereignty through the parliaments. The first form, that of a committee of experts is, however, not to be regarded as deserving the name of genuine professional representation. Because, these experts do not possess any delegation or mandate from their organizations. Without delegation there is no representation.

The *Reichswirtachaftsrat* (Imperial economic council) established by Bismarck was a mere council of experts. By the Weimar Constitution (1919) according to which the German Republic of to-day is being governed, the *Reichswirtschaftsrat* was to have been developed into a veritable Economic Parliament. But it has in the course of five or six years (1925) degenerated again into the old Bismarckian assembly of experts dependent on the Reichstag as well as the government. The consultative commission of Tchechoslovakia (1919), the Economic Council of Poland (1925), the Higher Council of National Economy in Italy (1923-1925), the Economic Council of Japan are likewise consultative bodies.

The National Economic Council of France (1925) is also mainly a *laboratorie de etudes economique* (laboratory of economic studies) with the right to examine certain problems, suggest solutions and transmit them to the government and the legislature.

The Council of National Economy in Spain (1924) has a more ambitious programme, approaching that of the economic parliament. The Higher Council of National Economy in Soviet Russia is not so much a parliament as an executive,—a commissariat controlling the industry of the entire system of Soviets.

It is clear that these councils are not economic parliaments. But they have already demonstrated, acco rding to the authors, that the Marxian doctrine of "class-struggle" is superannuated and bids fair to be replaced by a new system. The world is getting used everywhere to the system of corporate associations that rise step by step from the small local group to the

federations and to the national confederations. We have thus the "economic federalism" foreseen by Paul-Boncour in his book of that name (1900), according to which the social, regional and corporate groups would re-conquer the fullness of their anatomy, suppressed as they have been under the centralized state. In his judgment this would give rise to "Economic decentralization" which, based as it is on the sovereignty of the syndicates or trade unions, is even more opportune than the political decentralization longed for by **Barrek, Maurras** and **Brun;** because it is the professional groups that are the most diverse in their tendencies and vary according to the complexity of economic facts themselves.

The councils are to collaborate with the executive in matter of executing the laws, as **Paul-Baoncour** suggests. The authors do not want the "economic councils" to possess sovereignty even in part, which ought to belong exclusively to parliament. The councils are not to usurp the functions of parliament. As Bougle says: "a professional parliament replacing the parliament elected by the majority is almost inconceivable."

But there are theorists in favour of a real economic parliament, *i.e.*, a parliament elected by strictly professional representation. To-day **Lavergne** (see above) is one of the keenest advocates of this system which was sponsored a generation ago by Benoist in *La Crise de l'Etat moderne* (1897).

Race Questions.

1907. Japanese-Canadian agreement limits Japanese immigrants in Canada to 400 persons a year.

"Gentlemen's agreement" compels Japan not to grant passports for U.S.A. to labourers.

1910. Indian immigrants are not admitted in Canada except by "continuous journey" from India,—a prohibitive

ruling because there is no direct steamship between India and Canada.

Levy-Bruehl: *Les Functions mentales dans les societies inferieures* (Mental Functions in inferior or primitive societies): The mental processes of "primitives" do not coincide with those of the advanced moderns. The old belief in the identity of the "human mind" cannot be maintained. He criticises the traditional (English) anthropological theory of the animism as unscientific. Human aggregations may differ profoundly in their construction and as a consequence their higher mental aspirations will also present corresponding differences; comparative study of the various types of collective mentality is just as indispensable to anthropology as comparative anatomy and physiology are to biology.[1]

1911. Universal Races Congress: (London).[2]

1911. **Boas** (1858-) American: *Mind of Primitive Man*: He challenges the "raciological interpretation of culture and politics." The inherent superiority of any race cannot be demonstrated biologically. The doctrine of alleged "gifted races" cannot stand critical examination. There is no necessary connection between anatomical features and mental faculty. No direct relation between physical habitat and mental endowment can be established.

1917. Immigration Act unconditionally forbids the immigration into U.S.A. of "labourers" from Asia (minus China and Japan provided against separately) by latitude and longitude.[3]

1918. **Grant**. *Passing of the Great Race*: He interprets European history in terms of race. Pure-blond superrace is his ideal.

[1] Translated under the chauvinistic title *How Natives Think*. London, 1926. A companion volume to this by the same author is available in English as *Primitive Mentality*, 1923.

[2] Spiller: *Race Problems*, London, 1912.

[3] On these chauvinistic exclusion laws see the chapters on "Americanization" in Sarkar's *Futurism of Young Asia* (1922).

1920. **McDougall** (1871-): *Is America safe for Democracy ?* Nordic superiority is his race fetish.

1924. **Hankins** (1877-) American: *Racial Basis of Civilisation*: He vigorously attacks the doctrines of race-superiority embodied in Aryanism, Gobinism, Teutonism, Celticism, Anglo-Saxonism and Nordicism but establishes inequality between races with reference to particular qualities. He objects to imputing superiority to "individuals" on the strength of the group to which they belong and discusses the nature and extent of the differences between races with respect to these qualities which are important for the higher cultural activities. According to him racial differences are to be those of degree rather than of kind. In his judgment inter-racial comparisons such as are entirely fair and absolutely conclusive do not yet exist.

1926. In August the first Pan-Asian congress sits at Nagasaki. Propagandists from China, Siam, Korea, the Philippines, Japan and India take part as delegates. Equality of races, abrogation of unilateral treaties, emancipation of Asian peoples from the yoke of foreigners and other items form the subject of resolutions. Something like an Asiatic League of Nations is projected.[4]

This non-official meeting in the Far East is followed in November of the same year by an official (?) Congress held at Odessa in Russia in which the statesmen and ambassadors of Russia, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China take part. A Pan-Oriental League has been established with the object of promoting united defence against aggressors.

1927. **Heyking**. *La Conception de l'Etat et l'Idee de la cohesion Ethnique*: (The conception of the state and the idea of ethnic cohesion). He condemns the *snobisme rasiste* (racial snobbism), *i.e.*, the cult of ethnical nationalism from the standpoint of public law and international law. This racialism is, however, the production of the Treaty of Versailles

[4] Jung: *L'Islam et l'Asie*, Paris, 1927.

which has created the so-called nationality-state and along with them the minority-question. The new ethnical conception of the state is opposed to the traditional conception which considers the state to be an organization of public law. It is according to this law that Great Britain, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France and Russia have been going on. All these states are composite in the sense of racial diversity and yet none of them have cared to create these new-fangled theories of race, minority, etc. Racial intolerance should disappear as religious intolerance has done.

1927-28. The Indo-South African Agreement relieves to a certain extent the tension created by the Anti-Asiatic Bill of South Africa (1926). But some fundamental problems remain where they were, *e.g.*, those in regard to (1) the prohibition of Indian immigration, (2) the categorical refusal of franchise to the Indian settlers, and (3) the exclusion of Indian settlers from social life on the ground of colour.[5]

BENOYKUMAR SARKAR

[5] See "India's South African Question" in Sarkar: *Greetings to Young India*, (Calcutta, 1927).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHELLEY

It has to be borne in mind that though Godwin may have furnished Shelley with reasoned arguments many of which are practically used by Shelley in his *Queen Mab*, the intensity of his passionate attacks on the institutions of Church and State mainly owes its existence to the unhappy episode in his life connected with the dissolution of his engagement with Harriet Grove owing to his heterodox opinions. Shelley reverts to this incident which caused him poignant suffering in a number of letters of December, 1810, and January and April of 1811. We clearly notice how Shelley was led to become a sworn enemy of every form of bigotry, intolerance and persecution. "I burn with impatience for the moment of the dissolution of intolerance." "Down with Bigotry! Down with Intolerance."[1] "But that which injured me shall perish! I even now by anticipation hear the expiring yell of intolerance!"[2]

"Yet here, I swear—and as I break my oaths, may Infinity, Eternity blast me—here I swear that never will I forgive intolerance! It is the only point on which I allow myself to encourage revenge; every moment shall be devoted to my object, which I can spare; and let me hope that it will not be a blow which spends itself, and leaves the wretch at rest,—but lasting, long revenge! I am convinced, too, that it is of great disservice to society.*** Oh! how I wish that I were the avenger!—that it were mine to crush the demon; to hurl him to his native hell, never to rise again, and thus to establish for ever perfect and universal toleration, I expect to gratify some of this insatiable feeling in poetry. You shall see—you shall hear—how it has injured me. She is no longer mine! She abhors me as a sceptic, as what *she* was before! Oh, bigotry!

[1] Letter to Hogg of 20th December, 1810.

[2] Letter to Hogg of 26th December, 1810.

When I pardon this last, this severest of thy persecutions, may Heaven (if there be wrath in Heaven) blast me!" [1]

After dwelling at some length on his deep love for Miss Grove and the impossibility of forgetting her, of forsaking one whom he loved so intensely even though she was lost to him for ever, gone for ever, one whom he would have followed to the end of the earth, Shelley adds—"I will crush intolerance. I will, at least, attempt it. To fail even in so useful an attempt were glorious!" [2]

"Hideous, hated traits of Superstition. Oh! Bigots, how I abhor your influence." [3]

"I can scarcely set bounds to my hatred of intolerance." [4]

Sufficient emphasis has not been placed on these highly suggestive utterances of Shelley which have their bearing on his uncompromising attitude to intolerance and persecution as reflected in *Queen Mab*.

Shelley's views on government may be summed up thus:

"The benefit of the governed is the origin and meaning of government." "The goodness of a Government consists in the happiness of the governed. If the governed are wretched and dissatisfied, the government has failed in its end. It wants altering and mending." But, after all, "government is an evil; it is only the thoughtlessness and vices of men that make it a necessary evil. When all men are good and wise, government will of itself decay." "Government has no rights; it is a delegation from several individuals for the purpose of securing their own. It is therefore just only so far as it exists by their consent, useful only so far as it operates to their well-being. If these individuals think that the form of government which they or their forefathers constituted is ill adapted to produce their happiness, they have a right to change it. Government

[1] Letter to Hogg of 3rd January, 1811.
[2] Letter to Hogg of 6th January, 1811.
[3] Letter to Hogg of 14th January, 1811.
[4] Letter to Hogg of 28th April, 1811.

is devised for the security of Rights. The rights of man are liberty, and an equal participation of the commonage of Nature. As the benefit of the governed is, or ought to be, the origin of government, no man can have any authority that does not expressly emanate from *their* will."

"The majority of every country have a right to perfect their government."

"All have a right to an equal share in the benefits and burdens of Government. Any disabilities for opinion imply, by their existence, bare-faced tyranny on the side of Government." "Government cannot make a law; it can only pronounce that which was the law before its organization, *viz.*, the moral result of the imperishable relations of things." "The government of a country ought to be perfectly indifferent to every opinion." "A Christian, a Deist, a Turk, and a Jew, have equal rights." "The only use of government is to repress the vices of man."[1] "Constitution is to government what government is to law." According to his idea of a constitution, "the nations of England and Ireland have no constitution." "It is fit that the governed should enquire into the proceedings of government." "Government,[2] as it now subsists, is perhaps the most expensive engine devised as a remedy for the imperfections of society and may be distributed into two parts"—the fundamental and the accidental. From the first part results whether a state is democratical, or aristocratical, or despotic, or a combination of all these principles. The second part relates to Constitution and Law and law may be considered, simply—"an opinion regulating political power." "The only defensible intention of law, like that of every other human institution, is very simple and clear—the good of the whole."

Shelley seems to have cared little for political shibboleths

[1] Declaration of Rights.
[2] Government by Juries.

"I am no aristocrat," he says, "nor any "*crat*" at all; but vehemently long for the time when man may *dare* to live in accordance with *Nature* and Reason, in consequence (perhaps the right word is *consonance*) with Virtue...to which I firmly believe that Religion, its establishments, Polity, and its establishments, are the formidable, though destructible, barriers." [1]

"Perhaps you will say," he says in another letter,[2] "that my Republicanism is proud; it certainly is far removed from pot-house democracy, and knows with what smile to hear the servile applauses of an inconsistent mob. But though its checks could feel without a blush the hand of insult strike, its soul would shrink neither from the scaffold nor the stake, nor from those deeds and habits which are obnoxious to slaves in power. My Republicanism, it is true, would bear with an aristocracy of chivalry and refinement before an aristocracy of commerce and vulgarity; not, however, from pride, but because the one I consider as approaching most nearly to what man ought to be."

Again, "I certainly am a resolved[3] republican (if the word applies), and a determined sceptic; but although I think their reasonings very defective, I am clearly aware that the noblest feelings might conduct some few reflecting minds to Aristocracy and Episcopacy. Hume certainly was an aristocrat, and Locke was a zealous Christian."[4]

Religion, Shelley held, was intimately connected with politics and in that connection he wrote[5] to Miss Hitchener that the "empire of terror is established by Religion, Monarchy is its prototype, Aristocracy may

[1] Letter to Miss Hitchener, June 25, 1811.

[2] Letter to Hogg, February 7, 1813.

[3] *Cf.* "Mr. Paine's arguments are also unanswerable; a pure republic may be shown, by inferences the most obvious and irresistible, to be that system of social order the fittest to produce the happiness and promote the genuine eminence of man." (A Proposal for Putting Reform to the Vote).

[4] Letter to Hogg, December 3, 1852.

[5] Letter to Elizabeth Hitchener, July 25, 1811.

be regarded as symbolizing with its very essence. They are mixed: one can now scarce be distinguished from the other; and equality in politics, like perfection in morality, appears now far removed from even the visionary anticipations of what is called 'the wildest theorist.' I, then, am wilder than the wildest."

"Take the best aristocrat. He monopolizes a large house, gold dishes, glittering dresses; his very servants are decked in magnificence. * * Having once established the position that a state of equality (if attainable) were preferable to any other, I think that the unavoidable inference must induce us to confess the irrationality of aristocracy."[1]

Shelley was in favour of the abolition of the regal and the aristocratical branches of the English constitution as symbols of its childhood.[2] Stronger is his condemnation of the *new* aristocracy created by wealth.[3]

Interest in Current Politics.

Religion and politics are the subjects on which Shelley's attention became mainly concentrated. He took a deeper interest in speculation about these all-absorbing themes. Yet in his prose writings he gives ample evidence of his practical common sense as a writer on these subjects. His letters are full of references to current political affairs, both English and continental. The political condition of Ireland specially roused his ardent sympathies. He writes on the prospect of a Republic in Mexico, gives details in one[4] of his letters of rumours of a revolution in Spain resulting in the massacre of the King and murder of seven thousand insurgents of the popular party by the Inquisition, refers in another[5] to the state of things in France and to the Greeks and the

[1] Letter to Eliz. Hitchener, August 10, 1821.

[2] "A Proposal for Putting Reform to the Vote" (1817).

[3] Cf. "An Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte" (1817) section VIII.

[4] Letter to Thomas Love Peacock, January 26, 1819.

[5] Letter to Clara Mary Jane Clairmont, December 31, 1821.

massacres at Smyrna and Constantinople, to the Neapolitans and the Piedmontese,[1] to the wonderful revolution in Greece[2] and the attitude of Russia, Austria and England in the struggle of Greece for independence (for which we may also mention his *Hellas*), and to Italian[3] politics.

He eagerly asks for news of Naples and Neapolitan affairs and founds his hope not on the brutal populace of the city of Naples but on the cultivators of the soil "whom a sudden and great impulse might awaken into citizens and men, as the French and Spaniards have been awakened, and may render instruments of a system of future social life before which the existing anarchies of Europe will be dissolved and absorbed." Even the Austrians who are strong men and well disciplined and may possibly possess more individual excellence will be as mere chaff before the storm when the Spirit of Regeneration is once abroad. He indulges in speculation as to the political move likely to be made by Lombardy and Germany and refers to the note sent by the British Ministry to the allied sovereigns. "Even the unprincipled Castlereagh," Shelley adds, "dared not join them against Naples, and ventured to condemn the principles of their alliance ; saying as much as to forbid them to touch Spain or Portugal."[4]

Even India attracted his attention as we find from his letter of (probably) 11th January, 1822, to Peacock in which he says—"I wish I had something better to do than furnish this jingling food for the hunger of oblivion (referring to his *Adonais* and *Hellas*), called verse, but I have not ; and since you give me no encouragement about India, I cannot hope to have." On this Peacock's note runs thus—"He had expressed a desire to

[1] Letter to Peacock, March 21, 1821.

[2] Letters of September 14 (to Horace Smith) and April 2 and December 11 to Clara Mary J. Clairmont), 1821.

[3] Letter to Mary Shelley, July 23, 1820.

[4] Letter to Clara M. J. Clairmont of (18th February, 1821, the date being Professor Dowden's suggestion).

[4] Ingpen's Letters of P. B. Shelley, Vol. II, p. 929, foot-note.

be employed politically at the court of a native prince, and I had told him that such employment was restricted to the regular service of the East India Company."

These details prove not only that Shelley's political philosophy was not a mere matter of abstract speculation but also that his political interests and sympathies were not confined to his own country. Shelley was anything but insular in spirit and presents a sharp contrast to Tennyson. We do not come across in Shelley's writings intense but narrow patriotism. This is due not to his hatred of England and his revolt against the prevailing political and social order in his country which he was never tired of condemning from a sincere and passionate conviction that this order was at the very root of the enormous evils from which his age suffered terribly. It is rather due to his world-embracing outlook on life. He says—"I write now not only with a view for Catholic Emancipation but for universal emancipation; and this emancipation, complete and unconditional, that shall comprehend every individual of whatever nation or principles, that shall fold in its embrace all that think and all that feel." All reforms must, he adds, be "preparatory to the great and lasting one which shall bring about the peace, the harmony, and the happiness of Ireland, England, Europe, the World.[1] He denounces with equal vehemence "the present system of intellectual slavery" as that of political or social slavery. He recommends intellectual resistance as essential to the introduction of the millennium of virtue. Though as a speculative political enthusiast Shelley is an out-and-out revolutionary, when discussing practical politics he is decidedly more sober and his preference is then for constitutional as against revolutionary and disorganising schemes. This becomes significantly evident in his "Proposal for putting Reform to the Vote" where, for instance, in recommending Annual Parliaments he observes that its adoption

[1] "Address to the Irish People."

"would enable men to cultivate those energies on which the performance of the political duties belonging to the citizen of a free state as a rightful guardian of its prosperity essentially depends; it would familiarize men with liberty by disciplining them to an habitual acquaintance with its forms. Political institution is undoubtedly susceptible of such improvements as no rational person can consider possible, so long as the present degraded condition to which the vital imperfections in the existing system of Government has reduced the vast multitude of men, shall subsist. The securest method of arriving at such beneficial innovations, is to proceed gradually and with caution; or in the place of that order and freedom which the Friends of Reform assert to be violated now, anarchy and despotism will follow."

This is sound common sense in politics. It is sufficient to indicate that his grand visions regarding emancipated humanity were tempered with moderation and balance of judgment.

But Shelley was not interested alone in European politics. He never lost contact with what was happening in his own country and it will be clear from even the little that I am going to point out next to what extent this so-called idealist and dreamer gave his anxious attention to a detailed study of political and economic questions affecting the destiny of the English people of his day.

Current Politics of England.

In his letter of 6th November, 1819, from Florence to John and Maria Gisborne, Shelley shows how he attempted to keep himself in close touch with current English politics. He gives here his views on the national debt of England, public credit, national expenses and revenue, reduction of the interest, reduction of income of fund-holders, need for army organisation and imminent danger of a bloody struggle between the people and the government.

On November 3, 1819, Shelley sent to Leigh Hunt a long letter (which, however, was not printed by Hunt) containing

his arguments against the unjust prosecution of Richard Carlile, for publishing [1] a blasphemous libel in "Paine's Age of Reason" and Palmer's "Principles of Nature," who was sentenced in a heavy fine and three years' imprisonment. After referring to the enormous outrages inflicted on the people of England and discussing the merits of the case and the sham nature of the trial by jury in Carlile's case, Shelley adds—"Tyrants, after all, are only a kind of demagogues. They must flatter the Great Beast." Then he gives a list of urgently needed reforms—"Economy, retrenchment, the disbanding of the standing army, the gradual abolition of the National Debt by some just yet speedy and effectual system, and such a reform in the representative system, and such a reform in the representation, as by admitting the constitutional presence of the people in the State may prevent the recurrence of evils which now present us with the alternative of despotism or revolution." As an immediate measure of Reform he advocates Annual Parliaments but universal suffrage in the then unprepared state of public knowledge and feeling he considers to be a measure fraught with peril.[2]

Similarly he says—"It seems to me that things have now arrived at such a crisis as requires every man plainly to utter his sentiments on the inefficacy of the existing religion, no less than political systems, for restraining and guiding mankind. * *

England appears to be in a desperate condition, Ireland still worse: and no class of those who subsist on the public labour will be persuaded that **their** claims on it must be diminished. But the government must content itself with less in taxes, the landholder must submit to receive less rent, and the fund-holder a diminished interest, or they will all get nothing. I once thought to study these affairs, and write or act in them. I am glad that my good genius said, **refrain**—I see little public virtue

[1] Ingpen's Letters of Shelley, Vol. II, p. 736.
[2] Proposal for putting Reform to the Vote.

and I foresee that the contest will be one of blood and gold.[1] * * "

With regard to accumulating public debt Shelley says—"The government which the imperfect constitution of our representative assembly threw into the hands of a few aristocrats, improved the method of anticipating the taxes by loans, invented by the ministers of William III, until an enormous debt had been created.*** The effect of this debt is to produce such an unequal distribution of the means of living, as saps the foundation of social union and civilized life. It creates a double aristocracy, instead of one which was sufficiently burdensome before, and gives twice as many people the liberty of living in luxury and idleness on the produce of the industrious and the poor."[2]

From Aristotle's days all political thinkers have accepted from that father of western systematised thought that politics cannot be divorced from economics and that the cause of most of the revolutions is chiefly struggle for power between economic classes. "Whatever the apparent cause of any riots," says Paine, "may be, the real one is always want of happiness." Communistic ideas in their germ can be traced back to early Christianity and they were developed by the mediaeval peasant revolts. Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke—all emphasize the need for preservation of right relation between property and political power; nay, revolutionary leaders always demand first and foremost equality of property as a *sine quâ non* of political equality. In the 16th century, when modern commercial conditions began to prevail replacing the mediaeval agricultural basis of life, arose the doctrines of Mercantilism with its restrictive policies advocated in England by Dudley North, Josiah Child, and in France by Jean Colbert and in Germany later on by Frederick the Great in the 17th century. In the middle of the 18th century Locke's and Hume's individualism

[1] Letter to Horace Smith, Lerici, June 29, 1822.

[2] "An Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte" (1817).

in politics, economics and ethics opposed state regulation and state interference and favoured free competition giving rise to the views of the French Physiocrats and, in England, to Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations." The Physiocrats were champions of *natural law*[1] and natural order opposed to imperfect and fluctuating rules of existing governments condemned by them as the "positive order." Hence the well-known theory of *laissez faire, laissez passer*. Quesnay (1694-1774), Mercier dela Rivière (1720-1793), Turgot (1727-1781) are too well-known names to require any remarks from me. Franklin in America, Joseph II of Austria, Gustavus III of Sweden, Catherine II of Russia, more or less, adopted their ideas and applied them to the new science of economics which impressed thinking men with the ideas of all social and political facts being linked together by inevitable laws and that the state should respect and safeguard the *natural* rights of the individual and the Sovereign Head should particularly administer judicially and judiciously the *natural* rules of justice and morality, exercising the minimum of direct supervision and meddling restraint both on property and person,, so that men and women may get full scope of utilizing their faculties,[2] opportunities and assets, material and spiritual, for the benefit of each individual unit and of the larger whole. Shelley's political philosophy was largely determined by this mental attitude. "The rights of man, in the present state of society, are only to be secured by some degree of coercion to be exercised on their violator. The sufferer has a right that the degree of coercion employed be as slight as possible" (Declaration of Rights, section VII). Shelley next lays down that every man is entitled to the rights of (1) thinking as his

[1] *Cf.* Paine's "Rights of Man" (pages 61, 63, 152 and 160).

[2] Godwin opens his enquiry in his "Political Justice" by referring to the question as to "how may the security each man ought to possess as to his life, and the employment of his faculties according to the dictates of his own understanding, be most certainly defended from invasion?"

reason directs, (2) unrestricted liberty of discussions, (3) free expression of his thoughts, (4) and universal citizenship. According to him "the Government of a country ought to be perfectly indifferent to every opinion." He therefore advocates "unlimited toleration." He holds at the same time that "before the restraints of Government are lessened, it is fit that we should lessen the necessity for them. Before Government is done away with, we must reform ourselves."

In Article XXVIII he declares that "No man has right to monopolise more than he can enjoy; what the rich give to the poor, whilst millions are starving, is not a perfect favour, but an imperfect right." In his letter to Miss Elizabeth Hitchener (of 10th October, 1811) Shelley hints at his communistic views and proposes to share the estate, which considered in a worldly way is his alone, with all mankind considered as his brethren and sisters and adds "My friend Hogg and myself consider our property as common."

Space does not permit me to more than mention the work done in creating the revolutionary spirit and fostering its growth by the French Encyclopaedists—the 160 contributors to the Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, in 35 volumes, issued between 1751 and 1780, among whom the names of its editor, Diderot, and the general supervisor D'Alembert, of Euler, Marmontel, Voltaire, Montesquieu, D'Holboch, Condorcet, Turgot, and Helvétius are fairly well-known to all of us.

The Encyclopaedie[1] was mainly in favour of replacing theology by science, which, we know, represents the last of the three stages of human progress in Comte's programme. Though somewhat theistic it was avowedly practical and decidedly opposed to Christianity, to Church rule and Church dogma, state despotism, all established and traditional beliefs, and thus frankly materialistic in its main tendency.

[1] *Cf.* Shelley's Letters Nos. 162 and 167 (Mr. Ingpen's ed., Vol. I, pp. 374 and 385, respectively).

In politics it stood for stout opposition to all forms of absolutism [as advocated, for example, by Hobbes in his Leviathan (Part II, Ch. 17) or claimed by the Stuarts in the shape of the Divine Right of Kings or in the Bourbon formula of *L'Etat c'est moi* of Louis XIV] and the aboliton of all prerogatives and privileges (of the Monarch, the Nobility and the Clergy).

The dominant ideas of the Encyclopaedists that largely enter into the French Revolution which in its turn shaped the social and political philosophy of Shelley through the intermediate influence of Willian Godwin, Shelley's preceptor and friend, philosopher and moral guide, may thus be briefly summed up :—

(1) Sovereignty of the People.

(2) Equality of men, all class distinctions being conventional and artificial.

(3) Natural, innate, inalienable liberty of man as man, of person, of thought, speech, belief and the press ; freedom of conscience and absolute toleration.

(4) Society justified only as a device to preserve man's natural and primary rights.

(5) Law equivalent to a collective expression of the general will of all citizens.

(6) No particular form of religion compulsory for man who is free to choose or reject all religious systems unless conducive to his social, political, intellectual and moral life.

(7) Inviolability of property.

(8) Abolition of the monarchy, the nobility, the clergy.

(9) Cosmopolitanism and humanitarianism, defence of the down-trodden, oppressed and submerged classes in any sphere of life, including the family.

In short—" Rejoicing in a new freedom the encyclopaedists were determined to familiarise the younger generation of France with revolutionary ideas in every line " and Shelley was a representative of this generation, and was influenced greatly by the spirit of the Encyclopaedists.

Shelley's early works are so full of these ideas, oftener than not repeatedly introduced into his poems of 1812 to 1819, that I feel it to be quite superfluous to encumber my paper on this part of my thesis with too many quotations for illustrating the points I have just touched upon. I shall, therefore, confine myself to a small number of Shelley's typical utterances. Let me first dispose of Shelley's shorter, but therefore not insignificant, poems making here and there a necessary quotation and then pass on to a very general survey of his longer poems.

(To be continued.)

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

Reviews

Federal Finance in India.—By K. T. Shah, Prof. of Economics, University of Bombay, published by D. B. Taraporewala and Sons, Bombay. Price Rs. 6, pp. 334.

A new book by Prof. Shah is always welcome ; his name itself being a sufficient guarantee for the quality and quantity of information. This book is in fact a series of lectures or essays dealing with the broad principles of federal finance as the goal of India's national development is a federal organisation. As a short treatise on the problems of federalism and the principles underlying the Federal Constitutions in the West, the essays might not be very useful but the suggestive applications of the fundamental principles to judge and improve the present financial relations between the Provincial Governments, the Native States and the Central Federal Government of India show his profound grasp of the subject. Although one may not agree with all his conclusions, still even the warmest advocates of a unitary strongly centralised Government would not fail to realise the enthusiasm he has displayed in the different chapters for eliminating the attendant dangers of a loose federation.

Considering the fact that they were delivered before university students, with the object of enabling them to understand plainly the case for a federal structure of the Central Government in this country, its difficulties and the methods by which these can be alleviated, we heartily recommend the book to all students who wish to acquire an insight into the working of a federal constitution.

Lecture I is devoted to an exposition of the financial relations as between the federations and their component parts. Here is a lengthy review of the constitutional position affecting federal financing in the U. S. A., Dominion of Canada, Germany, Australia and South Africa.

In the second lecture the financial evolution in this country is traced in detail. The haphazard nature of development of financial federalism is pointed out. The author rightly comments on the impossibility of ignoring the Indian States in any final arrangement of Indian Federation.

Prof. Shah discusses what the relationship would be between the Indian States and the Central Government of India in a scheme of Indian Federation. Differing fundamentally from those who consider it an impossibility to completely assimilate the Indian States with the rest of India he proposes to permit the fertilising current of slow federalism to water the whole of the Indian States. Several issues are raised by the

author in this chapter which need more open discussion and thorough treatment. While he proposes to grant equality of status to a few of the bigger Indian States in the matter of Indian Federation the smaller states are to confederate themselves and it it is these confederations that can participate as usual units in the Indian Federation.

Lectures three and four deal with the revenue and expenditure items of the Government of India from the standpoint of federal financing. An ana lytical examination of the different sources of revenue and items of expen diture of the present-day Imperial and Provincial Governments of India is made with a view to point out which sources of revenue can best be declared federal items of revenue and which provincial. The same analysis is extended to the different items of expenditure.

The final lecture deals with the ancillary problems of public finance such as money, banking, currency, audit and accounts. In the last few pages he makes reconstructive suggestions to overcome the difficulties referred to in the previous lectures.

To solve the difficulties of financial adjustment the formation of a Federal Council where every Provincial unit and unit of N. State is given an equal vote is recommended. The basic policy of common subjects can only be altered with its permission. Regrouping of provinces and regrouping of states are essential for the success of this scheme and the Federal Council can be empowered on similar lines which the Federal Council of the present-day German Republic enjoys. The investing of it with powers of dilatory or suspensive veto over the actions of the national Legislative Assembly would doubtless conduce towards more efficient administration.

With the Central Federal Government's expenditure confined to 110 crores of rupees, the provincial expenditure raised to 125 crores of rupees and the Indian States' expenditure estimated at 50 crores, the total expenditure would come up to 285 crores of rupees. Roughly the present-day revenue resources of the three component parts amount on the aggregate to the same figure. To secure the revenue the suggested redistribution of items of revenue is as follows. He wisely rejects a complete system of separation of taxation and recommends that all indirect taxes and a part of the chief direct tax (Income-tax) and death duties would form the revenue items of the Central Federal Governments. Productive public works are to be undertaken. By an extended service on the part of Railways and by undertaking railway insurance scheme by the development of the commercial services of the Post Office and by conducting banking, greater resources can be secured in the near future by the Central Federal Government. To the provinces he would leave direct taxation and the liberty

to tax specially on excise such as tobacco and this would create a deficit in the revenue items which can be covered by subsidies, subventions and contributions granted on some well-known and universally approved principles. Irrigation, Forest, Roads and individual commercial enterprises ought to be made to yield further resources to the Provinces. The claim of the Native States for a share in the subsidies or subventions is admitted. A very careful and detailed scheme of federal finance is thus prsented. As an expert in unravelling intricate financial problems Prof. Shah has won his spurs already and the present book sustains this reputation. Being a contribution on a topical subject it would easily command the attention of all statesmen who wish to reshape the constitution of the Government of this country. Its theoretical background and its method of collecting and examining a mass of complicated data can afford to be of very great use to students and research workers in the economic field.

B. RAMCHANDRA RAO

"**Indian Practical Banking**"—By O. S. Krishnamurthy; D. B. Taraporewala Sons & Co., Bombay, pp. 137; price Rs. 2.

The task which Mr. Krishnamurthy has set himself is the describing of the day-to day operations of an Indian Joint Stock Bank. A perfectly lucid exposition has enabled him to achieve his task in a commendable manner and if the practical routine described in the book is carefully followed the lay beginner would secure very useful information.

This little brochure can be made more useful by including very suggestive statements of the existing banking law in this country. For instance without mentioning the classical case of Ladbrooke *versus* Todd it is impossible to enable the reader to grasp the significance of the banker's insistence on an introduction before any individual can hope to open a banking account.

Barring the chapters on Bankers' Advances, every other chapter needs more thorough revision and careful treatment. On page 8 he says that banks should publish monthly statements of assets and liabilities, but the possibility of window-dressing balance-sheets would defeat their usefulness. Insistence on publication of weekly averages would have been far more logical. While commenting on the secret reserve he does not draw attention to the possibility of magnifying assets to which some of the unscrupulous banks resort in days of adversity.

At this moment of banking reconstruction in this country, the author

ought to have laid bare the numerous sins of omission and commission on the part of the Indian Joint Stock Banks. No attention has been drawn to the general tendency of over investment in securities which precludes them from converting these assets into ready cash.

There is throughout the brochure a plain exposition of the exact nature of banks' work but the spirit of research ought to have prompted him to make suggestive improvements in banking practice and accounting methods. Only once on p. 46 he makes the suggestion that a special staff for collecting credit information should be appointed It is indeed strange that a practical officer, as he appears to be, has no word on the bank organisation and management. Banking practice after all depends on the technique of bank organisation and the skill of its management. For the beginner with little or no school education the book would be of immense utility.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

Mysteries of The Soul.—By Richard Müller Frinfels. Translated by Bernard Miall. Published by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1929. Price 12*s*. 6*d*. net.

The volume under review is an attempt by the author to present a practical philosophy of life in a number of chapters, the first of which is the metaphysical basis on which the rest of them are grounded as the psychological issues. Though the work cannot claim completeness it is yet an embodiment of the author's experiences of the varied aspects of the psycho-physical life of man, both individual and social. As the author himself prefaces, "By 'mysteries of the soul,' then, we do not mean such sensational results as have been sought or produced by the occultists in their darkness. We shall rather attack problems which are apparently illumined by the light of day, and facts which confront us all in our every-day life; and in so doing we shall try to show that things which are admitted may be very far from being recognised, and that behind what may seem to be the simplest facts of existence the profoundest mysteries may be at work." The author starts by saying that "a belief in the soul is inseparable from man; it follows him wherever he goes, intrudes into his daily activities and even lays claim to be the actual reality" and indicates that if such a belief is gone the entire civilisation crumbles into nothingness. His main thesis is that by soul we are not to mean consciousness but life which is more than consciousness and he supports this conception of soul by reference to the fact that all primitive cultures

identified soul with life, so that "animated" and "alive" are, as conceptions, completely identical. The Greek word *psyche* does not by any means signify merely consciousness but life and the German words *Leben* and *Seele* which stand for the English words "life" and "soul" are interchangeable. Thus according to him "soul" is life, considered in its manifestation as consciousness, though the consciousness is never the soul but only a practical manifestation of the soul, which operates even in unconscious life;" and body which the soul animates is nothing distinct in kind from the soul but is only a correlate of soul in the unity of life.

The author then extends the concept of soul from the individual psychical life to the entire system of the universe and in fact he identifies the soul with the universe which is pervaded by life which is dynamic and purposive. "Thus the problem of the nature of the soul can be solved if at the same time we can solve the problem of the nature of the universe itself—the whole organic and inorganic universe." In this comprehensive sense of the soul the author has embraced the problems of Man and of the world and of the relation between man as an individual conscious centre with a destiny of his own, and the world which partly shapes, and is partly shaped by, man, and finally of God as the epitome of the highest values, which he considers in the last chapter on the Future of Religion. In the chapter on the Individual and his Destiny his main contention is that the individual soul is the architect of his own destiny which is the resultant of the action and reaction between the individual and his environment. By this he does not mean that the man is what he is by the operation of environment without reaction from him as the positivist concept of the *Milieu* indicates, but that the individual makes for himself his own environment and transforms and transfuses it; and this he does by introducing into his environment his own forms of experience,—his style of speech, dress and of art, his vocation, his choice of his sexual mate. His destiny is also determined by his intellect no less than, nay even more, by his impulse.

In the chapters entitled, "A Journey into the Past" and the "Dramaturgy of Life" the author wants to point out that every individual, in order to understand his own nature and his place and destiny in the scheme of the universe, must also understand, compare and contrast his life of childhood in its various stages and its various relations to the world of adults, and thereby learn what he is to-day and how he builds his schools, or churches, or wages war, or controls his household, or in one word how a man is what he is as an inseparable unit among other units which make up the system. This idea he further develops in

its chapter on the "Dramaturgy of Life" where he emphasises that our activities considered individually or socially are but seeming, not real in the same sense in which those of an actor on the stage are seeming, and that it is impossible to draw a hard-and-fast line between what is being or real and what is seeming or unreal. In this way the author has gone on to point out that whether in the life of politics or in art or in religion "we find the same curious theatricality which was at once representation and misrepresentation, being indeed both in inseparable amalgamation." Even he has gone the length of suggesting that "the whole world is truly a Vanity Fair, a place of deceit and imposture;" and has concluded by saying "Have not all the great thinkers indeed, from the authors of the Upanishads and Plato down to Kant and Schopenhauer, to say nothing of many more recent philosophers, always been of the opinion that our so-called reality may be, in its entirety, an illusion?"

In the interesting chapter on the "Americanization of the Soul" the author speaks of the manner in which the Civilisation of Europe is progressing under the lead of America which, the author thinks, is giving us a new human type to which our very being is unconsciously tending. To him "Americanism" stands for a "*psychological notion*" which means "*mutational form* of the human species in general." The author seems to think that "the American is the most accentuated type of the civilised man in general, a type which is appearing everywhere as an international phenomenon typical of the age and which predominates wherever modern life is evolving. And to this idea he is led by his study of the traits of American life, the chief amongst which is the technicalisation or mechanisation of life conditioned by the need of railways, telegraphs, telephones and other mechanical inventions for ease of communication in the comparatively vast expanse of the continent of America. The other trait is the standardisation of life which consists in levelling down of all peculiarities, either of age or of sex or of complexion to one uniformity to which all Americans conform and this standardisation applies not only to manners and customs of men but also to other things and even industrial products. The third trait is impersonalisation of the soul whereby the author means the totality of the unconscious foundations of the soul which seems to have no hold on the external life of the American, either emotional or intellectual, so that it is as changeful as the weather; for the American, the author thinks, lacks in what is called an organic unity of personality. In the sphere of politics as also of art, we have the same tendency in the American to standardisation, technicalisation, quantification and impersonalisation. "And the reason why the

American conditions are so seductive to the rest of the world, and even becoming representative, lies in the fact that even in Europe and elsewhere a related type is emerging which cherishes the same ideals or at all events are yielding to the same suggestion." In the sphere of psychology behaviorism rules all their ideas of psychical processes; in the sphere of industrial psychology Taylorism is the most characteristic form in the sphere of knowledge; pragmatism decides between truth and falsity. Religion of the Americans has never depended on critical perception but always on the suggestibility of their character and has greater hold on adolescents and women who are more suggestible than the rest of the community. But after all the author is not sanguine whether the American type of humanity really represents a higher phase of development, but he suggests that though as an individual the American displays unmistakable signs of retrogression, yet the Americans, considered as a social whole, mark an increased range and acuteness of knowledge and power, but still the author thinks that though there is a tendency in Europe to the Americanisation of the soul, yet it is not necessarily the ultimate goal of our civilisation, that we must pass through it and transcend it, so that new forms of life and ideal may emerge from it.

In the last chapter the author has attacked the problem of the Religion of the Future not by asking which religion is the best but the question of religion itself. Here, after a comparative study of the religions of the East and the West, though superficial and inadequate, he intends to bring out the common property of all religions which he thinks to be the *mythos*. The modern man may not see anything transcendental in the myth in which all religion originated, but the myth had always a meaning without which no religion would have been possible. Even Christianity is no exception to this. The doctrine of Miracles, of Sin and Atonement, and of the sacrificial death of Christ, when shorn of their mythical charm, cannot appeal to the Christian mind. At the same time the myths, as myths, without their ethical and social orientation cannot claim to have anything to do with the origin of any modernised religion. Hence the author thinks that the religion of the future will also have the myths not of the type of the product of imagination, but should represent the symbolic character of all our knowledge of the Universe as a whole. "Hence, the mythos of the coming religion will not be a mythos of the ill-founded and deceptive knowledge but the mythos of a well founded and discerning ignorance." And the new religion, the author thinks, will be a transvaluation of our old values, will not be a view of life isolated from the universe, but of the life which is an integral part of it, "for it is not

we live our life but rather the infinite life lives us, kindles in us the miraculous light of the conscious, *i.e.*, not merely personal consciousness but also universal consciousness in which the ego becomes conscious of the universe, and the universe becomes conscious as the ego." And "the capacities and powers of man may be so increased by co-operation that entirely new relative values may come into existence; so that God as the epitome of the highest values, should be sought not in the beginning of the world, but in the future; so that God *is* not, but is *becoming*." The author thus fits in the doctrine of Panpsychism with a modified form of the doctrine of Emergent Evolution of Alexander in so far as the former has started with life as the basic principle—a gratuitous amalgam of views to which we of course do not subscribe.

The author has to be congratulated on the lucid and chatty style in which he has tried to clarify the "Mysteries of the Soul." Instead of confining himself to abstract thinking he has relieved the abstruseness of the subject by citations from concrete aspects of every-day life and familiar facts of science and history. The book, therefore, interests the reader while it instructs him, and will appeal not simply to the learned few, but also to the lay public who may have interest in the philosophy of life. The translator deserves no mean praise for the racy and unstilted flow of his rendering, making us forgetful that we are reading a translation of a German original.

HARIMOHAN BHATTACHARYYA

The Other Side of Death.—By the Rt. Rev. Bishop C. W. Leadbeater. (Theosophical Publishing House.)

This is the second edition of a very well-known writer on subjects relating to the super-physical aspects of life. The work of Conan Doyle on this subject has been recently drawing considerable attention in the West. Sir Oliver Lodge's book *Raymond* and its sequel also deal with the same subject and should demand very respectful attention, because they contain the deliberate opinion of a well-trained scientist of world-wide reputation. These questions, the survival of human personality after the death of the body, the eternal existence of the life principle, have taken on a new interest for humanity since the terrible slaughter of the Great War. Our human mind is not at all satisfied when told that all these thousands upon thousands of the bravest and finest of our race have simply "gone," have vanished for ever. All great Prophets have told us that death is never the end. In fact, to most

people in the East this is an axiom, a self-evident fact. The Theosophic movement began in the West over fifty years ago on purpose to combat the materialism which threatened at that time to overwhelm the whole world. Among the pioneers of this movement is C. W. L. (as he is affectionately known to his admirers), whose writings are an inexhaustible mine of information on the higher aspects of nature. "The Other Side of Death" gives us an idea of what vistas open out to our souls when we pass out of "Life." Blanco White wrote a fine poem describing "mysterious night" which ended up with the fine line, "If Light can thus deceive, why not then Life?" And this book tells us exactly how "life can deceive" us. It is a fascinating book and should prove of great help to many a stricken heart. How great is the need to-day of such comfort and of the realisation that the dead are *alive* may be seen from the following beautiful story that appeared in a paper some days ago:

One day Jimmy said, "I fought Tommy because he said dead people were dead. Dead people are alive, Miss, aren't they? In our school we pray for my father and all the soldiers who were killed in the war. You can't pray for dead people? My father is alive. Teacher says, I must be good because I want to see his face, when I am alive, after I die. So I fought Tommy."

The world is beginning to realise that there none is "dead." And among those who have helped in this realisation very considerably is Bishop C. W. Leadbeater. He has gone further than most writers on the subject. Myers, Conan Doyle, Sir Oliver Lodge, have just crossed over the threshold of what we call "the next world;" C. W. L. has penetrated much beyond. When first he wrote he was taken as a crazy faddist by many, as a wicked sinner by some; the time is coming when the world shall realise the truth of all he has written and regard him as one of the pioneers of the great movement which is even now leading humanity onwards and upwards.

BOOKWORM

Glimpses.—By T. L. Vaswani. Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras, 1928.

The author has given us a most exquisite treat and revealed glimpses of Truth, Beauty and Goodness for which we feel extremely grateful to him. These musical utterances breathe what is best in the human mind without tiring the reader in the least. The book is fittingly dedicated to Sri Keshava Chandra Sen who wanted to synthe-

tise all that is best in the different scriptures and in this attempt to follow in his wake we can discern no signs of a partial, emasculated view. Christian glorification of poverty has been combined here with the Eastern mysticism and the magic flute of Krishna has been effectively heard by the devout writer who has interpreted it with no uncertain voice. What differentiates him from other writers and places him in a class apart, is his keeping alive to the national cause and not ignoring it in his pursuit of the Universal. He diagnoses the disease from which the body politic is suffering and prescribes the only true remedy—"The Nation needs to-day a message of *Shakti*, of strength that flames as sacrifice." Preaching simplicity and strength, the need of *Tapasya* and *Brahmacharyya*, emphasising the importance of *Shanti* and inner light, the author may not succeed in winning popularity—which is not his quest—and people may fight shy of what they will describe as quietism, but that, we venture to assert, will not detract in the least from the merits of the book and we receive it with joy and offer our thanks for this happy result of an unhappy accident which had kept the author confined to bed for some time and compelled him, in a manner, to pour out his thoughts in writing.

PRIYARANJAN SEN

Ourselves

Dr. Bhagabat Kumar Goswami

The Government of Bengal have sanctioned the appointment of Mahamahopadhyay Dr. Bhagabatkumar Goswami Sastri, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Sanskrit, Hughly College, as Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit in this University for a term of five years in the scale of Rs. 600-50/2-1,000 on an initial salary of Rs. 700 per mensem on the conditions laid down in the rules governing the Professorship. Dr. Bhagabatkumar Goswami Sastri has taken over charge of his duties as the Asutosh Professor of Sanskrit from the 22nd July last.

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Dr. Upendranath Ghoshal

The Syndicate have recommended to the Senate that Dr. Upendranath Goshal, M.A., Ph.D., be appointed a Reader of this University to deliver a course of lectures on "The Ancient Indian Land Revenue System with special reference to the question of ownership of the Soil," on an honorarium of Rs. 1,000.

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Mr. K. M. Pannikar

The Syndicate have recommended to the Senate that Mr. K. M. Pannikar, B.A. (Oxon.), be appointed an honorary Reader of this University to deliver a course of six lectures on "The Growth of British Policy towards the Indian States" and that he be paid travelling expenses.

* * *

Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship in Comparative Religion

The members of the Committee appointed by the Senate to select a candidate for the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship in Comparative Religion for the year 1930-31 has recommended Prof. C. J. Webb, Professor of Philosophy of the Christian Religion in the University of Oxford, for appointment as the Lecturer for 1930-31.

* * *

Tagore Law Lectures for the Year 1930

Dr. Radhabinod Pal, M.A., D.L., has been recommended by the Committee appointed by the Faculty of Law to the Senate to be appointed Tagore Professor of Law for the year 1930 and the subject of his lectures will be "The History of Hindu Law in the Vedic Age and in Post-Vedic Times down to the Institutes of Manu."

* * *

Tagore Law Lectures for the Year, 1931

The following three subjects have been selected for the Tagore Law Lectures for 1931 :—

(1) History of the Development of Hindu Law in British India.

(2) History of the Development of Moslem Law in British India.

(3) The Law relating to Dissolution of Marriage and Judicial Separation in British India.

* * *

A New Ph.D.

Mr. I. Ramkrishna Rao, M.A., has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy on his thesis consisting of six essays relating to diffusion of light and the Raman effect in crystals.

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Mouat Medal

A Mouat Medal has been awarded to Dr. Sarojkumar Das, M.A., Ph.D., on the research work done by him in the third year's term of his Premchand Roychand Studentship in Literary Subjects for the year 1924.

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Mr. Panchanan Mitra

Mr. Panchanan Mitra, Post-Graduate Lecturer in the department of Anthropology and a Ghosh Travelling Fellow for the year 1929-30, who received the appointment of Research Associate in Anthropology on the staff of the Bishop Museum, Honolulu, Hawaii, has spent the period, February 25, 1929, to June 12, 1929, in a survey of Polynesian ethnological collections in the Museum with a view to determining Indian affinities. During this time also he visited the islands of Kauai and Hawaii for field investigations.

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Mahendranath Ray Prize and Medal for 1930

The following subjects were prescribed by the Higher Board of studies in Economics in 1928 :—

(1) Central, Provincial and Local Finance in India to be treated Comparatively ;

(2) Financing of Indian Railways ;
(3) Economic Imperialism in India ;
(4) History of Indian Commerce from 1765 ;
(5) Industrial Development of India ;
(6) The Public Debt of India ;
(7) Banking Law and Practice in India;
(8) Economic Effects of Foriegn Trade in India ;
(9) The National Wealth of India ;
(10) Jute Industry in Bengal.

The latest date for the submission of theses is the 31st July, 1931.

* * *

Students' Welfare Committee

It was resolved by the Students' Welfare Committee in their meeting of the 13th August, 1929,

(*a*) That the authorities in charge of the Colleges, affiliated to the University of Calcutta, be requested to state the steps they are prepared to take to improve the condition of the health of the students as revealed in the report of the Students' Welfare Committee for the year 1928.

(*b*) That the Sub-Committee consisting of the following members be appointed to consider and recommend steps to be taken to improve the health of the students :—

M. N. Banerjee, Esq., C.I.E., B.A., M.R.C.S.
Rai U. N. Brahmachari, Bahadur, M.A., M.D., Ph.D.
Rai Chunilal Bose, Bahadur, C.I.E., I.S.O., M.B., F.C.S.
James Buchanan, Esq., M.A.
A. N. Chatterjee, Esq., M.B.B.S.

* * *

Result of the B.Com. Examination, May, 1929

The number of candidates registered for the B.Com. Examination, held in May, 1929, was 100, of whom 40 passed, 57 failed and 3 were absent. Of the successful candidates, 3 were placed in Class I and 37 in Class II.

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Result of the I. E. Examination, 1929

I. E.—Section A

70 candidates were registered for the whole I. E. Examination, Section A ; 9 were registered for examination in Mathematics only, having already qualified in the other groups, Physics and Chemistry.

Of the 70 registered, 1 was absent, 36 passed in all three groups, 15 were partially successful (9 failing to qualify in Mathematics only, 3 in Chemistry only, 3 in Physics only) and can only be allowed to pass the I. E. Examination after qualifying in these groups, and 3 failed completely.

Of the 8 who appeared in Mathematics only, all qualified, thus completing Section A ; 3 appeared in Chemistry only, and 3 qualified ; 4 appeared in Physics only and 4 qualified.

I. E.—Section B

42 candidates were definitely registered for Section B of the I. E. Examination. 9 were provisionally registered, subject to completing Section A. Of these 8 qualified in Section A and 1 was absent ; the number validly registered was therefore 50 ; of these 25 passed, 25 failed.

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